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
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Page 346, 6th line from bottom, for — read אֱלֹם.

Page 416, note 5, line 4, for אֲדָם, read אֶדָם.

Page 424, line 3, insert comma before letters.

Page 425, line 6, for II., read III.

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Very respectfully,
Edmund A. Park

THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

EVOLUTION AND THE FALL OF MAN.

BY PROFESSOR D. W. SIMON, D.D.

THE chief authority on the theory of evolution, if not its originator, Mr. Herbert Spencer, defines it as follows: "An integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."¹ Among the numerous other definitions that have been proposed, that of Professor Le Conte has found considerable favor: "Continuous progressive change according to certain laws and by means of resident forces."²

Both of them, however, are open to serious criticism. That of Mr. Herbert Spencer specifies only one of the factors of the process, namely, matter; for surely motion, *per se*, is rather a state of matter for which an explanation is needed than itself a cause; besides to postulate that matter in motion should change the direction of its own motion, as it must if heterogeneity is to arise, is implicitly either to endow it with self-changeableness, or to introduce an-

¹ First Principles, p. 396. ² Religion and Science, p. 278.

other cause of change.¹ Besides, further, no mention is made of that which regulates the motion of matter. To attribute both motion and orderliness and aimfulness of motion to matter *per se* is to deny its fundamental characteristic of inertness.

Professor Le Conte's conception of evolution, on the other hand, provides us with resident forces producing, and laws regulating the changes, which constitute the progressive process; but it leaves unmentioned that which is the primary subject of the changes, namely matter.

If the ultimate constitutive factors of the cosmos—factors not further reducible—are matter, energy, and method or law, then some such formula as one of the following would more exactly represent the process of evolution, than the two just criticised: Evolution is an ever-varying integration and disintegration of matter brought about by the action of energy progressively though not uniformly differentiating itself under the regulative control of an immanent idea assuming ever greater complexity. Or, Evolution is a ceaseless differentiation and transformation of energy, giving rise to countless varied relations of matter, now of coherence, then of incoherence, under the control of an incalculably complex, informing, progressive idea.

These definitions relate to the entire process through which the cosmos, so far as it is open to observation, has passed or is passing. Before either of them can be applied to the domain with which we are at present chiefly concerned, it requires very marked differentiation and specialization.

The process of evolution, or, in other words, the process by which the world, with its hills and valleys, its fountains and streams, its lakes and seas, its flora and fauna, has been thus far evolved, is divisible into two great stages, each

¹ In point of fact, "Matter and Motion," later on developed into "Matter, Motion, and Force." See *First Principles*, § 194.

with its own specific characteristics. The first and preliminary stage is the inorganic; the second is the organic; to which Mr. Herbert Spencer adds the superorganic. The question whether or no a real gulf ever existed between the first and second and the second and third of these stages, needing to be bridged over by some sort of creative act, need not now detain us. A view of the process of evolution is quite possible,—let it be here remarked,—which shall eliminate events properly describable as creations, and yet leave room for that conscious freedom of man which is one of the essential presuppositions both of morality and religion.

The inorganic stage falls again into the three divisions; namely, the *physical*, in the narrower sense, with its subdivisions elemental, molecular, and solid; the *chemical*, with its strange anticipations of the higher forms of selection, not to speak of human choice, as well as its amazingly complicated system of law; and the domain of *crystals*, in which *form* seems first to assume sway, and a strange self-restorative power manifests itself that is suggestive of mysteries yet to be unveiled.

In this sphere, energy is found constantly differentiating itself into the various forces whose effects are investigated by physics, chemistry, and crystallography; and these forces again are found undergoing equally numerous transformations; so that, whilst all forces are forms of one energy, and all the known forms of energy can be transformed into each other,—a fact expressed in the formula “the correlation of forces”; the sum-total of energy is neither diminished nor increased,—a fact expressed in the formula “conservation of energy.”

The self-differentiations just referred to, however, rigidly conform to law—law that can, or is expected to, be exactly calculated. Hence the expression “Applied Mathematics.” Law we shall find elsewhere; but throughout this sphere

it is law of the kind that is deemed typical; rule, that is never broken, never swerved from by a single hair's-breadth; law, the apparent violations of which are found to be, if possible, more profoundly real fulfillments.

Here, too, there is evolution,—real evolution,—though it is marked by a simplicity and calculable regularity that are absent from the second and higher stage.

Evolution at the stage of life is defined by Hæckel as “the doctrine that all organisms (viz., all species of animals, all species of plants, which have ever existed or still exist on the earth) are derived from one single, or from a few simple original forms, and that they have developed themselves from these in the natural course of a gradual change.”¹ In other words, it is the doctrine that all the manifold forms of life, human no less than animal, animal no less than vegetable, have gradually arisen, the less simple from the more and most simple, the most complex from the less and least complex, though not necessarily or probably in a straight line.

The factors of the process have been the following:—

1. *Matter*, with the necessity characterizing it, as inert, of persistence in any relation which it may hold,—a necessity or tendency which, in the organic sphere, is perhaps the ultimate ground of what is known as the law of heredity;—for what is heredity after all, at the bottom, but the persistence of a germ in being and behaving as its generator before it was and behaved?²

2. *Energy*, with the self-differentiating and self-varying power which, though recognized by biologists under the form of the law of variability, has not yet been treated with adequate insight into its real significance. This again is the same factor as the one we found operating in the fore-organic sphere, but lifted to a higher potency; and though

¹ History of Creation, Vol. i. p. 4.

² Compare Grant Allen's article in Fortnightly Review, July, 1895.

not exempt from or raised above rule, it is a rule not restricted to mathematically calculable lines.

3. *Environment*, consisting primarily of the inorganic sphere and then of the organic, every part of which latter may alternately be related to every other part, now as environed, then as environment.

So much, then, for the process of evolution and the factors by which it is constituted.

1. Let us now consider some of the general characteristics of the several steps in the biological process prior to the appearance of the living creature which calls itself man; in other words, some of the general characteristics of the various species which in the larger sense constituted man's ancestry, from the protozoön at the very beginning to—let us say—the anthropoid ape, which, according to some, may have been “the hole whence we were dug.”

1. Species differ from each other, not in being less or more normally constituted, but in being less or more complex. The advancement or progress in the organic scale which is pointed out by biologists, rests, as Darwin says, referring to a great German authority, “on the amount of differentiation and specialization of the several parts of a being, when arrived at maturity.”¹ In other words, the difference between the earlier and the later, or between what we call the lowest and the highest organisms, is in the main a matter of the number of parts and organs and functions, that is, of greater or less simplicity or complexity; not of the healthiness of the parts and organs in themselves or their suitability in relation to each other. An amoeba is, in its kind, as well constituted as a whale or an elephant; and it discharges its functions and performs its activities in a no less healthy and orderly manner than the larger and more complex animal.

2. One species is intrinsically as well adapted to its own

¹ Descent of Man, p. 164.

environment as another; though each succeeding species has needed, has been fitted for, has been provided with, and has adapted itself to, a wider and more varied environment. The amoeba, though it lives in the same physical surroundings as a fish, actually utilizes a much more restricted part thereof for the upkeep of its life and the discharge of its functions. It does so because it needs less and is fitted to less; but it is *not less fitted*, in its way; it does not *less perfectly* relate itself, in its way; and it does not *less efficiently* supply its own specific needs. The fish needs more and finds more, so to speak, ready to hand; but it neither assimilates more of what it needs, nor does it find what is better suited to it, than does the amoeba. This is equally true of the other and higher species. The system to which they all belong supplies each with its own appropriate environment, varying according to the constitution of each; but in no case, so far as one can see, is the adaptation between the living beings and their respective environments more real, more complete, more full, than in another. Differentiation and specialization in the organism find corresponding differentiation and specialization in the environment; but that there is greater fitness or adaptation between the two cannot be maintained.

Exceptions, of course, exist to this general rule. Individuals are to be found in every species which are not suited to their environment, or for which there is not a fitting environment.¹ As a rule, however, far as environments may be from unchangeableness, they are fitted to

¹ To speak, however, as Romanes does, "Scientific Evidence of Organic Evolution," of "species" attaining to a condition of proper adjustment or complete and proper adaptation to their environment, is misleading, owing to its ambiguity. Every living being is, normally, adapted to its environment from the very first. Were it not so, its growth and development would be hindered. As it grows and develops, its relation to its environment changes; but it does not therefore become more fitting, i.e. intrinsically, though it may become more full and rich.

provide what is necessary to the development and increase of the living beings related to them. The whole system to which living creatures belong, comprises, as has been already stated, as many differing environments as there are differing species, or, one might almost say, as many as there are differing individuals of differing species; and, barring exceptions, there is always correspondence between them; the vast majority of individuals that attain maturity are capable of readily adapting or adjusting themselves to their own particular section of the general environment, and find an answering environment awaiting them.

3. Each species, accordingly, is not only *fitted* to live out its own particular life as normally and happily as another, but, barring interferences from without, actually does so. The life of a fish, for example, is, of its kind, as normal as that of a bird; that of a bird as that of a horse. Within each species exceptions occur; individuals are to be found which cannot, and do not, discharge their functions, put forth their activities, grow and develop as they should; but what has been advanced holds good of species as wholes—it is one of their characteristics.

Evolutionists speak indeed of a “survival of the fittest,” meaning that, in the competition for food and for mates, denoted by the phrases natural and sexual selection, and in face of other favorable or unfavorable conditions,—astronomical, geological, geographical, vegetal, zoölogical, and so forth,—the best fitted survive, and by surviving show that they possessed qualities which made them *fitter* to survive than the rest. But this common assertion is open to two serious objections:—

(1) It is by no means a universal fact that the intrinsically weaker and less swift, those with the less keen senses, and so forth, perish, either in the struggle for food, or in the competition for mates, still less in the frequent encounters with unfavorable surroundings, such as fire and flood, earth-

quake or volcano, lightning or avalanche, or any of the numberless other agencies by which animals are maimed or weakened or killed. Good reasons can in very many cases be assigned for just the opposite result.¹

(2) When certain members of a species perish in the struggle to exist, or fail to propagate themselves, it need not be because they are intrinsically less fit to live out their own life and propagate themselves than are the others. Looked at by and for themselves, they are just as fit to live, just as capable of propagating, as those by which they are superseded.

What is really meant, is, that, having regard to the evolution of animal life, to its progress,—that is, to the rise of new and ever higher species, by increased differentiation and specialization of the several parts of living beings,—those which survive are, as a rule, the fittest to survive. Indeed, apart from their survival, new species would not be evolved. The reason for the changes in which such new and higher species take their rise is of course a totally different question. This, however, is survival of the fittest in a *teleological* respect, not in respect of intrinsic adaptedness to live and flourish.

With rare exceptions the members of species that have perished, left to themselves, would have lived out their life as normally as those which survived. At any rate, of the members that arrived at maturity, barring accidents, those which perished would have enjoyed their life as much as those which survived.

4. No species has ever existed, so far as is now known, within which there have been serious differences in point of normality of constitution, fitness to live and living fitly, between the earlier and later members; or indeed between any one class of members, and another. For practical purposes, species may be treated as fixed and homogeneous,

¹ See C. C. Coe, *Nature versus Natural Selection*, pp. 66, 69, 71.

though the point under consultation would not be affected, were there absolutely no distinguishable species; and, this being the case, it may be safely affirmed that the earliest members have never been stunted, deformed, weak, unhealthy, backward, misrelated to their environment, and so on, as contrasted with members existing tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years later. There may possibly have been development in one and the other direction, though it is open to doubt whether, where nature is the sole educator, much change for the better is ever evoked, either in beast or man; but traces of progress warranting us in applying to the earlier stages terms analogous to "low," "savage," and the like have never yet been pointed out.

If there have been exceptions, they have undoubtedly been of the kind denoted by expressions like *lusus naturæ*.

So much, then, for the general characteristics of the species that have arisen through evolution prior to the appearance of man.

II. Let us now pass on to the consideration of evolution in its special bearing on man. For the purpose of our argument, we will assume that the species of living being which calls itself "man" is a real outcome of the process termed "evolution"; further, that, as the first bird or birds may have descended from some sort of reptile or reptiles, so the first man or men descended from some "ancestral form common to him and the anthropoid apes,"¹—in a word, that the founder or founders of the human race, as they may be termed, had non-human animals for their parents. We will still further assume that this species is the highest, as it is believed to be the latest, outcome of the process; in fact, its very blossom and flower.

Now what does the process of evolution at its previous stages, what do its previous products, warrant us in expect-

¹ Words of Alfred Wallace.

ing with regard to the new species? Will it not, at all events, be marked by the same general characteristics as the species which constitute its ancestry?

1. To begin with, its first members will surely be as normally *constituted* as were the first members of each of the preceding species; and with exceptions, most of which may be eliminated by the causes operative at the earlier stages of evolution, all the later members may be expected to be equally perfect. By way of illustration, let us take birds; though any other species would serve the purpose equally well. Birds as we know them—birds that are now called birds—though possibly descended from reptiles, are thoroughly birds: their constitution, organs, functions, all go to make them birds: there is nothing in them that can be said to contradict what one may term the bird-idea:—the reptile does not cleave to them, hampering them in the discharge of their bird-activities, checking the development of their bird-potentialities. So with man. The first men will be as truly men as birds are truly birds. The animal which was their immediate parent will not cleave to them as an element to hamper, hinder, drag down, or keep down. It will be as illegitimate to say of them, "The strain of antecedent beasts remains in their blood,"¹ animalism cleaves to them, as it would have been to say of birds, 'The strain of antecedent reptilism remains in their blood:—in the sense, namely, previously explained. In one word, if the process of evolution is to continue in the main the course it pursued in the past, man would stand forth, normally constituted in *his kind*, even as other animals stood forth normally constituted in *their kind*—not more, not less; still further, not only the earliest members of the species, but also their descendants—allowing of course for exceptions.

If any creatures of any kind intervened between man and

¹ The New Faith and the Old Faith, p. 137.

his simian or other mammalian ancestors, which, though no longer mere animals, were not yet men, they do not concern us, whether they have disappeared, or still somewhere survive. Being more or less mere animals, they necessarily had or have the constitution and potentialities of animals; but not those of man. Yet even they, unless evolution deviated from its course, must have been in *their kind*, normally constituted—not of course like the animals before them, because they were new; nor again like the animal man after them, because he too was new.

Putting the matter in a nutshell, man will be man; just as completely as any animal before him was the animal it was.

2. Still further, the new species will find itself in the midst of an *environment*, between which and itself there is all the correspondence necessary for the promotion of normal growth and development; and there will accordingly result a life as normal, in its kind, as any previously evolved species has lived in its kind.

A few words on each of the points herewith briefly formulated must suffice.

Beginning with man's environment: What would the most enlightened intelligence of the present day consider to be its constitutive factors? the factors necessary to a normal and full human development? The reply would be given: first of all, the natural world, as related both to body and mind; secondly, the human world, to evoke, guide, and train the powers of body and mind, to meet the needs of the affections, and to enable men to be not only full individuals, like the animals below them, but to constitute societies, nations, humanity; thirdly, the invisible sphere, with its unseen realities and personalities; and, finally, God, the Great Father, with his all-illuminating light, all-quickenings grace, and all-satisfying love. It is this environment that makes the best modern man what he is. Fish

do not need their environing water—be it brook, river, lake, or sea and ocean, birds their environing atmosphere, more absolutely, if they are not to be stunted and shriveled, than man needs the environment, just broadly sketched, if he is to grow and develop in accordance with his potentialities. It goes, of course, without saying, that this environment never could have been, and never can be, to him at any one stage all that it is capable of being. It will expand to him as he grows up to it. But the whole must act on him from the outset proportionately to his susceptibility, or his capabilities will never be unfolded and satisfied.

3. On the other hand, it is obviously to be expected that he will relate himself normally to his environment.

The several species of living creatures before him do this,—each to its own proper part of the great system to which all belong. So far as they do not, whatsoever may be the reason, so far does it not avail for them. The greater the differentiation of parts, the more complex the organization of a species, the more numerous its potentialities, the richer and more complex the process of adjustment, and the greater the risk of failure in adaptation and consequent miscarriage in the struggle of existence.

Not otherwise is it with man. And as self-adjustment to their proper environment was the rule among the members of his ancestral species, he too may be expected to adjust himself at every stage to the whole of his manifold environment as required by his varied potentialities; not indeed completely, for that will be a matter of growth, but certainly not to the complete neglect—whether from ignorance or any other cause—still less to the misuse, of any important factor.

Accordingly the life of the human species from the very beginning ought to be as normal in its kind as that of any one of the preceding species in its kind. Individual members and groups of members may prove exceptions to the

rule; but, taking the species as a whole, its life will be full, varied, rich, pleasant, proportionately to its constitution and potentialities, on the one side, and to the environment answering thereto, on the other. Nor will there ever be within the species any great class of members, any race, between which and the rest differences will prevail such as to warrant the application of contrasted terms like "low" or "backward" and "advanced"; "savage" and "civilized"; "debased" and "noble"; and so forth. Whatever differences may arise, they will remain within the limits compatible with normal growth and development.

Even if it should need to be granted that competition for food, for mates, and for the satisfaction of other needs peculiar to itself, was the lot of the human species no less than of those which preceded it; and that its members were, equally with the rest, exposed to injury and destruction from their inorganic, vegetable, and animal environment; there is nothing in the process of evolution as it went on during the assumed hundreds of thousands of years before the appearance of man, to suggest, much less to warrant, the assumption, that, as regards the general characteristics previously described, he would form an exception.

III. Yet what do we find? Let the answer be given in the words of one whom all evolutionists regard as a very high authority on this subject: "I know of no study which is so unutterably saddening as that of the evolution of humanity, as it is set forth in the annals of history. Out of the darkness of prehistoric ages, man emerges with the marks of his lowly origin strong upon him. He is a brute, only more intelligent than other brutes; a blind prey to impulses, which as often as not lead him to destruction; a victim to endless illusions which make his mental existence a terror and a burthen and fill his physical life with barren toil and battle. He attains a certain degree of comfort and develops a more or less workable theory of life in

such favorable situations as the plains of Mesopotamia or of Egypt, and then for thousands and thousands of years, struggles with varying fortunes, attended by infinite wickedness, bloodshed, and misery, to maintain himself at this point against the greed and the ambition of his fellow-men."¹

Or, as another writer says, "Looking back through the glasses of modern science we behold him [man] at first outwardly a brute, feebly holding his own against many fierce competitors. He has no wants above those of the beast; he lives in holes and dens in the rock; he is a brute, even more feeble in body than many of the animals with which he struggles for a brute's portion. Tens of thousands of years pass over him, and his progress is slow and painful to a degree. The dim light which inwardly illumines him has grown brighter; the rude weapons which aid his natural helplessness are better shaped; the cunning with which he circumvents his prey, and which helps him against his enemies, is of a higher order. But he continues to leave little impress on nature or his surroundings; he is still in wants and instincts merely as his fellow denizens of the wilderness."

"After a comparatively short interval, a marvelous transformation has taken place—a transformation without any parallel in the previous history of life. This brute-like creature, which for long ages lurked in the woods and amongst the rocks, scarcely to all appearances of so much account as the higher carnivora with which he competed for a scanty subsistence, has obtained mastery over the whole earth. He (or at all events certain tribes and races) has organized himself into great societies. The brutes are no longer his companions and competitors. The earth

¹ Huxley, "Agnosticism," in *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1889; cf. A. I. Balfour, *Essays and Addresses*, p. 307; Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 101.

produces at his will; all its resources are his. The secrets of the universe have been plumbed, and with the knowledge obtained he has turned the world into a vast workshop where all the powers of nature work submissively in bondage to supply his wants."¹

Evolutionists further assure us that the lowest races of men existing at the present moment fairly represent, if not the very earliest men,—for *they* may have been still lower down in the scale,—at all events men as they must have been tens of thousands of years ago. In other words, what human beings like the Aborigines of Australia or the Bushmen of Africa are to-day, prowling about and living very like the animals which they hunt and with which they compete for food; sheltering themselves in dens, holes, wurlies; their social relations not much higher than those of the prairie dog or wild horse; with the scantiest language; with little or no properly intellectual life; with ideas of right and wrong, truth and error, that can scarcely be indentified as such; and with totemism, fetichism, or animism, or something else of the kind, for a religion:—in short, what these are now, such or even lower were primeval men; such too they continued to be for tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years.

IV. Supposing the position thus taken up by what is commonly considered to be the best, the highest, the most authoritative science of the present day, to be sound and true, it scarcely needs saying that the *life* of the human species, whatever may be thought in the abstract of its constitution and its environment, has not hitherto been, and is not now, marked by the general characteristics of the species of living beings which preceded it on the earth; that on the contrary, for some reason or other, the human animal deviates,—that too, as seems to eminent and competent

¹ Kidd, *Social Evolution*, pp. 31, 32.

judges, very much for the worse,—from the animals which constituted its ancestry.

If one could imagine a philosophical or scientific observer arising among the slugs, or lizards, or herrings, or sparrows, or apes, or indeed any other animal species of the present day, would he have the slightest ground for using, with regard to his ancestry of thousands or tens of thousands of years ago, the terrible language which human observers use regarding their ancestry? Would he not, on the contrary, have a right to maintain that, apart from *lusus naturæ*, abortions, monstrosities, and other individuals which are defective or diseased from birth or through accident or interference, all the members of his species had been normally constituted, fittingly related to a fitting environment, and had lived a normal life; still more, that between those of the present moment and the earliest no appreciable or material difference of any kind can be discovered; that certainly no such contrast exists as only too plainly prevails between *some modern* and *all* primeval men; yea, even between *all civilized* men and all the *modern* representatives of primeval man?

If this is not a break in the process of evolution, what is a break? Why should the flower of the process be in some respects the least perfect of its productions? Why has not man lived from the very first a life as normal for him as the life lived by the races which preceded him, was normal for them; or that lived by *contemporaneous* species of living creatures is normal for them? *Had the great Demiurge grown weary, or exhausted his skill? Or were the materials on which he worked, no longer as plastic as of yore?* Or what can be the reason why hundreds of centuries should elapse ere man began to *live like a man*? Ere he began to live as normally in his kind as the brutes in their kind? Ere he stood forth, conformably to his essential nature, as the lord of the world, and the image and

son of the Eternal Father? He is characterized as a "brute,"—"ugly animalism" is predicated of him. Why? Verily, man would have been a noble and happy creature, had he discharged his functions, grown and developed, realized his potentialities, and held the relations to his environment which befitted *him*, as fittingly and well as the worms on which he trod, the fish which he caught, and the wild animals which he hunted, for his daily nourishment. The brutes, in fact, are *not brutes* in the reproachful sense in which the word is applied to man. In that sense of the term man is the only "brute" which the process of evolution has brought forth; and one would almost be justified in twisting Burns' well-known lines about Nature into,

Her prentice hand she tried on man,
And then she made the *beasties*, O!

His whole existence, as compared with that of the living creatures alongside of him—even the simplest—has been bungled; so much so, in fact, that even now, those who have to some extent fought their way out of savagery, only too often look almost with envy on the manner in which the lower animals realize the idea of their being. It is true, of course, that these latter are not men; but for what they are, they cannot be said to be at war with the law of their own nature, to live other lives than they are capable of living. To use language about them such as men use about their fellow-men—assuming them to be *fellow-men*—would be to give way to hysterical sentiment. There is nothing either in their constitution or mode of existence, intrinsically considered, that deserves reproach or contempt or even pity—unless it be the fact that so many of them have to live on each other. But what is man? At the best, a bundle of unrealized ideals; too often so little developed in mind as not even to have ideals. Mostly he drags on an existence either of more or less conscious wretched-

ness; or, what is sadder still, of insensibility to, or heedlessness of, nearly everything that appertains to his proper humanity.

The question to which attention has been called is not, whether the world in general, and the living part of it in particular, has become what it is by a process of evolution; nor whether variability and heredity, aided by natural and sexual selection and the multiform influences of inorganic cosmic forces, have been factors in the process, nor whether the life of the human species—social, political, intellectual, æsthetical, moral, religious—has been subject to the law of development or of evolution! No, let it be repeated, this is not the question. All this may be taken for granted.

The real question is, why the products of the process, that is, the innumerable forms of animal life evolved prior to man were marked by characteristics which are not only lacking to the latest and highest product of the same process, but have actually been supplanted by others, warranting descriptions of the kind previously quoted.

Either the process itself must surely have undergone a marked change at the moment of reaching its culminating stage; or a disturbing element must then have been introduced into the life of the world, infinitely more disastrous in its consequences to the newly evolved species than the competition for food and mates, or the untoward action of physical forces, ever were to the long series of species that arose during the hundreds of thousands of years which are supposed to have preceded the appearance of man.

On the problem with which we are thus face to face, light is thrown by the account given in the book of Genesis of the entrance of sin into the world, and of the effect which it had on man, considered both in himself and in his relation to his environment. But the narrative must be interpreted by the aid of the general conception of the world, of God, and of the relation between the two, which

lies behind the Scriptures, and to which, with more or less distinctness, they constantly point, though it never finds in them a formal statement or exposition, not under the misleading guidance of recognized or unrecognized patristic or theological or critical or merely philological authorities, least of all under that of the polytheistic cosmogonies of the heathen religions. The conception of the primitive state of man, of the relation between him and the world and of that between him and God, which was once avowedly held by well-nigh the whole Christian church, and which still unconsciously more or less colors and dominates the minds both of the friends and foes of biblical truth, left human history as difficult a problem as it is left by the current theory of evolution.

What that narrative teaches is substantially as follows: Man came into existence healthily constituted both as to body and mind, though the latter, as in the case of children born nowadays, was a mere bundle of potentialities. He was placed in a physical environment which comprised everything necessary to the healthy growth, development, and activity of his body, considered both in itself and as the organ of mind. The divine factor of his environment made himself known to, and behaved towards, him in a manner conformable to the childlike stage of his mental life, for the purpose of so evoking his intelligence and affection, and awaking his moral and religious nature, that he should be able to enter on the free and conscious development for which he was destined. Among the intelligences which constituted his—as they also constitute our—invisible environment, was one who sought to counteract the divine purpose, and therefore took measures to sow distrust of God in the mind of the newly created being, with a view to preventing his normal development and effecting his final ruin. The immediate result was alienation from God, divine resentment, restriction of the outflow

and inflow of the gracious energy which was necessary for the invigoration of man's higher nature. The further consequences of this failure of man freely to maintain the relation to God for which he was created and in which he found himself by nature, are seen in the physical and intellectual degradation, the wickedness, irreligion, and superstition, and the unutterable miseries which have marked the history of man from the beginning down to the present moment.

It was the incoming of sin that created the problem to which attention has been called. The law of evolution remained. But when the self-controlled force which bears the name man, "corrupted its way on the earth," in other words, entered on a course of conduct opposed to the order of the world, the process of evolution necessarily brought forth the fruits of brutality, ignorance, non-morality and immorality, godlessness and idolatry, physical and mental misery.

Until science and philosophy recognize this terrible fact, they will be condemned to go on, as heretofore, piling hypothesis on hypothesis, in the vain hope of reducing the history of the human race to something like order and rationality. The key to the strange and dark contrast between man and his animal ancestry, is to be found alone in the fact of the Fall.

ARTICLE II.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE: ITS NATURE AND CLAIMS.

BY EX-PRESIDENT JAMES H. FAIRCHILD, D.D.

WHEN we speak of man as a religious being, we refer to elements belonging to his constitution or nature. When we speak of one as a religious man, we mean that he has brought these natural elements into activity, and conforms his life to the facts and principles of religion.

The acceptance of such a life belongs to our personal responsibility. Our nature indicates its propriety and makes it possible. Our own definite purpose and responsible activity give us the religious character and make us partakers of the religious life. The devils who "believe and tremble" are by nature religious beings; but in responsible character and life they are irreligious and apostate. Men are naturally *social* beings. They have impulses and susceptibilities for a social life. They may order their lives in harmony with their social nature, or they may seek the solitude and live the life of a recluse. To have the character as well as the nature of social beings they must accept the responsibilities and adjust themselves to the relations of the social life. As rational beings men have the responsibility of determining for themselves the life which they will live. In the lower creatures the constitution and environment determine the life. They are made what they are to be. To make the brute a utility we mould and modify his natural activities within certain limits to suit our purpose. The man, on the other hand, must add to the

activities which spring from his nature and environment such aims and purposes as belong to a rational being, in order to realize a worthy life—a life that is not a failure. To the brute there can be no such failure, because he is not capable of shaping his life by any aim or purpose of his own. He always is and becomes what he was made to be.

The rational or moral being faces life under entirely different conditions. Sharing with the brute in many conditions and limitations, he moves scarcely a step in the world without encountering the fact of obligation, somewhat that he ought to do or ought not to do. Here comes the necessity of forming moral character. Here all fellowship with the brute must end. He might be willing to live—might even covet for himself the irresponsible life of the brute; but the likeness of a son of God is on him, and he can find no satisfactory life with brutes. He must lift his face upward and accept the principle of duty, the law of his own reason, as his rule of life. This necessity lies in the fact that he is a moral being, and the force of obligation is upon him by virtue of what he is, without reference to his constitution in other respects, and independently of all environment. Meeting another being, he finds a neighbor, whether like himself of the human family or of the family of brutes of less value than himself. Under the law of his nature he must adjust himself to this new relationship, and live the life of a moral being, or he must deny his nature and become a moral outlaw. Thus far, we may assume, he knows no authority to which he is responsible, no one above him that can bring him into judgment. The law of his own rational nature is upon him. Yielding to this he is righteous, worthy of approval—his own, and that of all moral beings. Resisting this, he is a sinner under the condemnation of his own conscience and the condemnation of all moral beings who understand his position.

Taking another step in the experience of life, he encoun-

ters the thought of God, obscurely apprehended, it may be, as the infinite, spiritual personality in whom he lives and moves and has his being. It matters not how the thought originally occurs to him, whether by suggestion from without or from within. It comes to him with authority, and becomes a permanent element in his experience. It appeals to him as having a religious nature, and impels him to enter into personal relations with the unseen and infinite personality, and thus to live a religious life. His own existence is a mystery in its origin and its destiny. The thought of God the eternal Father supplies, as far as necessary, the solution. He can go on his way without misgiving, because

"Awake, asleep, at home, abroad,
He is surrounded still with God."

No harm can befall the trustful child who thus adjusts himself to the infinite Father. There come times when all his own devisings seem vain, when all his plans and hopes are brought to nought, when all his precious things seem to have perished. To himself he seems like a child lost in the wilderness at midnight. The impulse to pray is as natural as for the child to call upon the father he does not see, but who he hopes may hear. He needs no instruction in the theory of prayer. His *need* is his argument. The dim apprehension of a gracious providence that environs him suggests the promise, "Call upon me in the day of trouble and I will deliver thee." His *moral* weakness and need lead in the same direction. The idea of duty, of obligation, is an ever-present fact. The conception of a character and life moulded by this high principle, presses upon him with constant authority. He finds himself weak and temptable, groveling in self-indulgence, when he ought to stand erect in the beauty of holiness. The bitter cry is often heard, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" He needs help from

above, the fellowship of the infinite spirit whose presence brings purity and life. The man may withstand all these aspirations of his religious nature, and go on in the lower plane of the worldly and sensual life. This is his prerogative as a moral being. The choice is presented to every human soul. One path opens to the worldly life, the other to the religious life. One leads to hope and peace and endless good, the other is without hope and without God.

There is a careless impression somewhat prevalent in the world that one may live the moral life and not choose to adopt the religious life. We often speak of one as moral, but not religious. A more thoughtful view will reveal the fact that these two lives are practically inseparable: that the same principle of action is the controlling feature in both, and constitutes the characteristic element. This principle is the subjection to duty or obligation—the settled purpose to do what one ought to do rather than what he may desire to do. There is a formal morality which consists in the performance of various outward duties without the true principle of duty-doing in the heart. Genuine morality is inward righteousness—a state of heart conformed to obligation—a commitment of soul in a regard for the well-being of all—a standing-ready to promote all good whenever and wherever it may be apprehended. The scripture word to express that attitude of the heart is love; a convenient philosophical name is benevolence. It is at bottom a controlling voluntary attitude which leads to outward activity in the promotion of well-being according as the way shall open and the mind shall be enlightened. In that attitude of the soul is found essential, genuine righteousness, and only there. In this attitude the man is worthy of moral approbation, however imperfect his judgment, and however unsuccessful his effort. No more can properly be required of him by God or men. In character and spirit he is a child of God, and wherever God gathers his

children there he will be found. But can we call him a religious man until he has added to his virtue, knowledge—the knowledge of God, and is thus able to enter into relations with him and extend to him his love? Must the good man, the righteous man, take a step further in order to become essentially religious? Can one who has not yet apprehended God be regarded as religious, provided he has yielded his soul to the principle of duty? He has essentially the religious spirit. He is ready for any service to which God may call him. Bishop Butler speaks of the religious spirit as shown as truly in seeking after God as in worshipping him when he has been found. The apostle perhaps has the same idea in mind when he speaks of feeling after God. When such a soul finds God, no new moral attitude is called for. He is already obedient, and is ready for the new experience in earth or heaven, as God may appoint. If he is not properly called religious, the difficulty is ignorance, not wickedness. I do not affirm that men in this way actually enter upon the religious life with no knowledge or thought of God; but we cannot question the possibility. It is entirely conceivable that a child may so adjust himself to father and mother or other members of the household as to form an obedient and loving character, with all the graces of the Christian life in embryo. When he shall attain to a knowledge of the heavenly Father, he must embrace him in his benevolent love, by virtue of the character already formed. The question of loving and serving God does not come to him as an unsettled question. This has been already practically settled in the attitude already taken and maintained. It is only an extension of the same principle of loving faithfulness to God which is already exercised for his father and mother and others. Loving those whom he has seen, he will readily embrace in his love the Father unseen.

It is a new experience thus to embrace the Father of

spirits, but not a new principle of action or of character. The true character is already established, and can take in the new object of regard without any conscious struggle. That conscious adjustment to obligation which in theological terms we call conversion, has already been made; and the revelation of God to the expanding soul is but the presentation of another object or person to be loved and honored. The old classic word piety which expressed only genuine filial regard and obedience, has come in our Christian usage to indicate the true religious attitude required toward God. The piety of Æneas was his fidelity to his human father; the piety of a Christian saint is his fidelity to God. Possibly it was only by analogy that the use of the word was thus extended. But if the human piety was genuine—not a mere sentiment or instinct, but the principle of benevolent regard which meets the obligation expressed in the fifth commandment, then the piety due to God is essentially the same thing, and the truly dutiful child grows into the pious man without essential change of character. That change was involved in passing from the irresponsible, non-moral condition of the animal to the positive and purposeful activity of an obedient child. When we train our children to the faithful and conscientious performance of their duties in the household, we are “training them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.”

Those who have observed the opening of the religious life of children in Christian families often find that the life began farther back than memory reaches. The child cannot recall the time when he did not love the Lord, and try in his childish way to do his will. Indeed, the religious life in his consciousness has not been separated from his every-day life and duty in the family. No one can tell whether the positively righteous character began with duty to parents or duty toward God, and the question is not essential. If the child grows up into positively worldly or

sinful character, as occurs with sad frequency, it is altogether probable that the first duty that can control his conscience will be his duty toward God. He takes on righteous character in a religious experience, and this principle of duty-doing then works out in all his earthly relationships.

Yet in the lives of many, as they pass on to maturity and responsibility, there occur crises in which they come to face some new and pressing responsibility. The young man becomes the head of a family; a young woman receives to her arms an infant child that calls her mother. Under the new sense of duty they are driven to prayer; and they become religious in their adjustment to the new duty. Thus the earthly life becomes "a heavenly discipline." Thirty years and more ago, the call of the country to a service full of self-sacrifice and danger broke in upon many careless and self-indulgent and worldly lives. Many responded who had never given an earnest hour to the question what end they should pursue or what life they should live. Some rallied to the flag as a thing fit for a young man to do, or as an adventure which might yield some entertainment or advantage. Others in responding to the call made the first surrender of themselves to the claims of duty, and went on their way of danger in the service of God and of mankind. Their surrender to duty was a genuine consecration, a taking up of the cross to follow the Master. It was to such the beginning of a religious life. Probably as the worldly character becomes settled and confirmed, the normal experience will be that nothing but the mighty truths pertaining to God, his character and claims, will move the heart; and the hardened sinner will yield to obligation only as he becomes religious. In the truths and claims of religion motives exist which are always available in the work of winning men to righteousness; and the great work of the preacher is to absorb these truths

into his own understanding and experience, until he shall be able to marshal them for the persuasion of men. He stands as the exponent of the religious life in his living and his teaching, and his work is successful in proportion as he is able to induce others to enter upon such a life for themselves, and pursue it to the end. This is his divine calling. Every line of thought and study which will aid him in impressing men with the beauty of holiness and the sinfulness of sin, calls for his attention. The greatest good that can be secured to any human soul is his establishment in this life. Every other good is enhanced in its nature by this antecedent condition. When all human lives have become conformed to this principle, then all essential conditions for the progress of society and of the world are provided for. We are sometimes encouraged to labor for and to expect the conversion of the community, the Christianization of society as a whole. We should never forget that there is just so much religion and righteousness in the world as there is in individual souls; and there is no room for any more. If by the conversion of institutions and of societies be meant that righteousness in individual lives will tend to mould and modify the outward conduct even of many whose hearts are not controlled by it, this can be understood and accepted. When Christian men shall become prominent as employers of labor, they will set the fashion for just and righteous dealing with laborers, and even the worldly and selfish employer must come up to the standard in order to live successfully and comfortably in a world where righteousness prevails. We have observed the growing tendency for men dying in the possession of wealth, to provide in their wills for the donation of large portions of this wealth to the public welfare. It is not probable that the idea is growing in the world that such gifts at death will insure the future welfare of the donor; but the idea is extending that the rich man is a debtor to

the world, and it is unseemly that he should die without some recognition of the obligation. Men approve of the principles of righteousness even when of themselves they have not the grace to practice them. They will yield to a righteous fashion, the vital principle of which is found in other hearts rather than their own. We have done our best to bring institutions and communities under the control of righteousness when we have done what we can to secure its control in the hearts and lives of individual men. It is safe to assume that the faithful preacher of the gospel is doing his part for the welfare of mankind. If he should not find time or strength for direct service in social or civil life, he is still in the way of his duty, and must be reckoned among the world's philanthropists. The human race owes as much to Paul as to Howard.

Since the essential work of the preacher is to promote the religious life, he will need a clear conception of its nature and its place in human character,—the varied activities it involves. He will find that the religious life is not an unnatural one, not constrained and artificial. The human soul was made for it and can never be complete in its development without it. Life is possible without religion, but always unsatisfactory, and in the end a failure. It can never be worth living. In commending this higher life to men, we are not proposing the suppression of any human faculty or of any natural activity. The result will be to remove the hindrances to the fullest and freest action, and to give to life its widest scope and highest vitality. I am often asked by students in Theology or Ethics if it is not natural to sin—if a life of impulse and passion and self-indulgence is not instinctive and natural. Is not the drift of the human soul in that direction? No, it is easy to sin; and if one chooses to count himself a brute, and live by mere animal instinct and impulse, he can do so. But he does violence to the higher principles of his nature in such

a course. It is natural to the brute, but unnatural to man. His higher intelligence is given him, his reason and conscience, to regulate his life. This is his higher nature, and living according to this he is living according to nature. Disregarding these regulative principles of his own constitution, he does violence to his own nature, and sins against his own soul. The brute lives according to his impulses, and finds satisfaction in the life. The man living by his impulses lives a life of conflict and bondage. Only the truth can set him free. He must accept the life which belongs to the moral being—the life of duty, the religious life, or fall forever under his own condemnation and contempt.

It is no part of the preacher's work to speak disparagingly of human nature. The human soul is most like God—the only work of his hand that bears his image. The irreligious character degrades that nature, and brings the sense of unworthiness and shame. We may lament our heredity, and attempt to excuse our misdoing by the degradation which is supposed to come from the fall; but the only thing for which the man has occasion to be ashamed is the conduct and character involved in his own responsible action. He is unworthy and irreligious, not because Adam fell, or because of the misdoing of ancestors less remote, but because he has refused to listen to the guiding voice within. In urging the acceptance of the religious life, then, the preacher is asking his fellow-man to reenthrone his reason and conscience and do honor to the nature which God has given him.

The religious life is natural even in a higher sense than the social or domestic life. The social life involves certain of the elements of human nature, but may leave others unengaged. The religious life, properly conceived, has a scope as wide as human nature itself, and provides for all its activities. We ask no man to deny his nature, but to

give to every susceptibility and impulse the consideration that belongs to it. I do not forget the Saviour's word, "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself"; and we regard self-denial as one of the cardinal virtues. But this self-denial is simply the subjection of impulse to reason, accepting every personal pleasure under the guidance of conscience, the limitations of duty. It is not a doctrine of Scripture or of common-sense that there is virtue or goodness in robbing ourselves of any satisfaction or enjoyment without an adequate reason. Paul expresses contempt for such self-denial. "Though I give all my goods to feed the poor, and my body to be burned, and have not love, I am become as a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal." The Buddha who fed his body to a starved tigress and her whelps was a bewildered ascetic, not a Christian hero. The history of religion affords us many examples of religious life based on the ascetic principle. Although Christianity gives us a "Captain of salvation made perfect through suffering," yet its history has been less marred by the blunders of asceticism than that of any other religion, and the tendency in its later progress is to rid itself entirely of these blemishes. The one demand which true religion makes upon every man is righteousness—rightness of character. Whatever self-denial this involves, is involved in the religious life. This righteousness consists in the right attitude of the voluntary powers, the commitment of the soul to the right end of life, such an end as the reason approves. This standard of righteousness as religion presents it is found in the immediate perceptions and affirmations of the soul itself. It is not primarily a requirement which comes from without, imposed by some high authority. It rests upon the authority of the soul itself. When the revealed command reaches a man, requiring love as the fulfilling of the law, it finds the law already written upon the heart, originating in the man's rational ideas and per-

ceptions. Hence this law reaches the man and not the brute. It can have no authority with any being who does not discern it by his own faculties. He may not be able to state the principle of righteousness; but he instinctively applies it, enforcing it upon himself and others. It may require years to bring him to the acceptance of the idea that the righteousness required, this love which fulfills the law, is fidelity to every interest, regard for all well-being. He may even go to heaven without being able to put the law of obligation in this form; but if he responds to the calls of duty before him, with the purpose to render to every interest its due, he is obedient to the will of God, and is reckoned with his children. This is genuine morality—true righteousness—the only righteousness possible to a finite being. His apprehensions of the value of the interests around him may be very imperfect, his judgment of the best means to promote them and the effort he puts forth very inadequate; yet his purpose is seen and approved of God, who looketh on the heart.

Let us understand, however, that this inward righteousness is not a passing experience, which one recalls in memory; it is a living, working attitude of the soul, controlling the activities and shaping the life. Thus it is the determining element of character, and constitutes the constant fulfillment of obligation. The morality of which the self-righteous boast, the dead works of which Paul speaks, makes the outward and formal righteousness, the body without the soul, which neither God nor man approves. True morality is not a thought nor a feeling, but a life, permeating and controlling the thought and the feeling, and the entire man. The beginning of such obedience to obligation, whether recognized in consciousness and held in memory or not, is the beginning of the religious life. The theologian calls it conversion, and the establishment of the life by "patient continuance in well-doing" is sanctifica-

tion. This is the duty and idea of religion—all that is obligatory, all that is required, the beginning and the end of man's responsibility. "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God." This inspired utterance sets forth both the inside and the outside of the righteousness of religion. Thus religion is first a duty—somewhat to be rendered by man himself, something to be done rather than experienced.

I am aware that there is in many minds a repugnance to such words as obligation and duty in connection with religion. To them they seem to imply constraint—the absence of free and spontaneous affection which is supposed to characterize the religious life. There is no proper force in this conception. In social life the conscientious devotion to duty is the ground and guarantee of all the affectional experiences which constitute the charm of our social relations. The young wife wishes the kindly attention and offices of her husband to spring from love and not from duty. When years have brought their changes, with a more mature experience, she finds that the solid ground of her peace and satisfaction is in the conscientious fidelity to duty which has grown to be her dependence. The love which is "the greatest thing in the world" has a duty side to it as well as an emotional one. It means first of all faithfulness. This is the voluntary element of love, and thus we can pledge our love to one another. Let no one speak disparagingly of duty as a principle of action for God or man. The difference between a true and a false religion is in this ethical element. False religion may furnish a zeal for God which is not according to knowledge or duty. It may make a fanatic like Saul, not a lover of men like Paul.

It is a matter of great significance that the claims of religion as duty come to men free from any bewilderment of doubt. It asks of every one simply rightness of purpose or

intention—not outward righteousness, involving action guided by the highest intelligence and reason, but righteousness of heart—the purpose to be and to do what he knows he ought to be and to do. Trying to meet obligation is to meet it, and that a man should try to be what he knows he ought to be admits of no shadow of doubt. The certainty lies below all question or skepticism. The claims of religion as the simple duty of righteousness within, of honesty, come to the infidel and the believer alike. The certainty to each is absolute. Thus the first step in the religious life lies open to every human soul. All beyond may seem like the darkness of Egypt—a darkness that can be felt. But let him take that first step, it may bring him to the light. He may experience the truth of the divine assurance, “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine.” But if no ray from “the Light of the world” ever penetrates the darkness, let him take this step. It is right and reasonable and honest—fundamental in character and righteousness. If he dies without any further light, he dies a righteous man, on the way to heaven, if heaven opens to every faithful soul.

But light will come to such a soul. He will be at peace with himself, approved of men and approved of God. He will walk carefully in the midst of the responsibilities of life. If there is good to be done he stands ready to do it. If there is truth to be learned he is ready to learn it. Such a life as this is the religious life. It is characteristic of all the good on earth or in heaven. As God sees the man who has taken this step, he is fit for the society of the faithful. All that we can reasonably ask of any man to admit him to the church is evidence of this honesty of heart—a willingness to know and do the truth.

Simple and self-evident as this principle is, this elementary principle of honesty and duty known to every man, it is the only requirement in the religious life at which men

ever hesitate, or which they resist. At this point all the opposition of the worldly or self-indulgent life is concentrated. This surrendered, the man lives upon a new principle. He lives to do what he ought to do instead of what he wants to do. It is a new life. Old things have passed away and all things have become new.

But the point of emphasis here is that the obligation of the religious life stands face to face with every man, and always, without the possibility of doubt or question; and so it must forever stand. There never was, and never can be, a valid reason to any man why he should not accept it. Every fancied reason is only an excuse. If religion had nothing more to offer or require but this self-evident duty, it would still be more important than any other idea of human life which experience or philosophy has given to the world. But religion is real and cannot be a merely human fact, an outgrowth or development of mere human thought. The most elementary conception of religion includes God as well as man; and the religious life is a life ordered by what we know, or can learn of him. It is this knowledge of God, more or less satisfactory, which has originated religious thought and given it the vitality it has. By some revelation of himself God has laid the foundation for a belief in him, and for all the relations which the religious life involves. An outgoing of the human soul which we call the religious impulse could have no reality without the apprehension of a personal being toward whom it is directed. Rousseau in some of his speculations represents religious thought and contemplation as a purely subjective exercise, like that of a philosopher or a poet looking abroad upon the beauties of nature from a mountain top at sunrise. No such conception can meet the case. Human life is a constant succession of crises and emergencies, such that only the thought of a heavenly Father who pities his children can make them tolerable to us. Thus sustained we

gather from them the peaceable fruits of righteousness, and account life under what seem hard conditions, still worth living.

But the simple idea of righteousness and character which comes to us with the first thought of religion might be a doubtful blessing. The ideal of life thus obtained is beautiful and naturally elevating; but the sense of weakness in ourselves, the inability to attain, and the sense of unworthiness which comes with failure, make a burden too grievous to be borne. The invitation, "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest," supplies the divine element in the religious life. It is the voice of him who "came into the world to save sinners." Thus we have not simply the ideal of the life of righteousness, but the mighty Helper through whom we become the sons of God, changed into the same image from glory to glory.

Thus the religious life becomes a life of experience as well as of duty, and the expression, "to experience religion," has found a place in the thought and teaching of the Christian church. The thought connected with it has often been confused and the teaching bewildering. The tendency has often been to divert attention from the duty of religion which faces every man from the beginning of his moral life, the responsibility of which is solely his, and lead to the thought and expectation of some dream or vision to come from without—an experience which shall prove the beginning of the religious life. From this conception has sprung the custom in various branches of the church with which we are familiar, of receiving to membership upon the relation of an experience. The error suggested is that the religious life must begin with an experience. It doubtless often begins thus; but to wait for an experience before entering upon the duty, is an utter transposition of facts. We have no such gospel to preach to men. Every-

where the duty comes before the experience. "Come unto me and I will give you rest." "Ask and ye shall receive, seek and ye shall find." "As many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God." "If any man is willing to do his will he shall know of the doctrine." "To them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life." And thus we always find it: first the duty, then the blessing. "Because thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things." Duty performed is the condition of the blessing, and the blessing helps in the further duty. The first side of the religious life we are likely to encounter is the duty side; and we shall find God responsive to us according as we meet our responsibility to him. It may well be that the divine gift shall utterly transcend our faith; but it can come only where there is the receptive heart.

It should be further observed that the experiences of religion gather about the great truths pertaining to God, his nature and character. This is their source and their support. It is not in general profitable to pursue religious experience as a desirable attainment in itself. Such a pursuit leads to the introspective habit of gauging our own feelings, endeavoring to produce a satisfactory religious life in the effervescing phases of our own consciousness. Those are false ideas and false religions that send their votaries to grope about in the darkness of their own souls for light and help. The true religion says, "This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." "Then shall we know if we follow on to know the Lord. His going forth is prepared as the morning, and he shall come to us as the rain, as the latter rain, and as the former rain upon the earth."

ARTICLE III.

SYMPATHY WITH THE LOWER ANIMALS.

BY PROFESSOR MATTOON M. CURTIS, M. A., PH. D.

As we survey the manifestations of the altruistic spirit in our own times, we see that the organization and rapid extension of humane societies occupy a prominent position as regards the attitude of man toward the lower animals. The father of the humane movement in America was Henry Bergh, who, on the nineteenth of April, 1866, secured from the New York Legislature the first law enacted for the protection of animals. On the twenty-second of April of the same year the first Humane Society was organized in Clinton Hall, New York City, and to-day there are about one hundred and eighty similar organizations in North America. In our larger cities the work of these societies has grown to great dimensions and has enlisted the active sympathy and support of all good citizens.

It is with special reference to man's sympathetic relations to the lower animals that I am to write. I am not aware that this subject has been looked upon from the historical point of view, and, as this standpoint is well fitted to furnish us with both information and direction, I shall use it to set forth the general grounds of sympathy between man and beast which have been recognized in the past and which seem to commend themselves to the various dispositions of mind which obtain at the present time.

In the Oriental countries of antiquity, and in some of them to-day, man's sympathetic attitude toward the lower animals is striking and in certain instances grotesque. So

far from finding exhibitions of cruelty toward the animal kingdom beyond that of necessary defense and the demands of religious rites, we see everywhere among ancient peoples a disposition to preserve and enhance their welfare. In India and China it was regarded as evidence of "a good and virtuous heart, and as meriting good fortune from the gods," to refrain from killing or maiming animal life, and to support certain animals as long as they live. In Egypt, India, and China, hospitals were established for certain injured and superannuated animals. Kindness is a part of the moral code of Mena, and in the Buddhist story we are told how "Sakka, the Great King of the Gods," when worsted in his fight with the Titans and fleeing in his famous "Chariot of Glory," turned aside, at the risk of falling into the hands of his foes, when the cry of young birds in distress smote upon his ears. "Let not these creatures," he said, "suffer on our account; let us not for the sake of our safety and supremacy put the living to pain." The orthodox Burmese will not kill even a wild animal; nor will he dig, except in sand, for fear of injuring or destroying life. But while animal life in antiquity was enjoying its golden age, human life was passing through its iron age of sorrow and oppression. The lines of Burns were truer then than now:—

"Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn."

The explanation of this happy state of things for the animal kingdom is close at hand. To the Oriental the phrase "Mother Earth" was full of significance. They were evolutionists, and lived in the closest sympathy and communion with all the phenomena of nature. They found in nature their theology, religion, and explanation of life. With their theories of emanation, transmigration, and kinship of man and beast, we find animal worship in its various forms. In Egypt and India, deities were supposed to be incarnated

in certain animals, while the belief in metempsychosis reached even to Greece. Some of the Orphists, as well as Pythagoras and Empedocles, prohibited the slaying of any animal and the eating of flesh, on the ground that one might be killing or eating an ancestor or a friend. Even Plato seems to have accepted the doctrines of the transmigration of human souls through the bodies of animals. Whether this fundamental feeling of kinship between man and beast is to be regarded as spontaneous, or as arising out of scientific reflection, is difficult to determine. This kinship comes to the front in most ancient mythologies. The general view was that man is a part of nature, and that all nature is alive, and that all parts of nature are kin. When we press the question we seem to come upon some scientific reflection, rather than a vague spontaneity of feeling. Thus in Africa and Asia, where the anthropoid apes are found, there were two theories as to the relations of man and the apes. Some held that the apes were degenerate men, while others regarded man to be developed from the ape. In recent times the Dyaks of Borneo and the Thibetans respectively held these views. The views agree only in emphasizing likeness or unity of sentient life. In examining various systems of *toboo*, we seem to come upon utilitarian considerations as we find, for the most part, those animals involved which are most useful and companionable to man. When we turn to early Greece, the scientific aspect or ground for sympathy is more pronounced in such physicists as Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, who outlined with considerable detail the modern doctrine of evolution. They regarded nature as in continual flux, with nothing permanent but the law of change; so that, from the lowest forms of life up to man, there is continuity of life. "Mother Earth" was to them the parent of all, and from her ample womb all organic things in common have their origin. But, aside from any religious

or scientific or utilitarian theory, it may be confidently asserted that antiquity furnishes many examples of a true altruistic spirit extending even to the lower animals. Plutarch tells us that the Pythagoreans, "in order that they might accustom men to the love of humanity and compassion, inculcated into their minds a particular care of being mild and gentle toward their beasts." This is sound pedagogy for all time. When we remember the barbarous games of Greece, such as the combats of cocks and quails, and the more savage sports of the Roman amphitheater, we should not forget that these were defended on the utilitarian ground, not of mere pastime, but of the example they offered to the people of courage and fortitude. That a mode of defense should be employed at all is sufficient evidence of the presence of humane feelings. Plutarch himself advocated kindness to the lower animals, on the ground of universal benevolence, and it is said that Appolonius of Tyana, on the ground of humanity, refused, even when invited by the king, to participate in the chase. Of Plutarch, Lecky says: "He condemns absolutely the games of the amphitheater, dwells with great force upon the effect of such spectacles in hardening the character, enumerates in detail, and denounces with unqualified energy, the refined cruelties which gastronomic fancies had produced, and asserts in the strongest language that every man has duties to the animal world as truly as to his fellow-men." Thus it seems to be clear that in pagan antiquity humane conduct toward the lower animals was advocated on the grounds of religion, of science, of utility, and of pure benevolence. The modern revival of humane feelings, like Humanism, draws largely upon Greek and Oriental modes of thought.

A somewhat different trend of thought is found in the literature of the Old and New Testaments. In Oriental thought the prevailing standpoint is cosmological, and some

form of materialistic monism is usually presented. Theology and anthropology get no independent positions, but are rather incidents in a comprehensive view of nature. In biblical literature, thought begins with God, and culminates in man in his relations to God. The archetypal thought is "In the beginning God"; from this basis of interpretation the genesis of the heavens and earth, the vegetable, animal, and human kingdoms, is unfolded in evolutionary sequence. Henceforth all thought centers in man,—his origin, nature, history, and destiny. Man is set apart from all other creations by a special act of the Creator. God breathes into man the breath of life, and man becomes by this act a living rational being. He is made in the image of God, and is given power over all things of earth. He becomes conscious that he stands highest in the scale of worth. Anthropology not only gets its first strong emphasis here, but is established as a standpoint which henceforth is parallel with, and frequently in conflict with, the theological point of view. In other ancient nations, human life was less sacred than that of many animals; but in the Old Testament it is of supreme value among created things. In theory Judaism is Humanism. One might suppose, with these anthropocentric views, which put man above natural and cosmic processes, that man's attitude toward the animal world would not be as sympathetic as among those peoples who view all sentient life as akin in mother earth. But when we examine the Hebrew literature we find the humane spirit as regards animals quite as active, though based on different grounds than those presented by India and Greece, as in any other ancient nation. Men and beasts are akin by virtue of having a common Creator, and animals are given to man as a trust from God. Hence Judaism is replete with legislation looking toward the welfare of the animal kingdom. Kindness is to be extended to the animals; they are to share in the Sabbath rest; they are

not to be mutilated; the nest of the bird is not to be robbed; the ox that treadeth out his master's corn must not be muzzled; the animal strayed must be led home to the stall, and the helpless beast must be relieved by the passer-by, even though the owner thereof be his enemy. God cares for the beast, and it is partly on this ground he promises to spare Nineveh. There are even indications that animals have moral character and responsibility. For certain acts they are to be stoned; they shared in the fall of man, and some commentators find in Isaiah and Paul a strong expectation of their restoration. While this may be true as regards Isaiah, there are good grounds for doubting such an interpretation of Paul's words in Romans viii. 19-22, for the New Testament in general, and Paul in particular, puts a much stronger emphasis upon the anthropocentric standpoint than does the Old Testament. In 1 Cor. ix. 9, we find Paul implying that God does not care for oxen, and the spirit of Paul, like that of Socrates, is almost purely anthropic. In a well-known passage in Origen's treatise "*Contra Celsus*," light is thrown upon the different way in which the early Christians and the Orientals regarded men and animals. Celsus objected to the Christian doctrine of man as the crown of creation, holding that many of the animals were at least the equals of men in reason, knowledge, and religious feeling. This objection may fairly be taken as revealing the difference between the Greek and the Roman spirit, as well as a distinction between Oriental and New Testament teaching. Still we should not overlook the fact that the cardinal principles of Christ's teaching have worked directly toward the amelioration of all sentient life, and that Christianity has taken up some of the Oriental extravagances for which Celsus contended. We need but recall St. Francis preaching to the birds, St. Anthony of Padua evangelizing the fishes, and Jelâl proclaiming the gospel to the dogs. These ex-

travagances remind us of the mediæval Cardinal Bellarmino, who refused to free his body from vermin, saying, "We shall have heaven to reward us for our sufferings, but these poor creatures have nothing but the enjoyment of this present life." Now and again in the history of the church we find councils protesting against cruelty to the lower animals. But while the church has broadened and deepened human love and sympathy by its great doctrines of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, and wrought powerfully in stimulating a cosmopolitan spirit among men, her work has been almost entirely confined within anthropological limits. Only indirectly has she taught, with Coleridge:—

"He prayeth well who loveth well
Both man and bird and beast.
He prayeth best who loveth best
All things, both great and small;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all."

When we turn to more modern times, the animal kingdom appears to disadvantage, as regards humane attention, compared with the more remote ages. A careful student of ethics in its various departments cannot fail to note that since the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries animals have been used more vicariously in our industrial system than in the religious systems of antiquity, and that the abuses and sufferings imposed upon the brute creation have no parallel in the more remote periods. The rise of humane societies in our century has its origin not in an effort to correct abuses that have always existed, but in the rapid rise of recklessness of animal life in recent times. It was the atrocious cruelty of the vivisection practiced in England, especially in the experimental lectures of Majendie, that excited revolt and set on foot this humane movement. I am aware that the statement that there is less humane sympathy with the animal kingdom in re-

cent than in ancient times may excite surprise and objections; but that this is the case, and that at the same time it may be easily explained, is not very doubtful. The intense industrial character of our age in opening up new continents and districts, in working mines and lumber regions, in building cities and establishing manufactories, and commerce, in struggling for wealth under the system of competition, in inventing and using firearms, has reacted very unfavorably upon animal life. Cruel and needless sports have been so widely extended that now the world is full of complaints that the large game of all countries is rapidly decreasing, while many species, large and small, have already become extinct. Thus both business and pleasure conspire against both the domestic and wild members of the animal kingdom. Then, too, as conduct is always governed in some degree by one's view, we must take into consideration theories as to the nature of the animal. With the Renaissance there arose the theory that animals are unconscious automata, without real sensations and feelings, and that their manifestations of pain and pleasure are but shams. Even so mild a spirit as Malebranche could write, "Men are too stupid to see that the abstract proof of automatism is most clear and certain, with nothing to set against it but a confused presumption from their own senses." Although this was but a crotchet in a metaphysical system, it gave an indulgence to cruelty which base natures would only too willingly accept. Like the Spanish interpretation of polygenism in the West Indies and Central America, it was a comfortable theory for industrialism, but wholly brutalizing in practice. Nothing of course could be more remote from facts than this theory, unless it be the more recent theory, revived from India through Schopenhauer and Fechner, which teaches that all nature, even the crystal and atom, possesses sentiency and will. It is clear that our humane societies cannot be, or at least

ought not to be, conducted on either of these two metaphysical programs.

Another depressing influence has been, and in a decreasing measure continues to be, the conception of nature entailed by the theory of "natural selection." It maintains that organic nature is a state of relentless and merciless warfare, a struggle for existence culminating in the survival of the fittest or the strongest. Although the phraseology of this theory is somewhat ambiguous, the picture of nature which is commonly held up to the world by the faithful disciples of Darwin is without design and sympathy. This yields an ethic, the leading principles of which are "Might is right" and "Each is for himself." This doctrine, false as thus stated and defective at best, paralyzes the moral sense, and sorely needs the revision which it receives from Mr. Spencer, Mr. Fiske, and Mr. Drummond. These able writers discover inherent altruism in nature, and seek to give cosmic sympathy a basis in fact and a position in philosophy. In saying this I venture no opinion as to the adequacy of a naturalistic ethic.

What has already been noted as regards theory and practice will enable one to understand how it is that in our own century there has been, and is, so much indifference to animal suffering, and especially in regard to those experimental exercises with animal life known as vivisection. One cannot help being impressed with the indifference of educational leaders as to the real status of the laboratories of colleges and universities on this question. That there is much idle and useless experimentation on animal life no one would deny; on the other hand, that the prevailing abuses are greatly overrated by sentimentalists is equally clear. The present enthusiasm for biology in its physiological and anatomical aspects makes it desirable that some means be devised to curb the recklessness of young and careless experimenters. In ancient Egypt vivisection was

practiced only under state control, by a special class and for humane purposes. In Rome, according to Galen and Celsus, the practice was guided by utilitarian ends. Ought the modern state to follow Egypt by legislation, or, like Rome, leave vivisection to the humane feelings of the individuals and to public sentiment? In a recent canvass of twelve hundred and thirty-nine physicians in Massachusetts, two hundred and forty-three were in favor of unlimited vivisection, nine hundred and sixty-eight against unlimited vivisection, and twenty-eight gave evasive answers. It is very important that this subject should not be treated either sentimentally or hysterically. Those who meet the protests against vivisection by the cry "opposition to science," ought to show what vivisection has done, or is likely to do, for science. There appear to be some good grounds for the opinion that a scientific showing favorable to vivisection cannot be produced. Though many attempts have been made to show that vivisection has advanced physiological and psychological science, the inconclusiveness of these efforts suggests that we are still in need of a scientific reason for the continuance of the practice.

On the other hand, there are some sentimentalists who speak after the manner of Robert Browning: "I would rather submit to the worst of deaths, so far as pain goes, than to have a single dog or cat tortured under the pretense of saving me a twinge or two." These ought to show on what ground such a preference should be made. It is perhaps not sufficiently remembered that pleasure and pain depend upon the development of the nervous and sympathetic systems, and that like afflictions are not attended with like sufferings in the man and in the lower vertebrates. But, considering the well-developed system of the higher vertebrates, such barbarous practices as docking, cropping, and worming should be prohibited, while no vivisection should be allowed without a proper use of

anæsthetics. That a judicious spirit prevails among the friends of the lower animals is seen in the refusal of the American Society to take action in cases where animals have been inoculated to produce anti-toxine for humane ends. The old Greek controversy, whether animals share with man the intellectual, æsthetic, and moral life, which is so finely reflected in the writings of Plutarch and which was revived by Descartes, Charron, and Chanet, although still in discussion, has at present a very considerable consensus of the most competent witnesses in the negative.

It appears to me, both from historical reflection and from observation of the present disposition of men, that there are three pretty well defined considerations that lead men to an exercise of mercy toward the animal kingdom,—considerations upon which we may rely for the prosecuting of the work of the Humane Society. I do not mean that each of these views will have like weight, but that one or other of them will appear as substantial to most men. These three points of view are the theological, the cosmological, and the anthropological. Some will be influenced by the theological point of view, that, as all sentient beings have a common Author, man, as the acme of the biological line, is under obligation, both in common sense and by prescription, to consult the welfare of the beast so far as it is consistent with his own. Others will be influenced by cosmic considerations,—by observation of the nature and habits of the lower animals, and perhaps too by the thought that man is, after all, a member of the same kingdom, of the same blood, and of the same general nature and process. But I suppose our chief dependence must be upon that somewhat vague but no less real altruistic spirit manifested in man which animates and impels all humanistic efforts. It is idle to deny that there is a spontaneous and disinterested impulse among men, call it love, benevolence, sympathy, philanthropy, justice, or equity, as we may. Whether

reasoned or unreasoned, it is potent, and Mr. Sidgwick is undoubtedly correct in holding, when speaking of the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, that the only legitimate interpretation of "the greatest happiness theory" extends it to all sentient beings. However this may be, it is desirable to make animals an object of study, to allow children to have pets and to read books concerning them. Such knowledge generates sympathy, and he who understands and loves one animal is thereby disposed to respect the well-being of all. Finally, we may consider the Humane Society as an educational institution. While the discovery of anæsthetics and the various applications of steam and electricity have done much to raise the burdens of suffering from animal life, it is the presence and the work of the Humane Society that puts man consciously and actively in sympathy with the animal world. Its presence and organized activity is a humanizing influence in every city. Armed with the power of the law, its every interference in behalf of the suffering teaches that the humane feelings are not impotent, but alive in the community. Its collections of instruments of torture and its records of cases relieved or rescued, show that it actually has a mission to make sympathy and decency the atmosphere of all life. What Landseer and Rosa Bonheur did for animals in art, that, I think, the Humane Society may do in the industrial and in the domestic world. The animal life about us, though helpless and dependent, may be made companionable and beautiful. As we proceed in our work and become better acquainted with the relations of man to the lower animals, we may reasonably expect that there will be less starvation, exposure, annoyance, bodily injury, and cruel death imposed upon our mute neighbors.

ARTICLE IV. .

THE PREDICTIVE ELEMENT IN OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY.

BY PROFESSOR WALTER R. BETTERIDGE.

A PROPER conception of prophecy is indispensable to a clear understanding of the Christian religion. As a revealed religion, Christianity is, in its essence, dependent upon prophecy; for, broadly considered, the prophet is the organ of revelation. In the Old and in the New Testament alike the prophet is the divine messenger who communicates to his fellow-men the messages which he has received from God. Paul as well as Isaiah, Peter as well as Jeremiah, belong to the glorious company of the prophets. Yes, even our Lord himself, though greater than the prophets, is also, in a very real sense, the greatest of the prophets. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the study of prophecy has occupied the attention of religious thinkers of all ages. The advocates of the most rigid supernaturalism have found their strongest support in their doctrine of prophecy, while, on the other hand, the most systematic and scientific attempt ever made to disprove the supernatural character of the religion of the Old Testament is also a work on prophecy,—I refer to the book entitled “*Prophecies and Prophecy in Israel*,” by the late Professor Kuenen of Leiden.

It is not my purpose here to discuss the question of the divine origin of the biblical religion. I would be the last to ignore the question or to underestimate its importance. No consideration of prophecy can be complete which does

not candidly face this problem and honestly attempt to solve it. But for the believer the divine origin of the Christian religion is an established fact. As Christians we accept the declaration of the apostle, that "no prophecy ever came by the will of man; but men spake from God, being moved by the Holy Ghost."¹ We admit the claim distinctly made by the prophets of both Testaments, to be divinely inspired and divinely commissioned. The messages which they delivered did not come from their own hearts. These messages are not in any sense the result of their own reasoning on the course of events, but have been communicated to their spirits by the Spirit of God. They appear as prophets not of their own will. On the contrary, they often prophesy in direct opposition to their own inclinations by virtue of the inner compulsion of the divine message which they have received; or, to express the same thought in the picturesque language of one of their own number, "The Lord Jehovah hath spoken, who can but prophesy!"² We are justified, therefore, in defining a prophet, in the biblical sense of the word, as the man who delivers to men the message which he has received from God. Or, to employ the comparison used in the book of Exodus,³ the prophet stands in a relation to God similar to the relation in which Aaron stood to Moses: the prophet is God's mouthpiece, his spokesman. This definition is in its essence equally valid, whatever may be our conclusion in regard to the vexed question of the fundamental meaning of the meaning of the word *nabi*, the principal Hebrew name for a prophet. Whether the prophet is the inspired one, or, as seems to me more probable, is the speaker, the result is the same. In the one case, he declares what has been inspired—breathed into him by the Divine Spirit; in the other case, the prophet is the speaker, the man who speaks under the influence of the

¹ 2 Peter i. 21.² Amos iii. 8.³ Exodus vii. 1, 2.

Deity. Accepting this definition of the biblical prophet, we are prepared to consider his function.

PROPHECY NOT EXCLUSIVELY PREDICTION.

Modern usage has given a narrower meaning to the term "prophet," and it is not strange that the popular conception of the biblical prophet is that he was chiefly, if not exclusively, a foreteller, a predictor of future events. This popular view of prophecy agrees essentially with the older scholastic theory which found the characteristic of the prophet in the fact that he is "endowed with a knowledge of hidden things, especially of hidden things of the future"; or, in other words, that his characteristic function was prediction. This theory has few if any supporters among biblical scholars of the present day. Its inadequacy has been exposed not only by writers who, like Kuenen, seek to disprove the supernatural origin of the Christian religion, but also by scholars who are hearty believers in the truth of a revealed religion. All recent evangelical interpreters of the religion of the prophets unite in protesting against this rigid scholastic theory of prophecy, and in endeavoring to restore to the term its original broad meaning. They also insist on the historical character of Old Testament prophecy, and in so doing have rendered an inestimable service to the cause of theological science. The prophet is undoubtedly a man of his own times; he speaks primarily to his own contemporaries; whether his message is concerned with past, present, or future, his primary object is the religious instruction of his fellow-men.

PREDICTION AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF PROPHECY.

But it may well be questioned, whether the modern historical theories of the functions of the prophet are not as truly open to the charge of inadequacy and defectiveness as was the theory which they have so largely displaced. It is

unquestionably true that these theories tend to minimize the predictive element in prophecy, and indeed to deny that prediction is an essential element of prophecy. They insist that the prophet was mainly, if not almost exclusively, occupied with the present as a reformer, as a preacher of righteousness, or with the past as historian, and hence interpreter of the events of history in accordance with his conception of the revelation of the divine nature. The future, on the other hand, he discusses only occasionally and incidentally. His statements in regard to the future are, in the main, only the result of his clearer insight into the true state of the affairs of the present, and of his unusual ability to read accurately the signs of the times; or they are the deductions which he makes from his divinely imparted knowledge of God's love and holiness. The following quotation from the "Old Testament Theology" of Schultz¹ may be taken as fairly representative of the views of this class of interpreters. "Prophecy," or in this connection more accurately rendered "Prediction," "is thus the prophet's application to the future of his certainty as to the eternal laws of the Divine Being and Will, and as to the final goal of salvation, in so far as that future is of importance for the present, and is connected with the sphere of religion and morals." In thus minimizing the predictive element, the recent interpreters of the prophets, whether influenced by the purely historical spirit, or by the desire to formulate such a doctrine of prophecy as would be unassailable by the opponents of a revealed religion, have formulated theories which are defective and one-sided. A true historical method of explanation must take account of all the phenomena of the prophetic activity, and must base its theory of prophecy upon a consideration of all the facts. And it is surely a mistake to suppose that any theory, no matter how important that theory may be, can be made secure

¹ English Translation, Vol. i. p. 282.

from attack when it plainly ignores or denies a large portion of the facts which must be taken into account before any proper theory can be formed. Such a fair and impartial consideration of the testimony of the prophets leads to the conclusion that prediction, so far from being merely subordinate and insignificant, is really a prominent and essential element in Old Testament prophecy; so far from being only the "prophet's application to the future of his certainty as to the eternal laws of the Divine Being and Will," that is really the result not of revelation, but of a process of reasoning, is actually a part of the body of truth which has been revealed to him by the Divine Spirit. This conclusion is amply supported by the testimony of the prophets themselves. On their own evidence they were seers. They knew the purposes of Jehovah in regard to their own people and also in regard to other nations. A recent writer in his¹ discussion of prophecy maintains that their denunciations of the sins of their contemporaries were only deductions from the revelation which they had received; a reasoning back from effect to cause. The coming catastrophe was revealed to them; from this fact in connection with the principle of divine righteousness and justice, they deduced the reason for the punishment, namely, the failure of the people to conform to the divine requirements. While it is doubtful whether this theory furnishes an adequate explanation for all the facts, it contains nevertheless a large element of truth. The prophecies of Amos furnish an excellent illustration in favor of this point of view. According to the prophet's own statement, Jehovah took him from following the flock, and said to him, "Go prophesy unto my people Israel." But the series of visions which he describes undoubtedly gives the fuller account of his call. And according to these visions the essence of the revelations which had been made to him was the approach-

¹ Smend, *Alttest Religionsgeschichte*, p. 170.

ing destruction of the Northern Kingdom. The disaster twice averted in consequence of the prophet's intercession is at last seen to be inevitable. "The high places of Isaac shall be desolate, and the sanctuaries of Israel shall be laid waste." The causes for this doom are not far to seek: they consist in the sins of the people,—sins which the prophet proceeds to denounce with unexampled severity. In their own accounts of their call and consecration, Isaiah and Jeremiah emphasize essentially the same truth. The Lord Jehovah is going to bring an overwhelming disaster upon the land, and indeed upon the whole earth. But the Lord Jehovah does not do anything without revealing his secret to his servants the prophets. And it is the proclamation, the development and the application of the secrets thus revealed which form the burden of the prophetic message.

THE PROPHEPIC ESTIMATE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PREDICTION.

Another fact which cannot be overlooked, is the emphasis laid by the Old Testament upon the power to predict as a characteristic of the true prophet. The law in Deuteronomy describes two qualities which the true prophet must possess, two kinds of credentials which he must show, in order to command the attention of his hearers. The one qualification is the substance¹ or content of his prophecy which must not seek to lead away to the service of other gods. But, further,² when Moses commands the people of Israel not to follow after the nations whom they are going up to dispossess who listen to "observers of times and diviners," but to hearken to the prophet whom Jehovah shall raise up, he distinctly asserts that the fulfillment of this prophet's predictions shall be the test of his divine commission. Micaiah³ the son of Imlah was content to await in confinement the progress of events, confident that

¹ Deut. xiii. 1-5.

² Deut. xviii. 14-22.

³ 1 Kings xxii. 28.

his prediction would be fulfilled, and calling upon the people to witness that if Ahab returned in peace, then he was branded as a false prophet. Jeremiah¹ holds essentially the same doctrine, and, according to Ezekiel,² the fulfillment of his prophecies will be the proof to the indifferent people that a prophet of Jehovah has actually been among them.

But unquestionably the classic exposition of the prophetic conception of the nature of prophecy is to be found in the second part of the book of Isaiah. For the purposes of this discussion it is not material when or by whom these chapters were written. Their prophetic authorship is unquestioned, and whether their author lived and wrote in the time of Hezekiah or during the closing years of the Babylonian exile, his views in regard to prophecy are of the first importance. In his magnificent description of the challenge which Jehovah the Holy One of Israel issues to the gods of the nations to come forth and compare themselves with him, it is upon the inability of these gods to prophesy, to predict, in contrast with Jehovah's own marvelous prophecies, that he never wearies of laying the emphasis. "Produce your cause, saith the Lord; bring forth your strong reasons, saith the King of Jacob. Let them bring them forth, and declare unto us what shall happen: declare ye the former things what they be . . . ; or show us things for to come. Declare the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods. . . . Who hath declared it from the beginning, that we may know? and beforetime, that we may say, He is righteous? Yea, there is none that declareth; yea, there is none that showeth; yea, there is none that heareth your words."³ "Assemble yourselves and come; draw near together, ye that are escaped of the nations. Declare ye, and bring it forth; yea, let them take counsel together: who hath showed this from ancient

¹ Jer. xxviii. 9. ² Ezek. xxxiii. 33. ³ Isa. xli. 21-23, 26.

time? who hath declared it of old? have not I Jehovah?"¹

Again it is upon prophecy that the prophet bases his plea to the people to hear and heed the words of Jehovah. "Remember the former things of old: for I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure."² And his severest denunciations are occasioned by the obstinate refusal of the people to serve Jehovah in spite of the fact that he has, by his prophetic dealings with them, proved himself to be superior to their idols. "Because I knew that thou art obstinate, and thy neck is an iron sinew, and thy brow brass; therefore I have declared it to thee from of old; before it came to pass I showed it thee: lest thou shouldest say, Mine idol hath done them, and my graven image and my molten image hath commanded them. . . . I have showed thee new things from this time, even hidden things which thou hast not known. They are created now, and not from of old; and before this day thou heardest them not; lest thou shouldest say, Behold, I knew them."³

But further quotation is not necessary. Even the most casual reading of chapters xl.-xlviii. of the book of Isaiah must show that their author, at least, did not regard prediction as an insignificant and sporadic element of Old Testament prophecy. One more illustration from another source will suffice to indicate beyond a doubt what the prophets themselves thought of the importance of their divinely imparted power to predict, and then we must pass on to a consideration of a few of the actual instances of predictive prophecy which are recorded in the Old Testament. This illustration is taken from the prophecy of Zechariah in the period immediately following the return from the exile. The prophet in beginning his appeal to

¹ Isa. xlv. 20, 21.

² Isa. xlv. 9, 10.

³ Isa. xlviii. 4-7.

the people, bases his claim to their respectful attention upon the ground that the earlier prophetic oracles had been fulfilled. "Be ye not as your fathers, unto whom the former prophets cried, saying, Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, Return ye now from your evil ways, and from your evil doings: but they did not hear nor hearken unto me, saith the Lord. . . . But my words and my statutes which I commanded my servants the prophets, did they not overtake your fathers?"¹

INSTANCES OF PREDICTION.

The most obvious though by no means the most frequent or the most important form of predictive prophecy consists in the precise foretelling of distinct and definite future events. Kuenen has endeavored to break the force of such predictions by maintaining that they were in most cases reduced to writing after the events which they ostensibly predicted had actually happened, while in other cases the predictions were of such a nature as naturally to secure their own fulfillment. The present tendency is undoubtedly in the direction of explaining these cases of definite prediction as sporadic and accidental, not essentially different from divination or soothsaying. To quote again from Schultz: "They must be connected with the dark and mysterious realm of spiritual life in which a special unnatural excitement and one-sided enlargement of particular faculties of the soul awaken presentiments which are taken for certainties."² This attempt to explain away such recorded cases of actual definite prediction can only be accounted for when we remember that it is made by those interpreters who seek to show that predictive prophecy is always general rather than specific, and is indeed mainly the result of shrewd generalizations. But this attempt is rendered futile by the facts which oppose it. Not merely in the historical books which contain the records of the lives of the earlier prophets,

¹ Zech. i. 4-6.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. i. p. 283.

but also in the distinctively prophetical books, cases of such specific prediction occur in such numbers and so well attested, as to render it impossible to doubt that the prophets themselves in these instances were conscious of uttering not "presentiments" but "certainties," certainties communicated to them by the same spirit who inspired them with their certain convictions in regard to religious truth. From the historical books of the Old Testament we may select as examples of such specific prediction or unveiling of the future,¹ the series of signs which Samuel gave to Saul, the occurrence of which was to prove to Saul that God had called him to be the leader of the people of Israel. Or Ahijah's promise to Jeroboam that he should become king over the ten tribes which were to be taken away from the house of David in the reign of Solomon's successor, or the doom pronounced upon Jeroboam's altar at Bethel by the man of God out of Judah, a prediction whose force is not destroyed even if it be proved that the name Josiah is a later addition to the text.

From the prophetical writings the following instances of specific prediction may suffice as illustrations: Amos predicts with great definiteness the fate of Amaziah the priest of Bethel, as well as that of his family; he also predicts the Assyrian captivity.² Isaiah declares that before the child whose birth is near at hand shall have come to the age of moral responsibility, great distress shall come upon the kingdom of Judah, while its foes Ephraim and Damascus shall be destroyed.³ A little later he asserts that before his own new-born son shall be able to say "My father, and, My mother, the riches of Damascus and the spoil of Samaria shall be carried away before the king of Assyria,"⁴ while in still another prophecy he says that an earlier still un-

¹ 1 Sam. x. 1-9; 1 Kings xi. 29; xiii. 1-3. For other instances see 1 Kings xiv. 1-18; xvii. 1; xviii. 1, 45; xxii. 14-28; 2 Kings vii. 1, 2.

² Amos vii. 17; v. 27. ³ Isa. vii. 16. ⁴ Isa. viii. 4.

fulfilled judgment which had been pronounced upon Moab shall be fulfilled within three years.¹ Jeremiah foretells the death of his opponent Hananiah within the year, and on at least two different occasions declares that the Babylonian exile is inevitable, but that it shall be of limited duration, extending over a period of seventy years.² Ezekiel in Babylon predicts the beginning of the siege of Jerusalem, and on another occasion by his symbolic action he depicts the futile attempt of the defeated king of Judah to escape from the doomed city, and declares that he shall be taken captive and be deprived of his eyesight.³ These instances, the number of which is capable of being largely increased, must suffice to illustrate the truth of the assertion previously made, that the prophets of Israel in all periods of their history were conscious of being endowed with the power of definite and specific prediction.

MESSIANIC PROPHECY.

But such cases, while sufficiently numerous and unequivocal to compel the acknowledgment of the predictive element in prophecy, form by no means the most characteristic feature of Old Testament prophecy, and if they stood alone the present tendency to ignore them would not be difficult to explain. But such is not the case. The most noble, the most characteristic, part of Old Testament prophecy is in its essence predictive prophecy. I mean the so-called Messianic prophecy, which I use in the broader sense of the term, as including all prophecies concerning the completion of the kingdom of God and the redemption and glorification of his people, whether this looked-for consummation is represented as being brought about by the royal personal deliverer from David's house, or is regarded as being the direct work of Jehovah himself. The retention of the

¹ Isa. xvi. 13, 14. ² Jer. xxviii. 15, 17; xxv. 12; xxix. 10.

³ Ezek. xxi. 18; xii. 3-15.

term "Messianic" may be further justified from the fact, that, whether expressly mentioned or not, it is nevertheless true that the personal Messiah is the central figure of the glorious kingdom of the future. Messianic prophecy forms a part of all forms of biblical literature. History and poetry alike contain allusions to the coming glory, but these are in the main only foreshadowings. Messianic prophecy in its highest beauty and splendor is chiefly confined to the prophetic books. But this glowing depiction of the future redemption has its darker counterpart, which stands even more distinctly in the foreground of the prophets' picture of the coming age. All of the prophets without exception are heralds of doom. It is scarcely correct to hold that this proclamation of doom was their principal function,¹ that their hopes for the accomplishment of redemption and the ushering in of God's kingdom while ever present, are only secondary. The truer conception would seem to be that the two phases of their work, the proclamation of the coming doom, and the description of the dawn of the reign of peace and righteousness, taken together, form the determining elements of their prophetic work. In other words the orbit of predictive prophecy is not a circle, but an ellipse, with judgment and restoration as its focal points. From these two great facts of the future which have been revealed to them by God himself and which no human power can change, the prophets judge their own contemporaries, both those of their own nation and those of foreign nations as well. These two facts form, therefore, the fixed points of the prophetic conception of the future. Some of the prophets seem to emphasize the fact of judgment, while others of them bring into prominence the fact of the coming glory. In Amos, for example, the proclamation of doom is the chief feature. But he too recognizes the fact that Jehovah's people shall be sifted

¹ So Smend, *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

like grain in the sieve, yet not one sound grain shall fall to the ground, and he closes his prophecy with a description of the glory of that future in which the Lord shall reign. In the second part of the book of Isaiah, on the other hand, the idea of the coming restoration occupies the more prominent position. But here, too, the proclamation of doom is not wanting. And at the close of the long series of prophets, we find that the same two facts are the determining factors of Malachi's picture of the future: "For, behold, the day cometh, it burneth as a furnace; and all the proud, and all that work wickedness, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the Lord of hosts, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch. But unto you that fear my name shall the sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings."¹ Without an apprehension of these two determining facts of the prophetic conception of the future, a correct understanding of prophecy is impossible, the marvelous interchange of light and shade, of denunciation and promise, which characterize the pictures of such a master of prophecy as Isaiah, seems only an illogical tangle. But, as is often the case with a picture which at first sight seems to be only a confused mass of color, but, when seen from the proper point of view, the confusion disappears, the figures or the landscape assume their rightful relations, and the beholder stands spellbound before the work of the master; so it is with prophecy, the various elements of the picture seem at first to be in a state of inextricable confusion, but, seen from the point of view of the prophet, with his vision of doom and of glory, the prophecy gradually assumes a symmetrical form, and discloses a picture of surpassing beauty.

That prophecy such as has just been described forms an important part of the prophetic portions of the Old Testament, no one would dream of denying. The mere attempt

¹ Mal. iv. 1-2.

to remove it from the body of extant prophecy shows instantly that without it we have very little record of the activity of those heroes, whose restoration to their true place in history is the service which modern criticism claims to have performed. But not until modern criticism is willing to accept the word of the prophets in regard to the source of their knowledge of the future, will it be capable of doing them full justice. Not shrewd generalizations, not "the application to the future, of his certainty as to the eternal laws of the Divine Being and Will, and as to the final goal of salvation," but "thus the Lord Jehovah showed me," according to the prophets themselves, is the ground of their knowledge, and the reason for their certainty. An Amos, a Hosea, an Isaiah, or a Jeremiah proclaims with certainty the approaching punishment, not from his conviction that sin must be punished, but from divine revelation. Similarly each one of them bases his faith in the ultimate restoration of at least a fragment of the people, not on his conception of the indissoluble bond between Jehovah and his people, but upon the promise which Jehovah has given him.

We conclude, therefore, that rightly considered the prophet is really a seer. This does not result in withdrawing him from his connection with his own time, nor preclude the strictest historical interpretation of his life and work. He is a preacher of righteousness, but the revelation of coming facts furnishes him with the text for his sermons. He is a reformer, but his vision of doom in connection with his divinely imparted conception of the true character of Jehovah's kingdom of the future has given him the measure with which to compare the present. His pictures of the future are not mere projections of his present experience and of his shrewd estimation of present circumstances, but are the result of a certain immediate knowledge of the divine plan for the future.

PREDICTION AND FULFILLMENT.

The object of this discussion has been to ascertain the prophet's estimate of the nature and value of the predictive element in Old Testament prophecy. The conclusions which may be reached in such a consideration are not dependent upon the question of the fulfillment of prophecy. But a few words upon the fulfillment of prophecy may not be out of place here. It is probably a fact that a large part of the prediction of the Old Testament prophets has not been fulfilled, and in all likelihood never will be fulfilled. It is probably equally true that the prophets themselves did not expect a literal fulfillment of their predictions. In many cases, indeed, the true object of the prediction could be reached only if the necessity of its fulfillment was averted. For it can scarcely be denied that the prophets recognized this fact that much of their prophecy was conditional. Even Amos, stern, unrelenting messenger of approaching doom that he was, interrupted the stream of his denunciations with the exhortation, "Seek ye me and live." And indeed all of the prophets, while despairing of reform, yet show unmistakably that they regard it possible to avert the punishment by speedy and thoroughgoing repentance. There is, therefore, no force in Kuenen's taunt, that to maintain that certain prophecies were conditional is to rescue the prophets at the expense of the divine omniscience. Furthermore, there is undoubtedly an ideal element in prophecy. Many of the prophetic pictures of the future are clothed in highly figurative language, and it is unreasonable to suppose that the prophets could have expected that these predictions would be literally fulfilled. And with the meager materials at our command it is impossible to declare just what kind of fulfillment the prophets themselves expected. That they expected the fulfillment of many of their prophecies in some way or other, and at some time or other, is certain, and the fact that a certain proph-

ecy remained for a long time unfulfilled did not cause them to waver in this belief. Isaiah makes use of an older prophecy against Moab, and supplements it with the assertion that, though delayed long, the judgment is not averted but shall soon come. And even if it be admitted that he expected the dawn of the Messianic era to follow very soon after the Syro-Ephraimitish invasion, yet he did not hesitate to express the same hopes when thirty years later the Assyrians were threatening the city of Jehovah.

It will be clear, therefore, that a proper conception of the fulfillment of prophecy cannot be derived from a study of the Old Testament prophetic writings alone. Prophecy was religious instruction and was based upon a distinct revelation of the divine plans and purposes for the future. But the most prolonged examination of the prophetic statements alone cannot make these plans and purposes clear to our minds. Much of Old Testament prophecy is explicable only in the light of the New Testament. The New Testament writers saw the true fulfillment of prophecy in the person and work of Jesus Christ. His life and the perfect revelation which he brought furnish the key which unlocks many of the mysteries of the Old Testament. In the highest and best sense of the term, Old Testament prophecy has found its fulfillment in Jesus of Nazareth.

ARTICLE V.

AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CLUB.

BY PROFESSOR R. T. STEVENSON, PH. D.

THE eighteenth century was an era of clubs. The essayists of Queen Anne's reign made them popular. From the founding of the famous Kit-Cat Club of Addison in 1700, there was a remarkable increase in their number till we reach the most renowned of all, "The Club," of Dr. Johnson, in 1763. The Kit-Cat had among its members Halifax, Somers, Addison, Congreve, Vanbrugh, a double handful of dukes and earls, Sir Robert Walpole, and such like Whig wits and statesmen.

A look at the greater of these two is interesting. After an inexpensive supper at the Turk's Head, Soho, art, letters, manners, and politics are discussed with freedom. Here sits Johnson the dictator, huge, scholarly, voracious, rough, veracious. Around the circle are Reynolds the painter, Burke the orator, Garrick the actor, Gibbon the historian, Jones the orientalist, Goldsmith the prince of essayists, and Boswell of biographical fame. In merry spirit they pass, with the swiftness of intellectual shuttles, jests, quips, philosophical reflections, satire, and story. In all this, brains as well as banter, distinguish the crowd. The beadroll of last century's notable names has a peculiar splendor when we reach the list of the members of the immortal Club. The passing years, like the worshiper's reverent touch, only polish more brightly the shining fame of Johnson and his friends.

Every business, social circle, and profession had its club. Nothing like it has been known in English history.

It would not be strange if Religion shared the spirit of the age. Piety was too inoffensive or too unambitious to give itself a club-life name. It left that to others, the ungodly, and then turned its crown of thorns into an imperishable halo.

In a small room in the second story of Lincoln College, Oxford, we see four young men bending over one book. It is the Greek Testament. The men are Morgan, Kirkham, John Wesley and his brother Charles. This is the "Holy Club."

These various good fellowships of the eighteenth century had distinct reasons for being. The student of English life in the early years of last century discovers a set purpose on the part of Addison and his friends to bring about a change in thought and manners. Addison's latest biographer, Coulthorpe, counts him as the "chief architect of public opinion in the eighteenth century." The facts fall short of this high eulogium, yet point that way. Addison's work as a reformer is too well known to be detailed. It is enough to show that the rigor of Puritan life and the recklessness of court circles were facing each other, sworn foes. Party violence was abnormally active to deepen the animosity. Addison showed the one that religion and good breeding were congenial, and the other that gloomy faces were not essential to a religious life. He said in the *Spectator*, No. 10, that it was his effort to "enliven morality with wit, and to temper wit with morality." Further on he said, "I have resolved to refresh their [his patrons] memories from day to day till I have recovered them out of that desperate state of vice and folly into which the age has fallen." Macaulay speaks of Addison as one "who, without inflicting a wound, effected a great social reform," and who united wit and virtue after a long separation, in which "wit

had been led astray by profligacy and virtue by fanaticism."

But Literature was not destined to lift England out of the mire. A mightier sword than the blade of wit must needs smite down the bad giant. Addison had been a Charterhouse boy. He died in 1719. One year later another Charterhouse boy, the son of a poor rector in Lincolnshire, left its cloisters for Oxford. The names that reflect upon the oaken walls and green quadrangles of Charterhouse the light of achievement are genial and glorious. In the list are Steele, Addison, Barrow, Havelock, and Thackeray. But Wesley has laid a mightier hand upon the helm of English history than satirist, statesman, or soldier.

The so-called Augustan age waned. Depravity deepened. London came to be called the "city of the gallows." No road ran into the metropolis that did not furnish to the eye of the traveler the sight of gibbeted highwaymen slowly rotting away in their clanking chains. The penal legislation of the eighteenth century knew of no cure for crime but the gallows. The iniquity of lawbreakers was only surpassed by the barbarity of their punishments and the atrocity of their execution. This ghastly generalization may seem to the average information too sweeping. Let us summon a few authorities, and make inquiry as to the moral condition of England in the eighteenth century.

The shameless profligacy of the reign of Charles II. was fairly well rivaled, though not so openly, by the deep depravity which pervaded the court until long after the accession of George III., the circles of the aristocracy, of the upper classes, of the middle classes, and of the lower ranks in the social scale. On all sides there was "duplicity, conjugal infidelity, dissoluteness, and laxity."¹ "Society² in

¹ Sydney, *England in the Eighteenth Century*, Vol. ii. p. 323.

² Trevelyn, C. J. Fox, p. 77.

those days was one vast casino." The gambler was abroad in the land.

Near the close of the first third of the century there grew up the "habit of gin-drinking, the master curse of English life, to which most of the crime and an immense proportion of the misery of the nation may be ascribed."¹ The same calm historian elsewhere says: "Small as is the place which this fact occupies in English history, it was probably, if we consider all the consequences that have flowed from it, the most momentous in that of the eighteenth century—incomparably more so than any event in the purely political or military annals of the country."²

Other well-known witnesses repeat the sad story. "In July, 1710, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu expressed her conviction in a letter written to the Bishop of Salisbury, accompanying a copy of her translation of 'Epictetus,' that more atheists were to be found among the fine ladies of the times than among the lower sort of rakes. Addison, writing in No. 47 of the *Freeholder*, declared that there was less appearance of religion in England than in any neighboring state or kingdom."³ While the Holy Club were poring over the Greek Testament in John Wesley's room in Lincoln College, Montesquieu was in the best society of London. He wrote, "There is no nation which has less religion than the English."

A witness of renown rises. The first sentences of Bishop Butler's "Analogy" (published May, 1736) state that many persons took it for granted that Christianity "is now at length discovered to be fictitious." The witnesses multiply. Bishop Secker, 1738, says, "An open and profound disregard to religion is becoming the distinguishing characteristic of the present age." Trevelyn says, "There is

¹ Lecky, *England in the Eighteenth Century*, Vol. i. p. 516.

² *Ibid.*, p. 519.

³ Sydney, *England in the Eighteenth Century*, Vol. ii. pp. 323, 324.

just as much and just as little trace of Christianity in Horace Walpole as in Pliny the Younger. Indeed in this very year of 1776, Walpole describes his first sight of the man [Wesley] who was guiding a revolution in creed and practice which has deeply and permanently modified the religion of the English-speaking race, in a letter, which, if translated into good Latin, might pass muster as an extract from the familiar correspondence of Gallio."¹ To quote a classic passage: "Never has a century risen upon Christian England so void of soul and faith as that which opened with Queen Anne, and which reached its misty noon beneath the second George; a dewless night succeeded by a sunless dawn. There was no freshness in the past, and no promise in the future. The Puritans were buried and the Methodists were not born." The Church of England was torpid. The lethargy which seized the church has been noted as "one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of religion."²

Macaulay has provoked much hostile criticism because of his sketch of the character of the Anglican clergy in the rural districts of England in the last half of the seventeenth century. Excellent authority, however, has declared, that "there is no reason to impugn the accuracy, in its main outlines, of the picture which Lord Macaulay has drawn."³ And further, Macaulay's picture would be a word-for-word statement of the condition of "one-half of the rural clergy of England for fully three-quarters of the eighteenth century."⁴

If the rural clergy were often inferior to the yeoman who hired their sons for the plow and their daughters for the dairy, the city clergy were not a whit behind their fashionable flocks in abandonment to follies, idleness, and sacrilege. The spouse of Archbishop Cornwallis presided over

¹ C. J. Fox, p. 86. ² Overton, *Evangelical Revival*, p. 1.

³ Sydney, *Op. cit.*, Vol. ii. p. 330. ⁴ *Idem*.

Sunday routs and balls at Lambeth palace. They became so notorious that George III. sent a remonstrance to his grace, and finally put a stop to this impiety.

Evidence accumulates on all sides to show that the guides of the church made sinecures of their sheepfolds, and even the more zealous contented themselves with a formal supervision of diocese and parish. When bishops were dead to duty, little could be expected of the under-shepherds, who fell into many and gross irregularities. Bishop Burnet thus expressed a not rare view: "I must say the main body of our English clergy has always appeared to me dead and lifeless." Arthur Young in "Travels in France," contrasts the exterior decency of behavior of the French clergy with that of the English. "Such advertisements were never seen in France as I have heard of in England: 'Wanted, a curacy in a good sporting country, where the duty is light and the neighborhood is convivial.'"

In 1781 Cowper penned these lines:—

"Except a few with Eli's spirit blessed,
Hophni and Phineas may describe the rest."

The ordination of ignorant dolts made the Ember weeks the "burden and grief of my life." So wrote Bishop Burnet in 1713.

Sir William Blackstone, early in the reign of George III., made the rounds of the pulpits of London. The result was, "that it would have been difficult for him to discover whether the preacher were a follower of Confucius, of Mahomet, or of Christ." Mark Pattison, in "Essays and Reviews," says the sermons of the eighteenth century were "cold and barren." As with the Anglican Church, so was it with the Nonconformist bodies. Skeats, their historian, says, "The churches were characterized by a cold indifference. The zeal of Puritanism was almost as unknown as it was unimitated."

The age was dry, cold, unromantic, severely practical. It cared little for high ideals. It set its face against enthusiasm. The two texts from which most sermons were preached in England during the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century were, "Let your moderation be known unto all men," and "Be not righteous overmuch."¹

A highly significant indication of the low moral tone of the times, especially of the first half of the century, may be found in the fact that men who filled pulpits dipped their pens in gossip, cheap comedy, coarse satire, and even wretched and unquotable obscenity. From Swift to Sterne, the highest officials and most brilliant wits read, quoted, and dilated with discreditable abandon upon the spicy scandals of letters, poems, plays, and daily life. Dean Swift grew old, and yet his old age was "stained with horrible and gratuitous obscenities" (Gosse). Lawrence Sterne preached with idiomatic power, yet his "Tristram Shandy" may not be unblushingly read to a group of both sexes.

To increase the difficulties of the situation, the deists were at the popular ear, especially in the first half of the century. It is true that Burke flung out the question, "Who, born within the last forty years, has read a word of Collins, or Toland, or Tindal, or Morgan, or the whole race of freethinkers? Who now reads Bolingbroke? Who ever read him through?" But it is also true that there was a time when this could not have been said. It is ours to show the reason of the overthrow of the deists. They had power at one time. Their influence was out of all proportion to their ability, for the scholarship of Locke, Clarke, Warburton, and Butler outranked theirs; to their literary standing, for Swift, Addison, and Steele were the rulers; and to their social influence, for with one or two exceptions they were unknown men. Deism was not unobstructed in its march. It was opposed. It was overthrown by Cony-

¹ Hunt, *History of Religious Thought in England*, Vol. iii. p. 291.

beare, Berkley, Lardner, and towering highest, by Butler. The answer to deism was complete, yet there was no guarantee of reform. The strongest motive to a moral life was lacking. The great danger was in the spiritual malaria of the times.

Attempts at cure were not lacking. Philosophy came with its balm and proposed a new ethical rule, "The greatest good to the greatest number." This scheme of ethics found its leader in Jeremy Bentham, who developed the theory of Utilitarian Morals. But it could only work upon life. It never called the dead to life. There is little room for doubt that Bentham's practical conclusions found in the latter half of the century readier welcome, because of the deeper and truer reformation wrought by the school of Christian evangelism. Aside from this, Utilitarianism never could have wrought even the good it boasted as its own, in the social and political reformation of England. It is stamped with selfishness. It is no pioneer in the world march. "Benthamism is an eyeless heroism; the human species, like a hapless Samson grinding in the Philistine mill, brings huge ruin down, but ultimately deliverance withal." So says Carlyle. But though "ultimate deliverance" may use to advantage somewhat of Benthamism, initial deliverance must come from heaven. What the English world needed was the touch of the Creator.

The above ethical theory has been declared "more beggarly than Mahomet's." Bentham's "moral arithmetic" would never have sent Whitefield to the collieries of Bristol. His mechanical scheme of life had too much of prudential calculation in it to send Coke to India, an old man on a young man's mission, with a young man's fiery heart. Preachers, like poets, are made, not by induction, but by inspiration.

This theory of reform was seconded by some very earnest practical efforts to work a change in the dolorous con-

dition of England, such as those put in operation by the "Societies for Reformation of Manners," near the beginning of the century. They soon assumed new functions, and became a sort of unofficial police. In making a fortieth annual report in 1735, it was stated that "the number of prosecutions for debauchery and profaneness in London and Westminster alone, since the foundation of the societies, had been 99,380."¹

Yet England was morally on the downgrade. Isaac Taylor speaks of "the ecclesiastical system under which the people of England had lapsed into heathenism—or a state scarcely to be distinguished from it."²

This then is the sum of our review:—

Not Addison, with his high *Culture*, nor

Lord Mansfield, with the might of *Law* at hand, nor

Bishop Butler, chief of *Apologists*, nor

Bentham, the arch-theorist in *Morals*, nor

Practical efforts for the "*Reformation of manners*," availed to insure the desired end. It is true that Addison made piety respectable; that Mansfield gave every trial the benefit of his splendid impartiality; that Butler cut its feet from under the current deism; that the Utility school of morals wrought some external reforms; and that practical protests were made; yet not one, nor all together, led England back to righteousness, to a guarantee of immunity from impending storms. The work was done by men known less than any of these I have named, in their day, yet now known beyond all put together in this day. Are we claiming too much for the "Holy Club"?

Leslie Stephen says, the religious revival of Wesley and Whitefield was "in many respects the most important phenomenon of the century."³ Justin McCarthy writes, "In-

¹ Lecky, *Op. cit.*, Vol. ii. p. 595. ² Wesley and Methodism, p. 56.

³ History of Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. ii. p. 389.

deed, there is not much about this period of English history concerning which the modern Englishman can feel really proud, except that great religious revival which began with the thoughts and teachings of John Wesley.”¹ Addison coveted much: “It was said of Socrates that he brought down Philosophy from heaven to inhabit among men; and I shall be ambitious to have it said of me that I have brought Philosophy out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell at clubs, and assemblies, at tea-tables and in coffee-houses.” We grant the claim. But the claim of the poor Oxford student goes far beyond this.

John Wesley’s work lay in another line. Not philosophy, but piety, was by his invitation to walk with unhopèd-for energy in unaccustomed ways, and to become the first power and familiar friend of the common people, the regenerator of homes, the most logical of apologists, the backbone of law, the foundation of a finer culture, the real saviour of the English race.

What of this man? There is time for only a silhouette.

The first thing that catches our eye in his life is his mother’s influence. John Wesley stands for heredity. Aristippus founded the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. At his death his daughter, Arete, directed its course. Her son was named for her father. So profoundly did she impress herself upon him that he, the next leader of the school, went by the name of *Matrodidaktos*, “mother-taught.” So might the boy of the Epworth rectory have been named, as the foremost of those whose mother’s apron-strings have been long enough to reach to the end of the boy’s life, to the end of the history of the English race, to the end of time.

The rector’s son becomes the Charterhouse gown boy. The gown boy passes on to Christ Church House at Oxford. He wins a fellowship in Lincoln College. He does not

¹ Four Georges, Vol. ii. p. 169.

lack ability. He does not lack character. He does not lack ambition. Yet his future is all unknown.

In fancy we see him on the evening of a busy day. His fellow-students, with whom he has been bending over the Greek Testament, have left him alone. The Book lies before him. His most recent self-dedication beckons him on. But how far on and up? In the veiled future he has no large vision of himself. His ingrained self-control has never indulged in idle dreams of attainment.

Had some one now told him, that, after years of study and prayer and waiting, he would become conscious of God's favor, would gather about him a band of like souls; that, after sifting his fellows, he would scour England; that, forsaking the traditions of the church, he and they would address, in open fields, vast throngs no building could hold; that he would organize, drill, direct, inspire, the multitude for a forward movement without parallel since the itinerating tentmaker of Tarsus prayed and preached the paganisms of the Mediterranean shores out of power; that he would die at the head of a host of one hundred and forty thousand followers; that in a century from the date he received the witness of divine love that host would number one million, one hundred and seventy-one thousand; that in another half-century (a century after his death) the host, bearing now in honor the name with which his early devotion was derided, and which he bore with unruffled serenity in the midst of cursing, maddened mobs, would be marching around the world over six million strong; and if he had been told that this would be the smaller part of the fruitage of his dedication of himself to God; that in the train of his mighty leadership would follow the reform of prison life, a better penal code, the abolition of a thousand brutalities, the founding of asylums, the protection of children, the establishment of schools for their training, the spread of popular education entirely unfelt before his day

and due to the religious movement led by him; that with increased knowledge of the rights of men, and an increased sympathy with their sorrows, the abolition of slavery would be demanded in a paper to Parliament in which out of three hundred and fifty-two thousand, four hundred and four names of petitioners against its continued existence, one hundred years from his vision of the future, two hundred and twenty-nine thousand, four hundred and twenty-six would be Methodists; that a new philanthropy would signalize each step of this people's march; that the widening circles of the evangelical movement would include all protestant Christianity; that tract, Bible, and missionary societies would spring from the intelligent fervor of the movement; that in the presence of this practical gospel deism would shrivel; that unwelcome and unreasonable dogmas would be shut out of the pulpits of the coming age; that cannibalism would become extinct in sea-girt islands; that the worse than cannibal ferocity of the French Revolution would fall back from England smitten blind by the flame and light of this mightier revolution; if he had been told that without "novelty of doctrine" this religious and moral revolution would "invest the most prosaic life with a halo of romance," would arouse in "great masses of men an enthusiasm of piety which was hardly surpassed in the first days of Christianity," would "emancipate great numbers from the fear of death, and impart a warmer tone to the devotion and a greater energy to the philanthropy of every denomination both in England and in the colonies"; and if, as the vision reached its vastest compass, he had been told that, led by his gospel-on-horseback, a mighty race would with a swinging, tireless stride press through the great gates of the Northwest, out into the wider area of the Anglo-Saxon's new land;—and that he, the poor rector's son, would help God turn a corner in human history, and that Westminster Abbey, into whose pulpit he was not to

put foot, would honor its walls with his face and that of his brother, carved in memorial marble, which, though white, would be less clear and unstained than his own transparent character and less enduring than his own immortal name;—had all this been told him, he would have dismissed the tale as an idler's vagary, and with that rare sanity of reason which distinguished him, he would have bent to his present task.

Yet the above is the barest recital of the outcome of the purpose of the Oxford student to live up to the highest light he had and could get. The vision has become fact. The nineteenth century is what it is morally and religiously because of the eighteenth century "Holy Club." Canon Taylor has declared that Methodism is "*The starting-point of modern religious history.*"

But this does not account for the movement itself. Is Methodism an enigma? Its visible elements in the Oxford student are not hard to find. Wesley's blood went for much. He was of gentle birth. He was so well born that he was absolutely unyielding to the seductions of rank, and so true a gentleman that he was every man's brother. His rearing was unexceptionable. His scholarship was above the suspicion of the most exacting critic. His character was stainless. His self-control was perfect. His courage was equal to that of Cromwell. His organizing power has been the subject of constant eulogium.

Men have thought to explain the rise of Christianity and its spread from the level of human motives and human energies. Gibbon is the great example of this. Men have thought to explain the rise and spread of Methodism in the same way. Southey has not escaped this difficulty. He went so far as to charge Wesley with ambition, though he afterward withdrew this judgment. If we canvass all the facts, we shall not err. A profound writer has said, "Wes-

ley perplexes only those who, if they would confess it, are still more perplexed by Christianity itself.”¹

It has been left for a skeptical historian to make a complete admission. Lecky says, “The Methodist movement was a purely religious one. All explanations which ascribe it to the ambition of its leaders, or to merely intellectual causes, are at variance with the facts of the case.”²

In speaking of May 24th, 1738, and of Wesley in the prayer-meeting, Lecky remarks, with philosophic and impartial candor, “It is, however, scarcely an exaggeration to say that the scene which took place at that humble meeting in Aldersgate street forms an epoch in English history.”³

Christianity is supernatural. So is Methodism.

Its rise, its centrifugal movement, its sin-subduing power, its grit in reform, its growth among men in the face of difficulties known, unknown, anticipated, and unsuspected, but all of them overcome, its humanitarianism, its tolerance, its charities, its enthusiasm, its hearty fellowship with the ever-widening republicanism of these modern days, its bounding hopefulness, its emphasis upon life rather than upon institutional or confessional types of Christianity, its ever youthful flexibility in methods, and its attractive consciousness of a high and holy purpose to lead on in the march of the world's evangelization,—these declare it to be divine.

The supernatural sounded the clarion for Wesley's advance. It became the consolation of his waning strength. It nerved him at St. Ives against the mob, and nursed him on his dying bed, around which many gathered to watch the old hero's passing on and up. The philosophy of the great revival was declared in the “strange warning” of his heart, in the Aldersgate meeting, and in his last note of triumph, “*The best of all is, God is with us.*” What ex-

¹ Taylor, *Op. cit.*, p. 87. ² *Op. cit.*, Vol. ii. p. 598. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 607.

plains Methodism? God. There is no other adequate explanation of the movement. Wesley was, under God, enabled to exercise a "wider constructive influence in the sphere of practical religion than any other man who has appeared since the sixteenth century."¹

Both England and France had gigantic revolutions in the last century. The high-priest of the one was Wesley, and of the other Voltaire. They both seemed to be full of destructive energy. Methodism appeared to be so revolutionary as seriously to threaten the stability of the social system as well as of church life.

The encyclopedists of France urged liberty. They invoked the terrors of the wildest and most furious fanaticism. The revolution of Wesley was constructive; that of Voltaire was destructive. One was Christian, the other was anti-Christian. Both were charged with folly, fanaticism, and certain failure. Both resented the charge. Methodism lived through calumny and won. French infidelity scornfully flung the disgraceful imputation from her. What? The robes of the Goddess of Liberty stained with fanaticism? Anything, all things, but not that despicable offspring of superstition. But the fact remains that the French Revolution is the most wonderful illustration of a lawless and pernicious fanaticism in all the annals of history. Burke said that thing happened which no one would have imagined; "that atheism could produce one of the most violently operative principles of fanaticism" ever seen on earth.

France owed much to England, in her great upheaval: pity it is that she had taken cast-off clothes instead of a new robe, which she could have had for the asking. Voltaire, while getting good from Newton's philosophy, and Locke's toleration, was influenced by Collins, Wollaston, Bolingbroke, and other English deists. The robes had

¹ Lecky, *Op. cit.*, Vol. ii. p. 687.

soiled the Saxon, and were now to stain the Gallic people.

English deism went to France unwashed. It underwent a change in England. Under Wesley deism became theistic. Under Voltaire it became atheistic. It sat under the fair bowers of Paris "squat like a toad," till the spear of an Ithuriel disclosure revealed it to men in all its devilish malignity. The deism of the English laborer went to its death in the Methodist class-room. The deism of the French attorney rioted away its allowance of liberty, and welcomed the chaotic frenzy of the Jacobin clubs of Ninety-three.

Wesley and Voltaire: these two are, as contemporaries, most fitting representatives of their peoples in culture, in toil, in character, and in the final result of life. We know Wesley's God and watchword. Had Voltaire no God, no watchword? The word of the French reformer was "Honor," and its sanctioning deity was the "Force of Public Opinion." But Honor is oftentimes the daughter of vanity, and the force of public opinion has little about it that is divine. It never sent Columbus to America, nor showed Copernicus the secrets of the starry system, nor fired Livingstone to go to Africa. As a basis of public and private morals it is a failure. It is as Carlyle has said: "Without some belief in the necessary, eternal, or which is the same, in the supramundane, Divine nature of Virtue, existing in each individual, what could the moral judgment of a thousand or a thousand thousand individuals avail us?"

The God of Wesley is the world's Maker and Redeemer. The watchword of the English reformer was not "Honor," but "*Holiness*." England rose, and France receded, because Holiness is evermore stronger than Honor. Holiness is the chief of builders. It works marvels in a short time, and finally moulds heaven out of earth. It is disinterested and centrifugal. Honor is oftentimes selfish and centripetal.

The Frenchmen boasted of their "Fraternity." But

what did it amount to? It was very far from being comprehensive. It was never unselfish. It was exclusive. Voltaire was fond of the attentions of the higher ranks. The insinuating flattery of their smiles fed the vanity of the poet-philosopher. Wesley went to the highways to walk with plain men. Voltaire said: "We have never pretended to enlighten shoemakers and servants." Without cheapening his refined manhood, Wesley befriended miners, plowboys, and cobblers. His fraternity included the whole world-parish.

The sentimental Frenchman praised the heroic of great days. The sensible Englishman begot the heroic of common days. Both attracted the women of their day, and received from them rare proofs of peculiar devotion. For answer to the declaration of the great English critic, who has said that there was nothing heroic in the eighteenth century, we recall two scenes in the middle of the century, one in France, the other in England. The surroundings of the two scenes are as different as can be imagined. Voltaire was loaded with honors on the occasion of the acting of his play "Merope" in Paris, February 20, 1743. Amid the tumultuous applause of the crowd, the author was seated at the front of the stage. While the crowd cheered, the Duchesse de Villars crowned him, and then, intoxicated by the part she had taken, she went further and immortalized him with a kiss.

While the Protagonist of Infidelity was thus set apart by the apotheosis of a titled woman's affection on a French stage, a scene less theatric, but more dramatic, was taking place across the Channel. The time was June 18, 1743. The place was Wednesbury. The slender Oxford scholar was the center of a storm. John Wesley had in some way aroused the mob. For six days the lanes and streets were filled with an infuriated, senseless, brutal throng. Down the road and by the river's brink Wesley was hustled,

cuffed, beaten, cursed, dragged, his clothing torn, his face bleeding, his cause forsaken by his friends. They were overawed. But Wesley was immovable. While chaos reigned he preserved an unbroken calm. Like Paul he could say: "No man stood by me"; yet one brave woman came to his aid. She walked by his side. She warded off the terrible onslaughts of the mob. She led him through the midst of the howling, drunken madmen. She became his guarantee of safety. She deserves a crown. Aye, she has one. It is unfading. Her name is her glory. Let the seeker for the heroic walk the streets of Wednesbury, and quicken his courage as he repeats the name of the heroine of the scene of the fiercest assault endured by the conqueror of a hundred mobs; and, for contrast to the hysterical Duchesse, study the heroic Joan Parks.

What did each leave? For immediate result; the writer of France, dying on the verge of the Revolution, deeded his tomb for a cradle of storms. The preacher of England walked a little nearer to the edge of the chasm, and found that the feet of the English people were on solid rock. The philosophy of Voltaire's skepticism blew up an awful tornado, and the tallest trees went to the ground. The philosophy of the Wesleyan revival walked the troubled waves, and silenced their fury with the might of speech and song.

For ultimate result; who can tell? The rock-firm biblical character of Wesley's gospel is known to all. Present-day judgment has strangely inverted the estimates of the last century. Then men thought that the power of Wesley's work was in its form, its new way of heralding the truth. But the power remains, though the form is ever changing. The opposite verdict is given in Voltaire's case. There the only thing that is now of any value is the form. According to Saintsbury, "Not the most elaborate work of

Voltaire is of much value for matter; but not the very slightest work of Voltaire is devoid of value as form."

The very year, 1778, in which, after having been crowned in a theater with laurel, Voltaire died, John Wesley opened City Road Chapel. Its pulpit, like all other pulpits of Methodism, was to achieve its loftiest purpose when in the union of truth with personality the surest success would be guaranteed to every preacher of righteousness. That pulpit towers above all other pulpits which most exalts the living witness.

The evangelical revival of the eighteenth century solved the question of the reformation of manners, of laws, and of life. This is no puerile boast. The whole world's regeneration lies in the microcosm of the one soul. The large liberty of the human race is involved in the one man's attainment of the "glorious liberty" of a child of God. Froude, in his Inaugural at Oxford, endeavored to tear in pieces the theory of the *evidence of progress in history*. He sees not much evidence of moral development. "According to Aristotle, that is the best condition of things which produces, not the largest amount of knowledge or wealth, but men of the noblest nature; and I cannot see that there is any distinct progress in productions of this kind." He admits there is more liberty, but authority is fading. "Does history show that, in proportion as men are left to their own wills, they become happier, truer, braver, simpler, more reverent of good, more afraid of evil? If so, the problem of existence is solved; but is it so?" He denies it. Liberty in the modern sense of the word has not raised the "character either of individuals or of nations." Character is the main thing to be considered, and "the only true progress is moral progress." Will any one with his historical perspective freed from the blurs and prejudices of oligarchic hauteur side with this pessimism?

The high ideal of liberty which the twentieth century

will take as its guide will not be the mad license of France, but the mild and firm loyalty of England under the direction of the Wesleys.

Who had the better notion of true liberty? The men who whirled about the benches of Danton and Robespierre, or those who watched at Independence Hall over the birth of the new nation? The liberty of the coming age will be seen to be a complete surrender to the will of God. The revolution of Irreligion issues in blundering crime and appalling cruelty. The revolution of Religion issues in real liberty, the elevation of the masses of men, their sharing in the affairs of government, the stability of the nation, the purity of its politics, and the peace of its homes.

The regeneration of the unit is the reformation of the universe.

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ARTICLE VI.

"THE MASTER-PASSION."

BY WILLIAM I. FLETCHER, A.M.

A FEW years ago there came from the press two books of apparently contradictory titles—Drummond's "The Greatest Thing in the World"¹ and Trumbull's "Friendship the Master-Passion."² Professor Drummond's book was not so much an argument for its thesis as an assertion of it, with ample illustration and enforcement. Probably it never occurred to him that any argument was called for, especially in view of the source of the saying, "the greatest . . . is love."

But when Dr. Trumbull's book appeared, it seemed that it might have been written as a reply to "The Greatest Thing in the World." In a chapter entitled "[Friendship] Transcending all Loves," and elsewhere throughout the book, there is a strenuous argument that love is a thing inferior to friendship. The following may be cited as representative sayings from different parts of the volume: "Friendship is love with the selfish element eliminated." "Friendship, in short, is love apart from love's claim or love's craving." "Other loves are based upon a love received or desired." "Friendship is the love of loves, by the Bible standard." "Thus always from the earliest ages to the latest, in sacred writings and in secular, friendship finds its recognition as the preëminent and surpassing affection of the human heart. The distinction between the

¹ New York : James Pott & Co. 1889.

² Philadelphia : J. D. Wattles & Co. 1892.

love that craves and seeks, and the friendship that would unflinchingly serve, has been perceived all along the centuries; as it was sententiously expressed by Publilius Syrus (and afterward by Seneca), 'Friendship always benefits; but love also injures.'" "It is *agape*, a love without 'desire' or craving, not *philia*, a love which goes out 'longingly' for the possession of its object, that seems to be recognized in Bible usage as friendship-love, and that would be better thus translated. 'Friendship-love is of God; and every one that [thus] loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God.' The divinest exhibit of God-likeness in man is in this friendship-love of which the Apostle Paul sounds the praises so glowingly." [And then follows a new rendering of the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, with the compound "friendship-love" substituted throughout for "charity" or "love."]

Perhaps it may appear that this is a mere logomachy or word-play. If this writer chooses to make the word "friendship" stand for what has always been counted the best quality and highest range of love, it might seem to be a matter of small moment, so long as he disarranges words only and not things. But it will be found that the discussion goes deeper than words and takes hold on great realities, and that in a way subtly dangerous. When Dr. Trumbull says, "Friendship is love with the selfish element eliminated," he makes it clear that he has chosen to confine the word "love" to its baser uses. Recognizing that the word has had to do duty for a wide range of meanings, he would attempt to clarify language and thought by debasing the word "love" to the lower meanings, and substituting "friendship" when the higher sentiments are to be spoken of. But one who reads this book with any care will perceive the serious dangers of the path upon which its author has entered.

It is obvious that such an argument as Dr. Trumbull's

must deal more or less with the family relation, and in this part of the treatise the author makes it evident that he is "on thin ice" and is not unaware of it. For it requires a miracle of dialectics to prove friendship superior to love, without putting a slight on the love of marriage. It does not avail that the writer attempts (in the dedication of his book to his wife, and elsewhere) to make the relation of husband and wife the highest exemplification of friendship. Although one is nearly confused by such juggling with terms, the writer's real meaning seems to come out as he quotes the following from Sir Thomas Browne, the words in brackets being Dr. Trumbull's addition: "I never yet cast a true affection on a woman [yet this was published, unchanged, by the author, two years after his happy marriage]; but I have loved my friend as I do virtue, my soul, and my God." Unless it was by an oversight that Sir Thomas published this unchanged after his marriage, that union, however "happy," was no true marriage, though solemnized by all the bishops in England.

Another expression used with apparent relish by Dr. Trumbull is that of "the keen-witted Frenchman, Joseph Roux, when he defined 'love' as 'two souls and one flesh' and 'friendship' as 'two bodies and one soul.'" This may be French keen wit, but it is nothing less than a direct blow at the sacredness of married love.

Our writer's chief error in the treatment of love is in the effort to mark it off into two divisions: the lower, consisting of loves which seek return, which "desire" and "long"; and the higher "friendship-love" which seeks no return but expends itself freely. Into the lower class of loves, from which souls may graduate into "friendship," mother-love is put as well as married love. But can it be admitted that mother-love is so tainted with selfishness as to be inferior to "friendship"? How absurd the claim! To be sure, the young mother has, in her first child, the greatest

treasure, the richest "possession," conceivable to her. But who doubts that she would give life itself, without thought of hesitation, for her child? Has the world indeed been wrong all these ages in counting this mother-love as the very type of unselfish devotion?

So with married love. Doubtless possession, self-gratification, has been too predominant an element in the current ideas of marriage. But neither love nor marriage is to be judged by its lower exemplifications. True married love is simply the highest known earthly form of unselfish devotion. In the very nature of the case, wedlock, with offspring, makes demands for self-sacrificing service and helpfulness that no other relation in life can equal. Marriage is essentially the devotion of one life to another. Not what one receives, but what one gives, is emphasized in the ceremony. The surrender of the selfhood and its absorption into the one complex personality of the family is what makes of marriage a sacrament. Human life is sacred, and when two lives are actually commingled, religion is invoked to witness to the solemnity and divinity of the transaction, and the blessing of God is pronounced on those whom he "hath joined together." Let no one interpret this phrase to mean that the union has been sanctioned and made divine by sacred rite or word of priest or minister. Whom love has joined are joined by God; for "whosoever loveth is born of God." Is it a mere rhapsody by which the love of marriage is thus made divine in its origin and character? Or is there profounder significance than is often noted in its use by inspired writers to typify the union of Christ and his church? With the low views of marriage which have too widely prevailed, doubtless this imagery has seemed low and the analogy quite imperfect. But as a more lofty view of wedlock, a more spiritual, and so truer, conception of the family relation, comes to be accepted through the progressive development in society of

the higher life, this biblical imagery will take on new force and meaning. The point here insisted on is simply this: that only as love assumes the form of complete self-devotion necessarily involved in a true marriage can it be permitted fruition, in any well-regulated state of society, or in any society which does not contain the seeds of its own destruction. So far from friendship being superior to love in that the selfish element is eliminated from love to constitute it friendship, love is itself the elimination of selfishness. So-called love, in which selfishness is a predominant element, is only the shadow of true love, only the baser passion from which the flower of love may grow under the sweet alchemy of love's own law, but which, if it be not brought under that law of joyfully accepted self-devotion and surrender, can work only destruction and misery.

But, to pass to the other half of the truth, there is perhaps no more error in charging common human love with the taint of selfishness, than there is in depicting the highest love as caring nothing for reciprocity. Dr. Trumbull makes much of this feature of friendship. "The very joy of friendship is found in loving, not in being loved," he says, and he quotes the following beautiful lines of Helen Hunt's in support of his view of friendship, although she wrote them of love. "When love is strong," she says,

"It hardly asks
If it be loved at all ; to take
So barren seems, when it can make
Such bliss, for the beloved's sake,
Of bitter tasks."

"The divine pattern of love is a love that loves without any condition of love returned, and that consists in loving rather than in being loved," continues the argument.

One cannot help asking, Is this, after all, the whole truth? No doubt a mother often loves her wayward child when there is no return. Many a wife cherishes a love "strong as death" for a creature, miscalled husband, whose

love (counterfeit that it is) is all bestowed elsewhere. But who would say the mother and the wife do not care for any return? Of course they do, it might be replied, their love being of the baser kind, not so refined as the friendship-love which Dr. Trumbull is depicting.

But how about this higher love? Is it true that even divine love does not seek return? Jesus Christ came to this world not more to reveal to men the love of God than to win theirs. The one thing we understand God lacks and is hungry for is the love of his children. "Lovest thou me?" was Christ's appeal to Peter, and as the word of God to man is the most pathetic utterance that ever fell on human ears. No, it is no mere "love of benevolence" with which our Heavenly Father regards us. We are his children. His love to us is beyond our comprehension in its fullness and extent, but it does not exceed his desire that we should love him.

Love is a holy mystery. It is not complete unless it both gives and takes. Neither is it genuine unless it finds it "more blessed to give than to receive." But in view of this divinely expressed anti-climax, is there harm in "receiving" at the hand of love? Was there ever stranger mistake than to brand as selfish the joy of taking delight from a loved one? There can be no selfishness where there is not the preference of self to another, and in the give-and-take of mutual ministration taught by love, there is no room for a "selfish element." Still it holds true that great as is the joy of receiving what a loved one gives, the joy of giving is "more blessed."

The perfection of love can be found only in the merging of personalities. Parental and filial love have their strong seat in the fact of this merging of the personalities in the backward look. But as life goes on and the identity of the personalities slips away into the past, the ties dependent upon it weaken. Here is seen the superiority

of the love of wedlock. "For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh," and so the love of marriage is declared to be the one typical and all-powerful love known to human life, and a symbol of the love by which man is united to God in a true merging of the human spirit and the divine.

How natural, then, that love as between the sexes should form the staple of romantic and poetic literature and give charm to art and music! The merging of personalities through the influence of love is so completely at the base of all human relations, of society and the state, that the theme must always and everywhere be of captivating interest, so long as man is a social being. Unless the advocate of friendship is to prevail in his effort to change the meaning and usage of words, the distinction that has always been made between love and friendship will still be maintained. The word "friendship" stands for that sort of love which contemplates no union other than one in sentiment and feeling. The demand for love is often met with the offer of friendship as a substitute, but is it not the coldness of the offer that has led to the figure of the mitten given when the hand is asked?

If the range of meaning covered by the word "love" is too great and we must recast the language at this point, it seems plain that we must reclaim the word "love" from its baser uses to its higher and more legitimate ones, and substitute other words for the lower meanings. Quite in a line with the disposition to find the word "love" too low to express the divine and the higher human sentiment to which it especially belongs, is the tendency of a vicious romantic literature to grow up around love thus falsely conceived. The bane of most of the love-literature so current is that it is essentially selfish in its ideals and principles. Its great staple is the unhappy marriage, resulting from the

failure to find expected self-gratification. Its ideal of marriage is the union of two congenial spirits so impossibly harmonious that they can live together without self-sacrifice at any point on the part of either. This congeniality must be of such an extremely delicate character that it cannot survive the thought of duty or law or outward propriety. (One of the decisions of a mediæval "court of love" was that there could be no such thing as love in the married state.) This idea of marriage is as pestilential in literature as it is in life. Perhaps we have here a partial solution of the vexed question of the moral and immoral in literature. These terms have not to do with things but with persons. A book may by virtue of its "realism" (falsely so called) be an improper book because it violates the ordinary proprieties. If it deals with personalities, however, it becomes moral or immoral according as it breathes the spirit of love or that of selfishness. If the first, its leaves are for the healing of the nations. If the second, it is poison.

Repeating what has already been said—love is a mystery. Its mysteriousness was vastly heightened, when it was said "God is love." What a weight of meaning with which to charge one small word! But what is the purpose of such a definition as this? Surely it is to teach us where we see love to see God. It is to make all loves holy. When one has begun to interpret the loves of every-day life in the light of this great saying, into what perfect accord with one's sense of what is sweet and pure and true come the otherwise strange words of Scripture, "As the bridegroom rejoiceth over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee"! How natural that the Christ should have first "manifested forth his glory" while sitting at a village wedding-feast, by turning water into wine, so foreshadowing the wonderful work of the Divine Spirit through the centuries in progressively elevating the common things of

human life into the region of the divine! And again how natural that the consummation of this work is depicted as another, a heavenly, wedding-feast, celebrating the reception of a purified humanity, as a bride, into the house of its Divine Lover!

The sociological bearing of this theme is obvious. The family is recognized as the unit in society. But how can it be a unit in such a sense as is required by this conception, if it be not itself an integer? If husband and wife are separate entities bound together only, as some would have it, by a "contract," or as others say, by congeniality of temper and spirit, where is the "unit"? To constitute such a unit as will serve to construct human society so that it is not self-corrupting and self-destroying, we must have a family not tied together, but actually welded into one personality. Here is where the evident demands of the case are met by the Divine order. It is the law of God, not simply as given from Sinai and enforced by Christ, but as written on the first page of the book of human life, that sexual union shall exist only under the sanction of marriage, marriage being not a license given to two individuals, permitting them to live in certain relations, but a solemn pledge taken from two individuals that, in uniting their persons, they also unite their lives in the indissoluble union of love; love meaning nothing less than the abnegation of self in the interest of the loved one.

This is the foundation on which the fabric of society may rest and stand the shocks of the centuries. So viewed, love is seen to be the one vital and moving principle of human life as well as of divine. Some day the "dismal science" of political economy must be rewritten with love as the key to unlock its mysteries. Then it will be seen that when it is said "nothing is settled until it is settled right," the rightness of bare justice cannot be meant, but the rightness of love. Under this, the Christian economy,

the law of business, as of every relation, must be to try to give more than is received, to live for what we can add to the lives of others, not for what we acquire for ourselves. By the thousands of lives already so lived society is saved from corruption and is gradually being regenerated. When love, the "master-passion," shall control all lives, then will be fulfilled the petition of the ages, "Thy kingdom come!"

ARTICLE VII.

THE NEW THEOLOGY.

BY THE REV. J. A. BIDDLE.

I. THIS is the title of a notable book by President Bascom.¹ The book is profound and clear. Through it we begin to see what there is in this new theology. This book clearly reveals the strength and weakness of this theology as a theology. "It is not a theology at all," remarks Dr. Bascom, "but a tendency." "It is not a creed but a movement." Then as he proceeds, we see that the tendency is away from the "traditional theology." The movement is toward something supposed to be better. What that something is it is quite impossible to tell. It is believed to be something not new but old, something that will be a better exposition of the truth than the traditional theology.

From this we gather that the new theology is an exploring party, dissatisfied with the old home, going forth in search of a better; going no one knows where. "Whither," is an open question. It has no organization, but a vast deal of life and confidence; it has no particular rallying-point, no discipline, no plan of campaign. It is a movement in religion resembling the movement of the Germanic tribes across the Rhine. There is an impulse to move, and that impulse is followed. It is full of vigor and confidence, but lacking in foresight, discipline, and aim. With the fate of the Germanic tribes in mind, one can easily predict the fate of this new theology, when it comes to mortal combat with the well-disciplined and as valiant sol-

¹G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1891.

diers of traditional theology. A tendency is no match for a well-ordered theology. A movement will always be stopped by a compact creed. Unless the new theology can state itself clearly and definitely, as John Calvin stated Protestant theology, it will go with Cain into the land of wanderings, and never be heard of more. It stands now between two giants—traditional theology and natural science. It seeks to be a friend of both. At present it pleases neither. It is in danger of destruction from both. Its imperative need is an Augustine or Calvin who can clearly state it, and organize it to hold its place in the minds of men. For such a man it still waits. As yet, Dr. Bascom tells us, it is not a theology.

II. The source of its dissatisfaction with traditional theology is its second weakness.

Who awakened this discontent in the old home? Who told this new theology that it was naked? Was it a friend of the old theology, or of any theology? Not at all. It was the most powerful enemy that traditional theology has ever met,—natural science. We all know that natural science has looked with disfavor upon traditional theology. The controlling power in natural science is evolution; while theology holds to creation. The one is agnostic, the other is positively gnostic. The universe of natural science is a mechanism, the universe of theology is an organism. The one is run by a force; the other is controlled by a free will, a person. It is very plain that between these parties there is no peace. Here is an irrepressible conflict. As they stand, one or the other must be destroyed. It must be borne in mind that both natural science and traditional theology are systems of thought. Both seek to interpret the universe of matter and spirit. The one says the universe was evolved, the other says it was created. We must take sides in this contest. There is a higher unity that will comprehend both evolution and creation. But the

present conflict is not for that higher unity, but between the two opposites. Now if this tendency of the new theology were toward that higher unity it would be well. But it is not. It is a movement away from traditional theology toward natural science.

Its dissatisfaction with traditional theology has been awakened by natural science, while its rebellion is against its own father. Already it begins to read history in the evolutionary spirit. Well we know that history written in the modern scientific spirit gives the direct lie to biblical history as read by traditional theology. Scientific history says that man began with the lowest form of being, and has advanced steadily forward to his present high estate. Theological history says Adam was at the first endowed with high advantages, that he fell by disobedience, that his sin brought death upon him and all his posterity, that out of this fallen state he has been redeemed by the humiliation, life, and death of his great son, Jesus of Nazareth. "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all, for all sinned." That is the way Paul read the history of the race up to his time. He sees in Jesus a crucified Redeemer of the race from this awful curse of sin and death. He makes an intelligent man, Adam, by his voluntary disobedience, the author of sin and death, and an intelligent man, Jesus, by his obedient suffering unto death, the Redeemer of the race from sin and death. Here is no evolution of a blind force in the history of man. Augustine and Aquinas, Calvin, Luther, Wesley, and Edwards, all agree with Paul in this reading of biblical history. The new theology is dissatisfied with this. It would rewrite not only traditional theology but biblical history, to meet the demands of natural science.

Mr. Savage of Chicago outlined the result of this tendency in his celebrated article entitled "The Surrender of Orthodoxy." He at once rejects the story of the fall

of Adam and the inherited sin of his descendants. Of course, the theology built upon that fall goes with it. The condition of the race is not one of sin. There is no need of a suffering Redeemer. The race needs a glorious leader, but not a crucified leader. So passes the story of the cross also. The cross is a necessity only as the fall is a fact, but there is no place for a fall of man in evolution, and, of course, there is no place for the death and resurrection of Jesus. I do not stop to ask, whether this evolutionary history tallies with real history or not. That is a question by itself. It is certain it does not tally with biblical history as the church has always read it. This dissension in the ranks of the church has been caused by the enemy. That of itself is a very bad sign. It necessarily throws suspicion on the new movement. It appears to be a virtual surrender to the enemy, an acknowledgment that the church of Christ has never known how to read its own books.

III. The one fatal weakness in the new theology is its subjective character: it appeals to no objective authority or fact: it appeals alone to the subjective experience of each man.

This appears most prominently in Dr. Bascom's treatment of inspiration. He is dissatisfied with the traditional view of the inspiration of the Bible. He thinks, and properly, that inspiration is a property of a man, and of a book only as the book is the work of an inspired man. He says, "Inspiration stands for the normal hold of the human mind on truth under all the liabilities and limitations which belong to its power." That is, there is no inspiration in the book; inspiration is in the mind of him who reads the book. It is all subjective. The judge of all things is the reason of man. Man, not the Bible, is the court of last resort; which, being interpreted, means not the man Christ Jesus, not the man Moses, Paul, Peter, or

John, but any man. Of course these men did make the Bible. It was their grasp of the truth which made them capable of writing the Bible. And if President Bascom means that inspiration is the normal hold of the mind of Paul or Jesus on the truth, nobody will object: Moses, the prophets, Jesus, and the apostles are the court of last resort. In that sense, man, not the Bible, is the final authority. But that is not what he means.

The Bible is all we have as our authority in religious truth. We have no Jesus or Paul to tell us the truth. But we have their words. If they were present, we would appeal to them. As they are not, we appeal to their written words. Their inspiration inheres in their words, and makes them words of inspiration. So there is inspiration in the Bible. Of this the new theology makes nothing. Inspiration is only in the mind of the reader. So, not the Bible, but Dr. Bascom, is inspired. Well, in a sense Dr. Bascom is inspired. His mind does get a hold on truth. But is it certain that he is inspired of the Holy Spirit as Bible writers were? Must we give the same authority to the books of the new theology men that we give to the books of the Bible? No new theology man would claim as much.

Neither they nor we must look within to find the truth. If we do, we make our thought the measure of all things. Then, the Bible is not what the writers made it, but what we think it to be. It does not tell the unchanging truth, but what my reason holds to be truth. There is no objective Bible before whose word my reason bows with absolute and unwavering submission. The Bible must bow to my "hold upon the truth." What I think, not what the Bible says, is true. My thought is the measure of all things. This leads to the annihilation of all objective realities. God is not an objective Being, independent from age to age: he is what I conceive him to be. So every

man makes his own God, as already he has made his own Bible. *The Faith* is not an objective statement of fact to which I humbly conform my faith. Faith is my subjective conception of the truth. It is not one and unchanging for all time. It is ever changing with the development and apprehension of men. Jesus Christ is not "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever," but the ever-changing, as men think of him,—now as a God, now as a man, now as a God-man, now as the highest of all creatures, now as an impostor.

How easily this passes from theology to science! What I think of a thing, that it is. The sun is not an objective orb, but it is what John Smith thinks of it. If I say the moon is green cheese, the moon is green cheese. If my hold upon the Bible makes it to say that Jesus is a man like other men, the Bible does make him so. If I think that heaven is only a state of the soul, and hell only remorse, I at once annihilate the old heaven and hell of God's making, and my heaven and hell remain. My fiat is almighty. If the Bible history is not to my liking, I make a new history, and at once what I make is real, and Bible history fades away into myth. That is the plain English of Dr. Bascom's conception of inspiration. Any one can see how awfully wrong it is. Inspiration is a quality of the Bible which makes it an absolute authority on religious truth. That is what traditional theology asserts. My inspiration is the hold my reason gets of this truth. The inspiration of the Bible is of the Holy Spirit. My inspiration may be of the Holy Spirit or a most unholy spirit. This tallies with the observation of mankind.

So the God, Christ, church, faith, heaven, and hell of the Bible remain, no matter what I or any man think of them. They are objective realities. If I think correctly concerning them, it is well with me. If I think falsely, woe unto me: I believe a lie. The hold my reason may get on these

things may and will change. The interpretation which men put upon the Bible varies from age to age. The Bible does not change. Alas, for the man who puts his conception of God, Christ, the faith, sin, or the Bible in the place of the reality!

This is the deep condemnation of men: "When they knew God, they glorified him not as God, . . . but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like unto corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." That is what came of the new theology in the days of old, when it made inspiration to consist in the hold of the reason of man upon the truth. We are always putting our conception of God and the objects of sight in the place of the objects themselves. The result is error and degradation; for what a man thinks of a thing, that it is *to him*. If I think a stone is a god, it is a god to me, and I will pay it divine honors. In the dusk I see a stump; I think it a lion crouching for a leap; I run from it as if the stump were a lion. My conception affects my action as much as the thing itself.

We must ever keep separate the external object and our conception of it. The one is objective, and authoritative for all time. The other is subjective, and authority for me only for one hour. The object is true, my conception may be false. Now the Bible, the God, Christ, church, sacraments, and teachings of the Bible are objects; they do not change. The faith once delivered unto the saints is an unchanging faith. It is a body of truth, to be read and believed by me. It remains the same, whatever be my conception of it. The Bible is an objective fact. It stands for what it was when it was finished, no matter what men may think of it.

On the other hand, the faith and apprehension of men

are subjective, and ever changing. Our theologies, our creeds, our churches, our sciences, our conceptions of God, must be reformed about once in so often. This must be until they conform to the reality. *The faith* is something *given*, to be believed and kept, not to be thought out and reformed. My faith by which I grasp and hold the truth is also a gift of God; that is in my possession; I can abuse or misuse it, even destroy it. But the faith is far beyond my reach, eternal and unmodified.

The Bible contains the writings that were inspired of the Holy Spirit. The prophets and apostles were the subjects of this inspiration. This inspiration was both objective and subjective. It came from the Holy Spirit. It was received and used by men. The men wrote. The power to write such things came from the Holy Spirit. "Moved by the Holy Spirit" is the account they give of themselves. So when Dr. Bascom says inspiration is the hold of the reason of man upon the truth, he describes only the subjective part of inspiration. The chief part, the objective influence of the Holy Spirit, which is necessary to complete inspiration according to traditional theology, he leaves out. Having omitted the supernatural part, he quietly objects to the words supernatural inspiration.

Supernatural inspiration is the inspiration which the Bible writers claim. That is real inspiration. By it we test the inspiration of all other men and writings. If any man thinks or writes anything contrary to what they wrote, we know it is untrue. What they say, is knowledge to be at once believed. What other men say, is speculation or theory. The Book is the standard. My subjective state must correspond to its objective statement, or I know that my hold of the truth is false.

So we have always been taught that we come to knowledge of eternal things not by thinking, but by believing what is written. The Bible has said the final word upon

religion. After Moses and Jesus have spoken, what is there for me to say? I do not get my astronomy by original investigation. Other men have done that for me. My way is easy. I read and believe. I know all they have written. I do not get my theology by my own thought. Moses and Jesus have spoken. They tell me all I need to know concerning God and my relations to him, and concerning man and my relations to him. It is folly and insanity to attempt to do for myself what Moses and Jesus have done for me. My strong hold is to believe what they say, to believe and obey. To dream for one moment that I can improve upon them is the height of self-conceit. But when my subjective faith grasps the old objective "faith once delivered unto the saints," by Moses and the prophets, by Jesus and the apostles, life, light, and peace come to me.

It follows, that when this movement has crystalized, when it does become a creed, it will not meet the needs of men as well as the traditional theology. Its creed will be based upon the evolutionary reading of biblical history. The fall and inherited sin of man will be eliminated. The supernatural origin of Jesus and his vicarious suffering will go also. Sin and its consequences, disease and death, will remain as the natural condition of man. With the supernatural removed from the inspiration of the apostles, there will be no room for the supernatural in the teaching and church of the apostles.

Out of the Apostles' Creed must go: "Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, . . . the third day he rose again from the dead, he ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead, . . . the forgiveness of saints, the resurrection of the body." The utmost that its master, natural science, will permit it to retain will be: I believe in God the Father, and in Jesus of Nazareth; in the spirit of truth; in

human society, and in a shadowy life everlasting, a choir invisible. For a reconstructed history means a reconstructed creed. As natural science reconstructs the history, it will also reconstruct the creed. The new Bible and the new creed will be the hold of natural science upon the old Bible and the old creed.

Again, this new creed will contain all that is bad in the old creed, and little of the good. The one profound defect of traditional theology from Augustine down, is its speculative character. A theology, like a science, is only a man's interpretation of the objective world. It is not a sacred thing. Sacredness belongs to the universe and all it contains.

Traditional theology begins, not with God, but with a conception of God. Augustine did not know God as John knew him. Augustine knew his conception of God.¹ I do not criticise that conception; it was a conception worthy of the man. To this conception he pointed all men. From this followed logically, conceptions of Christ, of man, of sin, of the church and its ordained sacraments, of human society, of holiness, of heaven and hell. The universe which Augustine constructed is the universe of traditional theology. It is not God's universe, but Augustine's; it is Augustine's science. As a work of constructive imagination it is beyond praise. Its weakness is that it is the work of a well-ordered imagination. It is the hold that Augustine's reason got of the truth. It is a logical series of magnificent conceptions. It is a metaphysical universe. As a statement of biblical fact in terms of pure thought, it will probably never be surpassed. It satisfied the church for a thousand years. It was rewritten by Aquinas, and again

¹ As he says in his *Confessions*: "See what a space I have gone over in my memory seeking Thee, O Lord, and I have not found Thee *outside or beyond it*. Since then I learned Thee, *Thou residest in my memory*." It is manifest that it is only his idea or conception of God that is confined to his memory.

by Calvin, to adapt it to change of philosophy. If Herbert Spencer were a churchman he could rewrite it in terms of modern science, putting his Inscrutable Power in the place of Augustine's God. For he is in the line of succession from Augustine. His Inscrutable Power is just as real as Augustine's theological God.

Now, the new theology is dissatisfied with the Augustinian conception of God and his world. In that it does well. Augustine's universe is not nearly equal to God's universe. But, instead of renouncing the vicious method of Augustine, and asking, Where is the God of the world? it sets itself the task of forming a new *conception* of God and his world by thinking. Certainly no good can come from that. We have no man in the ranks of the new theology, Dean Farrar included, who is the equal of Augustine, Aquinas, or Calvin, in intellectual power. If such men failed, what hope of success is there for smaller men? Besides, Augustine did limit his tremendous imagination by the Bible as it is. So in form and comprehensiveness his theology is both logical and biblical. These new theologians would re-read the Bible. They set no limit to their imaginations. Nothing is authority to them. Their theology will be just as big and comprehensive as themselves. It will partake not only of the weakness and humanity of Moses and Paul, but also of Dean Farrar and Dr. Bascom. On the whole, the church will do better under the intellectual leadership of Moses and Paul, with all their defects, than under the lead of much smaller and far less inspired men.

It does not take a great or strong mind to believe what the prophets and apostles have written. Any child can do that. It takes a supernaturally great mind to think out a true theology. Dean Farrar, Dr. Abbott, Dr. Bascom, and a million such as they cannot compass that. Augustine, that theological titan, tried it. Aquinas, than whom the ages since Plato have produced no superior as a thinker,

tried it. John Calvin and Edwards, the greatest thinkers of Protestantism, tried it. They all failed. After these magnificent failures, who can succeed? Some people never learn anything from the experience of the race. If that experience teaches anything, it teaches that God cannot be known or found by thinking. No human conception of God formed by abstract thought can ever be like him. God has proposed to save all those who *believe*. So the humble Christian need not follow this new theology in its vain chase after a new conception of God. Belief in the words of Jesus and his apostles is easy. Who cares to walk the hard road of his own thinking, which leads nowhere, when the easy way of believing, which leads to life, is ever open to him?

ARTICLE VIII.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THEOLOGY.¹

BY THE REV. DAVID N. BEACH, D. D.

I. THE CAVEAT OF SCRIPTURE.

IMBEDDED in the heart of the canon of the Old Testament, and also in the heart of the canon of the New Testament, is, in each instance, a document which, had it been apprehended in its broad relation to the volume in which it stands, might have saved the world a great deal of trouble. The latter of these is the Epistle to the Romans. The former is the Book of Job. In the case of the Romans, all fairly intelligent Christians are tolerably familiar with its general outline; much more, such persons as are special students of the Bible. In the case of the Book of Job, comparatively few of those who are fairly intelligent in biblical knowledge have adequately grasped its drift; though biblical specialists need not to be instructed concerning it. Yet such is the perspective in which these two documents stand in relation to each Testament, that, even though specialists should be among my readers, I undertake a *résumé* for the purpose of making clear the point I have in mind.

I. *In the New Testament—Romans.*

The writer to the Romans, in the case of this Epistle, as not in any other of his numerous extant letters, addresses

¹ Summer School of Theology, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, July 17, 1895; Boston (Congregational) Ministers' Meeting, March 16, 1896; Minneapolis (Congregational) Ministers' Meeting, October 5, 12, 1896; Saturday Club, Minneapolis, November 21, 1896. The article, "Some Questions in Religion now Pressing," in *The New World* for December, 1894, should, if practicable, be read first.

persons whom, as a body, he has never seen, and sends the Epistle to a place which, apparently, he has, as yet, never visited. The Epistle, indeed, is the immediate outgrowth of another, addressed to acquaintances in a particular place, and one of the most personal and pointed of all his letters. The Christians in the mountains of Galatia had been, by reason of their very liveliness of imagination, and devotion to Christian service, duped into a misunderstanding of the spirit of Christianity; and, at once upon the Apostle's hearing of this, he throws off for them in great heat of feeling and of logic, that affirmation and defense of essential Christian principles, which, obscure though it is in some respects for the modern reader, owing to the circumstances of its composition and the peculiar methods of argument resorted to, is, nevertheless, the germ of the Epistle to the Romans. That being done, the Apostle presently, with very considerable elaboration, and with most special design, prepares that Epistle which is to go, indeed, to a church and community which he has not as yet visited, but which as located at the capital of the world, he apparently desires shall receive, in most clearly stated and argued form, his conception of the general philosophy and ethics of the Christian religion. I say "general philosophy and ethics," because the Epistle distinctly passes, at the end of chapter xi., from the philosophical to the ethical part. Scarcely one, indeed, of the Apostle's letters fails to contain an ethical section near its close; but the division is so marked in the Romans, and the ethical section is so finely based, so beautifully unfolded, and so thoroughly elaborated, that it constitutes very distinctly an ethical Part II., so to say, of the Epistle.

It is in the philosophical section of this letter that the Apostle raises that note of warning and of exhortation which should have served, coincidently with a similar note in the Book of Job, to save the world from much of

that trouble through which it has passed. The assumption of the philosophical section is, that "the invisible things of God since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made." God, in other words, is self-manifesting. The order of the world shows him forth. The intelligent mind in not, at least to some degree, grasping the thought of him, is "without excuse." Nevertheless, not so has the world grasped God. The heathen world in particular has utterly perverted its thought of him, and its thought of life. This any Jew will admit. He will glory in the Apostle's trenchant characterization and condemnation of the Gentile peoples. However, the Apostle proceeds, the Jew who does this will, in its very doing, condemn himself. Not in precisely the same manner, not, possibly, to such excess, but in reality and in spirit the Jewish world has done the same thing. "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest dost practice the same things." This common failure of Jew and Gentile alike to apprehend and to follow God, the Apostle proceeds to set over against an effort on the part of God to recover the world, and especially to recover the Jewish portion of it.

The inquiry which this undertaking on God's part occasions the Apostle, concerns this primary question, What is the essential thing that God in this effort and self-revelation has been aiming at in the Jewish cult? The Apostle believes this essential thing to be, not what the superficially reflecting Jew might infer, the details that have unfolded themselves in connection with the Pentateuchal and other regulations, but a something which already appeared in germ, before laws were at all formulated, in the first great character of that people, the father of the faithful, Abraham himself. He "believed God, and it was reckoned unto him for righteousness." That is to say, however indispensable for the time, and educationally valuable, the

special Jewish training had been, its aim, as indicated from the beginning, was to develop a special attitude of mind, a saving quality in the soul, namely, "faith." How germinal, profound, incapable of adequate specific definition, and destined to indefinitely large unfoldings, this root idea had in mind in God's self-manifestation in the training of Israel, was, appears in those chapters of the Romans, the fifth to the eighth, in which faith, brought out into clear light in Jesus, is elaborated under several points of view. Justified by such faith we have peace with God. This is attained through our Lord Jesus Christ. Through him faith opens the door to a grace of life, "wherein we stand," unequalled heretofore in God's training of the world.

This faith and grace are turned over in many lights, but especially in the light of a continual spiritual battle waging in every soul, of which the classical statement occurs in chapter vii. To will is present with every earnest soul, but how to perform that will is the great problem. A war is in one's members. It amounts to a fearful struggle between the life and death of one's spirit. Its figure is a Roman prisoner chained to a festering corpse. From this struggle, the Apostle thanks God, he and any man may be delivered through that faith and grace into which Jesus is able to bring all. Thence the Apostle passes to the psychology of this experience; to a movement of the Spirit of God within the soul; and to a wonderful account of how that present Spirit helps men's infirmities, and brings them more and more out into the light and into the power of God. Nor is this description psychological only. It is cosmical also. It relates itself to that groaning and travail of the whole creation which has become the special study of the evolutionist in our time. Distinctly oblivious to that far future stage in the unfolding of scientific knowledge, the Apostle, nevertheless, as clearly prefigures it as the poetical Genesis story prefigures, though indeed vague-

ly and imperfectly, those stages of the creation which the evolutionist is now able to indicate so clearly. Nothing,—after this psychological and cosmical survey of the inner working of the Spirit of God through the touch of Jesus,—the Apostle profoundly affirms, is able to separate the soul that is responsive to God from his great love.

However, this glorious survey is, by itself, quite too simple and easy. The Apostle perceives this. He acknowledges straightway the difficulties in the case. What is to happen to the Jew? His very being favored of God has turned to his disadvantage. He has been taught so much that he is puffed up and cannot learn. The heathen is, in this respect, better off than he. What, then, about him? What, in other words, about the races and peoples and individuals who have suffered misfortune under the divine pedagogy? With this problem the Apostle is less successful, argumentatively, than with the earlier ones. The matter is, as yet, too dim and unrevealed. But difficulties which the head cannot as yet solve, the heart prophetically can. So with the Apostle. Eye hath not seen, but the soul discerns. The method of meeting the problem to which he resorts is not in all respects satisfactory, and could scarcely have been so to his own mind. He comes to a conclusion hardly so much logical as poetic and that of quickened insight. God, he urges, has a right to do anything. The potter has a right to make or mar, at will, the vessel which is upon his wheel. Nevertheless, the Apostle cannot think of God as arbitrary. He turns, therefore, from a figure of mechanics to a figure of life. In the well-known process of grafting, the young tree which has been growing and putting forth great and promising energy, is rudely sawn off. A scion is inserted from another stock. This is done to enhance and to enrich the life of that family of trees. If, then, God had thought so much of the Gentiles as to saw off the Jews for the time being,

much more, in view of his direct and long-continued kindness to the Jews, will he be disposed similarly to make them, in turn, to become scions of a completer growth. "For God hath shut up all," the Apostle at length profoundly and prophetically exclaims,—“For God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that he might have mercy upon all.”

This outline, familiar enough to us all as regards the light which it throws upon the distinctive doctrine of the Reformation, is even more remarkable for the indication which it also affords, almost at the beginning of the life of the church, of a fundamental philosophy of Christianity, of the world, and of the universe.

According to this philosophy this is God's world. He is in it. He is manifesting himself through it. Legally and technically considered,—which is the contemporaneous point of view, and as a postulate, the Apostle's point of view also, though toward the end of the Epistle he works away from it,—men are therefore without excuse for not recognizing God and practicing a true ethics. Still retaining this legal and technical point of view, the Apostle goes on to chapter v., pointing out the dereliction alike of Gentile and Jew, and characterizing the essential thing which God's training of Israel had contemplated as the remedy, namely, the great, undefined, intrinsic, and expansive principle of faith. Elaborate though the Jewish training had been, this faith was at the heart of it from before the circumcision of Abraham, and had been made clear and practicable through Jesus. Thence to chapter ix. this principle of faith through Jesus is turned over variously and acutely, as regards the Spirit of God present in the human heart, and the whole matter, psychic and cosmic, is brought forward into that place in which men cannot be separated by energy of any sort, whether of life or death, of things present or things to come, from the love of God. Here is the

great Christed realm in which the Apostle most delights to move, and in this respect his climax is reached at the end of chapter viii.

But, having occupied the legal and technical point of view that men are without excuse, the difficulties, even amidst the glories of a manifested Christ, are so stupendous, as regards those races and persons at a disadvantage under the divine education, that he willingly leaves this Beulah Land, and passes down into the shadowy valley of the great problem turned over in chapters ix., x., and xi., in which, with faulty enough logic, but with profound insight and picturesque touch, traversing certain figures, he comes out to the conclusion that all have been shut up unto disobedience, that all may become subjects of the divine mercy. Here it is that his true climax is reached, and his true philosophy rounded out as he exclaims, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past tracing out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor? or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and unto him, are all things. To him be the glory forever. Amen."

This great philosophical section, thus, not only concerns the distinctive doctrine of faith, but constitutes a broad, general survey of the whole life, world and universe, cosmic and psychic, in which God is self-revealing, in which men are being educated, in which peoples and nations have their respective parts to play, and in which no injustice shall be done, but in which, the rather, there shall be a grafting upon and regrafting, in order that God, somehow, may have mercy upon all. How greatly in contrast with such a survey is not only the pre-Reformation doctrine of salvation through works, but the almost continuous development of doctrine within the church from the beginning

until now, in a certain narrowness, failure to take account of all the facts, and failure to see life as it actually is! When, moreover, in connection with this great philosophical section, one recalls the culminating ethics of 1 Corinthians xiii., that love is the greatest thing, that as yet we see through a glass darkly, that only by and by we shall adequately know, what a warning have we here against thinking of God otherwise than in the light of the whole universe, and of the whole manifestation of him in mind, thought, aspiration and insight! Not by logic, but by figure, by insight, and by the use of the imagination, it is that the Apostle is able to bridge the dark valley into which he descends in the last division of his philosophical section; and figure, insight, and the use of the imagination must be involved in any adequate doctrine, either of God or of man.

2. *In the Old Testament—Job.*

Imbedded not only at the heart of the canon of the New Testament is there a document containing this suggested philosophy, but imbedded also at the heart of the canon of the Old Testament, there is another document, coming, by different processes, to an analogous conclusion. It is the Book of Job. The impression which that book has made upon the great minds of the world is nearly concurrent. In our own time to Carlyle on the one hand, and to Lowell on the other, it has seemed suggestive and profound to a degree scarcely equaled by anything else in the Bible, or in letters. Its literary method and its bold challenge of mightiest problems have succeeded in enkindling in the greatest minds, thoughts which have become germinally helpful to their conception of the world.

This book is an exquisite literary masterpiece. It concerns itself with the most general and profound thought, and yet has succeeded in being most specific and realistic

in method. Moreover, notwithstanding its abundant detail and its realism, it has skillfully avoided any allusion to contemporaneous political or religious conditions, so that, as far as mere language is concerned, one might never guess that there had been any Israel at all, any prophetic spirit, any stereotyping of religion into ritual, or any difficulties and problems involved in this vast educational process.

The principal character in this masterpiece is so real, and is so strongly drawn, that one can hardly doubt that it had its original; and, in this sense, a certain historicity would seem to inhere in the book. In many of its details, likewise, the book pictures the facts of a distinct age. Nevertheless, the whole method of treatment, the lofty march of the drama, and the simplicity and obvious artificiality of the dramatic method on the one hand, and, on the other, the strength and irresistibleness of the movement of thought, indicate unmistakably that the final form of the document belongs to a period relatively much later than that of the original character. Such literary conditions clearly imply that, however primitive that character may have been, the poet who turns him to account speaks out of a time when not only the prophetic spirit and the ritual of Israel were well advanced, but when the perils to simple and adequate thinking, involved in the unfolding of these, had very seriously manifested themselves.

It is in the light of such considerations, fairly evident upon any detailed examination of the book even in its English form, that one must be on the alert for the book's great motive. What is it undertaking to say? What led such skillful literary hands so completely to conceal not only their identity, but the place at which they belonged in history; and to withhold those ordinary contemporaneous touches which any usual literary motive would certainly not have excluded, but used, the rather, turning them to most effectual account? So phenomenal a document, in-

volving powers of mind and moral force so great, and peculiarities so unique, should stir the soul, as the unique Epistle to the Romans stirs it, to the most determined purpose to ascertain precisely what it is that the book intends to say for all time. As St. Paul wrote, not as usual to a people and a place with which he was familiar, but to the world's capital, and wrote as he nowhere else writes, and therefore places his Epistle, but especially its philosophical section, for broad teaching purposes, at the forefront of everything which he wishes to say,—so should this equally unique Book of Job, with literary characteristics such as I have hinted at, become, in its essential teaching, in large degree a key and pivot for all that the Old Testament is trying to say to us.

What, then, does the book undertake to say? A certain character, for purposes of the poem, in every way prospers, and, in addition to this, is not only upright, but also devout, spiritually minded, and at the same time a practical philanthropist. This character comes under consideration in the court of Heaven. Satan, appearing there, charges that the man's excellence is based in self-interest, and obtains successive permissions, first, to deprive him of possessions and children, and, next, to make a fearful attack upon his life. The details of these two onslaughts are given—as, indeed, the possessions and good fortune of the man are earlier described—with an artificiality of detail so obvious that more or less of the filling in is clearly fictitious, however real may have been the original experience on which the poem is based. It is to the central character, thus bereft, and thus under fearful strain of disease, that certain typical thinkers of the time, in the guise of sympathizers, come. The book, in its main portion, consists of prolonged dialogue between these men and the chief character,—a dialogue which, after a time, is represented as being interrupted by God himself. He, answer-

ing out of a whirlwind, sets forth the true state of the case as between the disputants. To all this, as the account of the chief character's prosperous state constituted the prologue, so an account of blessings subsequently coming to that character constitutes the epilogue.

Must it not be evident that the great point of such a writing cannot lie in the particular contention, itself, between Job and those who, in attempting, from various points of view, to console him, succeed only in enhancing his miseries; but must lie, the rather, in the opposition between the whole human contention, with its intensifying of the suffering of its poor victim, and the true thought and outlook which should have been held, and which are suggested in the part of the dialogue that is put into the mouth of God? Moreover, while doubtless the great ethical and spiritual strength of the book lies in the chief character's maintaining his hold on God, notwithstanding all that tended in the contrary direction, and refusing to think uncandidly of himself,—a course which the theories of his consolers in greater or less degree required,—nevertheless, from the broad point of view of the relation of the book to its setting and method, is it not very clear that what God has to say in rebuke of the dogmatic postulates which underlie the contention of the friends of the sufferer, constitutes the motive, and moral, and pith of the book? What, then, in one sentence, is that definitely expressed sentiment? It is this (and our revised English translation rightly makes here not only a fresh paragraph, but a break in the text): "And it was so, that after the Lord had spoken these words unto Job, the Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends: for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath."

Ah! the thing that is right has too generally not been spoken concerning God. It cannot be spoken without the

largest knowledge, the profoundest insight, the most conscientious regard for all the facts, and a reverent, waiting, expectant attitude toward that larger light, which, according to laws of the human mind, is continually breaking as knowledge grows from more to more, and the spiritual discernment of mankind deepens and broadens. The systems of religious thought, which, by slow stages and fearful travail, have succeeded one another through the ages, have only little by little made manifest to men the true things to be said concerning God. Nor, at any stage, least of all at the present stage, where ways part in so many directions, and all the indications point to yet vaster enlargements of knowledge and of insight, can the complete and final thing concerning God be said.

This is not to affirm that God is unknowable, or that our knowledge has no reality,—assertions not only destructive of knowledge, but tending to invalidate the mind itself; but it is to say that the greatest modesty, teachableness, openness of mind, expectancy of spirit, repression of the dogmatic temper, and unwillingness to bind one's self to systems of thought fast becoming outworn, ought to characterize all students of religious truth. The imbedding at the heart of the canon alike of the New Testament and of the Old, of such documents as the Epistle to the Romans, particularly in its philosophical section, and the Book of Job, with their familiar outlines of simple and profound truth, but with their utter refusal to remain at such positions, and their leaping forward, the rather, into vast and untried ranges of thought, and with, in particular, the stern chiding at the culmination of the Book of Job, of those who had dared to say concerning God the thing that was not right,—both these phenomena, in the inspired canons themselves, ought long ago to have sounded an alarm which should have prevented the narrowness, the tyranny, too often the outward calamities, and, during far the larger

portion of the time, the unprogressiveness by which theology has been characterized since the beginning of Christian history. Against these things the heart of the ancient and the heart of the newer Scripture alike protest.

II. THE WARNING FROM SCIENCE.

If "the invisible things of [him] since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made," God's self-revelation in nature is the primary revelation. How limited soever it may be, it is antecedent. However requiring to be carried farther, it is self-consistent. Nor can additional revelation contravene it. The witness of God is not self-contradictory. "It is impossible for God to lie." On this ground theology must listen to nature. It may not take *ex parte* testimony. The pattern shown in the mount requires that it should not do so.

I mention one other ground for the same thing. It is the inadequacy of language.

This principle underlies the incarnation. "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son." Nor so much has he spoken unto us by any words of his Son, as by that Son himself. That Son wrote no book. Even the perversions of him which were sure to occur, did not tempt him to entrust the sacred communication to any literary vehicle for forefending the same. His "many things to say unto you" he only partly communicated. He was himself the revelation. The word became flesh. Whoever had seen him had seen the Father.

So of the Sacraments. What God would say through those material symbols exceeded the containing power of human speech. Nor have any or all of the theories of the

respective Sacraments (frequently mutually contradictory, as when such pure and luminous spirits as Luther and Zwingli parted company regarding one of them) which have successively kindled the imagination of the church, begun to exhaust or even fairly to express what those same Sacraments have meant to the devout heart. Speech is an invaluable aid, a most serviceable instrument; but it can never take the place of concrete expression.

In a sort, nature itself is also sacramental. It bodies forth what can never be spoken; what can only, in fact, be most gradually apprehended.

"There is no speech nor language;
Their voice cannot be heard.

Their line is gone out through all the earth."

They declare the glory of God, and show his handiwork. This is the biblical as well as the rational postulate. The "firmament" and the "law" are bracketed as witnesses. At the mouth of the twain is every word to be established. The Devil tells us, "It is written." Jesus calmly adds, "It is also written."

Because, then, of the primary and antecedent revelation in nature, and because of the fact that the concrete is the more intrinsic kind of revelation,—as illustrated even in the incarnation and in the Sacraments,—theology is bound to listen to nature. Science, as the expression down to date of man's apprehension of nature, it must consult.

What, then, broadly speaking, has the heart of science to say, like the heart of the canon of the Old and New Testaments, as its admonition to theology? Precisely the same thing that the philosophical section of the Romans and the epilogue to Job has to say. The *caveat* of the canon parallels the warning from the study of nature. Take, briefly, three illustrations.

The most primitive man was set within the same infinite and speaking universe as that a fragment of which the Lick

telescope sweeps. But, with a confidence simply audacious, the first science, in fact nearly all science down to within five centuries, insisted that the universe was geocentric, the earth flat, and the heavenly host but its glittering illumination.

When, after painful and prolonged struggle, including ecclesiastical persecution in defense of theology as conceived to be involved in the controversy, the Copernican astronomy had supplanted the Ptolemaic, those same wonders of geology which broke like a revelation on the first half of the present century, were all around man, but were to him a sealed book. At length, toilsomely and amidst bitter contention, they won their place. The nebular hypothesis, in its essentials, made space intelligible, the stellar worlds thinkable, the emergence of this planet into its present condition rational.

Close upon this vast, horizon-widening achievement, with a swiftness almost appalling, has come a third generalization, multiform, applicable in many directions, and, if possible, yet more instructive. But it came not until one or two generations whose minds the revelations of geology had enriched, had missed the benefit of its additional fructification. In fact, to countless fairly intelligent persons, it is still a strange language, its profound underlying thought all unapprehended. I refer to the new sense of vitality in nature; of the world as informed; of force and of its potentialities; of a constructive power within the universe, seeking the line of least resistance and of highest achievement. This new sense expresses itself, comprehensively speaking, in the doctrine of evolution,—a doctrine still in its tentative stages, still needing much correction and enlargement, but already investing the thought of man and of God with new grandeur, significance and puissance.

So confident, in other words, was the dominant conception of the world—that is, the dominant science—in its pre-

vious attainments, that, until five centuries ago, a century ago, and the present generation, respectively, the Copernican astronomy, geology, with its correlate, the nebular hypothesis, and, comprehensively speaking, the doctrine of evolution, have been withheld from mankind. The truer science, indeed, under the impulse of the inductive philosophy, has not itself been holding back, since the moment when it gave itself to the inductive method; but the average scientific sense of man, and too many naturalists individually, have held back.

Does not this threefold experience of science, this testimony out of the heart of our slowly and painfully achieved knowledge of God in nature, lift up, then, its voice, along with chapters i. to xi. of the Romans, and along with the epilogue of Job, to plead with men, that, patiently, and with the constant anticipation of fresh light, they shall ever seek the better and yet the better to know God? Does it not join with that surpassing genius who wrought the legend of the Man of Uz into the great poem which bears his name in chiding theology if it speak not the thing that is right concerning God?

III. THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY.

In *The New World* for December, 1894, under the title, "Some Questions in Religion now Pressing," I have discussed somewhat in detail,—partly in considering certain traits of the time, and partly in drawing attention to the unsatisfactory and urgent state of certain primary theological questions,—the necessity for the reconstruction of theology. It is not my purpose at this point even briefly to recapitulate the considerations there adduced, and the inferences drawn therefrom. I only allude to the article because it covers with some pains a certain range of facts which unite with what I have thus far been saying to demand a fresh attitude in theology, and, as I think, its bold

though cautious reconstruction. Regarding the article itself, I desire only to add that, in the case of one or two of the questions summarily considered, for the sake of that inclusiveness which, in the science of theology, is a great desideratum, I have left certain matters somewhat open and tentative as yet, which, to my own mind, are measurably closed and established.

While, however, I do not go over the ground discussed in that article, I believe it capable of substantial proof that the traits of our time, its mental attitude, certain peculiarities of the entire situation near this close of the nineteenth century, and like considerations, join to demand, as of the greatest practical moment, a somewhat radical though tentative reconstruction of theology.

Moreover, coincidentally with these traits of the time, I believe that there are certain questions, primary to theology, in a state so unsatisfactory, and so unreconciled with well-established facts of nature and of mind, that not to put them at a fresh point of vantage by a somewhat fundamental change in the method of theology, by a new courage of outlook in it, and by fresh and large investigations within its entire field, is to deprive the principles involved in those questions of their due reasonableness, power over the mind of our time, and serviceableness in the upbuilding of spiritual life.

Those traits of the time to which I have alluded, on the one hand, and the present unsatisfactory state of certain primary questions in theology, on the other, unite, in short, in my judgment, to establish a most practical necessity for a new departure in the science of theology, for its true reconstruction; or, in brief, for its giving most earnest heed to that *caveat* in such matters, which, as I showed at the outset, is imbedded in the very heart of the canon of the Old and of the New Testament; and most earnest heed likewise to that warning from the backwardness of science

to apprehend that concrete revelation of God which nature constitutes,—the portentous matter which it next became our duty to consider.

The *caveat* of Scripture, the warning from science, and the practical necessity growing out of certain traits of the time, and out of the unsatisfactory state of theology, join, in other words, to render imperative that which, summarily, is to be considered in the remainder of this paper, namely, some re-making of theology.

IV. FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.

Great progress has been making, within the present century, in the direction of a broader, simpler, profounder theology.

The Germans have given the subject infinite research and cogitation. They have moved especially along critical and philosophical lines. They have laid theological learning under measureless debt. But their theology, during this period, has been like the troubled sea. Not only has it had the life and movement of the sea, which are indispensable, but also the sea's unstable equilibrium. To us, with the blood of Britain in our veins, and with its craving at once for the spiritual and the practical in life, this is vastly unsatisfactory. Nor is its occasion far to seek. In the main, and characteristically, German theology has lacked that practical directive, and that scrupulous application to life, which have afforded a certain calm, and a certain constructive progress, to the theology of the English-speaking peoples during the same period.

In his helpful little book, "The Movement of Religious Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Century," the late Principal Tulloch has outlined the saner and juster contemporaneous movement of theology in Great Britain. Since that book was published, Principal Caird's "The Evolution of Religion," and—to name that beloved scholar

whose lectures at Mansfield College in the summer of 1894, and at Western Reserve in that of 1895, have constituted the chief attraction of those respective Summer Schools—Principal Fairbairn's "Christ in Theology," have appeared as monumental indications of the fact that that movement is still fresh and strong and rich and in the path of destiny.¹

In America, Channing and Bushnell and Beecher and Mulford and Stearns, not to mention at all the living, have been among the foremost to attempt the transfer of theology out upon simpler, more rational, and more heart-affecting ground.

In the progress suggested by these statements, there is much to be thankful for. The fallow ground is breaking up. In some instances this is occurring faultily, as in defective and even destructive tillage of the ground; but, upon the whole, the earth is opening to sun and rain, the furrows thereof are watered and warmed, and their possibilities of productiveness and of beauty are greatly enhanced. In a wee book,—primer-like in its simplicity, and only like a "finder" to a telescope compared with such authorities as those to which I have referred,—"*The Newer Religious Thinking*," I have sought to outline the promise and glory of the whole general movement. Christ is the movement's center. It is from him and to him. The praise be to his blessed name!

And yet, brethren and fathers, may we not freely speak one to another? Are you satisfied with any progress yet made? Am I? Is any earnest and competent person? I do not refer to the imperfection and tentativeness common to all progress. I mean a more radical difficulty. I mention it to blame no one. The more capable thinkers have

¹To these books, on the hither side of the Atlantic, Dr. George A. Gordon has added, since this paper was prepared, "*The Christ of To-day*," a volume which at once takes rank among the foremost theological treatises of America, and of the period. Its depth, insight, eloquence, philosophical acumen, and rugged strength, give one new hope for our time.

been acting well their parts. The time was scarcely ripe. But it is fast ripening. These Summer Schools should accelerate the progress. They should help to usher in the better day. In plainest speech, and in bald outline only, I purpose to suggest certain directions in which, as I believe, this whole movement must become more thorough, more courageous, more epoch-marking, more life-giving.

1. *Things Which Cannot Be Shaken.*

There are, be it in the first place said, certain things which are unmovable. The yearning of the heart after God; its sense of an unseen world paralleling this,—Jacob's "Mahanaim," the interaction of the seen and of the unseen,—these are facts, differently explained, indeed, but so constant, so mighty in their influence, so dynamic, that they constitute a scientific basis for theology. The wiser thoroughgoing evolutionists like John Fiske, frankly say so. Our word "religion," in its not improbable etymology,—the "binding together," as we may express it, of the seen and the unseen,—happily expresses this.

Christ likewise is unmovable. Not theories about him. They have changed, and will change. But he abides. Account for him how we will, strip off from the doctrine of his person those dogmatic cerements with which—as with grave clothes, too often—he has been bound, and he simply abides, more glorious, still and ever, in the net account which is to be made for him. Oh, is it not pitiful to see so many hurrying hither and thither, to bulwark with their bishops' "encyclicals," and the like, the person of Christ, when, but let him alone, see him as he is, and he grows stronger ever? I have my theory of his person, as you all have yours; but he is utterly superior to any or all of our theories, depends on them not at all, and will abide if, as is not impossible, all of them are swept away. Oh, that we might but just let his light flood us, whoever and whatever

he is, and walk in his light, and follow him! Then, indeed, as he said, we should not walk in darkness, whatever our theology or lack of theology might be. The emancipation of Jesus from the hypotheses, provisos, and statutes of limitation within which we have tried to place him, into his own proper simplicity and largeness, is the one transcendent need of modern theology. He, like the religious faculty of man itself, however he is to be accounted for, is factual, primary, basal,—a part of that fossil-less rock on which the world is builded.

Another unmovable thing is experience. It is the counterpart of the religious impulse. It is accentuated in Jesus. No man may gainsay it. Like the habit of certain minerals to crystalize, like the habit of burning elemental substances to indicate certain bands through the spectroscope, so does the life of man answer true to itself in the realm of religious faculty. The pure in heart see God. They that hunger after righteousness are filled. The meek inherit the earth. Vision ensues upon adequate conduct. "No man," cried the lonely, intrepid, prophetic Robertson, blazing a path for us all through the then trackless forests,— "No man shall separate me from the Christ."

Correlative with this, and its slow deposit through the ages, like mighty fruitful prairies, is Scripture. Not the canon; not the story of the manuscripts; but, as says St. Paul, "every Scripture" inbreathed of God. Some of it is in the unlettered tradition of the Red Indian; some looks down from the monuments of Egypt; some is baked into the clay cylinders of Assyria; some is to be found in the far East, yea everywhere; preëminently it speaks to us out of the literature of that people which, of old, most of all opened its soul to be breathed on of God, and whose literature, therefore, and not by any partiality, nearest approaches the oracular. Inspired were all. God has spoken to men. He speaks still. His speaking to them is his token that

they are men, in his likeness, his children. If he has not spoken to you, he never spoke to any one. This vast deposit, of varying value, some of it hardly better than slag or refuse, some of it finest gold, is factual also. It is scientific basis for theology. Theology will never be worthy of utmost respect until it has planted itself four-square upon the whole of it.

The religious faculty thus referred to, the Christ, experience, and Scripture, in its only true wholeness,—these are unmovable. They cannot be shaken. The point of view may from time to time change. The *tout ensemble* may at length scarcely resemble at all what we conceive it to be now. But these will abide. Heaven and earth shall pass, but not these,—even as Christ, speaking of his word, but meaning himself, and thinking of himself as comprehending within himself all the others, said so bravely once upon a time.

2. *Need of a Scientific Basis.*

But while these specifications embrace, though not at all exhaustively, data whence theology may be safely constructed, there is much in the present fabric of theology which is not only open to challenge, but which even offends sound reason, is a stumbling-block to the spiritual life, and deserves that protest which the Book of Job was constructed to administer to the theology with which it was contemporary. We, too, have not spoken the thing that is right concerning God. As the present purpose is positive, not negative, I refrain from presenting examples, though I have plainly stated some of them in the article already referred to. What, on the positive side, the rather, are some requirements of a reconstructed theology?

One of them is a scientific basis. At present theology rests (1) partly on a basis of fact; (2) partly on authority,—which, indeed, may be factual in part, but which is involved in theories more or less attenuated and untenable;

and (3) partly on faith,—regarding which, again, there is often the greatest confusion of thought. There is but one authority,—that of reality. No authority can contravene the revelation of the unseen in nature and in right reason. There may be innumerable mysteries, but there cannot be unreason and absurdity. And as for faith,—it is the eye of the mind and of the soul. In this sense it is as real as existence is real. But faith in the other sense (which is the sliding scale introducing endless confusion),—faith in the sense of the content of faith, the sum-total of the things supposed to be perceived by the eye of faith,—the awakened and spiritual mind should never cease challenging that, as an astronomer challenges his observations of the stars, until the errors of every observation shall be more and more eliminated.

In place of this threefold basis,—fact, authority, faith,—theology should have but one basis, fact. Whatever belongs legitimately to the other two bases, is really only fact. Scripture does not claim any such authority as has been ascribed to it. Its sole legitimate authority lies in its facts, using that word in the inclusive sense just implied. Faith, too, is factual as the seeing eye, as an insight from above; but not as content of things supposed to have been perceived thereby, which must be always open to revision in conformity to the results of ampler and acuter vision.

We shall not be at an end of our confusions, nor make theology a respectable science in the eyes of very many whose respect it should command, nor put ourselves in the way of those great discoveries and enrichments which as much await this science as any other, until we have brought it upon this base. Unsuspected planets will not be descried, the magnificent rock-ribbed geology, so to say, of our science will not appear, and the true, vital, and evolving force of the same will not be felt until, as in physical sci-

ence, the slow, plodding, teachable, inductive process has been submitted to. The cost will be slight; the gain will be measureless. Besides, theological truth is far too noble and glorious to be demeaned by withholding it in any respect from this test. God, in the Job poem, was not afraid to test Job. The fire was fierce, but he stood it. The new Job was worth far more than the old, albeit he was sorely depleted for a time. Such will be the effect upon theology of the factual test. The dignity due the truth represented by it requires that it be placed upon a scientific basis.

3. *Conception and Function of Scripture.*

As I have already implied, the only ground on which Scripture can be held to convey a revelation, requires a larger definition of Scripture.

Scripture is that deposit of experience of the unseen which has come to us out of the past and comes to us in the present. Not in the canon only, not through a special people only, not mainly through any or all cults, but in the very life of our race, has God been speaking; that is, if he has been speaking at all, which may be fairly assumed. If he has ever spoken to anybody, he has spoken to you. If he has not spoken to you, he has spoken to no one. For it is a peculiarity of man to be spoken to from above. The voice of God, the "Wisdom" or "Word" of Holy Writ, is an inbreathing of God in man; is distinctive of man; is not partial, but universal.

This is not to deny degrees of God's speaking, or inbreathing, or inspiring. It is, in fact, the difference of degrees in this matter that has thrown us off the track. Owing to varying receptivity, parts of the message received have been infinitesimal; much of it has been of little practical worth. The Red Indian has little; the Indian by the Ganges, more; that people which became greatly recept-

ive, an extraordinary degree; and so forth. But all have some. Be it, however, hardly more than slag or refuse, or be it finest gold, it is all from one source, and must be received in its wholeness. "*Every Scripture*" inbreathed of God is profitable.

We are thus put upon a larger conception of Scripture. The very defense of Scripture requires it. Not only so, but the function of Scripture, *par excellence*, requires to be discriminated. What do the contents of the canon convey to us? "God's proclamation," we answer. "His revealed will." "His authoritative asseverations, to which his revelation in nature and in life must be squared as best we may square it." Ah, me! Was God, then, so püt to it that he had to post up that Hebrew and Greek bulletin? Had his speaking power sunk so low?—not low in point of matter, for the literature is great, but low in the method, for no literature is the highest form of speaking. And is God thus the author of confusion? Nay, brothers; and if ever there was need to "try the spirits, whether they be of God," those spirits which claim to define revelation for us, and to limit and degrade theology thereby, have need of being tried.

What Scripture is trying to impart to us, is, the rather, a kindling of the soul; an openness of eyes to behold wondrous things through the revelation; such factual matter as shall inspire confidence and expectancy; such knowledge of things unseen as, by somebody's being in the process of enlightenment (which is always the Bible way), shall fructify our own knowing power. Let me illustrate:—

David had somewhat of Scripture. It served, in connection with personal experience, to open his eyes to something beyond, and in seeming outward opposition to Scripture, namely, that sacrifice and burnt offering were not the point which God had in view, but a broken spirit.¹

¹ While it is doubtful if Psalm li., as it stands, is David's, its temper is

Again, a large part of the conflict of the prophets, that which caused men not to believe their report, was their movement of thought, as it had been touched partly by such Scripture as they had, but more by God's speaking through their experience,—the movement of their thought out beyond anything that was as yet in Scripture. Almost to a man they were heretics. Scripture, and a speaking God, carried them beyond Scripture, and therefore they were stoned and sawn asunder.

Or take the most spiritual Gospel, the Fourth. Its whole method, though it lays down some guiding propositions, is to show how Christ was so with men, and was such to them, that they "believed on him." It had, not improbably, for its original climax, the surrender even of Thomas, after that stout and prolonged resistance of his, to the resistless presence of Jesus. In other words, the method of the Fourth Gospel assumes that Scripture's main intent is a process in the heart of the reader (which process it seeks to quicken), rather than mainly an objective content of knowledge.

Or take Christ himself. He is exceeding plain in the fifth of St. Matthew. The law, he says, shall stand. Heaven and earth shall not, but it shall. But how stand? By being broken. "Ye have heard that it hath been said" thus and so; "but I say unto you" that what that saying was driving at is the one authoritative thing, and that the letter, as it stands, is likely to damn you. The Pharisees could not see this. An ever advancing, never attained, horizon of Scripture was unintelligible to them. From their point of view, therefore, Jesus was a destroyer of Moses. And we likewise have, too often, regarding that

his, particularly in the part cited. The originality and sturdiness of his character, and the relation which his age holds to that of Solomon and to the age which succeeded that, imply such a temper in him. Note, likewise, the insight of our Lord's allusion to him, Matt. xii. 3, 4.

Scripture which we possess, a view which, but supply the conditions, would lead us, and does actually tend to lead us, analogous lengths.

These examples may illustrate my point. Not only must we enlarge our conception of Scripture, but we must apprehend its true function, as a kindling of the soul, an opening of the eyes, an awakening of expectancy, and a pointing out to us by factual illustration, how we too may make the personal achievement of righteousness. And, brethren and fathers, to say truth: I, for one, never saw that part of Scripture which is within the canon in such beauty, and glory, and inspiring power, as in these last years, since I have seen in that Scripture precisely what I see in all other Scripture, and hear in my own soul,—albeit in superlative degree in that Scripture,—namely, an inbreathing of God to stir to duty, to aspiration, to greater hunger to know the truth, and to greater power to live the truth. Oracle of God, in such a sense, the canon indeed is, but to be heard in connection with all other oracles, and, above all, in connection with the oracle within. For whatever God was to Isaiah, or to St. Paul, or to St. John, such, too, must he be to you and to me,—a Speaking Presence; and if he be not that, even Isaiah and St. Paul and St. John will be but unintelligible sound to our souls.¹

V. THE LINE OF DIRECTION.

When theology shall have placed itself upon a scientific

¹ The universality of inspiration is maintained throughout this section of the essay, and that the inspiration of the Bible ("Scripture, *par excellence*") is unique, not in its kind, but in its superlative degree. It is just to the writer, and perhaps also to the reader, to add :—

The intrinsic distinction of the Bible, that which places it in a category by itself, is its witness (inspired in superlative degree) to certain primary redemptive facts. These, while manifold, various, and intricate, are, comprehensively speaking: (1) Such a training of the world, but particularly of Israel, that the right line of approach was open to conceptions of God, of man, of duty, and of destiny; and (2) The culmination of all this in Jesus Christ.

basis; when, humbling itself that it may be exalted, it shall have followed the example of physical science, and submitted itself without reservations to the inductive process; when, beyond this, availing itself of one of its great *principia*, experience, and resorting to the major portion of this *principium*, namely, the experience of our race, a deposit which has come down, partly outside of letters and partly in letters, but, all of it, properly apprehended, Scripture to the awakened spirit,—the inbreathing of God into the souls of men,—when, I say, so availing itself of experience in its major portion, theology, in respect of Scripture (both in general, and *par excellence*), shall have formed not only so large a conception of Scripture as this, but shall have apprehended its function as, that of enkindling the soul, enlightening the eyes, and challenging man's whole being, by example and other factual matter, to come out into larger life, rather than as principally the imparting of a content of objective knowledge, the entire content being but, as it were, the blazing of a path out toward the never-to-be-overtaken horizon of enlightenment and growth;—when, I say, theology shall have done this, then shall a new day indeed dawn for religion. The splendid discoveries of physical science, achieved through resorting to such a method, will not outshine those spiritual discoveries which shall then hasten to break upon the world.

What, in general, will be the line of direction in this reconstruction of theology?

1. Our *a priori* rubric of theological instruction will be mainly set aside. The cumbrous, undemonstrating demonstration of the existence of God, through "Natural Theology"; the sudden and almost contemptuous dismissal of that theology, thereupon, in order to take up "Revealed Theology" (as if a man could receive anything, even so supposedly superfluous a thing as "Natural Theology," except it be given him from above!); the section on the Di-

vine Being, attributes, and government; this department shuffled hastily out of in order to contemplate at inordinate length a moral cataclysm, a great overwhelming of God's plan through sin, which he is remedying as best he may (for the inventors of such a table of contents for dogmatics inferred, and rightly if their premise were correct, that the attributes and government of God might be best known by contemplating him, not as he is manifesting himself on every hand and within every heart, but as he resorts to supposed makeshifts for the remedying of the cataclysm); the intricacies and mysteries of soteriology (which, did we but know it, are just as intricate and mysterious, and no more, as is sunlight melting the frosts, summoning the crocuses from underneath the snow, absorbing the noxious exhalations of earth, and making the dull world a garden of God);—all these, and much more, of the major part of which the next best thing to never having heard of them at all, is swiftly to forget them, for no childlike soul ever yet found God by the help of, but, the rather, in spite of them,—all these, I say, and much more, will either be dismissed altogether, or will be greatly abridged, subordinated, and readjusted in the matter of emphasis.

2. But this line of direction concerns method only, and is negative. Not so of the next. The primary thing, in the reconstructed theology, will come to the front. A definition, demarcation, and inductive and experimental study of the religious faculty, and of all which that involves, will then advance into the foreground. The undemonstrable being of God is there nearest approached. The more that range shall be studied, on its many sides,—and especially, at theological schools, by each student's employing the "laboratory method" within himself, and by instructors' and students' doing "seminar" work within their own number, and amongst those about them,—the more thoroughly grounded in its "evidences" will the mind become.

Men, in such a case, cannot but testify the things which they have seen and heard. Scripture, too, in the large sense, will be especially studied in this connection. The *Theologica Germanica*, and the temper of Erasmus, when so approached, will prove not to be in conflict. A holy life, a "retreat" or "mission," and yet a perpetual advance and gospeling, will grow normal to him who so prosecutes theology. If such a one be a preacher, he will go forth so grounded in an inner and factual sense of God, that, like Maurice or Phillips Brooks, he will interpret God to men out of the very experiences of their lives. And he will be, himself, in such a temper that he will, in his own person, be a discoverer of spiritual things, a prophet of God with open vision. •

3. A theology so grounded,—grounded where Abel, and Moses with shining face, and David, and Isaiah, and Stephen filled with the Spirit, and Paul, by whom a man was wont to stand speaking in the night, and John of peerless insight, were wont to ground it; yea, where Christ himself grounded it, saying, "The pure in heart shall see God,"—a theology so grounded, will pass thence out upon the great tablelands of theological knowledge. The indwelling of the Spirit of God in men; the processes, simple but profound, of the upbuilding of spiritual life; a right, Christed ethics; God's ways with men, everywhere, under all religious conditions,—and in all manifestations of himself to them,—these expansive fields, and such as these, will be seriously and broadly and courageously entered upon. Above all, that desire of certain Greeks, which stirred the soul of the Christ as no other single human contact seems to have stirred him,—that sublime request, "Sir, we would see Jesus," will be heeded. We shall have a theology which will show Jesus to men. He shall be held up to them,—his person, his temper, his thought, his life-impressing, life-renovating character. It will be "Evolution

of Religion," and "Christ in Theology," then, truly. And then, as when the Greeks asked the question, the hour will have come, the Son of man will be glorified, and, at that precise moment, will have arrived "the judgment of this world."

VI. DISCOVERIES AND EFFECTS.

I have but suggested, without definition or explication, and, it may be, far from correctly, the general line of direction of the reconstructed theology. What will be its traits, its lines of discovery, its effects? You will understand that, in answering this question, as in answering the preceding, I can only throw out a suggestion or two.

The reconstructed theology will be most studious and teachable. Spiritual and intense, it will none the less keep a cool head and clear vision. It will traverse widest ranges. "Nothing," to paraphrase Terence,—*"Nothing which affects man will be alien to it."* What man is, looked at from the spiritual side; therefore looked at from the psychic side, the social side, the functional and physical side; what human society is, its true laws, its proper economics, its right claims; the problem of redeeming weakened or damaged or abnormal moral life; how, in short, truly, in broad and inclusive lines, to save men, will engage its consecrated and concentrated powers. But when such a theology enters adequately upon these researches, prosecuting them always in Christ's spirit, which is a practical, applied, and experiencing spirit, shall we not, think you, get discoveries as notable in these ranges, as any physical discoveries with the fame of which the world has resounded?

Again the life toward God, the life of prayer and of thought, the blowing where it listeth of the Spirit, its mysterious impulses, in fact, the whole subject of the reciprocal interaction of the seen and unseen worlds,—matters, after all these Christian centuries, almost as little exploited scientifically as electricity was, say at the middle of the pres-

ent century,—will be as patiently and inductively studied as electricity has been, since that time, and,—can we question?—with as marked results. For nothing happens by accident in the spiritual world, any more than in the physical; and the reconstructed theology will set up its observatories, poise its transit to tell the hour of noon, and bring celestial glories near to men.

Above all, in the range of motive, of “how to perform,” as St. Paul expressed the desideratum, will research and discovery be made. There is but one transcendent motive. The Apostle hastened to express it. “Through Jesus Christ, our Lord”; or, “The love of Christ constraineth me.” But surely such a motive, the source of spiritual life and health, must needs be of more certain and determinable application than St. Paul or St. John, even, found it among their contemporaries. In this highest matter,—the relation of the soul to Jesus, the bringing it under his power, can we doubt that a vital theology, such as we are thinking of, will make discoveries and practical applications which will change the face of the world?

What will be the effect of such a theology? To break, in the range of dogmatics, many graven images, wrought, some of them, of finest gold, with holiest intent, but idols still, taking the place of God, and destined to be ground to powder, and the ashes of them to be drunk by those who persist in adhering to them.

Also, a great sifting of men. Very many persons will not study theology then, or teach it, or serve on boards of trustees of its schools, or preach it, or battle for it in ecclesiastical courts, who do so now. One by one, a great number of them, being condemned in their own hearts, as when Jesus wrote on the ground, will go out.

But their places will be more than made good. Many a true man, who, at present, cannot, with mental self-respect, enter a theological school, will do so then. Many a dead-

in-earnest man, who, although not prevented by intellectual obstacles, has, nevertheless, an obstacle of spirit,—who proposes to sell his life more dearly than in prosecuting branches and refinements of study, precious to the theologian, but useless if not baseless; or, in minding ecclesiastical leading-strings, or disregarding them at his peril; and, than in the ineffectiveness and inanity which too frequently mark a ministry reared under a decadent theological system,—many a dead-in-earnest man, I say, deterred for reasons like these, will hasten to enter upon the severe studies, the brave, Spirit-led life, and the grand achievements which such a theology will render possible to the ministry of Jesus.

Radical will such a theology be, with the fearlessness, the freshness, the power of changing the face of the world, which it had in Jesus, in St. Paul, in Savonarola, in Luther and in Maurice. The Bible will not be its collection of proof-texts, to be used by concordance, but its marching music, its battle hymn, its

“Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott,”

sounding like a trumpet through the soul.

And such a theology will come. There are persons already alive who will dedicate their whole being to it, who will sacrifice the vitality of their lives in its development and defense, and the child is already in his cradle who will see it triumphing throughout the world. Missions will get meaning then. The churches will not be half empty any longer. There will not be any problem of reaching the masses with the gospel in that day. And, most important of all, the lamp of Christian living, too often low and flickering now, will blaze like a beacon fire in multitudes whom no man can number all over this earth.

If we can speed its advent, let us be at it.

At any rate, let us not block its way.

And Christ's shall be the glory! AMEN.

ARTICLE IX.

THE SOCIAL LAW OF SERVICE.

BY THE REV. NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS, D.D.

THE waxing name and fame of Jesus Christ is the most striking fact of our era. His star is causing all others to pale and disappear through his increasing flood of light. Indeed, the time seems rapidly approaching when society will have but one Hero and King, at whose feet humanity will pour out all its songs, its prayers, its tears. In the triumphal procession of the Roman conquerors, kings and princes walked as captives. At last an era has come when literature, learning, art, statesmanship, philanthropy, are all captives, marching in Christ's triumphal procession up the hill of time. Hitherto, if political economy has followed Christ at all, it has been a disciple that has followed afar off. But let us hasten to confess that to-day, the science of wealth is being entirely rewritten in the light of the Sermon on the Mount. Our best economists are now ceasing to look upon man as a mere covetous machine, with one hand raking in wealth, by buying in the cheapest market, with the other hand heaping up treasure, by selling in the dearest market,—both processes being as innocent of ethical considerations as is the iron rake that pulls the stray coin out of the gutter. Happily for society an age has dawned when all economists are coming to recognize that the centripetal law of getting is balanced by the centrifugal law of giving. Students of the problems of the market-place are becoming preachers of righteousness, and are emphasizing increasingly the debt of strength to weak-

ness, and the law of social sympathy and social liability.

Among the modern humanists and prophets who have a message for the children of this generation, let us hasten to inscribe the name of Professor Ely, whose new book on "The Social Law of Service"¹ makes us all his debtors. Perhaps it was Christlieb that first said that society would never witness the reconciliation of science and religion until God raised up some great soul who should unite in a single personality the training of an expert in both those realms where warfare reigned. Professor Ely's "Outlines of Economics" has passed through so many editions at home, and been read so widely in foreign languages, as to establish his reputation as a student of the problems of wealth. But to his fame as an economist must now be added his fame as a student of the problems of Christian thinking and living. His former volume on "The Social Aspects of Christianity" appealed to a single class, and was chiefly helpful to pastors and teachers. This new volume, "The Social Law of Service," is in the interests of that great multitude, of all classes and ages, included in what is called "the Chautauqua movement." Fundamentally, this book is a study of the second commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It exhibits strength as a debtor to weakness; wealth as having an obligation to poverty; wisdom as a trust in the interests of ignorance. Not to love one's self at all is foolishness; to love others more than one's self is love gone daft; but to love and serve one's neighbor as one's self is exhibited as safe, wise, and Christian. This instructive and stimulating volume needs not our praise as to its aim, spirit, and methods; it rather asks us to consider anew the principles of social sympathy, social service, and vicarious suffering as the divinely ordained method for securing society's happiness, comfort, and highest welfare.

¹ New York : Eaton & Mains. Pp. 276.

Having made much of the principles of the solidarity of society, not Christianity alone, but science also is now engaged in emphasizing the principles of vicarious service. The consecrated blood of yesterday is seen to be the social and spiritual capital of to-day. Indeed the civil, intellectual, and religious hope and freedom of our age are only the moral courage and suffering of past ages, reappearing under new and resplendent forms. The social vines that shelter us, the civic boughs whose clusters feed us, all spring out of the ancient graves. The red currents of sacrifice and the tides of the heart have nourished these social growths and made their blossoms crimson and brilliant. Nor could these treasures have been gained otherwise. Nature grants no gratuities. Every wise law, institution, and custom must be paid for with corresponding treasure. Getting is only an exchange of goods. Thought itself takes toll from the brain. To be loved is good indeed; but love must be paid for with toil, endurance, sacrifice—fuel that feeds love's flame. Generous giving to-day is a great joy, but it is made possible only by years of thrift and economy. The wine costs the clusters. The linen costs the flax. The furniture costs the forests. The heat in the house costs the coal in the cellar. Wealth costs much toil and sweat by day. Wisdom costs much study and long vigils by night. Leadership costs instant and untiring pains and service. Character costs the long, fierce conflict with vice and sin. When Keats, walking in the rose garden, saw the ground under the bushes all covered with pink petals, he exclaimed, "Next year the roses should be very red!" When Æneas tore the bough from the myrtle-tree, Virgil says the tree exuded blood. But this is only a poet's way of saying that civilization is a tree that is nourished, not by rain and snow, but by the tears and blood of the patriots and prophets of yesterday.

Fortunately, nature also in manifold ways doth witness

to the universality of vicarious service and suffering. Indeed the very basis of the doctrine of evolution is the fact that the life of the higher rests upon the death of the lower. The astronomers tell us that the sun ripens our harvests by burning itself up. Each golden sheaf, each orange bough, each bunch of figs, costs the sun thousands of tons of carbon. Geikie, the geologist, shows that the valleys grow rich and deep with soil through the mountains growing bare and being denuded of their treasure. Beholding the valleys of France and the plains of Italy all gilded with corn and fragrant with deep grass, where the violets and buttercups wave and toss in the summer wind, travelers often forget that the beauty of the plains was bought, at a great price, by the bareness of the mountains. For these mountains are in reality vast compost heaps, nature's stores of powerful stimulants. Daily the heat swells the flakes of granite; daily the frost splits them; daily the rains dissolve the crushed stone into an impalpable dust; daily the floods sweep the rich mineral foods down into the starving valleys. Thus the glory of the mountains is not alone their majesty of endurance, but also their patient, passionate beneficence as they pour forth all their treasures to feed richness to the pastures, to wreath with beauty each distant vale and glen, to nourish all waving harvest-fields. This death of the mineral is the life of the vegetable.

And if now we descend from the mountains to explore the secrets of the sea, each Maury shows us the isles where palm-trees wave, and man builds his homes and cities midst rich tropic fruits. There the scientist finds that rich coral islands were reared above the waves by myriads of living creatures that died vicariously that man might live. And everywhere nature exhibits the same sacrificial principle. Our treasures of coal mean that vast forests have risen and fallen again for our factories and furnaces. Nobody is richer until somebody is poorer. Evermore the vicarious

exchange is going on. The rock decays, and feeds the moss and lichen. The moss decays to feed the shrub. The shrub perishes that the tree may have food and growth. The leaves of the tree fall that its boughs may blossom and bear fruit. The seeds ripen to serve the birds singing in all the boughs. The fruit falls to be fruit for man. The harvests lend man strength for his commerce, his government, his culture and conscience. The lower dies vicariously that the higher may live. Thus nature achieves her gifts only through vast expenditures. It is said that each of the new guns for the navy costs one hundred thousand dollars. But the gun survives only a hundred explosions, so that every shot costs one thousand dollars. Tyndall tells us that each drop of water shields electric power sufficient to charge one hundred thousand Leyden jars, and blow the House of Parliament to atoms. Faraday amazes us by his statement of the energy required to embroider a violet or produce a strawberry. To untwist the sunbeam and extract the rich strawberry red, to refine the sugar, to mix the flavor, represents heat sufficient to run a train from Liverpool to London, or from Chicago to Detroit. But because nature does her work noiselessly we must not forget that each of her gifts also involves tremendous expenditure.

The law of vicarious service holds equally in the intellectual world. Each author buys his poem or his song with his life-blood. While traveling north from London, midst a heavy snowstorm, Lord Bacon descended from his coach to stuff a fowl with snow, to determine whether or not ice preserves flesh. But with his life the philosopher purchased for us the principle that does so much to preserve our fruits and foods through the summer's heat, and lend us happiness and comfort. And Pascal, whose thoughts are the seeds that have sown many a mental life with harvests, bought his splendid ideas by burning up his brain. The professors who guided and loved him knew that the

boy would soon be gone, just as those who light a candle in the evening know that the light, burning fast, will soon flicker out in the deep socket. One of our scientists foretells the time when, by the higher mathematics, it will be possible to compute how many brain-cells must be torn down to earn a given sum of money; how much vital force each Sir William Jones must give in exchange for each of his forty languages and dialects; what percentage of the original vital force will be consumed in experiencing each new pleasure, or surmounting each new pain; how much nerve treasure it takes to conquer each temptation or endure each self-sacrifice. Too often society forgets that each song, law, reform, has cost the health and life of the giver. Tradition says that, through much study, the *Iliad* cost Homer his eyes. There is deep meaning in the fact that Dante's face was plowed deep with study and suffering, and written all over with the literature of sorrow.

Milton, too, to gain his vision of the hills of paradise, lost his vision of all earth's beauteous sights and scenes. In explanation of the early death of Raphael and Keats, and hundreds like them, it has been said that few great men who are poor have lived to see forty. They bought their greatness with life itself. A few short years ago there lived in Iowa a boy who came up to his young manhood with a great, deep passion for the plants and shrubs. While other boys loved the din and bustle of the city, or lingered long in the library, or turned eager feet toward the forum, this youth plunged into the fields and forests, and with a lover's passion for his noble mistress gave himself to roots and seeds and flowers. And while he was still a child he would tell on what day in March the first violet bloomed, when the first snowdrop came; going back through his years, could tell the very day in spring when the first robin sang near his window. Soon the boy's collection of plants appealed to the wonder of scholars. A lit-

tle later, students from foreign countries began to send him strange flowers from Japan and seeds from India. But one midnight, while he was lingering over his books, suddenly the white page before him was red with his life-blood as the rose that lay beside his hand. And when, after two years in Colorado, friends bore his body up the sides of the mountains he so dearly loved, no scholar in all our land left so full a collection and exposition of the flowers of that distant State as did this dying boy. His study and wisdom made all to be his debtors. But he bought his wisdom with thirty years of health and happiness. We are rich only because the young scholar, with his glorious future, for our sakes made himself poor.

Our social treasure also is the result of vicarious service and suffering. Sailing along the New England coasts, one man's craft strikes a rock and goes to the bottom. But where his boat sunk, there the State lifts a danger-signal, and henceforth, avoiding that rock, whole fleets are saved. One traveler makes his way through the forest and is lost. Afterward other pilgrims avoid that way. Experimenting with the strange root or acid or chemical, the scholar is poisoned and dies. Taught by his agonies, others learn to avoid that danger.

Only a few centuries ago the liberty of thought was unknown. All lips were padlocked. The public criticism of a baron meant the confiscation of a peasant's land; the criticism of the pope meant the dungeon; the criticism of the king meant death. Now all are free to think for themselves, to sift all knowledge and public teachings, to cast away the chaff and to save the precious wheat. But to buy this freedom blood has flowed like rivers, and tears have been too cheap to count. To achieve these two principles called liberty of thought and liberty of speech, some four thousand battles have been fought. In exchange, therefore, for one of these principles of freedom and happiness,

society has paid—not cash down, but blood down—vital treasure for staining two thousand battle-fields. To-day the serf has entered into citizenship, and the slave into freedom, but the pathway along which the slave and serf have moved has been over chasms filled with the bodies of patriots, and hills that have been leveled by heroes' hands. Why are the travelers through the forests dry and warm midst falling rains? Why are sailors upon all seas comfortable under their rubber coats? Warm are they and dry midst all storms, because for twenty years Goodyear, the discoverer of india-rubber, was cold and wet and hungry, and at last, broken-hearted, died midst poverty.

Why is Italy cleansed of the plagues that devastated her cities a hundred years ago? Because John Howard sailed on an infected ship from Constantinople to Venice, that he might be put into a lazaretto and find out the clew of that awful mystery of the plague and stay its power. How has it come that the merchants of our Western ports send ships laden with implements for the fields, and conveniences for the house, into the South Sea Islands? Because such men as Patterson, the pure-hearted, gallant boy of Eaton College, gave up every prospect in England to labor amid the Pacific savages, and twice plunged into the waters of the coral reefs, amidst sharks and devilfish and stinging jellies, to escape the flight of poisoned arrows, of which the slightest graze meant horrible death, and in that high service died by the clubs of the very savages whom he had often risked his life to save, the memory of whose life did so smite the consciences of his murderers that they laid "the young martyr in an open boat, to float away over the bright blue waves, with his hands crossed, as if in prayer, and a palm branch on his breast." And there, in the white light, he lies now, immortal forever.

And why did the representatives of the five great nations come together to destroy the slave-trade in Africa, and

from every coast came the columns of light to journey toward the heat of the dark continent, and rim all Africa around with little towns and villages that glow like lighthouses for civilization? Because one day Westminster Abbey was crowded with the great men of England, in the midst of whom stood two black men who had brought Livingstone's body from the jungles of Africa. There, in the great Abbey, faithful Susi told of the hero, who, worn thin as parchment through thirty attacks of the African fever, refused Stanley's overtures, and turned back toward Ulala, made his ninth attempt to discover the waters of the Nile, and search out the secret lairs of the slave-dealers, only to die in the forest, with no white man near, no hand of sister or son to cool his fevered brow or close his glazing eyes. Faithful to the last to that which had been the great work of his life, he wrote these words with his dying hand: "All I can add in my solitude is, May heaven's rich blessings come down on every one who will help to heal this open sore of the world." And why is it that in the next ten years Africa made greater advancement than in the previous ten centuries? All the world knows that it was through the vicarious suffering of one of Scotland's noblest heroes. And why is it that Curtis says that there are three American orations that will live in history—Patrick Henry's at Williamsburg, Abraham Lincoln's at Gettysburg, and Wendell Phillips' at Faneuil Hall? A thousand martyrs to liberty lent eloquence to Henry's lips; the halls of Gettysburg, all billowy with our noble dead, exhaled the memories that anointed Lincoln's lips; while Lovejoy's heart, newly martyred to Alton, poured over Wendell Phillips' nature the full tides of speech divine. Vicarious suffering explains each of these immortal scenes.

Long, too, the scroll of humble heroes whose vicarious services have exalted our common life. Recognizing this principle, Cicero built a monument to his slave, a Greek

who daily read aloud to his master, took notes of his conversation, wrote out his speeches, and so lent the orator increased influence and power. Scott also makes one of his characters bestow a gift upon an aged servant; for, said the warrior, no master can ever fully recompense the nurse who cares for his children, or the maid who supplies their wants. To-day each giant of the industrial realm is all compassed about with a small army of men who stand waiting to carry out his slightest behests, relieve him of details, halve his burdens, while at the same time doubling his joys and rewards. Lifted up in the sight of the entire community, the great man stands on a lofty pedestal builded out of helpers and aides. And though here and now the honors and successes all go to the one giant, and his assistants are seemingly obscure and unrecognized, hereafter and there honors will be evenly distributed, and then how will the great man's position shrink and shrivel!

Here also are the parents who loved books and hungered for beauty, yet in youth were denied education, and went all their life through concealing a certain hunger and ambition, but who determined that their children should never want for education. That the boy, therefore, might go to college, these parents rose up early to vex the soil, and sat up late to wear their fingers thin, denying the eye beauty, denying the taste and imagination their food, denying the appetite its pleasures. And while they suffer and want, the boy in college grows wise and strong and waxes great, and comes home to find the parents overwrought with service and ready to fall on death, offering a vicarious sacrifice of love.

And here are our own ancestors. Soon our children, now lying in the cradles of our state, will without any forethought of theirs fall heir to this great region and city, with all their treasures material—houses and vineyards, factories and cities; with all their treasures mental—li-

brary and gallery, school and church, institutions and customs. But with what vicarious suffering were these treasures purchased! For us our fathers subdued the continents and the kingdoms; wrought freedom, stopped the mouths of wolves, escaped the sword of savages, turned to flight armies of enemies, subdued the forests, drained the swamps, planted vineyards, civilized savages, reared school-houses, builded churches, founded colleges. For four generations they dwelt in cabins, wore sheepskins and goat-skins, wandered about exploring rivers and forests and mines, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, because of their love of liberty, and for the slave's sake were slain with the sword—of whom this generation is not worthy. "And these all died, not having received the promise"; God having reserved that for us to whom it had been given to fall heir to the splendid achievements of our Christian ancestors.

No deeply reflective nature, therefore, will be surprised that the vicarious principle is manifest in God, man's father, in Jesus Christ, man's saviour. Rejecting all commercial theories and judicial exchanges, let us recognize the reign of this principle in the moral realm. God is not at warfare with himself. If he uses the vicarious principle in the realm of matter, he will also use it in the realm of mind and heart. It is given unto parents to bear not only the weakness of the child, but also his ignorance, his sins—perhaps at last his very crimes. Nature counts it unsafe to permit any wrong to go unpunished. Nature counts it dangerous to allow the youth to sin against the brain or nerve or digestion, without visiting sharp penalties upon the offender. With God also it is unsafe to blot out all distinctions between the honest citizen and the vicious criminal. Penalties are sent, therefore, as warnings. Punishments are thorn hedges, safeguarding man from the thickets where serpents brood, and forcing his feet back

into the ways of wisdom and peace. For man's integrity and happiness, therefore, conscience smites, and smites unceasingly. For each David weeping bitterly for his sins, for each poor Magdalene sobbing out her bitter confession, there is a pity that is infinite, and a pardon that is measureless. For the law of service, that affirms the debt of strength to weakness, hath its culmination in this scripture, "Faithful and just to forgive our sins," as if for God not to forgive man would be the part of injustice. The implication is that purity is under moral obligations to pardon iniquity, for God is the great Burden Bearer. Calvary is the eternal heart-ache manifest in time. Groping, hoping, trusting, we fall blindly on the stairs that slope through darkness up to God. But falling, we fall into the arms of him who was slain from the foundation of the world.

We return from our survey of the nature and scope of the principle of vicarious service, with the conviction, that if the problems of our generation are to be solved, the solution must be found in the application of this law of social service to the duties of the home, the school, the market and forum. Confessing to the wish that Professor Ely had emphasized more fully the philosophic ground and sanctions of this divine principle, we hasten to make recognition of the value of his study in the practical realm. The young people of the Christian Endeavor society, not less than those who belong to the Chautauqua movement, will do well to read and ponder this book, and seek to realize its ideas. Should this law of social service be immediately incarnated in all our social and industrial institutions, what a transformation would result! No more trusts, no more grinding monopolies, no more strikes and lockouts, no more bitter hunger, but each bearing another's burdens, and wisdom and wealth, serving ignorance and poverty in the noble effort to fulfill the law of Christ. A beautiful dream! Yet ideals alone are omnipotent. Christ's law of service is the prophecy of that golden era of good-will, which is the far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves. Selfishness and greed may postpone the consummation—they cannot prevent it. That Divine One whom God hath lifted to the world's throne shall yet lift the world to a place beside him.

ARTICLE X.

HARNACK'S "HISTORY OF DOGMA."¹

BY PROFESSOR ALBERT TEMPLE SWING.

PROFESSOR ADOLF HARNACK, of Berlin, is the most prominent church historian living. It was, therefore, desirable that English readers should have his principal Work, in an unabridged form, made accessible to them through the medium of a translation. Harnack is not hard to translate: his style is comparatively simple. But he deals in this volume with many closely related types of thought, which renders it sometimes difficult to understand him even in his mother tongue. No one, however, can be clearer than Harnack when he wishes to be positive. His thought often flashes out with electrical brightness and surprise. That at other times one is left uncertain as to just what he purposes to teach, is probably not altogether unintentional on the author's part, though it is mystifying to the reader.

That this first volume covers what he has well called the most important period in church history will be seen by noting some of the topics. After introducing the work with a valuable Prolegomena to the Study of the History of Doctrine, he treats at first hand such themes as the following: "The Gospel of Jesus Christ according to his own Testimony concerning himself"; "The Common Preaching concerning Jesus Christ in the First Generation of Believers"; "The Current Exposition of the Old Testament and the Jewish Hopes of the Future in their Significance for the Earliest Types of Christian Preaching"; "The Re-

¹History of Dogma. By Dr. Adolf Harnack. Translated by Neil Buchanan. Vol. I. Pp. 364. Boston: Roberts Bros. 1895. \$2.50.

ligious Conception and the Religious Philosophy of the Hellenistic Jews in their Significance for the Later Formulation of the Gospel," etc. Of the monographs included in the appendix, that which treats of "The Different Notions of Preëxistence" is of special value in coming to an understanding of Harnack's historical method.

In the treatment of all these early questions, Harnack has no respect for authority as such. While he welcomes scholarship from whatever source, and while no one is more quick to recognize independent thought, and to use it, he pushes boldly back of councils, and canons, and of written documents, and seeks to have something to say of the world which he supposed to lie beyond the clear light of mere factual history. He makes it clear, however, that he is writing the history of dogma, and not of religion, or even theology. He recognizes and emphasizes the limitations of history in the work. These admissions of his, and his frankest and most generous acceptance of recent criticism in scripture and tradition—which must be a permanent cause of anxiety to those of conservative temper—must not be taken as necessarily his own views as to what can be believed. It is all he is willing to say is at present historically established. In fact he believes much more. Dogma grew, and it is the task of the *History of Dogma* to trace that growth. But the great work, after all, for which this is only to prepare the way, is the emphasis that beyond dogma, and even history itself as we can write it, are the religious elements that have produced the history and theology, viz., the great and unique Person of Jesus Christ, and the establishment of a spiritual religion in the world.

To one trained in the strong biblical faith of the American churches this volume will prove a surprise, both because of its bold pushing beyond accepted doctrines, and because of its spirit of faith and manifestation of religious fervor. If we are to be both truthful and fair, we shall find

it necessary to recognize both of these features in his work. In his historical method he is as remarkable in his cautiousness as in his boldness. While he rejects unhesitatingly the theories of Baur and Strauss, he yet shows such regard for their spirit that he leaves very much historically unsettled. He is certainly inclined to give full value to the influence of the 'human vessel' upon the divine treasure. It even seems sometimes that he has come to his conclusions about the New Testament not from a direct study of its contents, but from following out special lines of thought about these things, in which documents of secondary importance have been unduly exalted to a primary place. Harnack's thoughts, however, are as yet in too fresh and plastic a state to allow of very definite statements as to just what his real views are; and those who attempt to place him too confidently under exactly trimmed labels should not be surprised if they do not find him remaining beneath them. One seeks in vain for scientific statements as to the historical foundation-stones upon which he stands, and upon which he seeks to place the footsteps of his followers. He will never construct a symmetrical text-book for the study of the History of Doctrine as Loofs of Halle has done. And yet no scholar of the present generation will make his excursions into the field of early church history without having to reckon sooner or later with Adolf Harnack.

Isolated statements in large numbers could be gathered out of this volume which, standing alone, seem to be wholly in the spirit of destructive German criticism, and which would not only be disturbing, but even confusing, to any one not familiar with the Ritschlian method. But to the acumen of Baur he has added the faith of Ritschl. In his Preface to the English Edition he has rightly objected to being classified from a 'point of view' instead of from his historical method.

"In a historical work there is no room to ask what is the 'standpoint' of the author, but the question is, whether the author is in sympathy with the subject about which he writes, whether he can distinguish original elements from those that are derived, whether he has a thorough acquaintance with his material, whether he is conscious of the limits of historical knowledge, and whether he is truthful" (p. vii).

And yet, if I mistake not, Harnack will generally be prized in so far as he has gone beyond the stricter limit of historical knowledge and become an apostle of religious realism.

The definite indefiniteness of Harnack's method may be seen pretty clearly in his treatment of some of the fundamental elements of Christian belief:—

1. The Person:—

"Jesus himself is Christianity, for the 'impression of his person convinced the disciples of the fact of forgiveness of sins and the second birth, and gave the courage to believe in and to lead a new life.' We cannot, therefore, state the 'doctrine' of Jesus; for it appears as a supra-mundane life which must be felt in the person of Jesus, and its truth is guaranteed by the fact that such a life can be lived" (p. 70).

2. But he will not allow the force of formal statements and dogmas here:—

"But it is in accordance with the mind of Jesus, and at the same time a fact of history [Christian Consciousness in the Church?] that this Gospel can only be appropriated and adhered to in connection with a believing surrender to the person of Jesus Christ. Yet every dogmatic formula is suspicious, because it is fitted to wound the spirit of religion. It should not at least be put before the living experience in order to evoke it; for such a procedure is really the admission of the half belief which thinks it necessary that the impression made by the person should be supplemented. . . . Faith assuredly is propagated by the testimony of faith, but dogma is not in itself that testimony" (p. 71).

But here seems to be not only a 'point of view,' but an exceedingly fundamental dictum. For, while the analysis may be wholly approved, and all cheerfully agree in emphasizing the primary place to be assigned to experience, not every one feels like saying that "every dogmatic formula is suspicious." Can there then be no reasonably sure teaching of any truth of religion? If we cannot know the

whole truth about anything, can we not know the exact truth about something?

3. He does not think it historically allowable to accept all that is said in the New Testament about this Person:—

"But though it certainly is the first duty of the historian to signalize the overpowering impression made by the person of Jesus on his disciples, which is the basis of all further developments, it would little become him to renounce the critical examination of all the utterances which have been connected with that person with the view of elevating and glorifying it" (p. 77).

The first impression will be that very little has been left over to be put down as the history:—

(1) Of the Virgin birth, he says:—

"Even the belief that Jesus was born from a Virgin sprang from Isa. vii. 14. . . Those who suppose that the reality of the Virgin birth must be held fast, must assume that a misunderstood prophecy has been fulfilled."

And quoting Dillmann, who considers Luke i. 34, 35, to be the addition of a redactor,—

"Of the birth by a Virgin [viz. of one who at the birth was still a virgin] the Hebrew text says nothing."

(2) What he says of Jesus in connection with the miracles ascribed to him, is worthy of special note in coming to an understanding of Harnack's method:—

"The historian cannot regard a miracle as a sure given historical event for in doing so he destroys the mode of consideration on which all historical investigation rests. Every individual miracle remains historically quite doubtful, and a summation of things doubtful never leads to certainty. But should the historian, notwithstanding, be convinced that Jesus Christ did extraordinary things, in the strict sense miraculous things, then, from the unique impression he has obtained of this person, he infers the possession by him of supernatural power. This conclusion itself belongs to the province of religious faith; though there has seldom been a strong faith which would not have drawn it. Moreover, the healing miracles of Jesus are the only ones that come into consideration in a strict historical examination. These certainly cannot be eliminated from the historical accounts without utterly destroying them. But how unfit are they in themselves, after eighteen hundred years, to secure any special importance to him to whom they are attributed, unless that importance was already established apart from them. That he could do with himself what he would, that he created a new thing without over-

turning the old, that he won men to himself by announcing the Father, that he inspired without fanaticism, set up a kingdom without politics, set men free from the world without asceticism, was a teacher without theology, at a time of fanaticism and politics, asceticism and theology, is the great miracle of his person : and that he who preached the Sermon on the Mount declared himself, in respect of his life and death, to be the Redeemer and Judge of the world, is the offense and foolishness which mock reason " (pp. 65, 66).

(3) As to the popular views of the resurrection of Christ, he makes his approach from the side of history, and declares that it can never be cleared from historical doubt that the body of Jesus did not remain in the grave. But he especially emphasizes a spiritual resurrection. That Jesus Christ is alive is the one great central fact whose influence is everywhere felt. But his method here is so characteristic that it is worth while to study it from a full quotation.

" It is often said that Christianity rests on the belief in the resurrection of Christ. This may be correct, if it is first declared who that Jesus Christ is, and what his life signifies. But when it appears as a naked report to which one must above all submit, and when in addition, as often happens, it is supplemented by the assertion that the resurrection of Christ is the most certain fact in the history of the world, one does not know whether he should marvel more at its thoughtlessness or its unbelief. We do not need to have faith in a fact, and that which requires religious belief, viz., trust in God, can never be a fact which would hold good apart from that belief. The historic question and the question of faith must therefore be clearly distinguished here. . . . But, as even the empty grave on the third day can by no means be regarded as a certain historic fact, because it appears united in the accounts with manifest legendary features, and further because it is directly excluded by the way in which Paul has portrayed the resurrection (1 Cor. xv.) it follows : (1) That any conception which represents the resurrection of Christ as a simple reanimation of his mortal body, is far from the original conception ; and (2) that the question generally as to whether Jesus has risen, can have no existence for any one who looks at it apart from the contents and worth of the person of Jesus. For the mere fact that friends and adherents of Jesus were convinced that they had seen him, especially when they themselves explain that he appeared to them in heavenly glory, gives, to those who are in earnest about fixing historical facts, not the least cause for the assumption that Jesus did not continue in the grave. . . . The idea of the rising again of the body of Jesus appeared compar-

atively early, because it was this hope which animated wide circles of pious persons for their own future. Faith in Jesus the living Lord, in spite of the death on the cross, cannot be generated by proofs of reason or authority, but only to-day in the same way as Paul has confessed of himself (Gal. i. 16): 'That God was pleased to reveal his Son in me.' The conviction of having seen the Lord was no doubt of the greatest importance for the disciples, and made them evangelists, but what they saw cannot at first help us. It can only then obtain significance for us when we have gained that confidence in the Lord which Peter has expressed in Mark viii. 29. The Christian even to-day confesses with Paul, 'If in this life only we have faith in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.' He believes in a future life for himself with God, because he believes that Christ lives. That is the peculiarity and paradox of Christian faith" (pp. 85-86).

(4) As to the Trinity, he of course avoids definite expression; but he has some very definite statements to make as to the Dogma of the Trinity:—

"The Trinitarian formula is foreign to the mouth of Jesus, and has not the authority of the apostolic age which it must have had if it had descended from Jesus himself" (p. 79).

This is one of the proofs which he brings forward that the baptismal formula of Matt. xxviii. 19 is not a saying of the Lord.

It is interesting to see how far he goes in his conception of the Son, and where he seeks to arrest his thought:—

"The peculiar character of the Christian religion is conditioned by the fact that every reference to God is at the same time a reference to Jesus Christ, and *vice versa*. In this sense the Person of Christ is the central point of the religion and inseparably united with the substance of piety, as a sure reliance on God. . . . But just because the Person of Christ has this significance is the knowledge and understanding of the 'historical Christ' required: for no other comes within the sphere of our knowledge" (pp. 71-72).

"Behind the only manifested life of Jesus, later speculation has put a life in which he wrought, not in subordination and obedience, but in like independence and dignity with God. That goes beyond the utterances of Jesus even in the fourth Gospel. But it is no advance beyond these, especially in the religious view and speech of the time, when it is announced that the relation of the Father to the Son lies beyond time. It is not even improbable that the sayings in the fourth Gospel referring to this, have a basis in the preaching of Jesus himself" (p. 64).

Harnack's cautiousness here, against dogmatic statements,

seems to leave little that one can depend upon in either Peter, John, or Paul, in their wonderful emphasis of Jesus Christ.

From these extended quotations it is easy to see how different the feelings are which Harnack's writing arouses. In order that we may not do him injustice, it is ever necessary to distinguish his own spirit and aim from what we believe may come to be the effects of such a free method. We should judge him amiss, as we have seen, if we should allow ourselves to rest too confidently upon isolated, literally interpreted statements. When he destroys one familiar and revered form of belief after another, at the dictates of what he calls the historical spirit, it is not because he has gone over, bag and baggage, to the camp of the destructive critics. His historical method is severe, and for this very reason he himself goes ever beyond it in his own faith. He comes very decidedly to a 'point of view.' He is not disturbed when formal facts cannot be indubitably proved, because the one Unique Person in human history is not less, but greater, than the human impressions of Him, and before Him he trustingly bows. The imperfect knowledge which he finds left by the first witnesses does not prevent him from having a perfect religious faith.

While it is easy to understand why conservative circles in Germany believe that such transcendental leadership is not safe for the young men,—and we ourselves have our own serious fears that the next generation may stop with Harnack's doubts and never gain Harnack's faith,—yet Harnack himself, in spite of it all, is to be thought of as honestly seeking to be an Apostle of Religion.

As furnishing even a better illustrative glimpse of the man in the use of his own method from another source, I venture to add a quotation from a recent address¹ of his:—

¹ Now translated and published under the title of "*Christianity and History*." London: Adam and Charles Black. 1896.

"The man who reads his Bible in a homely way is wont to treat all the characteristic features which he encounters in that book as above and beyond time. He sees and feels such things only, as he takes to form the true kernel of the narrative; things which concern himself: and it was by these that the Christian doctrine was formerly established by the church. But the historical way of looking at them may not, and will not, overlook the concrete features in and by which the life and the doctrine were actually fashioned in their day. It seeks for points of connection with the Old Testament and its developments, with the religious life of the synagogue, with contemporary hopes for the future, with the whole intellectual and spiritual condition of the world of Greece and Rome: and it finds that the evidence of such connection is unmistakable. The consequence is, that the sayings and discourses of the Lord, and the image of his life itself, not only take their colour—and it is a very definite colour—from the history of the time, but they are also seen to possess certain definite limitations. They belong to their time and their environment: and they could not exist in any other. But they lose no particle of their power and validity, unless it can be shown that the main lineaments of the personality of Christ, and the sense and true point of his sayings, have been altered. I cannot discover that historical criticism has effected any such change.

"The same is true of the testimony which he gave of himself. I admit that if historical research had proved that he was an apocalyptic enthusiast or a visionary, whose image and utterances were advanced to the level of pure aim and lofty thought only by the refining influence of later times, it would be another matter. But who has proved that, and who could prove it? For besides the four written Gospels we possess a fifth, unwritten: and in many respects its voice is clearer and more effective than those of the other four—I mean the united testimony of the first Christian community. It enables us to gather what was the prevailing impression made by this personality, and in what sense his disciples understood his words and the testimony which he gave of himself. It is true that his clothes—the outward form of his doctrine—were part of the heritage; but the great and simple truths which he came to preach, the personal sacrifice which he made, and his victory in death, were what formed the new life of his community: and when the apostle Paul with divine power described this life as a life in the Spirit, and again as a life in love, he was only giving back light which had dawned upon him in and through Jesus Christ his Lord. This is a simple matter of fact, which no historical criticism can in any way alter. All that it can do is to place it in a clearer light, and so increase our reverence for the divinity which was revealed in radiance in a Son of Abraham, amid the wreck and refuse of a narrow world. Let the plain Bible reader continue to read his Gospels as he has hitherto read them: for in the end the critic cannot read them otherwise. What the one regards as their true gist and meaning, the other must acknowledge to be such" (pp. 54-58).

ARTICLE XI.

CRITICAL NOTE.

DID BAPTISTS IN ENGLAND IMMERSE PRIOR TO 1641?

IN his article in the *BIBLIOTHECA SACRA* for October, 1896, Dr. B. B. Warfield says: "The original Baptists apparently did not immerse; and Dr. Dexter appears to have shown that even the first English Baptists who seceded from the Puritan emigrants and formed a congregation at Amsterdam, baptized by affusion. It would seem that it was by the English Baptists of the seventeenth century that immersion was first declared to be essential to valid baptism; and the practice of immersion by them can be looked upon as a survival from an earlier time only in the sense that it was a return to an earlier custom, although with the variation of a single instead of a trine immersion" (pp. 603, 604).

Dr. Dexter, in his "True Story of John Smyth," argues that immersion was not practiced in England prior to 1641, and was at that time introduced from Holland. He relies upon statements of various authors soon after 1641, to the effect that immersion was "new." It would be easy to show that Dr. Dexter has strangely misused many authorities quoted. Take a single example: On page 51 of his "True Story of John Smyth," J. Parnell is quoted, the quotation professing to come from "The Watcher; or, The Stone Cut from the Mountain," p. 16, as follows: "Now within these late yeeres . . . they (the Anabaptists) say . . . they must be dipped in the water, and that they call baptizing." Now in the original document the words "now within these late yeeres" are more than a page removed from the words "they must be dipped in the water and that they call baptizing"; while the words "they (the Anabaptists) say," are not found at all. Dr. Dexter has put two fragments of sentences, more than a page apart, together, and inserted words of his own invention, and made the whole into a single statement. This is but one of many instances; and Dr. Warfield should not rely upon Dr. Dexter's citations, without verification.

But conceding that there were English authors about the middle of the seventeenth century who called immersion "new," it by no means follows that it was then new in England. When it is remembered that not till August 1st, 1641, were the persecuting courts of High Commission and of Star Chamber abolished, it is not to be wondered at that the Baptists should then have shown themselves as they had not done before. The

fact that they appear about that time, here, there, and everywhere in England, proves that they existed there before ; and it also explains why many should regard their practices as new. This is a point Dr. Dexter has wholly overlooked in his discussion.

In 1644, the Baptists put forth their famous confession of faith of that year, in which immersion is insisted upon as essential to valid baptism. It is admitted that at this time the Baptists were immersionists. Now if they began to immerse in 1641 and in 1644 the practice had become universal among them, we have the most remarkable change ever known in the history of the world. That a denomination as independent and scattered as the Baptists should, in so short a time, have completely changed their initiatory ordinance, is little short of a miracle. That immersion was universal among them in 1644 proves they did not begin the practice in 1641.

The Westminster Assembly in 1644 voted down immersion by a majority of only one. That a new rite introduced only three years before could have taken such strong hold of those divines, is well-nigh incredible. They are known to have been men remarkably tenacious of their opinions. That they voted immersion down by only one majority in 1644, proves that the rite was not introduced into England in 1641.

But there is not lacking direct testimony to the practice of the immersion of believers in England prior to 1641. Edward Barber in that year published "A Small Treatise of Baptisme or Dipping, wherein it is cleerly showed that the Lord Christ ordained dipping for those only that profess repentance and faith." In this treatise he takes immersion for granted, and argues that only believers should be immersed. He advocates believers' dipping as opposed to infants' dipping, and not immersion as opposed to affusion. For example, on page 16, we read : "But for infants' dipping there is no express description of the persons, condition, time : whereas true dipping, which is that one dipping (Eph. iv. 5) which is the dipping of repentance for the remission of sins (Mark i. 4), it is most evidently and faithfully set downe for persons, condition, and time."

This is not the language of a man who is introducing immersion among those who knew of no such practice. Moreover, Barber answers objections to immersion. On page 3 he replies to the objection that "there was no plain text of the dipping of any woman." Had there been no dipping of women before that time this objection could not have arisen. Again, on page 43, he replies to the objection : "Lastly, whereas the clothes or vestments are said to bee holy, which they weare when they receive the Ordinance of Dipping, they being dipt into the death of Christ." It is evident that people who did not practice immersion could not have been charged with regarding as holy the clothes in which they were immersed.

We find on page 7 another utterance of Barber's which is decisive on

this point. He says: "In like manner lately, those that professe and practice the dipping of Jesus Christ, instituted in the Gospel, are called and reproached with the name of Anabaptists, although our practice be none other than what was instituted by Christ himself," etc.

It is not that those who lately began to "professe and practice the dipping of Jesus Christ," were "called and reproached by the name of Anabaptists," but those who all along had been professing and practicing this dipping, were lately thus "called and reproached." The professing and practicing of the dipping, according to Barber, preceded the name Anabaptist.

Dr. Daniel Featley in his "Dippers Dipt, or the Anabaptists Ducked and Plunged over head and eares," bears testimony to the practice of immersion in England prior to 1641. In the Epistle Dedicatory of the above book, written January 10th, 1644, he tells how these Anabaptists "flock in great multitudes to their *Jordans* and both sexes enter into the river and are dipt after their manner, with a kind of *spell* containing the heads of their erroneous tenets," etc. A little later in this same Epistle Dedicatory, Featley gives as a reason why he arrayed himself against these sectaries, that they had shown themselves "near the place of my residence, for more than twenty years." He dates the origin of these "Dippers," against whom he is writing, at 1525 (p. 28), and he connects them with the Donatists of A.D. 380 and the Novationists of A.D. 250.

Thomas Blake in his "Birth Privilege," published in 1644, says: "I have been an eye witness of many infants dipped, and I know it to have been the constant practice of many ministers for many years together" (p. 33).

William Kiffin, the leading English Baptist of his time, wrote his "Brief Remonstrance," etc., in 1645, in which he answered the charge of Robert Poole that the Baptists were erecting "new framed congregations" and interfering with the work of the Reformation. Kiffin says: "To the first, it is well known to many, especially to ourselves, that our congregations were erected and framed according to the rule of Christ, before we heard of any Reformation," etc. (p. 12).

Likewise Thomas Grantham in 1678 thus answers the charge that the Baptists were a new sect: "That many of the learned have much abused this age, in telling them that the Anabaptists (i.e. the Baptized churches) are of a late edition, a new sect, etc., when from their writings the clean contrary is so evident."¹

Thus the Baptists of that period denied the charge that they and their baptism were "new"; although they seemed new to many as they came forth from their hiding-places when the hand of persecution was lifted by the abolition of the courts of High Commission and of Star Chamber. Leonard Busher, "citizen of London," in 1614 published his "Religious Peace," etc., in which he incidentally speaks of baptism and says:

¹ Christianismus Primitivus, pp. 92, 93.

"And therefore Christ commanded his disciples to *teach all nations and baptize them*; that is, to preach the word of salvation to every creature of all sorts of nations, that are worthy and willing to receive it, he hath commanded to be baptized in the water; that is, dipped for dead in the water" (p. 59).

This shows that immersion was practiced in England in 1614. Going back to the sixteenth century we find John Penry was put to death May 20th, 1593, at St. Thomas-a-Watering, "at the early age of thirty-four"; of whom Joshua Thomas says: "Possibly he was the first that preached believers' baptism openly and publicly to his countrymen since the Reformation. I am strongly inclined to think that he was the first that administered that ordinance by immersion upon a profession of faith in and about Olchon. . . . A. Wood in Ath. Oxon . . . speaks out plainly that Penry 'was a notorious Anabaptist of which party he was the coryphæus.' . . . Strype owns that Penry expressed great concern for his native country, yet charged him with Anabaptistry."¹

Bishop Horn, writing to Henry Bullinger of Zurich in 1575, speaks of baptism in England as follows: "The minister examines concerning their faith, and afterward dips the infant in water."²

It was in 1562 that John Fox published his well-known "Book of Martyrs." He says: "There are some Anabaptists at this time in England who came from Germany. Of these there were two sorts: the first only objected to the baptizing of children, and to the manner of it, by sprinkling instead of dipping. The other held many opinions, anciently condemned as heresies; they had raised a war in Germany, and had set up a new king at Munster; but all these were called Anabaptists from their opposition to infant baptism, though it was one of the mildest opinions they held."³

Here, then, were Anabaptists in England who practiced immersion and objected to affusion in 1562. From aught that appears, both classes of Anabaptists held to immersion; but the latter class held to many heresies besides.

The catechism of Edward VI. (A.D. 1553) provides for the immersion of believers. It says: "Him that believeth in Christ: professeth the Articles of the Christian religion and mindeth to be baptized (I speak now of them that be grown to ripe years of discretion, sith for young babes their parents' or the church's profession sufficeth) the minister dippeth in or washeth with pure and clean water only, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."⁴

Dr. Thomas Fuller, who wrote his "Church History of Britain" in

¹ Hist. Bapt. Ch. in Wales, p. 43, MS. in Baptist College, Bristol.

² Zurich Letters, 2d Series (Parker Society), p. 356.

³ Alden ed., p. 338.

⁴ The Two Liturgies, etc. (Parker Society), p. 516.

1656, speaking of the condition of England in 1539, says of the Anabaptists: "Their minds had a by-stream of activity more than what sufficed to drive on their vocation; and this waste of their souls they employed in needless speculations, and soon after began to broach their strange opinions, being branded with the general name of *Anabaptists*. These Anabaptists, for the main, are but 'Donatists new dipped'; and this year their name first appears in our English chronicles," etc.¹

The force of this testimony is sought to be evaded by supposing that Fuller meant "new named" when he said "new dipped." But this is a mere conjecture, and a most improbable one. No instance is cited where in that age the word "dip" was used to mean "name"; and to suppose Fuller used it so is wholly gratuitous. Moreover, Fuller puts quotation marks around "Donatists new dipped," indicating that it was a common designation in his day. And even if it be conceded that the Anabaptists of that day were but Donatists new named, since the Donatists confessedly practiced immersion, the Anabaptists must have done the same.

In the year 1523, the Anabaptists of Holland published a book called "The Sum of the Holy Scriptures," which was translated and circulated in England. On the subject of baptism, among other things, this book says: "So we are dipped under as a sign that we are, as it were, dead and buried, as Paul writes, Rom. vi. and Col. ii. The life of man is a battle upon earth, and in baptism we promise to strive like men. The pledge is given when we are plunged under the water. It is the same to God whether you are eighty years old when you are baptized, or twenty; for God does not consider how old you are, but with what purpose you receive baptism."²

Mosheim, in speaking of the "Anabaptists or Mennonites" in England in the sixteenth century, mentions the Baptists of England of his own day (1755), and says of them: "The Baptists of this latter sect settled chiefly at London, and in the towns and villages adjacent; and they have departed so far from the tenets of their ancestors, that, at this day, they retain no more of the peculiar doctrines and institutions of the Mennonites, than the administration of baptism by immersion, and the refusal of that sacrament to infants and those of tender years."³ According to Mosheim, therefore, the "Anabaptists or Mennonites" of England in the sixteenth century administered "baptism by immersion." It is true that Mosheim might have been mistaken, but it has not been shown that he was so.

Many other authorities might be cited to the same effect. These have been selected because they speak of different periods between 1641 and 1509, beyond which latter date, it is admitted, immersion was practiced in England.

Add to this that there are Baptist churches in England to-day which antedate 1641. These churches claim to have practiced immersion from

¹ Vol. ii. p. 97. ² Armitage, Hist. Bapt., p. 409. ³ Vol. iv. pp. 462, 463.

their origin, and there is no evidence of their ever having practiced af-fusion. For example, the Baptist church at Warrington was organized in 1522; the churches at Braintree, Eythorne, and Sutton, in 1550; those at Crowle and Epworth in 1599; those at Bridgewater, Oxford, and Wedmore in 1600. Let it be noted that, while there were those who called Baptists "new" and "upstart," after the abolition of the High Commission and Star Chamber made it safe for them to advocate their views, there is no record of any one's charging them with ever having changed their initiatory ordinance from sprinkling to immersion. Wherever there were Baptists they practiced immersion.

Let it be borne in mind that positive evidence is not to be set aside by negative evidence. However many there were who, soon after 1641, did not know of the practice of immersion in England before that date, this does not set aside the testimony of even one who had such knowledge. The Irishman, in the story, who sought to offset the testimony of the two men who said they saw him take the horse, by producing twenty who did not see him take it, was very properly held for the crime. Hence if any of the testimony I have cited be valid, the thesis falls to the ground, that immersion was not practiced in England previous to 1641. It is absolutely necessary to that thesis that *all the evidence* to the contrary be proved to be invalid.

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ARTICLE XII.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES AND REVIEWS.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.

THAT our legislative bodies in city and state are disgracefully bad in most places goes without the saying. Even where not positively corrupt, they are composed of incompetents, or of men who do not really represent the people, unless, indeed, we assume that the people are so bad as to make democratic government a failure. Even if we should be forced to believe with some that the mass of our citizens admire the corrupt buyer of franchises and evader of taxes, if he only become wealthy thereby and is kind to his neighbors, we must recognize that in all other matters we call to our service those better than the average. We do not want an average man for physician or attorney or business manager, if we can get a better man. There is a growing desire to have the state assume co-operative as well as coercive functions. Cities are more and more to be asked, and almost forced, to supervise the housing of the poor, sanitation, pure water, cheap gas and street car fares, bath-houses, parks, laundries, pawn-shops, savings-banks, and numerous other agencies for improving the condition of all. But at the threshold of such an advance we are confronted with the deplorable nature of our governmental machinery.

While making direct personal appeals to all strong men to take a hand in making a better government, by becoming members of it, the question arises, whether by some change in the machinery of government we may not make it easier for our best citizens to enter our city councils and state legislatures and, once elected, to secure reelection, if satisfactory to a considerable number of voters. There is certainly precedent for the idea that a change in machinery will sometimes work wonders. Note the great improvement that has followed the civil service and the Australian ballot laws. So far as these laws have gone into effect, they have wonderfully improved political conditions. Yet human nature must be about the same as ten years ago.

Such another change is now ably urged by a rapidly growing and enthusiastic class of citizens and with conspicuous force in a recent book by Professor Commons.¹

¹ Proportional Representation. By John R. Commons, Professor of Sociology in Syracuse University. Pp. 298. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1896. \$1.75.

Under our present methods, only the two great parties have any chance of electing their candidates, and of these only the party in the majority in a district is really represented. Frequently a party casting 45 per cent of the votes secures only one-fourth of the members of a state legislature or city council.

The way proportional representation would change this, and secure representation in proportion to the votes cast by any party, may be thus illustrated: Suppose that in a city or district of 60,000 population there are 12,000 voters at a certain election, where ten men are to be chosen. Let there be but one district, and allow every voter to have ten votes, of which only one can be given to a candidate. If there were any left after the voter had expressed as many individual preferences as he desired, they would be counted as belonging to the party designated by the voter with a cross. Suppose the 12,000 voters cast 120,000 votes, of which the Republican ticket received 55,000, the Democratic 45,000, a Citizens ticket 15,000, and the People's Party 5,000.

Dividing the total votes cast, 120,000, by the number to be elected, gives 12,000, which is called the quota. This divided into the totals for each ticket gives four with a remainder of 7,000 for the Republicans, three with a remainder of 9,000 for the Democrats, one with a remainder of 3,000 for the Citizens ticket, and simply a remainder of 5,000 for the People's Party. At once four Republicans, three Democrats, and one independent from the Citizens ticket, would be declared elected. To get the other two, the parties would be selected having the largest remainders, which, in this case, would be the Republican and Democratic parties. The requisite number of individuals on each ticket, e. g. five Republicans, receiving the highest number of votes would be declared elected.

The advantages and objections are obvious. Minorities would be more justly represented. Reform ideas could more easily find expression. Party dictation would be less felt, for a strong man might easily secure enough votes to be kept in power. Since bolting would be easy, even the old parties would have to put better men in nomination. Under these circumstances, able citizens would be more likely to receive and accept a call to public service. Thus a long step would be taken in the reform of our city council, which might then recover the powers it still enjoys in England, but which we have been forced to deprive it of here, because of its horrible character. If the council cannot be reformed in our large cities it seems likely that it will ultimately be abolished, and all power be concentrated in a despotic mayor as the lesser of two evils.

The plan of representation very much as above outlined is in successful and rapidly extending operation in Switzerland, and is now being urged by some of the leading thinkers of England and America.

The objections to the plan do not appear at all conclusive. Some object to the abandonment of district representation. But in a large city there might be a division into three or four districts, leaving, however,

ten of fifteen representatives to be elected in each. This might also occur in a state, while, even without such a provision, party expediency would surely lead to the placing on the ticket of men from different sections. This demand for district representation is largely a foolish survival of the time when there were only small communities in which every one had identical interests. To-day, one's interests are far more bound up with kindred spirits in every part of a city or state than with those living in the same ward or voting precinct. Class rather than local interests now need representation.

It is also urged that proportional representation has been tried and has broken down in Illinois and elsewhere. But no true system of this kind has been tried, nothing that is worthy of the name. It was a mistake for reformers to lend any countenance to these makeshifts.

Others fear that minority representation would lead to the election of "faddists," but the latter would not be so dangerous when subjected to the sobering influence of public discussion and actual participation in public business. The probability is that proportional representation would be chiefly useful to large reform movements.

There seems to be only one serious objection. That is the fear that third parties would be placed in position to hold the balance of power, and force one of the two larger parties to terms, thus destroying party responsibility. To this, Professor Commons, whose admirable ideas have been used in almost all of this discussion, makes several replies. He suggests that in city politics, at least, we have already accepted the idea of third parties and independent tickets. He assumes that almost all matters of legislation are best settled by compromise, such as minority representation would encourage. Since the individual responsibility of every member would be increased, and the main parties would be put on their good behavior, most people would be quite willing, it would seem, to forego a possible loss of a little of the so-called party responsibility which to-day seems utterly unable to prevent the most shameless abuses of trust by our parties. It is well known that there are no politics in boodle. Yet the author admits that questions relating directly to the political power of parties, such as the election of senators by state legislatures, or the division of the offices under the spoils system and questions connected therewith, cannot be compromised. This would imply that the proposed method of minority representation cannot well be extended to state politics as long as we elect our senators through the legislature—a method that ought to give way in any event to election by the people. The spoils system also must go, before proportional representation can be easily applied in city politics. This, however, is only a question of time. Already in some Eastern cities, notably in Massachusetts, this absurd spoils system has apparently received its death blow.

Professor Commons gives a suggestive criticism of the initiative and

the referendum, which, he thinks, will not be so much needed as now appears, after proportional representation has been secured.

Taken all in all, the work which has called forth these comments, is the best contribution to the subject since the work of the famous Hare, and is far more replete with practical suggestions and illustrations from recent American politics.

E. W. B.

THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT.

THE most encouraging sign of municipal progress of the past year has been the third annual convention of The American Society of Municipal Improvements, held in Chicago in October last. Composed almost exclusively of city engineers, from perhaps a hundred different cities, and with D. L. Fulton, of Allegheny, Pa., as secretary, this society seems to be the first effort of our city engineers to unite in a scientific study of city problems. The movement has had no inspiration from outside writers and theorists, and is on that very account the more significant. In many cases the membership fee and the expenses of the delegates to the conventions are borne by the city governments whose engineers thus come together.

The methods and costs of various kinds of street paving and lighting, street cleaning, disposal of garbage, sewerage, water-works construction, water purification, municipal control and inspection of street-railways and electric light, methods of raising, appropriating, and spending money for public works, these were the vital questions discussed informally and in elaborate papers at this three-days' convention.

Among the facts brought out, two may be here referred to. It appeared that two years ago an outside electrical company offered to erect a thousand electric lights for Minneapolis and sell the plant to the city for one dollar at the end of five years, if, meantime, it might receive \$150 a year per light, which was the price the old company was getting. It was found by the city engineer, after a careful investigation, that the new company could afford to make this proposition. But, such was the influence of the old company on the press and council, and such the ignorance of the public, that the contract with the old company was renewed for five years at the old price of \$150!

The greatest interest of the convention seemed to center in the problem of securing pure water in the larger cities. One of the best papers on this subject was by Mr. John W. Hill, the consulting engineer of Cincinnati, O., who indorsed the opinion of the Massachusetts Board of Health that ninety-nine per cent of the deaths from typhoid fever are due to bad water. Now the average deaths from typhoid fever per one hundred thousand of the population in ten large European cities in 1895, where great attention is paid to water purification, was only six, and in ten large

American cities was fifty-six and nine-tenths. The taking of part of Chicago's water-supply from four miles out in the lake, instead of two, reduced the typhoid death rate from an average of one hundred and sixteen, during 1890-92 inclusive, to thirty-five during the next three years respectively.

The German government in 1893 warned its municipalities not to use water containing more than one hundred typhoid germs per cubic centimeter. Yet at certain seasons of 1896, according to the report of a physician of the Chicago Health Department to the Civic Federation, the average number of such germs was seven thousand one hundred and forty-three, and occasional tests revealed one hundred thousand typhoid germs! No wonder that deaths from typhoid fever were reported to be on the rapid increase. Sometime we shall indict our municipalities for murder in the first degree, if such a state of things is long allowed to continue. A test case for damages for death from typhoid fever has recently been brought in another city. It has been estimated that the value of the lives needlessly lost every year in this country by poor water, if we count each life at five thousand dollars, which many states allow in railroad accidents, is over ten times the yearly expense of proper sand or other filtration. This estimate would appear all the greater if we also counted the expense of sickness of the many who do not die, and the sickness and cost of burial of those who do.

E. W. B.

WILLOUGHBY'S NATURE OF THE STATE.¹

THIS is the most notable book in its line for some years, and its author has received well-deserved recognition for it at his University.

There is so little in the work to criticise that the province of the reviewer is rather the pleasant one of calling attention to the latest views of political science as herein presented. Passing over his brilliant discussion of the social contract theory and that of state rights, we notice that the author holds utility to be the positive basis of society, which arises from the opposition of the collective interests to the selfish individual interests of the members and to outside foes. The state has a popular origin and rests upon the sentiment of unity. However much the state may limit freedom, almost any conceivable state secures more freedom to its citizens than they would enjoy without it. The idea of the famous sociologist Lester F. Ward is indorsed, that we have outgrown the conception that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. "It is no longer the consent, but the positive known will of the governed, from which government now derives its powers." Such has been the recent growth of democracy.

¹ *The Nature of the State.* By W. W. Willoughby, Ph. D., Lecturer in Political Philosophy in the Johns Hopkins University. Pp. xii, 448. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1896. \$3.00.

In disputing the position of Spencer and Kidd, that society is so like a physical organism as to make it unwise for man to interfere with the struggle for existence, the truer position of Huxley, Ward, and many others is maintained, that society is more psychical than physical, and that "The entire distinction that is to be made between mankind and brute creation is contained in the fact that while the animal is transformed by its environment, man transforms the environment,—that the slow and expensive method of structural development by means of the biologic law, is supplanted by the intellectual capacity of man to transform and adapt his environment to his needs, and thus to secure an improvement higher than the mere biological law could obtain, and without its painful and prodigal methods."

Dr. Willoughby is far from indorsing the assertion of M. Jules Simon, that "The State ought to render itself useless and to prepare for its own decease." Dr. Amos G. Warner's view of the purpose of philanthropy is declared to be also, in a broad sense, the purpose of society: "(1) To preserve those who are fit, from the standpoint of race improvement, from being crushed by unfortunate local and temporary conditions; and (2) to enable those who are unfit, from the standpoint of race improvement, to become extinct with the least possible suffering."

The functions of the state are divided into the essential, such as defense of nationality, person, and property, and the non-essential, or optional. The latter are divided into: (1) non-socialistic activities, that could not or would not be undertaken by private initiative, such as education, public libraries, statistical inquiries, sanitation, parks, public baths, factory legislation, and control by public commissions of some lines of business; and (2) socialistic activities, such as public ownership and management of some kinds of business. Just how far the state should go is admitted to be solely a question of expediency. Even trusts such as those in oil and sugar may sometime, in the author's view, become public enterprises, if their present development continues, and legislation should prove insufficient to prevent injury to society.

As a fitting companion to Kidd's famous indictment of existing social conditions from a rational standpoint, should be read Dr. Willoughby's words:—

"The statement cannot be gainsaid, that, for the great majority of persons in society, as at present constituted, the laws of human competition work with unjust and cruel severity. . . . We may ask ourselves what will be the attitude that will be taken by the masses generally when they come to see that the favored few obtain their advantages largely by climbing upon others' shoulders, and that in the government is to be found a force,—the control of which is in their own hands,—whereby is offered at least a possibility of mitigating the evils of their lot and of equalizing the conditions that the struggle for existence has rendered so unequal

and, to them, so oppressive. It does not seem possible but that the fuller recognition of these facts, which must come with the wider spread of education, must greatly intensify the demand of the lower classes for greater material equality—a demand that in default of means on their part can only be met by the employment of the power of the State. At the same time, of course, this very increase of knowledge will render more rational and feasible the plans for securing the ends that will be advocated by them. The only danger is that the pressure that will come from the more unfortunate classes will result in efforts at amelioration before the spread of intelligence and morality is such as will ensure that these efforts will be directed to the real and permanent good, not to the apparent temporary advantage only."

Yet the whole tenor of the book is scientific and conservatively progressive, rather than radical. Our form of government is preferred to the British, because of our possession of constitutional checks on the power of our legislatures. Anything likely to bring our judiciary more under popular control is deprecated. The view of the author on this last point will be questioned by some, because of the increasing disposition of our courts to decide laws to be unconstitutional that conflict with their views of public policy—in other words, with their views of economics and politics.

The increasing difficulties of government with the growth of democracy and of the functions of the state are justly dwelt upon. Unfitness for government, both educationally and morally, and, he might have added, among all the classes alike, the mediocrity of statesmanship and administrative talent, and the tendency to party tyranny in popular governments, as also the tendency to a lax enforcement of the law, are strongly brought out. It is declared that: "Democracy is by no means a simple government, nor one easily administered, but rather the reverse. . . . It is one which presupposes a high morality, an advanced state of education, a great degree of self-control, a considerable amount of material and social equality, and, above all, the active and disinterested participation of the wisest and best of its citizens in its political life."

But the author has a healthy optimism, and declares of popular government: "The manly self-control which is taught and practiced in this political form stamps it as the best type that developing civilization has thus far disclosed, and in the continued existence of democratic control we see the highest hopes of human progress."

E. W. B.

RECENT WORKS ON SOCIOLOGY.

THE newest of the social sciences heralds its rapid advance by three works of high pretension within a single year, two being from the publisher whose imprint is always a guaranty of merit. Mr. Fairbanks' book

will attract less attention than the other two, because less of a contribution, and because it is so abstract and theoretical as to make hardly a reference, in chapter after chapter, to the facts of societary life which its theories are supposed to explain. Mr. Fairbanks' work¹ seems to be generally in harmony with current sociological thought, but is too colorless to invite much praise or attack.

Professor Mayo-Smith's work,² on the other hand, is preëminently in touch with the facts of our environment, and with wise suggestions as to the cautions to be observed in studying the current statistics and other information about them. Here the student of Malthusianism and other problems of population, as also the investigator of dependency, crime, emigration, the growth of population in cities, etc., will find the most reliable, although of course not the fullest, recent information, together with most valuable observations about the general bearing and trustworthiness of the information furnished. Its relation to present social questions is also kept constantly in mind. For what it attempts to be, namely an accurate introduction to many fields of investigation of population problems, rather than a formal and connected treatment of any one or of sociology as a whole, this work is invaluable.

Professor Giddings' book,³ although little larger than the last named and apparently not as strong as Lester F. Ward's sociological work, will yet attract great attention as a vigorous effort to reduce to scientific form a science still largely in its infancy.

The average reader will probably be disappointed in the author's conception of his science. Instead of attempting to coördinate the results of special social sciences, such as ethics, political science, economics, etc., with a view of studying the actual man in all his attributes, and thus discovering how his future progress may be hastened, Professor Giddings starts out with very abstract considerations of "the social man," who seems as different from the actual man as did the famous "economic man." Now there may be, and probably is, need for such an abstraction; but, unless sociology soon shows a readiness also to deal with present problems of the social progress of the actual man, a new department, with that end in view, will be demanded. It is possible, indeed, that the author may himself plan to do this in a later work. In view of the researches of Mr. Ward, it seems that man has not been by nature a social animal, as Aristotle held, but is only gradually becoming such. It ap-

¹ *An Introduction to Sociology.* By Arthur Fairbanks. Pp. 274. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$2.00.

² *Statistics and Sociology.* By Richmond Mayo-Smith, Ph. D., Professor of Political Economy and Social Science in Columbia College. Pp. xvi, 398. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895. \$3.00.

³ *The Principles of Sociology.* By Franklin H. Giddings, M. A., Professor of Sociology in Columbia University, New York. Pp. vii, 476. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1896. \$3.00.

pears that the "consciousness of kind," which is declared to be "the original and elementary subjective fact of human nature," is given an undue importance.

Yet the cohesion of public sentiment in the South on the negro question, or in Philadelphia on protection, or in a trade-union as to the "scab," indicates how the consciousness of kindred interests and ideals binds men together. In a fine passage it is held that this consciousness of kind is being broadened by Christianity, until it will include the world, securing a "diffusion of knowledge," an "improvement of conditions," an "upbuilding of character," and "uniting the classes and the races of men in a spiritual humanity."

The part which pleasure plays in developing this consciousness of kind is brought out; and it is held, that, if ever the tenement-house population of our large cities is socially organized, "it will be after they have been brought under the influence of more healthful social pleasures than those to which they often instinctively resort."

Altogether too much respect is paid to the present membership of the Knights of Labor, when it is stated that it "is less than two hundred thousand." In fact, the membership keeping up the dues is under forty thousand, and probably under twenty-five thousand. But this is of slight importance.

More significant is the writer's opinion of *laissez faire*, or the absence of governmental activity. "No sounder rule of practical conduct can be followed as long as we are contemplating the possibility of restraining the spontaneous activity of mature and normal men; no worse rule could be devised for governing our conduct towards the immature and the degenerate." This seems to ignore entirely all those growing activities of a coöperative nature, such as public water, gas, electric light, postal service, and in some countries express, telegraph, telephone, and even railroad business,—enterprises that are likely to grow all the faster with the growth of better men, and therefore of better government which shall be more honest and trustworthy.

After having given this new work only partial praise thus far, it is a great pleasure to refer to a few of its many strong points. Although so good an authority as Mr. Ward has criticised it as revealing too little knowledge of Comte, the founder of the science, the work before us does, as a whole, show most painstaking care and accuracy.

The nearly two hundred pages of Book III, describing the evolution of society, is capital, particularly the earlier portions. In view of the author's well-known conservatism, the readers of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA will be interested to note his attitude upon the few points of present-day social problems to which he refers. In one place he says:—

"If, beside the premise that a man may be conceived abstractly as a competitor with his fellow-man for economic advantage, economists had made use of the further premise that he also may be conceived abstractly

as an instinctive combiner with his fellow-man for maintaining class power and privilege, they would have drawn not only the deduction that employers will compete with one another in building up industries, but the further deduction that, as far as possible, they will refrain from competing with one another in buying labor, and will never fail to stand together in shaping the social and the legal conditions under which laborers must sell their work. The two deductions put together would have made a resultant truth not unlike the generalizations of history and statistics" (p. 66).

No one aware of the real conditions of municipal life in Chicago and some other of our large cities can fail to be drawn to these startling words:

"From such indications as a few societies have already afforded, and from such further indications as are now thrusting themselves upon observation in parts of Europe and America, it may be inferred that in a community whose life is a tireless pursuit of materialistic ends in which money-getting is the sum of success there will be a sharp separation of the successful from the unsuccessful classes and an exploitation of the poor by the rich as wanton and as merciless as was any exploitation of the weak by the strong in societies of the military character. In such a society the tools of the wealthy will command office and power. Even the laws will favor the prosperous and will weigh heavily against those whose struggle is against hope. The mercenary spirit will corrupt judgment and religion alike. The magistrates of the nation will judge for a consideration, the priests thereof will teach for hire, the prophets thereof will divine for money, the princes thereof will be companions of thieves; every one loving gifts and following after rewards.

"This is an extreme picture. We may hope that in no society will the quest of gold so completely subvert the mental and the moral life, the enjoyment of beauty and the love of truth, as to separate absolutely the wealthy from the poor, or to throw government and the moulding of institutions wholly into the hands of those who control the material means of existence. Yet, that a plutocratic spirit is a real cause of social disintegration is beyond reasonable doubt. It played its unworthy part in the fall of the Roman Empire and in the ruin of the medieval republics. It seriously menaces the future of our own free institutions. . . . It was the rare fortune of the American people that in its formative days the quick moral life of such communities left a deep impress on the larger life of the nation. The impress has not been effaced, but the clear lines of its beauty have been broken and confused" (pp. 354-356). E. W. B.

RECENT WORKS ON THE MONEY QUESTION.

No student of American banking history and present money problems should fail to read Mr. Horace White's work,¹ especially the part relating

¹ *Money and Banking*. By Horace White. Pp. x, 488. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1896. \$1.50.

to the history of American banking. Few economists will be able to indorse his treatment of the silver question, which is that of gold monometallism, pure and simple; but this need not interfere with a full recognition of his contribution to the history of the many experiments in banking and in bank money in this country, on pages 235-444. The book will serve as a good supplement to Mr. Conant's recent work on the general history of banking in Europe as well as America.

Mr. Nelson's little book on "The Money we Need,"¹ written just before the recent campaign, contains the usual popular arguments of the gold monometallists who believe the world has ample money for its needs. It is strange, however, that the writer should indorse the fallacy, of which much use has since been made, that reduction in the quantity of money by the disappearance of gold would lessen the purchasing power of the dollar before the vacuum were at all filled by silver. A reduction in the quantity of money accompanied by such restriction in credit as would probably attend the introduction of free coinage would surely still further lower prices for a time, which is one of the strongest arguments against the experiment.

Professor E. A. Ross, in charge of economic theory and finance at Stanford University, is the only one of our college professors who has written a popular tract² on the free coinage side in the present discussion, as Professor Laughlin, of the University of Chicago, has been the only one to do so on the side of gold monometallism, unless we class as popular the able works, favorable to international bimetallism, of General Walker and President Andrews. Professor Ross presents a much smaller work than Professor Laughlin, and one more dignified in its choice of illustrations and treatment of opponents. While expressing a preference for a higher ratio than 16 to 1, he says: "Historical causes have fixed the old ratio so firmly in the minds of the American people that there is no hope of getting up enthusiasm for a new-fangled ratio. The alternative is 16 to 1 or the gold standard; and put that way I am unreservedly for 16 to 1. In the second place, a new ratio would compel the recoinage of our silver into bigger dollars, and, apart from the expense, would mean a contraction instead of an expansion."

In this latter point, Professor Ross is apparently mistaken, as explained in the last issue of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA. Our existing silver certificates might remain, but all further deposits of silver bullion could cover the issue of a new type of certificates at such new ratio of, perhaps, 22 or 24 to 1 as might be adopted.

Professor Ross, as was natural in one writing in the summer and from the far West, did not appreciate the tremendous business scare, which

¹The Money we Need. By Henry Loomis Nelson. Pp. 124. New York: Harper & Bros. 1895. 50 cents.

²Honest Dollars. By Professor E. A. Ross. Pp. 63. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr & Co. 1896.

threatened the complete paralysis of all business for months, if free coinage at 16 to 1 were approved at the polls.

The large work of Mr. Shibley,¹ of Chicago, formerly a student of the University of Chicago, has a vast quantity of valuable information and discussion of the silver question. The great length of the book, its cheap cuts, following the poor example of "Coin" and Professor Laughlin, and the tendency to ascribe cowardly or dishonest motives to antagonists, will doubtless turn away some intelligent readers. The argument for free silver is, however, put more fully, and with more weight of authority quoted in its behalf and in behalf of the author's arraignment of our existing situation, than has thus far appeared in the discussion of a question where the weight of economic authority is mostly on the other side. The more concise works of Ross and Wharton Barker will be more widely read by those desiring to get the pith of the free silver side. Those wishing to make a fuller study will gain much from this volume of Mr. Shibley, albeit, probably, many will not be able to agree with the remedy urged.

E. W. B.

SPAHR'S PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES.²

THIS work, which appears to reveal an astonishing concentration of wealth and income in both this country and Europe, contrary to the opinion of many economists, will attract great attention. It is to be regretted that more statistical material is not at hand, but this able work will stimulate the collection of it. Dr. Spahr, one of the editors of the *Outlook*, and former lecturer at Columbia, took advantage of the tax laws of New York State, which require quite a complete return to the probate court of all properties of deceased persons, and gathered valuable data. It appears that while there are twice as many savings-banks accounts in New York city as there are families, two-thirds of the heads of families dying during certain months in 1892 left no property other than household effects. This and many other facts indicate that a large portion of the savings-bank deposits are by the well-to-do, who have deposits in many banks at the same time, or at least are not so largely by the wage-earner as commonly supposed.

Excluding New York City and Brooklyn as not typical, the probate returns from thirty-six counties of the State indicate that nearly one-half of the heads of families leave nothing at death save household furniture, probably of less than \$200 value. Two per cent of the rest, or one per cent

¹ The Money Question. By Geo. H. Shibley. Pp. 743. Chicago: The Stable Money Publishing Co. 1896.

² The Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States. By Charles B. Spahr, Ph. D. Pp. 184. New York: T. Y. Crowell & Co. 1896. \$1.50.

of the whole, leave in properties of \$50,000 and upwards about one-half of all inheritances, and so must own half the wealth. There are given some facts to indicate rather than prove the author's belief, that this proportion applies to the whole country. It will be recalled as confirmatory of this that the conservative and able head of the United States Mortgage Census estimated that 52 per cent of our population own only five per cent of the nation's wealth, and three-one-hundredths of one per cent own 20 per cent.

The inventoried probates of Massachusetts from 1829-31 to 1889-91 show that estates over \$50,000 grew from 34 per cent of all the property probated to 55 per cent, while properties under \$5,000 diminished from 25 to 11 per cent. Yet small estates seem more commonly probated now and large ones seem more undervalued.

From a keen analysis of the Aldrich or Senate report on wages and prices so often quoted, it is shown that the materials for the report were combined in a very defective way, and that they really indicate a fall in nominal or money wages in gold of nearly seven per cent from 1873 to 1891, instead of a rise of over fourteen per cent claimed in the Report. Independent research had already convinced the reviewer that criticism of the Report might go even farther than Dr. Spahr has carried it. Imagine the assumption that wages in all the stores of the United States had risen, because they had done so in two New England stores employing together less than thirty clerks! This is mentioned by Dr. Spahr.

He attempts the daring task of proving that the English statisticians have wrongly interpreted their own figures. For instance, Giffin seems to have ignored the vast increase of income from corporations, confining himself to the income from trades and professions, when he marshalled figures to prove that the income of the poor has increased faster than that of the rich. These English statisticians are certainly placed on the defensive, and it will be interesting to see what their defense will be.

The author gives some data for his belief that one per cent of income receivers enjoy one-fourth of the total income of this country, and thirty-five per cent in Great Britain, while one-half of the population in this country receive only one-fifth of its income.

As already suggested, further research is needed before we dogmatize too much, but surely Dr. Spahr has presented facts and conclusions which no one can ignore who desires some light on the modern tendencies toward wealth concentration.

One of the most striking features of this original work is its claim, in opposition to Professor Seligman and many others, that the American system of taxing property will give substantially the same results as the growing European system of income taxation, as soon as we stop attempting to tax both physical properties and the securities based on them so far as the latter do not exceed in value these physical properties.

E. W. B.

THE ECONOMIC CLASSICS SERIES.

PROFESSOR W. J. ASHLEY is doing a great service to all students of economic problems by republishing, in cheap yet neat form, short typical chapters from the writings of our greatest economists past and present.

Every one must commend the choice of the selections from Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Mun, Jones,¹ and Schmoller² already made in separate books, while many will regret the absence of critical notes. But all will prefer the text and brief introductory notes by Professor Ashley to any critical discussion, no matter how able, if a choice must be made.

In the interesting quotations before us from the great living head of the historical school of economics at the University of Berlin, appears a very valuable defense of the much misunderstood mercantilist legislation of the last century and the one preceding. Out of warring towns and small country districts there grew up a spirit of nationality, which swept away local barriers of tariffs, etc., while forced by the soundest considerations of public policy, in the author's view, to adopt toward other nations the same selfish policy that they were using. The exposure of the conduct of Holland and England at a time when they are now supposed to have taken a disinterested stand in favor of freer trade and social relations with foreign nations is very well done.

The following paragraph is well worth quoting: "The doctrine of the natural harmony of the economic interests of all states is just as false as the opinion then entertained [16th and 17th centuries] that an advantage to one state is always a disadvantage to another. . . . In reality, all social bodies, and therefore economic bodies among them,—at first towns and districts, and afterwards nations and states,—stand to one another in a double relation; a relation of action and reaction by which they mutually supplement one another, and a relation of dependence, exploitation, and struggle for supremacy. The latter is the original one; and only slowly, in the course of centuries and millenniums, is the antagonism softened. Even to-day the great economic Powers seek to utilize their economic superiority in all their international relations and to retain weaker nations in dependence; even to-day any half-civilized nation or tribe, among whom the English or French establish themselves, is in danger, first of a sort of slavery for debt and an unfavorable balance of trade and, following closely in the wake, of political annexation and economic exploitation,—though this, indeed, may turn into an economic education for it."

E. W. B.

¹ *Peasant Rents.* By Richard Jones. Pp. xii, 207. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895. 75 cents.

² *The Mercantile System.* By Gustav Schmoller. Pp. 95. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1896. 75 cents.

MISCELLANEOUS.

IN an unostentatious way a most worthy charity has been founded in Chicago at 42 Custom House Place. Two brothers in Cape Town, South Africa, have invested \$40,000, the income of which is to be used for charitable purposes. It has taken the form of a Working Men's Home and Medical Mission, and is conducted by a board of trustees, not one of whom is a resident of Chicago. It furnishes for ten cents a day a clean, comfortable bed, free baths of various kinds, including shower and full bath, free laundry, free medical dispensary under the charge of a competent physician. A good penny lunch counter is attached where good, wholesome, well-cooked soups, grains, sandwiches, and coffee at one cent a dish are furnished. A free reading room with periodicals and books; a system of visiting nurses; a lying-in home for friendless girls; a gospel service; a farm in the country, where men are sent to cultivate vegetables and small fruits; and an industrial department, where carpets and rugs are woven; are some of the valuable features. It is one of the most quiet but effective charities in Chicago, and is a testimony to that real and best form of altruism known to the world,—a love for humanity springing from a religious inspiration, a genuine love for Jesus Christ. If crime and wickedness are ever banished from earth, it will be by the "propulsive power of such an affection," and a sociology that fails to reckon with this power as a living, moving, actual force in the world is to just that extent impracticable and unscientific. Such a charity was not founded to acquire a good name nor wealth, for the names of its founders are unknown. Genuine Christianity is life no less than light; it is good works no less than philosophy.

Z. S. H.

ON a recent visit to the old Emerson home at Concord, Mass., it was learned that Mr. Emerson's income during most of his life was rarely more than three hundred dollars a year. Yet millions of Americans have an idea that a man's ability is in proportion to his income, and that those are most worthy of respect who have acquired the most wealth. It is about time that we learned that money-getting is no greater evidence of mentality than musical or poetic or philosophical or many another talent.

When propositions are before a community for improvements in the educational system or in bath-houses, water-supply, etc., in the case of cities, how frequent is the claim, even in rich communities, that the requisite taxes would lessen the wealth, as if that were the only factor to be considered. To all such the life of Emerson doing some of the best work of the century on three hundred dollars a year conveys an important lesson.

E. W. B.

JUST before lecturing upon Christ's attitude upon social questions, a well-known preacher and student of sociology east of the Mississippi was remonstrated with by a church official in somewhat the following words:

"I am very sorry you are popularizing these ideas of Christ. I have studied them a good deal and believe you understand them correctly, but I am opposed to your presenting them to the people, for these ideas of Jesus are so dreadfully disturbing!"

This is typical of the absurd and almost criminal excess of caution, bordering on cowardice, that is to-day keeping a portion of the Christian church from any vigorous promulgation of business and social righteousness. To be sure, Jesus has been declared to have been something of an opportunist, so that when his prosecutors tried to convict him, they had to do it by false witnesses, although the spirit of all he said and did was destructive of the social and political conditions of his time. Tact in the presentation of the gospel's revolutionary principles of social service and righteousness is still necessary, but few will honestly think that they can find in Jesus' example any warrant for the altogether too typical attitude of the church officer above quoted.

E. W. B.

THE writer's article on "The Free Coinage of Silver" in the last issue has been criticised by some journals on the basis of the necessarily brief extracts from it sent out as advance sheets by the publishers. While the author attempted to give some of the arguments that to him seemed most weighty on both sides of the question of free coinage, he stated in a post-script: "If we are to have free coinage, without European coöperation, a ratio of 22 to 1 would seem to the writer safer, and more likely to pass both houses of Congress, than 16 to 1." I have always been in favor of international bimetallism and, in default of that, have favored either free coinage at such a higher ratio than 16 to 1 and nearer the market ratio as would be likely to keep the two metals on a substantial parity, or, as an alternative, have favored some approach to the famous scheme of Secretary Windom, that we should receive silver bullion at its market price, issue silver certificates thereon, and redeem them in the same value (not weight) of silver as might rule in the market at the time of presentation of the certificates for redemption, the government standing the small loss or securing the small gain that might accrue from the fall or rise of silver bullion. These silver certificates would somewhat lessen the demand for gold as primary money, while as good as gold in purchasing power.

Secretary Windom's other scheme for relieving a run upon really solvent institutions for money in a panic by allowing any possessor of a certain type of government bonds to secure at once government paper money in return for them, but on such conditions as would make it profitable to retire the extra money issue as soon as the stringency was over, was approved by all those who spoke upon the subject, as several did, at the last meeting of the American Economic Association.

In the tremendous struggle to improve our monetary situation which the Republican party has just begun, too much attention cannot be paid to the ideas of such men as Windom, and of Fonda whose recent book was briefly reviewed in our October issue.

E. W. B.

ARTICLE XIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. (International Theological Library.)
By GEORGE PARK FISHER, D.D., LL.D., Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University. Pp. xvi, 583. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$2.50.

This is the most comprehensive and important work upon the history of Christian Doctrine which has appeared in America. It embraces the whole scope of the Christian history from the beginning to our own day, and pays attention to every important school of thought and separate communion, including the Roman Catholic Church. The discussion is condensed, and yet very well proportioned, the great writers receiving attention commensurate with their importance. One-half of the entire work is devoted to Modern Theology, and about one-fourth of it to the nineteenth century. American Theology receives its first adequate treatment in such a work.

The great characteristics distinguishing the work, as would be expected by all acquainted with the previous writings of Professor Fisher, are lucidity, accuracy, wide learning, fairness, sobriety, and sane reasonability. He is a good student of the great recent writers upon this discipline, such as Harnack, but he is himself an independent master in the branch, and he does not permit himself to be carried into the extremes to which any of these writers may have been led. The theories which Harnack has spun about Montanism, which have exalted that comparatively insignificant phenomenon to the place of a pivotal element in Christian history, find no echo in the sober and objective account which we find in these pages. Another characteristic which we might mention is the impersonality of the book, by which word we would designate the fact that the writer is endeavoring constantly to give us not his own opinion as distinguished from that of all other men, but what another man, as wise as himself, might fairly call the generally accepted and reasonable opinion. This characteristic is evident in nearly every detail, as when he discusses the date of the Didache. The book is one that commands confidence, therefore, and will be useful to persons of quite different schools, who use it for quite different purposes. At the same time, Professor Fisher's own position as an American, and even as a Congregationalist, is not forgotten, and we have an amount of attention devoted, for example, to New England Theology, which no one will maintain, in view of its importance

to this country, is excessive, but which scarcely any other writer would have been qualified to give it.

It were more agreeable to bestow upon such a book nothing but praise, especially as it has been found at several points to agree with views which the present writer had formed by his own study long since, and in which he now finds himself, as a German scholar once remarked, "infinitely strengthened." In one respect, however, the book disappoints our expectations. It lingers in general upon the plain of an annalistic narrative of facts rather than attains the heights of a fully genetic history. True, this is a matter of degree. No history of such a structure as is the system of Christian doctrine, could fail to exhibit the great outlines of its growth through the ages, if at all faithful to the facts. It may well be a matter of difference of judgment just to what extent the endeavor shall be made to emphasize the main current of things and exhibit the steps by which the conception of a given doctrine has advanced from one writer to another. But we cannot suppress the regret that this has not been done in a far greater degree than it has been in the present volume. Take, for example, the treatment of Augustine. The great significance of that writer for the growing edifice of Christian doctrine lies in his discussions of anthropology. The secret of Augustine's view of sin is his view of grace, and this has its theological root in his view of God, as it has its practical root in his experience of regeneration. To begin, therefore, with the doctrine of God and to trace in its logical order the connection of element with element of his doctrine is at the same time to follow the course of events, to make Augustine intelligible to the reader and to present Augustinianism in all its strength as it appeared to its originator. In the progress of this narration many other elements must, of course, come in as "peripheral," to use Thomasius' word, but certainly the introduction of Augustine's ill-digested and altogether valueless opinions upon justification, the atonement, and eschatology, to say nothing of the extraordinary amount of space given to his resultless discussions of creationism *versus* traducianism, can serve only to confuse the mind and to obscure the true work and service of the great teacher.

In fact, what we want in a book of this kind is not a history of men but of ideas, a history of the growth of the Christian doctrinal system. It must be a history not dissociated from men; but, after all, not what a man held in all its details, is the real matter of interest to us, but what he had to contribute to Christian thinking. Hence, while now and then the historian will pause to gather up all the elements of the system of some transitional man, like Irenæus, it will be as much his task to suppress or pass over certain wholly meaningless details as it would be that of the annalist to record them.

We regret this deficiency in our historian the more because the failure to keep more sharply the demands of history in mind has sometimes obscured the vision of important doctrinal facts. Irenæus was the first in

the church to make Christology the center of the system ; but this important fact is lost sight of in Professor Fisher's delineation. The account of Luther's theology is the best in form and most comprehensive of anything in the book till we come to the New England School, as might be anticipated from Professor Fisher's former and wide studies in the history of the Reformation. But how does he fail to discuss, as the direct outgrowth of the necessities of his sacramental theories, Luther's remarkable discussions of the *communicatio idiomatum* in its application to Christology?

But enough of this style of remark. If the book does not rise by a free use of the historical imagination to the higher planes of historical writing, it certainly pursues its course upon the lower plane with distinguished success.

We strike a rich vein when we turn to the account of theology in America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We note one error in passing, that Pynchon's theory of the atonement "is not essentially diverse from the governmental theory," since he can hardly be said to have had a theory at all, or if he did, it was that the atonement was made by Christ's "mediatorial obedience." The treatment of Edwards is a masterpiece. While the full measure of the greatness of this theologian is acknowledged, his preëminence is placed rather in his dialectic skill, his thoroughness, his earnestness, and his spirituality than in intellectual originality ; and this is to make a correct discrimination. The dependence of Edwards upon Locke for the ideas and even the individual proofs of his theory of the will, is made perfectly plain. The strictly causal efficiency of motives is stated, as Edwards presents it, and his failure really to understand and actually to refute his adversaries made plain. Considering the place which a generation of writers gave to Edwards, and the wrestings of history which they performed to bring their own quite different theories into supposed harmony with the teachings of their great leader, this objective view of Edwards on Professor Fisher's part may be said to be an achievement second to none in difficulty and importance in the whole work. The true place is also given to Edwards' treatise upon Virtue, which ranks among the greatest of his productions and the most influential in succeeding generations. It determined the adoption of the theory of the atonement which became characteristic of New England, and it will be likely to modify that theology still further. The series of great writers among us is then passed in review, notice being taken of the extreme school who became Unitarians. The only criticism we are inclined to make is upon the large amount of space devoted to Bushnell. From the standpoint of the annalist, it may not be too much ; but considered as having contributed to the modification of thought by elements of permanent value, Bushnell can scarcely claim so prolonged attention, which is, in fact, largely taken up with the account of his own personal vacillation. Still, no doubt, he was a wonderfully suggestive writer.

But we pause in this review. To the end, the book is well sustained and thoroughly well done. It is a monument of thorough American scholarship. No American scholar could have done it better, scarcely any as well, whether in Europe or America. It is at the same time an exceedingly useful book and a great credit to our country and our times.

FRANK HUGH FOSTER.

OAKLAND, CAL.

HISTORY, PROPHECY AND THE MONUMENTS; or, Israel and the Nations. By JAMES FREDERICK MCCURDY, Ph. D., LL. D., Professor of Oriental Languages in University College, Toronto. Volume II. TO THE FALL OF NINEVEH. Pp. xxii, 433. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1896. \$3.00.

The first volume of this work, which brought the history down to the fall of Samaria, was noticed in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for January, 1895. The author expected to finish his task in a second volume. We are glad he did not, for the extension of his plan to include a third volume secures for us a more elaborate presentation of the inner development of Israel in the volume before us, and we have yet to look forward to an adequate discussion of the literature of the people in the final part.

The former volume received high praise as it appeared, and a third edition already issued is proof that it has found a place for itself. The second volume is a worthy successor. The relations of Judah to foreign nations in the period covered are pretty thoroughly treated in the recent commentaries. McCurdy raises his book out of the ordinary by interrupting the external history at the fall of Samaria, and devoting the first half of the volume to a somewhat different subject, though one which he handles with equal vigor, the "Inner Development of Israel." Thanks are due him for an elaborate and dignified treatment of this unfamiliar topic. In his own words, he attempts "to trace the rise, direction and issue of the hidden currents of national life." We are thus at last brought face to face with the people of Israel. The topics are many which must be treated before this book could be written; and the work of future years will, it is to be hoped, render it possible to fill out the picture more completely; but it is well to remind ourselves in the midst of these subsidiary studies, that not Assyriology or the Cognates or excavations or criticism is our goal, but this same internal development of Israel, as affected to be sure by their environment, but also by their own endowments and by their rich heritage of divine instruction.

McCurdy perhaps nowhere better explains the title of his work than in the following sentences: "The relations of the subject states of the (Assyrian) empire to the sovereign power; the conditions of protection or of tolerance on the one hand, and of repression or of obliteration on the other; the degrees of subjection; the civil and religious obligations of the dependent peoples,—these conditions, learned from the chronicles of the governing nation, assume now a dignity and importance which in their immediate setting they could never deserve. They are brought close to

the immortal and priceless words of the Prophets of Israel, and both together furnish the key to the history of those memorable times." It has been said by some reviewers of Vol. I. that the work forms an early history of the Semitic peoples, and so it does; but the author could do no less. The case simply illustrates the new spirit that has of late come over Bible study. Scholars search the uttermost and nethermost parts of the earth to secure material that will aid in the study of the Holy Scriptures; and they do well. We all agree with Sayce that no archæological witness can be ignored, and all critical inferences made from such data must be held tentatively, subject to modification required by newly found facts. Archæology, however, shares with criticism, or any other science, the uncertainties that arise from insufficient data, and it is as safe to guess with the critics as to guess with the archæologists, if guesswork it must be. The frequent quarrels between these two classes might be averted if all would recognize to what an extent Old Testament investigation is, and must be, a series of clever inferences from insufficient data. The chief thing is not the glorification of archæology, as would seem to be the aim of some, or of criticism on the other hand, but the better understanding of the people of Israel. In rising above these quarrels and making his principal object the study of the life, character, and institutions of the nation, McCurdy has rendered a grand service.

A second reason given for this emphasis is stated to be the great need that Old Testament students should have a consistent and rational conception of the conditions under which the word of Revelation came to the people. Higher criticism must rest on a broad and sure foundation or abdicate its seat of popular authority.

After a chapter of review of the preceding volume, the author proceeds to analyze the elements and character of Hebrew society. The clan is the nucleus of political expansion. In distinction from the family whose uniting bond is kinship, the clan is bound together by association of custom and belief. He is inclined to the view that the earliest clans gradually came into being as organizations through association of individuals already members of families; but he notes that the question does not "touch the so-called 'patriarchal' stage of ancient Israel, since Abraham and his people belonged to a period of social development subsequent to the conditions in question."

Very instructive and suggestive are the paragraphs which treat of the importance to their literature and religion of their system of slavery, of their family government, of the wifely relation among them, of fatherhood and motherhood. From these institutions and relationships comes largely the terminology of their religion. History of Doctrine does not properly begin with the doctrines of the Church Fathers, or even with New Testament Theology. It should be traced all the way from the earliest Semitic institutions down through the vicissitudes of Old Testament times.

In the chapter on the Hebrews as nomads and semi-nomads we have a stout defense of the principal features of the narratives of the Exodus, the sojourn in Egypt, and the patriarchal times. This is refreshing after so much said in certain quarters against those narratives. We may in a word suggest his argument. The cult of Jehovah was no novelty at the time of the occupation of Canaan, and it cannot have originated in Egypt. It must go back to still earlier times. It must have been vigorous or it would have been lost in Egypt. Israel itself, in order to survive the Egyptian oppression and to enter on its subsequent career at the stage of development which it in fact occupied, must have been numerous and coherent, and must have had about such a past as is pictured in Genesis and the first chapters of Exodus.

Repudiating thus the mythical character of those stories, he on the other hand pleads for a "larger interpretation of the patriarchal narratives" than is the traditional one. "Abraham and his descendants in the time of historical influence were of course only the heads of the leading families in their respective clans." They were the men of force of character, and hence were outstanding representatives of the race. In Egypt the prevailingly social life of the patriarchal families gave place to the political life of clans. The change in Hebrew society at the Exodus was not a new creation but an evolution. The first step toward a common national life was taken before the revealed law of Sinai and no revelation is claimed as its authorization. In like manner the whole social development throughout the existence of the nation is left to work itself out without interference on the part of revelation. Human society is taken for granted as it stands. It is the duties that grow out of social relations that are divinely dictated.

The interval between the settlement in Canaan and the establishment of the monarchy was of necessity marked first of all by the breaking up of the old tribal system. This was not followed, as it should have been, by a durable reunion on any extensive scale and resting on any inner principle of cohesion. The lack of a central judicial or religious system, and, positively, the establishment of local courts and local shrines, were among the disintegrating agencies of the period.

In the period of the monarchy, Saul, although king in name, was really dictator of an unorganized people, and therefore he failed. David organized the kingdom, and the monarchy began to fulfill its functions. His centralization was, however, carried on in a way to conciliate all the tribes. Solomon failed at this point, and erred also in attempting to make his kingdom a commercial nation.

This book closes with a fine chapter on society, morals, and religion, in which special prominence is given to the poor in Israel, as a social factor, opposed and oppressed by the aristocracy.

The ground traversed by the eighth book, namely, the Hebrews, Egyptians and Assyrians, is more familiar, but we find a wider horizon than is

usual, and a recognition of the influence on Palestine of peoples and transactions remote from it geographically.

In thus singling out a point here and there for mention, we mean no reflection upon the rest. It is a profitable book to own, and an inspiring book to read.

OWEN H. GATES.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NICENE THEOLOGY; with some Reference to the Ritschlian View of Theology and History of Doctrine. By HUGH M. SCOTT, D.D. Chicago Theological Seminary Press. 1896.

In this volume Professor Scott presents to the public six exceedingly fresh and pungent lectures, which give a vigorous treatment of some of the most vital questions of theology, to which he has added a large number of footnotes in the same vein, gathered from a broad reading of German theological literature. The clear exposition of the development of the Logos Christology, with a view to establishing the legitimacy of that development, is a theme worthy of the most thorough and scholarly handling. Professor Scott's knowledge of the questions of early church history recalls not infrequently Henry B. Smith's keen historical insight.

But the book would have been more effective in positive results, both from the point of view of Nicene and of Ritschlian theology, if the author had not proposed to treat of Ritschlianism in distinction from other types of German thought. In the body of the book he has treated of German thought in general, with the result that the one type especially named in the title-page has received no clear and distinguishing treatment of its own. The innocent reader not previously informed upon Ritschlian theology might sometimes suppose that Lipsius and Harnack, Pfleiderer and Loofs, sit on different seats in the same school. And when he says that 'Ritschl makes Christ a product of our own imagination' (p. 27); that 'John the Baptist or a voice from a cloud preaching the Sermon on the Mount could, in the Ritschlian view, be our Redeemer just as well as Jesus Christ' (p. 28); that 'Pfleiderer, Hatch, Harnack, all agree that the Divine Christ is an invention of the Greeks' (p. 58); and that, according to Harnack, 'the first Christians perverted the Gospel by putting the Person of Christ in the place of his words,' it is more than likely that the Ritschlians themselves will think that Professor Scott has not been flailing them, after all, but only giving a threshing to the 'impression' of them which he carries in his own mind.

While it can therefore be said with grateful appreciation that Professor Scott has successfully set up what Ritschlian negations would knock down,—the Logos Christology, yet in trying to knock down what they set up—the Person of Christ and a spiritual kingdom in the world, he has seemed to consider their teaching as entirely destructive, and he has thus far proved too much. So that, instead of having settled their case, he has opened the way for a defense by its friends. And the final decision of all such questions will belong not to the friends who claim everything, or the opponents who will allow nothing, but to those who add to the broad

scholarship of Professor Scott even more of that judicial temper which alone can be safely followed in the field of history, and which more and more is to have a chief place in solving the intricate problems of theology.

THE BOOK OF DEUTERONOMY. (*The Expositor's Bible.*) By the Rev. ANDREW HARPER, B. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Ormond College, within the University, Melbourne. Pp. xii, 491. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. \$1.50.

This volume represents in favorable light the views of those critics who are endeavoring to keep hold of the substance of the Pentateuch, while maintaining that in its present written form it took shape several centuries after the events recorded. Professor Harper holds, indeed, that, "long before Moses, writing was a common accomplishment in Canaan" (p. 472); and that "the story of Moses, as the author of Deuteronomy knew it, rests upon authentic information handed down somehow, probably in written documents, from the earliest time. . . . We may rest upon it as reliable in all essentials" (p. 491). But he supposes that the Pentateuch grew, as the laws of Manu are supposed to have done, by adding to the teaching of the original lawgiver the "decisions of those acquainted with the law" and the customs of its followers (pp. 30, 243). The learned scribe who put the laws in their present form is compared to a conscientious Hindu gentleman who is known to have prepared a new Book of Manu, and is waiting to have it set up in authority when some powerful native king shall arise in India.

In perusing the excellent commentary it strikes us that the author believes much more strongly in the Mosaic character of the book than he thinks he does. The volume may be commended as a most useful aid in the study of Deuteronomy.

THE SONG OF SOLOMON AND THE LAMENTATIONS OF JEREMIAH. (*The Expositor's Bible.*) By WALTER F. ADENEY, M. A., Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Church History, New College, London. Pp. viii, 346. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. \$1.50.

In the portion of this volume which treats of Solomon's Songs the author ably defends its canonicity (p. 54) and unity (p. 4), and interprets the book as a drama, written in the Northern Kingdom, designing to enhance the appreciation of the simple family virtues which there contrasted so strongly with the corruption of Solomon's court. With much spirit and force the author rejects the various mystical theories of interpretation which enabled Origen to write a commentary of ten volumes upon it, and St. Bernard eighty-six homilies on the first two chapters. By way of contrast, our author's commentary, with all its subsidiary matter, fills only fifty-nine pages.

The portion of the volume devoted to Lamentations is much larger. Though not claiming to have been the utterances of Jeremiah, the author regards them as mainly, if not entirely, his, believing, at any rate, that

they must have been written by some one who witnessed the scenes of Jerusalem's destruction during the second half of the sixth century B. C. The commentary is a sympathetic and scholarly unfolding of the conditions to which the Lamentations pertain, and will be most helpful in their interpretation. The turn given to the closing verse of the book by Professor Adeney transforms it from a dirge to a shout of joy. Accepting the translation of the Revisers, which is placed in the margin, he reads,

"Turn thou us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned;
Renew our days as of old,
Unless thou hast utterly rejected us
And art very wroth against us."

But this the Lord has not done; for his redeeming power is mightier than human sin.

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. By the Rev. WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, and the Rev. ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, B.D., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. Pp. cxii, 450. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. \$3.00 net.

Among the innumerable commentaries on the book of Romans, this work deserves to be placed in the highest rank. The extended introduction treats with satisfactory fullness of the condition of Rome in the middle of the first century, of the Jews in Rome; of the origin of the Roman church; of the time and place and purpose of the Epistle; of its argument, language, and style; and of its text, literary history, integrity, and commentaries, and is well-nigh perfect, both in its conception and in its execution.

The body of the Commentary is almost equally satisfactory. The Greek terms are considered separately; while from time to time space is given to a topical discussion of the apostle's arguments and of the various controverted points of interpretation. Instead of a translation, a free paraphrase precedes each section, in which there is embodied the results of the authors' painstaking study of the text.

With remarkable success the volume combines both the inductive and the deductive method. The Epistle is shown by inductive methods to be largely an *argumentum ad hominem*, designed especially to meet the wants of a particular church with particular traditions and with special problems pressing upon it for solution.

This principle comes, therefore, to be deductively of great assistance in the solution of many difficult problems of interpretation; for it is true, as the authors maintain, that the apostles "never wrote or legislated except so far as existing needs demanded. They founded such institutions as were clearly required by some immediate want, or were part of our Lord's teaching. But they never administered or planned with a view to the remote future. Their writings were occasional, suggested by some

pressing difficulty; but they thus incidentally laid down great broad principles which became the guiding principles of the Church. The Church, therefore, is governed by case law, not by code law; by broad principles, not by minute regulations. It may seem a paradox, but yet it is profoundly true, that the Church is adapted to the needs of every age, just because the original preachers of Christianity never attempted to adapt it to the needs of any period but their own" (pp. 380-381).

The theological position of the authors may be described as that of moderate Calvinism, and the volume will be in the main satisfactory to all evangelical parties. In consonance with the general dictates of evangelical piety, the authors hold that Paul's doctrine of justification is forensic. "To justify" means, according to Paul, to pronounce righteous, and is equivalent to forgiveness (pp. 30, 36). The death of Christ is recognized as a propitiatory sacrifice, having respect to God's relation to sinful man (pp. 91, 93). In harmony with the interesting discussion by Dr. Simon (see above, pp. 1-21), it is maintained that whatever may be held respecting the origin of man through evolutionary processes, the Fall is as real and significant as ever it was thought to be.

"In some way or other as far back as history goes, and we may believe much further, there has been implanted in the human race this mysterious seed of sin, which like other characteristics of the race is capable of transmission. The tendency to sin is present in every man who is born into the world. But the tendency does not become actual sin until it takes effect in defiance of an express command, in deliberate disregard of a known distinction between right and wrong. How men came to be possessed of such a command, by what process they arrived at the conscious distinction of right and wrong, we can but vaguely speculate. Whatever it was we may be sure it could not have been presented to the imagination of primitive peoples otherwise than in such simple forms as the narrative assumes in the book of Genesis" (p. 146).

In the hotly contested questions concerning the interpretation of the seventh and eighth chapters the authors side with the Greek theologians and with the New School Calvinists in maintaining that the seventh relates to an unregenerate state; while the eighth describes the experience of one who is truly and fully regenerate. The authors, however, are somewhat embarrassed by their church views of baptismal regeneration, but extricate themselves by maintaining that "the word is used in a higher and a lower sense. In the lower sense it is applied to all baptized Christians. In that sense there can be little doubt that the experience described [in the seventh chapter] may fairly come within it. But on the other hand, the higher stages of the spiritual life seem to be really excluded. . . . The state described [in the eighth chapter] is that of the truly and fully regenerate" (p. 185).

Upon the doctrine of divine sovereignty the authors maintain the true medium position between extreme advocates of the Calvinistic and the

Arminian school. Remarking upon the passage "whom he willet he hardeneth," in ix. 18, it is maintained that "there is no necessity for softening (as some have attempted to do) the apparently harsh expression. . . . St. Paul says no more than he had said in i. 20-28, where he described the final wickedness of the world as in a sense the result of the divine action. In both passages he is isolating one side of the divine action; and in making theological deductions from his language these passages must be balanced by others which imply the divine love and human freedom" (p. 257).

"The two ideas of Free-will and the Divine sovereignty cannot be reconciled in our own mind, but that does not prevent them from being reconcilable in God's mind. We are really measuring him by our own intellectual standard if we think otherwise. And so our solution of the problem of Free-will, and of the problems of history and of individual salvation, must finally lie in the full acceptance and realization of what is implied by the infinity and the omniscience of God" (p. 350).

The points in which we should differ from the authors are few. It seems to us, however, that in v. 12 they are too confident in limiting the word "death" to that of the body. They are also too ready to impute rabbinical error to the apostle Paul on page 304; while in their treatment of the Parousia (pp. 379, 380) they reject with too little consideration the typical interpretations of the phrases used in describing the judgment-day, and thereby impute an ignorance to Paul with which he is not properly chargeable. Second Thessalonians seems to teach that Paul was well aware that his First Epistle had been misinterpreted, as it often is now.

But these are slight matters of criticism upon a volume which should find its place upon the shelves of all diligent students of the New Testament.

L'APOTRE PAUL. Esquisse d'une Historie de sa Pensée. Par A. SABATIER, Doyen de la Faculté de Théologie protestante de Paris. Troisième Édition revue et augmentée; avec une Carte des Missions de Paul. Pp. xxx, 424. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1896.

The first edition of this work was published about twenty-five years ago, and the second in 1881. In the third edition some noticeable changes appear. The author has added the map and a note on the figure of anti-Christ in Second Thessalonians. He has made further researches resulting in a modification of his former views as to the apostle's relation to the turbulent church at Corinth. He now holds the theory of an intermediate lost letter. He further adds an appendix in which he discusses at length Paul's theory of the origin of sin.

The author gives as his aim the discovery of the man in the apostle, the study of his personal life rather than a reproduction of the portrait which ecclesiastical tradition has drawn of him. This praiseworthy aim is of course more hopeful in the case of Paul than of any other apostle, for his

numerous writings are alive with revelations of his mental processes and spiritual experiences. "Nous n'avons pas voulu écrire une biographie générale de Paul, mais la biographie de son esprit et l'histoire de sa pensée."

First Sabatier examines the influence upon his thought, of pharisaism, of the Christian Church, and especially of his own conversion. The vision of the Christ which dawned gradually upon the other apostles, broke suddenly upon him and drove him from one extreme to the other of theological position. The life of Christ in him became the center of his whole creed.

After analyzing the three groups of Epistles, he devotes a final book to a statement of Paul's theological system. Based as it is on his own experience, and that an exceptionally profound one, the usual subdivisions of systematic theology are ill adapted to describe it. They would rob it of its peculiar vigor and vitality. We give his synopsis of the Pauline Theology. The Person of Christ, characterizing, determining, constituting the Christian consciousness. Anthropology: 1. Impossibility of securing justification by the law; 2. Justification by faith. Religious philosophy of history: 1. Christ and the Church; 2. The old and the new covenant; 3. Adam and Christ, or the two ages of humanity; 4. Eschatology; 5. Faith, hope, love. Theology: 1. Grace and predestination; 2. Christology; 3. The Father, Saviour, the Holy Spirit; 4. The notion of God.

ÉTUDES SUR DANIEL ET L'APOCALYPSE. Par C. BRUSTON, Doyen de la Faculté de Théologie de Montauban. Pp. 39. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1896.

There are two studies. The first is upon the four empires of Daniel and the second is upon the Roman Empire in the Apocalypse. The two are connected only in the title and in a preliminary page of comparisons and contrasts. The second is a modification of a work published in 1884, and the first wears the same title, at least, as an article by Bruston published in the current volume of the *Revue de Theol. et des Quest. rel.*

The author supports the view that the beast with the ten horns represents the empire of Alexander and his successors down to the time of Antiochus Epiphanes. The bestowal of a human heart upon the lion he regards as referring to the kindness shown to Jehoiachin by Evil-merodach.

ESSAI D'UNE INTRODUCTION A LA DOGMATIQUE PROTESTANTE. Par P. LOBSTEIN, professeur à la Faculté de Théologie de Strasbourg. Pp. 250. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1896.

Lobstein proposes to exclude from Introduction much material commonly introduced. He retains nothing which really belongs to Dogmatics itself. Such subjects as Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Apologetics, the Church, he finds it impossible to discuss without entering the province of Dogmatics, for they involve knowledge of truths and relationships not yet investigated. First he discusses the meaning of the word

"dogma." He finds the correct meaning to be a formula of religious faith which has acquired the force of law in the Church and which shares the authority of that Church. This, however, does not correspond with the use of the term in the Protestant Church. It is antagonized by the Protestant idea of faith, of the Church, and of authority in religion. He accordingly uses the term as a scientific statement of Christian faith, adapted to the needs of the present time; and this definition fixes the task of Dogmatics.

The source of Protestant Dogmatics is the evangelical faith. Discussing its norm, he rejects, of course, the legal authority of confessions of faith, and also claims that the Bible as norm must be rejected by all except those who hold to its plenary inspiration. The exception gives a hint of the extent to which he would discard the Bible: he will have no bibliolatry. The gospel is the norm of dogma, i.e., the word of God revealed and realized by Jesus Christ.

The proper method is the historical, for only in that way can the consciousness of Christ be discovered. Biblical Theology and History of Doctrine are essential auxiliaries of the discipline. His method will not permit the use of isolated proof-texts, and carefully distinguishes between facts and truths, between eternal truth and its changing expression.

The correct theology is Christocentric, for it is Christ's person and redeeming work that forms the basis of Christian experience. There should follow the subject of Theology proper, the dogmas of Creation, and of Providence, Anthropology, the subjective realization of salvation and its individual and collective appropriation, Eschatology, and the dogma of the Trinity as the crown of Protestant dogmatics. A final section is devoted to an examination of the objections to the Christocentric point of view.

A HISTORY OF THE COUNCILS OF THE CHURCH from the Original Documents. By the Right Rev. CHARLES JOSEPH HEFELE, D.D., late Bishop of Rottenburg, formerly Professor of Theology in the University of Tübingen. In Five Volumes. Vol. V. A. D. 626 TO THE CLOSE OF THE SECOND COUNCIL OF NICÆA, A. D. 787. Translated from the German, with the Author's Approbation, and Edited by WILLIAM R. CLARK, M. A., Hon. LL. D., D. C. L., F. R. S. C., Professor of Philosophy in Trinity College, Toronto; Hon. Professor in Hobart College, Geneva, N. Y. Pp. xvi, 472. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$4.50.

This final volume of Bishop Hefele's great work will be received by all classes of scholars with much satisfaction. The work itself is monumental, and the translator and publisher have placed it before the English-reading public in most satisfactory and attractive form.

The period covered by this volume includes the great monothelite controversies; the sixth ecumenical synod; the controversy about images, and the seventh ecumenical synod at Nicæa.

The Appendix contains fifty pages of corrections and additions to the first volume, among which those relating to the Quartodeciman contro-

versy occupy sixteen pages, and are equivalent to a new discussion of the subject. An Alphabetical List of Synods and an Index fitly close this translation of one of the most valuable monographs on church history which have ever been written.

THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS. (Ten Epochs of Church History.) By WILLIAM P. DU BOSE, S. T. D., author of "Soteriology," etc. Pp. xii, 350. New York: Christian Literature Co. 1896. \$1.50.

Students who have not time for more thorough study of early church history will find this volume sufficient to give them a satisfactory working knowledge of the period; while the more special investigators cannot fail to find it useful in helping them to a reasonable interpretation of the controversies that come under discussion. Among the topics treated are "The Christology of the New Testament"; "Ebionism and Docetism"; "Sabellianism and the Beginning of the Trinitarian Discussion"; "The Origin and Rise of Arianism"; "The Council of Nicæa"; "Arianism after the Council of Nicæa"; "The First General Council of Constantinople"; "Apollinarianism"; "Nestorianism"; "The Council of Ephesus"; "Eutychianism and the Council of Chalcedon"; "The Monophysites and the Second Council of Constantinople"; "The Monothelites and the Third Council of Constantinople"; "Adoptionism"; "The Christological Goal."

A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES. By THOMAS O'GORMAN, Professor of Church History in the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C. Pp. 515. New York: The Christian Literature Co. 1895. \$2.50.

This ninth volume of the American Church History Series is the tenth to appear from the press, and lacks but two volumes of completing the set. The present volume is no plea for the Church of Rome, but a sympathetic setting forth of the main facts in the history of that body in America. The history is divided into two periods: the mission period, 1513-1789, and the period of the organized church, 1790 to date. The author estimates the number of Catholics now in America at twelve millions, and indicates that about twelve per cent of Catholic baptisms are converts. We have little doubt that both these figures are too high. The volume will be read with interest by students of our history, and also by those interested in the moral forces at present working in our American life.

OUR LORD'S TEACHING. By the Rev. JAMES ROBERTSON, D. D. Pp. x, 139. London: A. & C. Black; Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark. 1895.

This book is one of a series of "Guild Text-Books" for young men and women of the Church of Scotland, published under the editorship of Professor Charteris and Rev. J. A. McClymont, D. D. Among the series are volumes upon "The Old Testament and its Contents," "The New Testament and its Writers," "Landmarks of Church History," etc.

The subject of the Teaching of Jesus was committed by the editors to Rev. James Robertson, D. D., of Whittingehame, and the little volume which he has issued abundantly justifies their wisdom in doing so. Dr. Robertson's standpoint is that of a wisely conservative pastor who has familiarized himself with the principles of treatment which prevail in modern biblical theology. He recognizes in his preface the necessity of temporarily isolating the teaching of Jesus from that of Paul, which has received so much more attention in the history of the church. After two preliminary chapters upon the manner and method of Jesus' teaching, the "great subject of his teaching, the kingdom of God" is introduced, and this is followed by a chapter upon the "basis of his teaching, God the Father." These two chapters are especially impressive. There then follow chapters upon Jesus' teaching regarding himself, man, righteousness, condition of entrance into the kingdom, blessings of the kingdom, his death, the Holy Spirit, the church and the family, the end of the world.

The little volume is characterized by rare simplicity and lucidity of statement. It is readable enough to be popular and is at the same time based on scholarly investigation. This is evident in the author's definition of the kingdom of God. "We may say then that it is (a) the name Jesus used for a good time coming among men—a golden age—which he came in the flesh to begin, comes in the Spirit to advance, and will come again in glory to perfect. Or (b) it is a sphere of life higher than our natural sphere into which men can be born anew (John iii. 3) and in which the Spirit works, imparting the life which is eternal. Or (c) it is a new society or commonwealth, which Jesus came to form, of men redeemed from sin, and in fellowship with God as His sons, in which He is to them, and they are to Him and to one another, all that they are capable of being" (p. 20).

The edition is already well on toward its tenth thousand, and is on sale in this country. It is reported that a more expensive edition of the whole series is to be issued soon. Dr. Robertson's volume ought to find large circulation, not only among the young people of our churches, but also among older Bible students.

E. I. B.

THE WHENCE AND THE WHITHER OF MAN: A Brief History of his Origin and Development through Conformity to Environment. Being the Morse Lectures of 1895. By JOHN M. TYLER, Professor of Biology, Amherst College. Pp. xvi, 312. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$1.75.

Prepared upon the foundation of a special lectureship by one who is at once a devout Christian and an accomplished biologist, this volume will be of special value in steadying the minds of all such as are in danger of having their faith in man's higher nature shaken by his apparent relationship to the lower orders of being; for the author correctly and forcibly maintains that the theory of evolution makes as great a demand upon

the creative power as does the opposite theory; for, while in the one case its exercise is "distributed over a series of acts," in the other it is "concentrated in one final creation" (p. 3). Professor Tyler well illustrates the needlessness of our alarm at being classified physiologically with the lower orders of creation by exclaiming "what a comedy that man should work so hard to prove that his chief glory is his opposable thumb, or a few ounces of brain matter. Man's glory is his mind and will, his reason and moral powers, his vision of and communion with, God" (p. 99).

In the chapter upon "The Teachings of the Bible" the author enforces, with an eloquence that would not be expected from a biological professor, the great truths that the Bible and science are in marvelous agreement in their representation of nature, man, and God. In the closing chapter, upon "Present Aspects of Evolution," the author brings within the apprehension of all the differences which separate the neo-Darwinians, of whom Wallace and Weismann are the representatives, and the neo-Lamarckians, represented by Osborne and Cope, and holds to the mediating view so ably defended by Romanes. In the author's table of the Attainments and Dominant Functions of the Animal Creation it is instructive to notice that personality, mind, reason, the love of man, truth, and right and unselfishness are set down as exclusively human.

FAMOUS GIVERS AND THEIR GIFTS. By SARAH KNOWLES BOLTON. Pp. 382. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. \$1.50.

Mrs. Bolton is a popular and prolific writer. The present volume is the thirteenth of a series on famous personages. It is dedicated to the memory of the late William Frederick Poole, LL.D., the famous librarian and author of Poole's "Index."

The dedication is most fitting; for, if there has lived in this generation a giver who deserved recognition,—not because of money gifts, but because of the dedication of his life to a high and useful end,—that man was Dr. Poole. The men of wealth, of whom Mrs. Bolton has so beautifully and so charitably written, gave of their abundance, but Dr. Poole gave all that he had, his life, to the work of libraries, and to the preparation of such aids and improvements in practical library work, including his "Index," that every student and scholar is under perpetual obligations to him.

Nor was this done in a perfunctory way, simply as a means of livelihood, and much less with any desire to acquire money or fame; but it was done with unostentatious and modest enthusiasm in a life-work for which he was endowed most richly, both by natural and acquired gifts; and with a faith in the permanent and beneficent results as beautiful as it was genuine and earnest. This simple tribute by Mrs. Bolton to the memory of Dr. Poole is most fitting as the dedication to a volume whose title-page bears the motto, "For no man liveth to himself."

The book is written in Mrs. Bolton's easy and charming style, and yet

quite factual and statistical; and it bears tribute to such well-known philanthropists as John Lowell, Jr., the founder of the Lowell Institute of Free Lectures in Boston; Stephen Girard, Andrew Carnegie, Charles Pratt, James Lick, Leland Stanford, Walter Newberry, Philip D. Armour, Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, and others.

The perspective on these men, which Mrs. Bolton has chosen, is the grateful and kind view, and a high appreciation of those things which they have done, and not an enumeration of those things which they ought to have left undone. She is not of that noisy class who permit popular prejudice, awakened by envy and ill-will, to warp their judgment and bias their minds, till they think and speak unkind and hateful words. She has not rushed into print with street gossip, true or untrue, that is dignified with attention because its subject is preëminently successful and conspicuous.

Mrs. Bolton well knows that all men have their faults, and that the more marked oftentimes the ability and the virtue, the more conspicuous is the blemish. She also well knows that some of them builded better than they knew, and their peculiar gifts for acquisition have been used by a wise and overruling Providence for the benefit of society.

Mrs. Bolton has written in a room full of sunshine and good-will, and in a spirit of high appreciation of those who have done so much to advance the world's best interests by acts of genuine philanthropy. Viewed in this light, she has done her work well, and deserves for her task the highest praise.

Z. S. H.

A HISTORY OF EGYPT DURING THE XVIIITH AND XVIIIITH DYNASTIES.
By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, D. C. L., LL. D., Edwards Professor of Egyptology in University College, London; Member of the Imperial German Archæological Institute; Member of the Society of Northern Antiquaries. Pp. xvi, 353. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$2.25.

The second volume of this invaluable series covers what is, on the whole, the most interesting part of Egyptian history, and contains everything which can be expected in a book of this size. The illustrations number one hundred and sixty-four, and are all of the highest order both in selection and in execution. Dr. Petrie has the remarkable power of bringing his unrivaled stores of detailed knowledge within reach of the ordinary student. With this series at so easy command, there will hereafter be no excuse for the general ignorance which has prevailed concerning the history of Egypt and the monuments which have preserved it.

Among matters of special interest contained in this volume are the expulsion of the Hyksos, which he places between 1610 and 1587 B. C., and the decline of Egypt's influence in Syria so well marked in the Tell-el-Amarna tablets. Seventy pages of the volume are devoted to a description and summary of these, amounting to one hundred and forty-nine in number. This will be to most readers extremely interesting and valuable,—the next thing indeed to having the translations themselves.

SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. By LESLIE STEPHEN. Two volumes. Pp. 255 and 267. New York : Macmillan & Co. \$3.00.

The name of Macmillan is a guarantee that a book is well made. These volumes are in evidence, for they are well printed on good paper and substantially bound.

Mr. Stephen is an ethical writer, and these essays are chiefly a republication of addresses delivered to the ethical societies of London. They are literary in style, elevating in spirit and purpose, and wholesome in their social teaching. Social questions are preëminently the subjects for discussion, as the title would indicate, although in the first essay the *modus operandi* of the Salvation Army seems to disturb the author not a little, and in the last essay the doctrine of the Incarnation comes under the condemnation of his caustic pen. We take it that Mr. Stephen is not likely to be influenced much by tambourines and poke-bonnets, and it may be that General Booth did not have men of his stamp in mind when he established the army and its peculiar methods. It is generally conceded that the work of the Army has been sufficiently useful to justify its peculiarities, and we know of no other test to apply to it.

So far as the "butcher" theory of the Atonement comes under the ban of Mr. Stephen's displeasure, his entire two volumes are a testimony to the beneficent principle of sacrifice, which is all that any theory of the Atonement means or exalts. It is a pleasure to read Mr. Stephen, for he stimulates thought, and exalts the best in human nature, while the sidelights which he throws upon his subjects lend a new charm to them, and compel admiration.

Z. S. H.

CLASSES AND MASSES. By W. H. MALLOCK. Pp. 139. New York : Macmillan & Co. \$1.25.

By means of illustrations and statistics the well-known author of "Is Life worth Living" brings before the reader in this little volume in a plain and picturesque way some practical truths about the relations of the classes. He essays to disprove the generalization that the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer, by showing how wealth is distributing itself. The doctrine of a "living wage" is shown within certain limits to be true, and Mr. Mallock sets the bounds to humane living. He is most conservative and, by his arguments, lends color to the old saying, "Whatever is, is right." Conservatism of a progressive type is the true spirit of progress and reform, but no one should view with equanimity, nor with patience, the struggle for existence that is necessary with the great mass of bread-winners. With difficulty body and soul are kept together. England is not cursed, like these United States, with monopolies and trusts, yet those born into lowly conditions have a poor show for existence. If society cannot care for its submerged one-tenth, then the submerged one-tenth will care for society. Self-preservation is not the noblest motive of action, but it is better than none.

Z. S. H.

CHAPTERS FROM A LIFE. By ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS. Illustrated. Pp. 278. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1896. \$1.50.

One of the most charming and at the same time one of the most instructive books of the season is furnished by Mrs. Ward's little volume. To the most of our readers it will have special interest in the insight it gives of the life at Andover forty years ago. But not only does it introduce him to the Andover professors of that period, and to the scenes dear to the large number of clergymen who were educated there, but to the most interesting of the larger circle of the author's later friends, among whom are Longfellow, Whittier, Holmes, Phillips Brooks, Mrs. Stowe, Lucy Larcom, and Lydia Maria Child. The book is illustrated from photographs of the most of these as well as of Andover scenes.

THE DIVINE LIFE IN MAN, and Other Sermons. By Rev. FREDERICK A. NOBLE, D. D., Pastor of the Union Park Congregational Church, Chicago. Pp. 311. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1896.

In the crowning days of his ministry, Dr. Noble is furnishing the wider Christian public, through the printed volume, the best fruits of his clear thought and lofty conceptions of Christianity and its adaptations to the wants of men. The sermons are models both in homiletic form and in the method of elaborating the minor divisions. The themes are all timely and well chosen. The volume must take its place beside those of William M. Taylor and Phillips Brooks as among the most valuable contributions to homiletical literature which the closing half of this century has produced.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES. By PATON J. GLOAG, D.D. Pp. xvi, 416. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. \$4.00.

We have been too late in speaking of the high merits of this elaborate work upon a portion of the New Testament which has of late received relatively too little attention. Dr. Gloag combines the qualities of a careful and thorough student with those of one who has a deep religious experience and its consequent reverence for the Bible, together with rare ability in putting his views in literary form. The book is to be highly commended and will be most useful in every pastor's library.

EVOLUTION OR CREATION? A Critical Review of the Scientific and Scriptural Theories of Creation and Certain Related Subjects. By Professor LUTHER TRACY TOWNSEND, D. D., author of "Credo," "Fate of Republics," etc. Pp. 318. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25.

A forcible but rather extravagant and careless attack upon scientific theories supposed to be antagonistic to Christianity. For the most part the author is demolishing a man of straw. On page 196 a very glaring mistake occurs which should not be passed unnoticed. The author says, that the United States geologists "refer the Eocene of the Colorado basin

to the last century and the Pliocene of Utah to the last ten years." What Mr. Gilbert said was, that if we call the date of the Bonneville flood the geologic yesterday, then the Pliocene of Utah would belong to the last decade and the Eocene in the Colorado basin to the last century. That is simply the scale on which he is making his calculations. (See Wright's *Man and the Glacial Period*, p. 351.)

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE OF JESUS: An Investigation of the Historical Sources. By ALFRED WILLIAMS ANTHONY, Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Criticism, Cobb Divinity School. Pp. 206. New York, Boston, Chicago: Silver, Burdett & Co.

A very useful compend of those portions of Christian evidences which have been made prominent in connection with modern critical attacks upon the New Testament.

THE SEARCHLIGHT OF ST. HIPPOLYTUS. The Papacy and the New Testament in the Light of Discovery. By PARKE P. FLOURNOY. With an Introduction by Professor WALTER W. MOORE, D.D., LL.D., of Union Theological Seminary, Virginia. Pp. 250. New York, Chicago, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.00.

A scholarly, brilliant, and very readable presentation of the external evidence recently discovered in confirmation of the genuineness of the New Testament.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY, Philadelphia.

CONFLICT AND CONQUEST. By Rev. GEO. C. NEEDHAM. Pp. 123. 50 cents;—**DOLLY FRENCH'S HOUSEHOLD.** By JENNIE M. DRINKWATER. Pp. 308. \$1.25;—**SAXENHURST.** A Story of the Old World and New. By DANIEL C. EDDY, D. D. Pp. 440;—**SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE.** By Rev. GEO. C. NEEDHAM. Pp. 199. 75 cents;—**THE HATHAWAYS' SISTER.** By ANNE KENDRICK BENEDICT, author of "My Wonder Story," "Centa—the Child Violinist," etc. Pp. 204;—**THE QUIET KING.** A Story of the Christ. By CAROLINE ATWATER MASON. Pp. 304. \$1.50.

CONGREGATIONAL SUNDAY-SCHOOL AND PUBLISHING SOCIETY, Boston.

THE TEARLESS LAND. A Collection of Poems on Heaven. Compiled by M. C. HAZARD, Ph. D. Pp. 303. \$1.50.

EATON & MAINS, New York City.

BETTER THINGS FOR SONS OF GOD. By GEO. T. LEMMON. Pp. 184;—**ILLUSTRATIVE NOTES.** A Guide to the Study of the International Sunday-school Lessons for 1897. By JESSE LYMAN HURLBUT and ROBERT REMINGTON DOHERTY. Pp. 376;—**IN HIS FOOTSTEPS.** A Record of Travel to and in the Land of Christ, with an Attempt to mark the Lord's Journeyings in Chronological Order from his Birth to his Ascension. By WM. E. MCLENNAN. Pp. 111;—**NATURE AND CHRIST.** A Revelation

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THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

1887
ARTICLE I.

THE PARADOXES OF SCIENCE.¹

BY PROFESSOR G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

THERE is a somewhat general impression abroad in the world, that whatever is scientific is clear and free from doubt and difficulty. But such an opinion is as far as possible from the truth. The mysteries of existence, though seeming to be progressively solved by science, are never more than partially solved. Indeed, in the strict sense of the word, they are never solved at all. The attempted explanations of science, instead of being real solutions of mystery, are merely substitutions of one mystery for another, or, what is more frequently the case, of several mysteries in place of one.

I. THE THEORY OF GRAVITATION.

The Newtonian theory of gravitation is far from being so simple as it seems, and this its author clearly saw and was free to acknowledge. Newton's law was merely a mathematical statement of facts established partly by observation, but more largely by inference, since observation is never absolutely exact, and is always limited in its

¹The second lecture in Professor Wright's Lowell Institute course on "The Scientific Aspects of Christian Evidences," delivered in Boston, November 26, 1896.

range. The statement, therefore, that all material objects are attracted toward each other by a force which is directly as the product of the combined masses, and inversely as the square of the distance, is itself a theory incapable of absolute verification; while the acceptance of the theory impales us on one or other horn of a dilemma from which it is not easy to be extricated. We must either believe that bodies act upon each other from a distance through a vacuum, or that matter is continuous in space, so that there is no such thing as a vacuum. In his third letter to Bentley, Newton declared that it was to him "inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter, without mutual contact." And again, "that one body may act upon another at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else by and through which their action may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man, who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of my readers."

So keenly were the difficulties of this paradox felt, that many of Newton's eminent contemporaries, especially upon the Continent, refused to accept the theory of gravitation, thus delaying its final triumph for a century. Huygens declared the theory to be absurd; John Bernoulli, that it was "revolting to minds accustomed to receiving no principle in physics save those which are incontestable and evident"; while Leibnitz called gravitation "an incorporeal, an inexplicable power." To the contemporaries of Newton, and indeed as we have seen to Newton himself, that one material body should act upon another at a distance seemed not only inconceivable but absurd.

The philosophical statements of this difficulty are easily understood and incapable of refutation. A material body can no more act *where* it is not than when it is not. According to the Newtonian hypothesis, matter in itself is inert and motionless. Its sole office is to receive and transmit or transform such motion as is imparted to it from the outside. The impartation of motion to a mass of matter is always from behind: it is by a push, and not by a pull. With reason did Newton's contemporaries assert that his law of gravitation seemed to compel the readmission of occult forces to the realm of science; while it had been the great mission of scientific men up to that time to banish such conceptions from the universe.

Nor have the difficulties of Newton's theory disappeared since his day. The acceptance of the theory as a fact has taken place in spite of the paradoxes which it involves, and mathematicians and physicists are as much puzzled as ever to find any ultimate explanation of the law. Gravitation is unlike all other forces of which we are cognizant, and cannot therefore be brought into harmony with them.

First, gravitation acts instantaneously, while all other known forces occupy appreciable time in passing from one portion of space to another. The swiftest rate of transmission of force with which we are familiar is that of light, which speeds at the rate of 187,000 miles per second, and crosses the space separating the sun from the earth in eight and one-quarter minutes. But the astronomers have shown, that, if the force of gravitation be not transmitted instantaneously, it must certainly be at a rate which is fifty million times greater than that of light—that is, it cannot be more than $\frac{1}{50,000,000}$ of a second in passing from the earth to the sun.¹ If its rate were less than this, it would have been detected by the careful observations which astronomers have already made. From the nearest fixed star the

¹ Smithsonian Report, 1876, p. 212.

light reaches us, traveling at the rate of 187,000 miles a second, in three years; but the force of gravity, if it requires any time at all to cross that space, cannot take more than two seconds. Astronomical calculations are based upon the assumption that the action of gravitation is instantaneous across all distances of space.

Again, gravity is absolutely indifferent to all intervening objects, and is inexhaustible. A grain of sand exerts its gravitating influence upon another grain upon the opposite side of the globe. The intervention of the earth neither augments nor abates the action of the mysterious power. It would act with equal power upon any number of grains situated at equal distances. Indeed the attractive power of every particle of matter would seem to be unlimited in capacity. The force exerted by the sun to hold the planets in their orbits does not to any degree exhaust the sun's power. The planets might be multiplied indefinitely, and the sun would continue to attract each addition to the family with a power which is directly as the product of the two masses, and inversely as the square of their distance apart.

This apparently unlimited capacity of the attractive force of gravitation perplexed and confounded Faraday to such an extent that he thought it to be in flat contradiction to the important and well-established modern doctrine of the conservation of energy. To Faraday, indeed, it seemed that a gravitating body possessed the mysterious power both of annihilating and of creating force. If, for example, a ball be projected to a height of ten miles from the center of gravity of another body, the attraction at the point at which the projectile force was overcome by the force of gravitation is only $\frac{1}{100}$ as great as it was at the distance of one mile, while, in returning again, the force of the gravitation in the mass increases a hundredfold.

To Faraday this seemed like an alternate annihilation

and creation of force. When the bodies are removed from each other by ten units of distance, their mutual force exerted upon each other is only $\frac{1}{100}$ of what it was at the distance of one diameter. But it possesses now, what the physicists call, an energy of position one hundred times greater than before. When the bodies are permitted to fall through this space and collide, this potential energy manifests itself, first, in augmenting the velocity of the fall, and, finally, in the transformation of its energy of position into an energy of heat, which dissipates in space, and is lost, never to return again. The mass becomes cold when the heat is all radiated, but it does not lose any of its attractive power. Unlike heat, the power of attraction is indestructible by radiation. It continues its activity forever in its new position, reaching out its mysterious arms of influence instantaneously, and through all time, to the remotest realms of space.

Ever since the days of Newton, unceasing efforts have been made to explain gravitation by some theory of the impact of material elements upon each other, and by that means to avoid the absurdity of supposing action at a distance, or the action of a body where it is not. Newton himself at times cherished the theory that, as gravitation is merely constant stress, it was produced by the steady pressure of ethereal matter filling all space, but being much rarer in the dense bodies of the stars and planets than it is in the empty celestial spaces, growing denser and denser perpetually, in passing from them to greater distances, "thereby causing the gravity of those great bodies toward one another, and of their parts toward bodies; every body endeavoring to go from the denser part of the medium toward the rarer."¹ But as this involves an increase of density up to the point of infinity in the outer circles, it could scarcely be entertained; while, as it would also tend

¹ Optics, Bk. iii., appendix. Query 21.

to retard the planetary movements, he concludes that, as "there is no evidence for its existence, therefore it ought to be rejected. And if it be rejected, the hypothesis that light consists in pression, or motion, propagated through such a medium, are rejected with it."¹

So great are the difficulties of this theory, that Newton at last came back to accept the position which, twenty-four years before, he had declared to be so absurd that no competent thinker could ever fall into it; and despairingly asks, "Have not the small particles of bodies certain powers, virtues, or forces, by which *they act at a distance?* . . . What I call attraction *may* be performed by impulse, or by some other means unknown to me. I use that word here to signify only in general any force by which bodies tend toward one another, whatsoever be the cause."²

In 1692, in Newton's third letter to Bentley, he had expressed himself similarly to this effect, averring that "gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of my readers." Again, in the "Principia," at the conclusion of the third book, he writes: "Hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypothesis; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis. . . . To us it is enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained."

The recognition of this paradox by John Stuart Mill, and his confident acceptance of the facts which involve it, is even more remarkable than in the case of Sir Isaac Newton. Where the great discoverer halted and wavered, the logician marches boldly forward and cheerfully impales himself on one horn of the destructive dilemma. "No one now feels," says Mill, "any difficulty in conceiv-

¹ Optics, Bk. iii., appendix. Query 28. ² *Ibid.*, Query 31.

ing gravity to be, as much as any other property is, 'innate, inherent, and essential to matter,' nor finds the comprehension of it facilitated in the smallest degree by the supposition of an ether; nor thinks it at all incredible that the celestial bodies can and do act, where they, in actual bodily presence, are not. To us it is not more wonderful that bodies should act upon one another 'without mutual contact,' than that they should do so when in contact; we are familiar with both these facts, and we find them equally inexplicable and equally easy to believe."¹

But, notwithstanding the ease with which Mill disposes of the paradox, it still remains true that the greatest leaders in modern science are perplexed by it as much as Newton was, and efforts to explain gravitation by some theory of impact or of pressure, and thus to avoid the apparent absurdity of an attraction which is felt at a distance and through a vacuum, are as prevalent at the close of the nineteenth century as they were in the latter part of the seventeenth. Professor Tait² still maintains that the theory of Lesage is "the only even apparently hopeful attempt which has yet been made to explain the mechanism of gravitation." Lesage's theory was that all space is frequented by innumerable minute particles of matter moving with great velocity in every possible direction, and that the onward motion of a portion of these particles is intercepted by the masses of matter with which they come in contact. But where the course is free in both directions, the effect of these impacts is neutralized by the impact of those from an opposite direction. When, however, two bodies are in line, each would protect the other from a certain number of impacts upon the sides which are facing each other, and so give rise to a mutual attraction; in other words, two bodies produce between them a shadow of pro-

¹ Logic, Harper's ed., N. Y., 1867, pp. 461, 462.

² Lectures before the British Association, 1876, at Glasgow.

tection from the impinging molecules as they do from rays of light.

But, ingenious as this theory is, it involves more than one apparent absurdity as great as that which Newton perceived in action at a distance. The most patent of these is that urged by Clerk Maxwell, who shows that the impact of molecules which would suffice to produce gravitation would generate such an amount of heat that they would in a few seconds raise not only the body, but the whole material universe, to the melting-point.¹

The other direction in which physicists have been looking for a rational conception of the force of gravitation is to the possible effects of waves of transmission through an all-prevalent ether, such as is hypothecated to account for the phenomena of light. The most carefully wrought out theory of this class is that of Professor James Challis,² an eminent mathematician of Cambridge, Eng., who assumes that the universe is pervaded by an ether which is defined to be "a uniform, elastic fluid medium pervading all space not occupied by atoms, and varying in pressure proportionally to the variations of its density. The theory recognizes no other kinds of force than these two, the one an active force resident in the ether, and the other a passive reaction of the atoms."³

This ether is supposed to be all-tremulous with vibratory waves of different lengths, each order of length giving rise to various exhibitions of force,—waves of a certain length producing heat; those of another length, light; those of

¹ Encyc. Brit., art. "atoms."

² Smithsonian Rep., 1876, pp. 247-254; *Principles of Mathematics and Physics* (Cambridge, 1869, pp. 750). A theory somewhat resembling this has been carefully wrought out by Mr. J. H. Kedzie in his interesting volume on *Solar Heat, Gravitation, and Sun Spots* (Chicago, 1886, pp. 304).

³ Smithsonian Report, 1876, p. 247.

other lengths molecular attraction; and of still another length, gravity.

But, as heat manifests itself as a repulsive force, separating the particles from each other, while gravity is an attractive force, drawing the particles together, we have ethereal vibrations producing exactly opposite results; that is, while some of the vibrations are forcing the particles of matter toward each other, other vibrations are separating them from each other. Professor Challis undertakes to solve the difficulty by supposing that waves of different magnitude may produce opposite results,—those of large length producing attraction, and those of extremely small length producing repulsion.

Some of the most interesting paradoxes involved in this supposition will appear later, in connection with remarks upon the atomic theory of matter. But here it is sufficient to say, that the ceaseless vibrations of the all-pervading ether involve an omnipresent activity which is absolutely without any scientific explanation, and is flatly in contradiction to the modern doctrine of the conservation of energy. Professor Challis's carefully elaborated theory makes the atoms themselves the cause of those indefinitely minute vibrations involving repulsion; while the vibrations of greater wave length, producing gravitation, must come from the outside, and be produced from some independent and inexhaustible source of energy. In short, this theory, like all others, in its attempt to account for gravitation, ends in a paradox. It is, scientifically speaking, absurd. But the facts, nevertheless, remain to warn us against making the limit of our conceptions the measure of the truth.

II. THE ATOMIC CONSTITUTION OF MATTER.

In close connection with these difficulties concerning the Newtonian theory of gravitation are those of the modern

scientific conception of the constitution of matter. By numerous well-established scientific methods of proof, matter, according to the new chemistry, consists of sixty or seventy kinds of minute atoms which are collected into molecules and masses, or volumes, and held together by the mysterious force of molecular attraction, and kept apart to various degrees of distance by certain repulsive forces connected with the vibrations of an all-pervading ether. Under this view, a molecule, like a solar system, is simply a body of atoms in motion, like a swarm of gnats in the air; while the larger masses of matter represent more comprehensive systems of motion compounded with centripetal and centrifugal forces of mysterious origin.

According to the well-established results of modern science, the difference between the three forms of any particular kind of matter, namely, the solid, the fluid, and the gaseous, is produced by the presence of heat, which is a mode of wave motion in the all-pervading ether. As a result of an increased intensity of heat, the molecules of matter are separated from each other and thrown into larger orbits of revolution. We are familiar with this fact in the innumerable instances in which heat is transformed into motion, as in the cylinder of the steam-engine, and in the contrary process, where visible heat is produced by the arrest of motion. A few smart blows from the blacksmith's hammer, for example, will raise a slim bar of Swedish iron to a red heat. Water, however, furnishes us the most familiar illustration of the three forms of matter in their relations to heat. By the addition of a certain amount of heat, water is changed to a gas, in which condition the particles become so separated that they are invisible, and any amount of tension can be produced by confining them in an inclosed space, and subjecting the volume to increased degrees of heat. The theory of the steam-engine is that the heat applied to the boiler produces tension by increas-

ing the vibratory motion of the ether in which the gaseous atoms are floating, thus imparting increased velocity to the ultimate particles of water confined in the piston. It is the impact of these infinitesimal atoms against the head of the cylinder, which pushes it along. It is the law of all gases that the volume is increased proportionally with the increase of temperature; but, as already said, this increased volume is merely increased activity of motion on the part of the ultimate atoms. With twice the temperature the motion of the inclosed atoms is twice as rapid. In other words, the application of twice the amount of heat to a gas doubles the orbit of atomic revolution in each instant of time.

But in connection with this theory several paradoxes arise. Newton supposed that the ultimate particles of matter were impenetrable and inelastic, that is, that they were absolutely hard. To use his own words, "These primitive particles, being solids, are incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them; even so very hard as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation."¹ But this supposition of the impenetrability and consequent inelasticity of the ultimate atoms involves a paradox. On this supposition the collision of atoms which is constantly supposed to take place in gaseous bodies would produce a loss of motion where we know there is perpetual motion; for nothing is more certain than that a volume of gas confined within definite limits, in a room of constant temperature, maintains its character without change. The molecular energy of gas does not become dissipated in space; its machinery does not run down by reason of the friction of its parts.

To escape this paradox of the perpetual motion and collision of absolutely solid atoms, a class of physicists (of

¹ Optics, 4th ed., p. 375; quoted in Stallo's *Modern Physics*, p. 41.

whom Lord Kelvin and the late Clerk Maxwell are most eminent representatives) have invented atoms which are absolutely elastic. These atoms can collide indefinitely without losing any motion. When followed out to its full length, this conception leads us back again to the Cartesian theory, which so long withstood Newton, and delayed the acceptance of gravitation, namely, that there is no such thing as vacuous space, but that all space is full of a fluid which is absolutely continuous, and whose particles, if we can speak of particles, are infinitely divisible. In this inconceivable fluid, possessing qualities which in any form of statement are absolutely contradictory to each other, there are supposed to be an indefinite number of inconceivable and self-contradictory vortices or whirlpools of force producing the phenomena which on the other theory are thought of as impenetrable atoms. Maxwell's treatise on the dynamical theory of gases is in large part a discussion of the "motions and collisions of perfectly elastic spheres"; while Lord Kelvin says, "We are forbidden by the modern theory of the conservation of energy to assume inelasticity or anything short of perfect elasticity of the ultimate molecules, whether of ultra-mundane or mundane matter."¹ Thus, upon this theory, we have the absolute creation of something out of nothing. The whirling motion of particles of fluid which are no particles, and from which inertia is by the very definition ruled out, produce all the effects of the indestructible atom of definite weight and of all the properties which are supposed upon the other theory. This, however, is but a single illustration of the readiness of scientific men to accept self-contradictory statements of facts revealed to them by experience and mathematical calculation.

III. THE MYSTERY OF LIFE.

So far we have dealt with facts and theories of a purely

¹ Stallo's *Modern Physics*, p. 42.

physical character. The forces of animate nature are even more perplexing, recondite, and paradoxical, if indeed it is proper to speak of more or less degrees of inconceivability where all is absolutely mysterious. The Darwinian theory of evolution, for example, is based upon the observed fact that in general the progeny is like the parent. This is the law of heredity, without which there could be no such thing as species. If the progeny was not in general like the parent, utter confusion would everywhere prevail in the animate world, and we could form no calculation of what the harvest would be from the seed which had been sown. Without this law there would be no warrant that hen's eggs would produce chickens, or that grapeseed would not produce thorns, or figs thistles.

At the same time this transmission of qualities from parent to offspring is not perfect: there is a limited range of variation, such that no two individuals are absolutely alike; contrary to the common belief, one pea is always distinguishable from another pea, and in more complex organisms the variations are still more marked.

The complexity of the problem which the scientific evolutionist endeavors to solve is so great that every attempted explanation of the theory leads one to the verge of absolute incredulity. Indeed, nothing can better illustrate the limitations of human thought in its endeavor to compass the nature of ultimate causes than the efforts of our leading philosophical naturalists to explain the law of heredity as displayed in the actual history of the vegetable and animal kingdoms; for not only are all these explanations manifestly incomplete in themselves and founded upon ultimate assumptions which defy explanation, but they are all so far unintelligible, or perhaps we should say inconceivable, that none of them can be made clear to anybody, not even to their own authors.

Not to attempt an exhaustive catalogue of these theories,

it is sufficient to refer to a few which have attracted most attention by reason of the eminence of their advocates.

From Buffon and Bonnet of the eighteenth century we have inherited the theory that the original germs from which the whole succession of plants and animals have been evolved included within them miniatures of the whole succession. This has often been illustrated to the popular mind by the supposition that the bud of the oak contained in it a miniature tree, and that behind the bud was a still smaller miniature, and so on *ad infinitum*; so that the process of evolution was but an unfolding of real forms impressed upon the germ at the original creation.

Herbert Spencer's theory is that "germ-cells are essentially nothing more than vehicles, in which are contained small groups of the physiological units in a fit state for obeying their proclivity towards the structural arrangement of the species they belong to."¹ By "physiological units" he means "vitalized molecules" in "all of which there dwells the intrinsic aptitude to aggregate into the form of that species."² These vitalized molecules possess a mysterious polarity which he accepts as an ultimate fact.³

Mr. Darwin's theory was named by the author *Pangene-sis* at first, and was thought by him to have some resemblance to the foregoing theory of Mr. Spencer; but from one of Darwin's letters⁴ we learn that Mr. Spencer was unable to see any resemblance between the two theories, which, Darwin confesses, greatly relieved his mind, since he himself had utterly failed to be sure what Spencer meant by his polarized physiological units, and "so [to avoid charge of plagiarism] thought it safest to give my [Darwin's] view as almost the same as his [Spencer's]," while Spencer it seems returned the compliment by saying that he was not sure that he understood Darwin; yet, says

¹ *Biology*, Vol. i. p. 254. ² *Ibid.*, p. 181. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴ Vol. ii. p. 260.

Darwin, "I took such pains, I must think I expressed myself clearly." But that there was some difficulty with the theory Darwin was compelled to fear, since so few of his friends acknowledged their ability to understand it; for, he writes, "Bates says, he has read it twice, and is not sure that he understands it"; while "Old Sir H. Holland says he has read it twice, and thinks it very tough; but believes that sooner or later 'some view akin to it' will be accepted." Still Darwin declares that he feels "sure if Pangenesis is now stillborn it will, thank God, at some future time reappear, begotten by some other father, and christened by some other name."

The intellectual difficulties into which one is plunged by attempting "to connect by some intelligible bond" the facts of heredity may be best presented by giving a somewhat detailed account of Pangenesis and of the wonderful feats which it is supposed to accomplish in nature.

Briefly stated, the theory is, that organic bodies are composed of cells and colonies of cells which, though organized into unity by some mysterious power, are themselves units possessing a remarkable degree of independence, and "propagate themselves by self-division, or proliferation, retaining the same nature."¹ In a mysterious way some of these cells are made to contain the potentiality of the whole organism. In the lower forms of life every cell contains this power of reproduction, while in the higher forms the power is only partially limited. From any small section of the leaf of a begonia, for example, a perfect plant may be grown. Some freshwater worms when cut into forty pieces arise again to life in forty perfect animals. When the limbs of some of the lower animals are amputated, new and perfect limbs grow out to replace the old. Nor is this power wholly absent in the highest animal forms. Without this power of self-reproduction on the

¹ *Animals and Plants*, Vol. ii. p. 448.

part of the cells, there would be no such thing as the healing of a wound in the human body or the joining together of fractured bones.

But it is in the reproduction of plants and animals in connection with sexual processes that the profoundest mysteries are forced upon our attention. In these organisms the species is perpetuated only through the agencies of special cells, and that ordinarily when those of different sexes are united. The mystery is only appreciated when we consider both the minuteness of these cells and the burden which is laid upon them. To begin with, they are microscopical objects ordinarily invisible to the naked eye; yet upon them is laid the burden of receiving from all parts of the body or of the plant the potentialities which shall reproduce the individual in its entirety and continue to transmit specific characters to future generations.

In his efforts to connect the facts by "some intelligible bond," Mr. Darwin supposes that every cell in the body of the plant or animal "throws off minute granules or atoms, which circulate freely throughout the system, and when supplied with proper nutriment multiply by self-division, subsequently becoming developed into cells like those from which they were derived."¹ To these atoms he gives the name of gemmules. The "gemmules are supposed to be thrown off by every cell or unit, not only during the adult stage, but during all the stages of development." Lastly, he assumes "that the gemmules in their dormant state have a mutual affinity for each other, leading to their aggregation either into buds or into the sexual elements."

The smallness of these gemmules did not escape the notice of Mr. Darwin, nor did it stagger his belief in them, for, he says, "As each unit, or group of similar units throughout the body, casts off its gemmules, and as all are contained within the smallest egg or seed, and within each

¹ *Animals and Plants*, Vol. ii. p. 448.

spermatozoon or pollen-grain, their number and minuteness must be something inconceivable. I shall hereafter recur to this objection, which at first appears so formidable; but it may here be remarked that a codfish has been found to produce 4,872,000 eggs, a single *Ascaris* about 64,000,000 eggs, and a single Orchidaceous plant probably as many million seeds. In these several cases, the spermatozoa and pollen-grains must exist in considerably larger numbers. Now, when we have to deal with numbers such as these, which the human intellect cannot grasp, there is no good reason for rejecting our present hypothesis on account of the assumed existence of cell-gemmules a few thousand times more numerous.”¹

The strength and precision of the elective affinity displayed by these prolific gemmules is illustrated by Darwin in the case of the *Compositæ*, the species of which number about ten thousand; yet “there can be no doubt that if the pollen of all these species could be, simultaneously or successively, placed on the stigma of any one species, this one would elect with unerring certainty its own pollen.”² The precision is still more wonderfully shown among animals when different varieties are crossed. For example, if a short-horned cow is crossed with a long-horned variety, the progeny shows the effect in the horns, and not in the horny hoofs, which are of the same material; while the “offspring from two birds with differently colored tails have their tails, and not their whole plumage, affected.”³ Still further he concludes that each particular feather of a bird “generates a large number of gemmules” which are possibly aggregated into a compound gemmule; for, complex as is the structure of a feather, “each separate part is liable to inherited variations.”⁴

Having shown that sexual and asexual generation are

¹ *Animals and Plants*, Vol. ii. pp. 453-454.

² *Ibid.*, p. 455. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 455. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 458.

fundamentally the same, Parthenogenesis seems no longer wonderful to Mr. Darwin; "in fact, the wonder is that it should not oftener occur."¹ But while "the reproductive organs do not actually create the sexual elements," but "merely determine or permit the aggregations of the gemmules in a special manner," these organs do still have "high functions to perform." "They give to both elements a specific affinity for each other. . . . They adapt one or both elements for independent temporary existence, and for mutual union." At the same time it is refreshing to learn that "what determines the aggregation of the gemmules within the sexual organs we do not in the least know."² Finally, after saying that "the power of propagation possessed by each separate cell determines the reproduction, the variability, the development, and renovation of each living organism," and that "no other attempt has been made to connect under one point of view these several grand classes of facts," Darwin frankly confesses that "we cannot fathom the marvelous complexity of an organic being; but, on the hypothesis here advanced, this complexity is much increased. Each living creature must be looked at as a microcosm—a little universe, formed of a host of self-propagating organisms, inconceivably minute and as numerous as the stars in heaven."³

The force of this concluding remark will be lost if we do not pause for a little to bring before our minds some of the facts concerning the principle of reversion which Darwin declares to be "the most wonderful of all the attributes of inheritance"; for, as he truly says, "what can be more wonderful than that characters which have disappeared during scores, or hundreds, or even thousands of generations, should suddenly reappear perfectly developed." So that "we are led to believe that every character which occa-

¹ *Animals and Plants*, Vol. ii. p. 459. ² *Ibid.*, p. 459. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 483.

sionally reappears is present in each generation . . . ready to be evolved under proper conditions.”¹

With many of the facts underlying these statements we are all so familiar that we cease to be impressed by their marvelous character. We know, for example, that a child oftentimes resembles his grandparent more than he does his parent, and indeed we are not much surprised when, through the law of reversion, the child reproduces the peculiar attributes of some even more remote ancestor. So strong is this tendency to reversion that the preservation of an improved variety of plants or an improved breed of animals can be maintained only at the price of constant vigilance on the part of the horticulturist or the breeder. It is doubtless true, as Darwin says, that “by the aid of a little selection, carried on during a few generations, most of our cultivated plants could probably be brought back, without any great change in their conditions of life, to a wild or nearly wild condition.”²

When one adds to these facts the marvels concerning the metamorphoses through which the individuals of many species constantly pass, as when the caterpillar changes to the butterfly, and when peculiar instincts and mental characteristics develop only after a series of alternate generations or at particular stages in the life of the individual, one does not wonder at the difficulty experienced by some of Darwin's most eminent friends in seeing just what he meant by his theory, and in failing to find that “positive comfort” in it which the author himself professed to experience. It is not strange that “Hooker . . . seems to think that the hypothesis is little more than saying that organisms have such and such potentialities,”³ or that Huxley failed “to gain a distinct idea” “when it is said that the cells of a plant, or stump, include atoms derived from

¹ *Animals and Plants*, Vol. ii. p. 447. ² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³ *Letters of Darwin*, Vol. ii. p. 262.

every other cell of the whole organism and capable of development"; but preferred to say that "a single cell of a plant, or the stump of an amputated limb, have the 'potentiality' of reproducing the whole—or 'diffuse an influence'"¹ towards the accomplishment of this result, even though these words could give Darwin no positive idea.

At the present time the theoretical point most under discussion relates to the inheritability of acquired characteristics. It was the theory of Lamarck, that variation in animals was mainly produced by the effort of individuals to attain objects which were a little beyond the reach of their present capacity; and this principle was not wholly ignored by Darwin, who believed that the use or disuse of organs had much to do in producing transmitted variations. Still it puzzled him to see, on his theory, how this could be. "Nothing," he says, "in the whole circuit of physiology is more wonderful. How can the use or disuse of a particular limb or of the brain affect a small aggregate of reproductive cells, seated in a distant part of the body, in such a manner that the being developed from these cells inherits the character of either one or both parents?"

Weismann answers this question by absolutely denying the influence of external conditions on heredity. On the other hand, he affirms that acquired characteristics are not and cannot be inherited. In his view, variations originate wholly apart from the external conditions. He believes that immortality is an attribute of the cell, or what he calls the germ-plasm, and that there is absolute continuity in the development of this hypothetical basis of life. Wallace is in substantial agreement with Weismann, and these two leaders are supported by a large following of eminent younger naturalists who are designated as neo-Darwinians. The late Professor Romanes devoted the last years of his life largely to the defense and develop-

¹ Letters of Darwin, Vol. ii. p. 264.

ment of Darwin's views upon these points, and to answering the arguments of Weismann and Wallace.

The many criticisms to which Weismann's theory has been subjected have drawn out from him at last not only a defense, but an explicit statement of what is involved in his views, which is both exceedingly instructive and significant of the close connection between scientific theories concerning the origin of things and metaphysics.

The theory of Weismann with respect to the origin and development of species from germ-plasm was originally closely akin to the necessitarian theological systems which rested everything upon foreordination, and left nothing for free-will. This, however, was seen to overburden the material particles of germ-plasm upon any mechanical theory of their action. The great objection to his theory lay in the fact that variations in plants and animals are not haphazard; for, if they occurred at haphazard, definite varieties could not be maintained, even on the highest view of natural selection. To maintain a variety the selector must have something definite to select. Weismann meets the difficulty by throwing the principle of variation and of selection back into the unknown realm of germinal activity, supposing that in that realm, which is out of sight, if not beyond the realm of thought even, there is a struggle for existence going on analogous to that of which we hear so much in the visible realm of natural history. There is a survival of the fittest among the particles of Weismann's germ-plasm. Thus he says, "The struggle for existence takes place at all the stages of life between all orders of living units from the biophores recently disclosed, upwards to the elements that are accessible to direct observation, to the cells, and still higher up, to individuals and colonies."¹

¹ Germinal Selection. An address delivered before the International Congress of Zoölogists at Leyden, September 16, 1895; translated from MS., by T. J. McCormack; published in *The Monist*, January, 1896, pp. 250-293; especially p. 291.

"If," he goes on to say, "there is any solution possible to the riddle of adaptiveness to ends,—a riddle held by former generations to be insoluble,—it can be obtained only through the assistance of this principle of the self-regulation of the originating organisms. . . . Selection of *persons* alone is *not sufficient* to explain the phenomena; *germinal* selection must be added. . . . It is true it leads us into a terrain which cannot be submitted directly to observation by means of our organs of touch and by our eyes, but it shares this disadvantage in common with all other ultimate inferences in natural science, even in the domain of inorganic nature: in the end all of them lead us into hypothetical regions."¹

Earlier in this same address Weismann had confessed that "we cannot penetrate by this hypothesis to the last root of the phenomena"; and that "all our knowledge is, and remains throughout, provisional"; expressing surprise that "any living being could have the temerity to pretend even so much as to guess at the *actual* ultimate phenomena in evolution and heredity"; for, he avers, the whole question is a matter of symbols only, just as it is in the matter of 'forces,' 'atoms,' 'ether undulations,' etc., the only difference being that in biology we stumble much earlier upon the unknown than in physics."²

The appropriateness of these last-quoted phrases from Weismann is made even more clear when we consider the theory of life units and of living fluid as it is defended by Professor Minot,³ who maintains that Darwin's theory of Pangenesis and of gemmules is untenable, and that Spencer's conception of "*physiological units*," although an advance on Pangenesis, is still insufficient; while the plastidules of Hæckel and the biophores and determinants of

¹ Monist, January, 1896, p. 292. ² *Ibid.*, p. 286.

³ Art. "Microscopical Study of Living Matter," North American Review, May, 1896, pp. 612-620; "On Heredity and Rejuvenation," American Naturalist, January and February, 1896, pp. 1-9, 89-101.

Weismann "have made a gay tournament of hypotheses," thus¹ leaving no theory so probable as his own; namely, that life is perpetuated not by hypothetical life units, but by means of a living fluid which he thus describes:—

"The physical basis of life is protoplasm; protoplasm consists of two fluids, intimately commingled, yet separate, and which may include various granules of solid organic substances, more or less complex, and also include globules of various liquids. This theory in its best form has been termed the foam theory, because foam offers the most familiar illustration of the kind of structure conceived by this theory as characteristic of living matter. As in foam, air and water are commingled, so in protoplasm are cell-sap and the proteid or albumenoid fluid commingled. The latter it is, which, when coagulated by our so-called preserving reagents, gives under the microscope the familiar appearance of a network of solid threads. This theory I consider by far the best theory of the nature of protoplasm yet advanced. . . . It seems to me [he says further] that we have now reached a point when we need no longer divide protoplasm into its living and not living constituents. It is all living, the water and salts as much as the proteids and other organic compounds. Its phenomena are displays of energy resulting, so far as we at present know, from chemical actions, the possibility of which is given by the commingling of substances in the foam-structure."

"The conception of protoplasm above advocated seems at first to involve a complete materialism [he continues], but against this conclusion I must protest, for I hold that an opposite interpretation of life best accords with our knowledge—namely, that since there appear to be vital phenomena, which do not occur without life, it is legitimate to assume that there is a special vital power, which is not necessarily identical with any form of physical energy, though it may be conceived to cause the transformation of energy. Indeed, it is perfectly thinkable that the universe would come to rest, were not the balance of the forms of energy disturbed by the life-power."²

In an article on "Heredity and Rejuvenation," Professor Minot is more precise, holding "that the hereditary impulse is distributed in very different cells, and is probably distributed equally through all cells" (p. 95). Rejecting germ-plasm in Weismann's sense, which he affirms does not exist, Minot holds that "the development of an organism does not depend upon a substance stored in special cells, but on a special condition (stage) of organization" (p. 93).

¹North American Review, p. 618. ²*Ibid.*, pp. 619-620.

Rejecting Weismann's theory of the "continuity of germ-cells," and Darwin's conception of Pangenesis, he adopts the conception of Nussbaum of "the continuity of the germinal substance." The problem, according to Minot, therefore, now is, what "is the explanation of the germinating power, and the propagation of this power" (p. 91). This is indeed the problem, and has been from the beginning. But it is difficult to see the fundamental distinction between these various theories, or how any of them avoid materialism and the paradoxes into which all forms of materialism eventually run. How can a cell carry in it a pattern of all that is to come, unless there is some physical substratum for it, and on any theory the process of subdivision as we recede from germ to parent germ leads us to the contemplation of elements smaller than the very atoms out of which the physicist makes the world.¹

¹ The mysteries involved in the cell theory appear in the following representation of it by Professor G. C. Browne of Oxford, in an article on "The Present Position of Cell-Theory," in *Science Progress* for June, 1896, pp. 321-323:—

"It was Professor W. K. Clifford, I think, who first drew a graphic picture of the molecular forces which are at work in any chemical compound, by describing the atoms as linked to one another and dancing a sort of merry-go-round within circumscribed limits. We may carry on the illustration, which, fanciful though it may seem, is supported by physical and mathematical considerations. A biont is a great organized war dance, performed by a whole army corps. The individuals composing each company are the atoms, they are linked to one another by companies and each company dances its own figure. Every company is a molecule, and every company dance is but a part of a larger dance, in which the companies act in relation to one another, as the individuals act in the company dance. The larger dances are regimental dances and every regiment is a micella. The regimental dances are but parts of still larger brigade dances, and the brigade dances are but part of the great dance of the whole army corps, which, taken as a whole, is a biont. The illustration is not quite exact, for each company must not be considered as consisting of like individuals, but of many individuals of all arms, some like and some unlike, linked in such various ways that no two companies are the same, partly because of the proportions of different kinds of individuals composing them, partly because of the way in which those

The truth is that every effort so far made to discover what Darwin calls "an intelligible bond." harmoniously

individuals are linked together. Nor must we imagine that individuals are permanently attached to companies, nor yet companies to regiments, but that in the course of the dance individuals are passed from company to company, and companies from regiments to regiments, each conforming temporarily to the particular figure of that part of the dance to which he or it for the time belongs. Further than this the individuals engaged in the whole dance are never long the same; there are bystanders who for a time do not participate in the dance but are caught up one by one, whirled through the figures, passed from company to company, from regiment to regiment, and brigade to brigade, and are eventually passed out of the dance again, after having participated in some or all of the figures as the case may be. Every individual in the dance is at some time passed out of the dance, becomes a bystander, and may again be caught up and whirled along in the dance once more.

"The illustration is fanciful, if you please, but it is of the same kind as illustrations used to depict the play of molecular forces in the inorganic world. It serves a purpose in that it gives the imagination something to work upon, and it enables one to conceive of the immense complexity which is possible in a chemico-physical process. The army dance which I describe is capable of any number of combinations, a number amply sufficient to satisfy the needs of those who insist so strongly on the marvellous complexity of life. Let anybody imagine an army to be composed of four brigades, each brigade of four regiments, each regiment of ten companies, and each company to contain 100 individuals of the eight kinds, carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, sulphur, phosphorus, potassium, and iron, in varying proportions, and let him work out the possible combinations. I think he will be satisfied with the complexity.

"What then of heredity and of the capacity which I have mentioned for acquiring historic qualities?

"Believing as I do that the vital processes must in the end be attributed to a particular mode of molecular motion, I believe that it is the form of movement which is transmitted. Returning to my illustration, I would say that it is the figure of the whole dance which makes up the species, and that it is the figure—the mode of motion—which is inherited, clearly not the individuals engaged in the dance, except in a very small degree, for they are constantly coming into the dance anew and as constantly being passed out of it. Under certain circumstances there may be an excess of one or more kinds of new individuals pressing into one part of the dance which will affect the figure of the company dance which they crowd into, and this will affect regimental figures and ultimately, in decreasing degrees, the whole army figure. In this way we may picture to ourselves the action of external influences in bringing about variation."

connecting together the incalculable diversity of facts exhibited in the life of plants and animals becomes not only a mystery, but a paradox, and brings all investigators to a precipice facing a boundless metaphysical fogbank. The theories of the nineteenth century are not preëminently clearer than were those of the eighteenth. It is easy to show that Bonnet's theory of "incasement" rested on expressions which contained utter vacuity of meaning. He indeed supposed an evolution which was real—the pattern of the progeny having a real existence in the parental germ, supposing that the pattern of the whole development was really "incased" in the original created germ. "But," he says, "it is not necessary to suppose that the germ has all the features which characterize the mother as an individual. The germ bears the original imprint of the species, and not that of the individuality. It is on a small scale a man, a horse, a bull, etc., but it is not a certain man, a certain horse, a certain bull, etc."¹ As another has well expressed it, "in organs conceived as infinitesimal, shape, size, proportions, signified nothing." "The ears, for example, in the germs of the horse were supposed to pre-exist as actual ears, but in what shape and proportions Bonnet never undertook to say. . . . They must have shape, but not the particular shape presented in the adult state."²

Careful study of more recent theories shows that in their ultimate analysis they are each as paradoxical as was their great predecessor. It is easy for Weismann to show that Spencer's theory of "physiological units" involves an incomprehensible complexity of molecular motion in every organic variation for which no cause is assigned, thus leaving his theory to rest on nothing. It is equally easy for Minot to show that Darwin's "geinmules" and Weismann's "biophores" are too clumsy to go through with all the ev-

¹ Quoted by C. O. Whitman, *Monist*, April, 1895, p. 423.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 422-423.

olutions demanded of them, but it is difficult to see how his own theory of "foamy germ-plasm" has any physical basis at all to stand upon.

The moral of this discussion may be stated in a few words. Religious philosophy does not by any means possess a monopoly of all the mysteries of existence. The truths of religion are not the only truths which apparently rest on paradoxical statements. All verbal statements of ultimate truth are paradoxical; but this arises partly from the essential infirmities of language. It is no less true in science than it is in theology that the whole truth is too complex to be compressed into single statements. The human imagination does not give us the full measure of the truth which we are compelled to believe.

These conclusions at once clear the field of a great mass of current objections to Christianity, since they show us that our knowledge of nature even at the close of the nineteenth century is entirely too superficial to give any weight to *a priori* objections to the central facts of the Bible. Nothing which we have learned of the constitution of matter or of the universe renders the conception of a miracle impossible, or materially increases its improbability. The worst foes of Christianity are not physicists, but metaphysicians. Hume is more dangerous than Darwin; the agnosticism of Hamilton and Mansel is harder to meet than that of Tyndall or Huxley; the fatalism of the philosophers is more to be dreaded than the materialism of any school of science. The sophistries of the Socratic philosophy touching the freedom of the will are more subtle than are those of the Spencerian school. Christianity, being a religion of fact and history, is a free-born son in the family of the inductive sciences, and is not specially hampered by the paradoxes which are connected with all attempts to give expression to ultimate conceptions of truth. The field is free for the reception of such moral evidence as it has pleased the Creator to afford us.

ARTICLE II.

SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

BY THE REV. EDWIN STUTELY CARR, A. M., D. B.

IN Part I. of the "First Principles," Spencer applies himself to the task of reconciling science and religion. He begins his discussion by reminding us there is a "soul of truth in things erroneous"; and he will seek the soul of truth in religion. The phenomena of religion, practically universal, raise the question as to whether religion is of divine origin, or the result of natural evolution.

"Considering all faculties to result from accumulated modifications caused by the intercourse of the organism with its environment, we are obliged to admit that there exist in the environment certain conditions which have determined the growth of the feeling in question; and so are obliged to admit that it is as normal as any other faculty. . . . We must conclude that the religious sentiment is either directly created, or is created by the slow action of natural causes; and whichever of these conclusions we adopt, requires us to treat the religious sentiment with respect."

" . . . Regarding science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may see that every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience. . . . Hence it must always continue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge; then there can never cease to be a place for something of the nature of religion; since religion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in this, that its subject-matter is that which passes the sphere of experience."¹

The reconciliation is to be found in the most abstract truth contained in science and religion.

"If there be a fact which science recognizes in common with religion, it must be that fact from which the several branches of science diverge, as from their common root.

"Assuming, then, that these two realities are constituents of the same mind, and respond to different aspects of the same universe, there must

¹ First Principles, pp. 16, 17.

be a fundamental harmony between them; we see good reason to conclude that the most abstract truth contained in religion and the most abstract truth contained in science must be the one in which the two coalesce."¹

This most abstract truth is found in the second and third chapters, on the ultimate religious and scientific ideas. The old antinomies as to creation, first cause, etc., are made to do service in showing that the religious sphere, transcending experience, is a region of absolute and eternal mystery.

"The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect—not a relative, but an absolute mystery.

" . . . If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, most certain of all facts,—that the Power which the universe manifests is to us utterly inscrutable."²

Spencer had at his disposal the dialectical puzzles of universal history, from Zeno down to date, which Hamilton's immense erudition had gathered—as to space and time, the divisibility of matter, rest and motion, etc. It was not difficult, therefore, to show that

"Ultimate scientific ideas are all representative of realities which cannot be comprehended. . . . In all directions his [the scientist's] investigations eventually bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma. . . . He, more than any other, truly *knows* that in its ultimate essence nothing can be known."³

The concluding chapter is on The Reconciliation. The "ceaseless conflicts" of science and religion

"have been due to the imperfect separation of their spheres and functions. Religion has, from the first, struggled to unite more or less science with its nescience; science has, from the first, kept hold of more or less nescience as though it were a part of science. . . . Religion, though at the outset it asserted a mystery, also made numerous definite assertions about this mystery—professed to know its nature in the minutest detail; and in so far as it claimed positive knowledge, it trespassed upon the province of science. . . . In the meantime, science substituted

¹ First Principles, pp. 23, 24. ² *Ibid.*, p. 46. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 67.

for the personalities to which religion ascribed phenomena, certain metaphysical entities, and in doing this, it trespassed on the province of religion. . . . Gradually as the limits of possible cognition are established, the causes of conflict will diminish. And permanent peace will be reached when science becomes fully convinced that its explanations are proximate and relative, while religion becomes fully convinced that the mystery it contemplates is ultimate and absolute." "Thus the consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and must be eventually freed from its imperfections. The certainty that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards which intelligence has been from the first progressing. . . . And this conclusion, satisfying as it does the demands of the most rigorous logic at the same time that it gives the religious sentiment the widest possible sphere of action, is the conclusion we are bound to accept without reserve or qualification."¹

Spencer's principle of reconciliation is in essence the specious one, appearing so often in religious history, that we know so little about the supernatural background of the universe, that reason cannot deny to faith the privilege of believing what it will, so long as it confines itself to the regions of the transcendental. The new element Spencer introduces is the strong insistence that the ultimate scientific principles are as mysterious and contradictory as those of religion; so that in the dark region of the unknown which lies, both for science and religion, beyond the limits of experience, the clashing antagonisms of the two spheres of thought may disappear.

The unsatisfactory nature of this general argument, as a defense of the objects of faith, is well enough known by all students of philosophical opinion. It was made especially clear by Kant, who assigned to the theologian an intelligible world beyond the bounds of experience, where he could amuse himself by constructing speculative air-castles, while the intelligent of mankind looked on with a smile of pity or contempt. This type of thought was given a temporary prominence in Great Britain through Hamilton

¹ First Principles, pp. 106-108.

and Mansel; and Spencer, unfortunately for his fame, was seized by the idea that here was the golden opportunity to bring the conflict of the ages to an end. He accordingly abandoned temporarily the task for which his talents undoubtedly fit him,—the collection and systemization of scraps and clippings about the Aztecs and the Zulus,—and betook himself to the misty regions of the transcendental, where his most ardent admirers will hesitate to assert that he is peculiarly at home. Spencer's discussion of the ultimate metaphysical principles is for the most part a feeble echo or a direct quotation from Hamilton and Mansel; what little he adds being largely erroneous, and serving only to reveal his inability to deal with philosophical questions. Hamilton's philosophy of the unconditioned died early and childless,—is already an historical reminiscence; so that Spencer has lived to repent the mistake of assuming that any theory can remain an exception to the law of evolution long enough for us to derive from it any substantial knowledge of the ultimate verities.

As for Spencer's method of reconciliation in general, it would be difficult to find a more perfect example of the logical *non sequitur*. Science and religion both run up into the unknown, and therefore they have a common root! It is surely apparent, that the denial of any knowledge of two objects gives no ground for their positive identification. I know nothing about Smith and Jones, therefore Smith and Jones are the same man; a dog is the same as a cat, because one can see no difference in the dark! If Mr. Spencer knows nothing about the ultimate facts of science and religion, he cannot assert that they have a common root or any root at all. Of course, among the infinity of suppositions possible on this line of argument, it may be that science and religion have a common basis; and no one can deny this, for neither affirmation nor denial has any place in the vacuum of the unknown, where the

laws of human thought, causality, the law of contradiction, etc., do not hold. Spencer's argument then brings us one chance against infinity, that religion and science may have a common root. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the waters of controversy have not yet become still, though this valuable "reconciliation" has been before the world for many years. Mr. Spencer has been more and more driven by his critics to realize that pure negation can never furnish a basis for positive reconciliation. This appears strikingly in his discussion with Frederic Harrison. Harrison makes it so plain that a blank unknown can serve no useful purpose in religion or any other sphere, that Spencer ascribes to the unknown one after the other of the divine attributes; but when Harrison accuses him of playing into the hands of the theologians, and declares there is joy among the orthodox over one philosopher that repenteth, maddened by the keen thrusts of his adversary, Spencer throws consistency to the winds, and declares he does not claim that his doctrine of the Unknowable furnishes any ground for a religion!

It will be objected that this is an extremely unfair treatment of Mr. Spencer's theory. I submit, however, that I have done Spencer only the injustice of taking his doctrine of the Unknowable Absolute, and carrying this doctrine through to its logical conclusion. If Mr. Spencer's result does not agree with mine, it is because he has not dealt with the problem in rigid consistency. The fundamental difficulty with Spencer's position, which involves him and is likely also to involve his critics in inextricable confusion, is that he never deals with the notion, the Unknown Absolute, in logical strictness. The supernatural basis of phenomena is the unknown, and yet Spencer speaks of it in the same breath as the Infinite Power, the Eternal Energy, the Ultimate Cause, etc. Here is a plain contradiction in terms, for if it is unknown it cannot be Power, Cause, etc.

Spencer is ready enough to accept the conclusion of Hamilton and Mansel, that thought runs out into mystery and contradiction on every hand, for this conclusion is useful in destroying the assumptions of the theologians; but he denies Mansel's assertion that we are necessitated to believe that God is infinite and personal. We are necessitated to believe no more than we know. Spencer holds, against Hamilton, that we have a positive though indefinite consciousness of the Absolute,—the undefined, "raw material" of the notion.

"Clearly, the very demonstration that a *definite* consciousness of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an *indefinite* consciousness of it."¹

" . . . We have seen how impossible it is to get rid of a consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances, and how, from this possibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality."²

Spencer, therefore, feels justified in assuming that there is a supernatural basis of phenomena,—a power, first cause, etc.; it is a "sort of a something," but we know nothing of it except that it exists. This position appeals to him as satisfactory, because it curbs the pride of the theologians, and yet preserves enough metaphysical principles, power cause, etc., to keep the scientific world in motion.

This fundamental ambiguity of Spencer's metaphysical work renders it worthless or worse. If the infinite is Unknown, it is not a power or cause; if it is a power or cause, we know, on rational grounds, much more than that it is a cause. Spencer nowhere treats, in logical strictness, these two mutually exclusive notions, and this ambiguity vitiates his conclusions. Take the concept, the Unknowable Absolute. This x is assumed to be unknown and unknowable to man, which must mean in strictness that it is in no causal relation to the world, that personality, unity, the law of contradiction, no categories of thought apply to it. It is evident, then, that nothing whatever can be said or

¹ First Principles, p. 88. ² *Ibid.*, p. 97.

thought about it, it amounts logically to nothing at all, and should be treated as such. It is in this strict sense of the term I have discussed the question above, and of course the outcome can be only absurdity or vacuity.

Spencer's ambiguous use of terms, however, furnishes him an easy method of defense against criticism; for when attacked for preaching the unknowable, he can assert that the unknowable is a cause or power, and *vice versa*. This is the course of his defense against Harrison. When Harrison ridicules the unknowable as an x nth power which gives no ground for religion, Spencer declares it is the Ultimate Cause, the All-Being, the Creative Power, etc.; when Harrison rejoins that, in this case, Spencer is preaching the Christian God, Spencer says no, for he holds to the unknowable, and does not claim to furnish any basis for religion whatever.

It is not necessary, of course, to suppose that Spencer was consciously disingenuous in his treatment of these questions; for he was in the fog of a relativistic theory of knowledge, where many stronger metaphysical heads than his have lost their bearings. The vicious subjectivity of modern philosophy has resulted in idealistic or relative theories of knowledge, so that the notion is as widespread as it is erroneous that knowledge is merely phenomenal, never bringing us to ultimate external realities. If this be true, the conclusion is absolutely unavoidable that we know and can assert nothing of ultimate verities; this is as clear as daylight, and a man need not take a course of philosophical study to understand it. The idealistic and relativistic thinkers, however, recoil from the gulf of absolute skepticism, that *reductio ad absurdum* of all false philosophy, and resort to various expedients, unwarranted on their premises, to retain some sort of Absolute Being and give it a content comprehensible to the human mind. An interesting example of such an attempt, where the wide erudition

and the philosophical acumen of the author make the resulting failure the more conclusive and instructive, is Professor Royce's "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy." Here appears the fundamental and fatal inconsistency of assuming an Absolute Thought which is not personal and thinks and acts in no way as our thought; and which is not in a causal relation to the world, though its realized thoughts are the beings and things of the world. This type of philosophy, when presented by a pleasing writer and a skillful dialectician, may seem profound and perhaps satisfactory; but a little careful reflection shows that the result must be a state of mental confusion where all landmarks of substantial truth vanish, and the outcome is the suicide of philosophy as well as the vanishing-point of religion.

It is unnecessary, even if the limits of this article would permit, to dwell at any length on Spencer's use of the philosophy of the unconditioned. This element in Hamilton's system has served its purpose as an evidence of the injurious effects of the falsely subjective attitude of modern speculation, and has passed into neglect and insignificance. It is true, of course, that speculative reflection brings one upon difficulties and apparent contradictions in the fundamental laws of thought, undreamed of by the unphilosophical thinker; but the dialectical puzzles of Zeno, as well as Kant's antinomies, have been satisfactorily solved again and again, and no respectable thinker now accepts the "imbecility" of the understanding because he cannot form a satisfactory mental picture of the creation of the world out of nothing. Spencer's second-hand dialectic, therefore, about the inscrutable and contradictory nature of the ultimate religious and scientific ideas may be simply dropped out of the discussion. The question then arises, Does anything remain, of solid and permanent value, in Spencer's reconciliation of science and religion?

Religion is primarily concerned with the First Cause, the supernatural background of knowable phenomena; science is primarily concerned with the natural sphere of the knowable, with second causes so far as they are knowable by man. If the limits of these two spheres can be distinctly drawn, and then each party can be persuaded to keep on his own side of the fence, the conflict will plainly cease. Are these conditions possible? and, first, Can the limits of the spheres of the natural and supernatural be distinctly drawn? Not certainly in a way that is likely to be permanently satisfactory. The progress of science has been simply the enlargement of the sphere of the natural, at the expense of what had been considered the sphere of the supernatural. A hundred years ago the opinion was practically universal in Christendom that the first members of the human race were divinely created. The limit of the natural and the supernatural, in the history of the human race, was then set at the appearance of the first man. It is now carried back by many in the scientific world to the appearance of the first bit of protoplasm, or farther. As science promises to enlarge the boundaries of natural knowledge indefinitely, and every advance is attended by uncertainty and weighing of doubtful evidence, the prospect of a speedy and permanent demarcation of the spheres of the natural and the supernatural is far from encouraging.

As to the second condition, Can each party be persuaded to keep his own side of the fence, supposing a fence, of a reasonably permanent nature, to be erected? The most encouraging feature of the situation is the fact that each party is becoming more disposed to recognize its limitations, instead of claiming the whole field. The scientists have asserted, often enough, that the universe can be easily explained by material laws, without assuming God or anything mysterious; and the theologians have offset this dogmatism by asserting that in the Bible is the one reliable

account of creation and scheme of ancient history. The growing moderation of both parties, which is undeniable, is a hopeful sign of peace.

The above statement and solution of the difficulty is suggested, in the main, by Spencer on page 107: "Gradually as the limits of possible cognition are established, the causes of conflict will diminish." But when will the "limits of possible cognition be established"? Evidently not till the death of the last member of the human race makes it certain that no other mystery is to be brought into the light of reason, and under the sway of natural law.

Spencer endeavors to give an air of satisfactory definiteness to his reconciliation, by limiting science rigidly to the "proximate and relative," and religion to the ultimate mystery. It is doubtful whether scientists in general would agree to this limitation. It is certain that no intelligent adherent of religion would do so, for his religion must ultimately become a pale abstraction, and vanish from the real life of the world. I have said above that religion is concerned *primarily* with the first cause, and science is concerned primarily with the sphere of the natural; but science would doubtless object to being thus summarily excluded from the fascinating problems of ultimate reality, and any religion which is alive and expects to continue so would claim a present power and influence in the present world. Spencer was encouraged to think that the religious world would accept his "ghost of religion," because of the folly of certain Christian apologists who have sought to defend the divine Being from attack by making him invisible, powerless, and useless in the world,—"defecated to a pure transparency"; but this is not the common or the sound view of Christian theism. Religion is not a thing "only to stare at," an *x*th power of mystery of which we can know nothing and with which we can come into no relation; but it is the revelation of a real divine power

which is operative in the real life of the world. Especially is this true for a religion which recognizes miracle and prayer.

It is therefore evident that neither science nor religion is likely to remain content with the limits established by Mr. Spencer; and there is thus introduced a new complication into the problem, which is not encouraging to those who look for a speedy suppression of the conflict. Spencer suggests the proper point of view for understanding the contending forces; but he does not recognize sufficiently that the conflict is unavoidable and endless for finite humanity, and therefore the problem is not to suppress it, but to carry it on with mutual courtesy, candor, and good feeling.

Space will not permit even a reference to the many valuable criticisms on Spencer's philosophy of religion, except those of Edward Caird and Frederic Harrison. The former, presented in his "Evolution of Religion," is important as treating Spencer from the Hegelian standpoint; and the controversy of Spencer and Harrison is not only extremely entertaining in itself, but is an instructive illustration of the fact that when free-thinkers fall out, the orthodox may gain many valuable suggestions.¹

Caird's philosophical position is that of the modified Hegelianism of the late Professor T. H. Green. From Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception" has been developed an all-embracing world-consciousness, in which the finite mind knows the external object, and the knowledge of which is religion. The "transcendental unity of apperception" has thus been made the source of all truth and life,—it is the Hegelian God, deified and enthroned, and univer-

¹See the *Nineteenth Century* for January, March, July, September, November, 1884. These Essays, published in March, 1885, by D. Appleton & Co., under the title of "The Nature and Reality of Religion; a Controversy between Herbert Spencer and Frederic Harrison," were, after a public correspondence in the *London Times*, suppressed by order of Mr. Spencer (see *Popular Science Monthly*, August, 1885).

sal humanity is summoned to bow and worship. What is Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception"? It is simply the unity, or the unifying power, of the finite consciousness,—the sense of oneness, selfhood, which abides through all changing mental states, and makes possible the union of subject and object in the act of knowledge.¹ One of the most extraordinary achievements of Kant's idealistic successors was to take this unpretentious principle of our inner life, disguise it in the garb of an unintelligible terminology, quote Scripture about it, and so metamorphose it into the divine Being. The result is that we "see all things in God."² "In the transcendental unity of apperception we live and move and have our being." This theory has manifest advantages in dealing with ultimate philosophical and religious questions. God here has two or three distinct meanings, and the philosopher can use the one which suits his convenience, so that there is little difficulty in refuting the common-sense objector, or reducing him to speechless astonishment. God may mean (1) the unity of the finite consciousness; (2) the general principle of unity in the universe [(1) and (2) may fall together for the pantheistic idealist]; (3) the popular notion of Christian theism. It is very easy on this theory to prove the existence of God. Do you know the book or table before you [in the unity of your inner consciousness (1)]? Then you know God [which means (3) to the hearer], for he is the principle of unity in this knowledge.

This is the principle of Caird's criticism of Spencer. He quotes Spencer's "Principles of Psychology" (p. 120):—

"When the two modes of being which we distinguish as subjective and objective have been severally reduced to the lowest terms, any further comprehension must be an assimilation of these lowest terms to one another; and as we have already seen, this assimilation is negated by the very distinction of subject and object, which is itself the consciousness of

¹ Seth's *Hegelianism and Personality*.

² Caird's *Evolution of Religion*, Vol. i. p. 112.

a difference transcending all other differences. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion, becomes more and more manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition."

Caird continues that for Spencer,

"the unity is found only in that unknowable, of which, although we cannot know it, we are still conscious, as the absolute reality of which both subject and object may be regarded as modes."

Caird's reply to Spencer's agnosticism as to the absolute may be anticipated from what I have said above. Spencer's problem here is the old one of how mind and matter can be united in knowledge or action; and his solution is the true one, that they are to us ultimate and inexplicable modes of the manifestation of the divine,—though he is wrong in asserting that the divine is unknown. Caird proceeds to overthrow materialism,—the common-sense assumption of external reality,—and also subjective idealism. We have then the Hegelian idealism of knowledge as the unity of the subjective and the objective, of the self and the not-self. Caird is now in position to assert against Spencer that the fundamental principle of unity cannot be unknown.

"It is obvious that when we thus break down the supposed wall of division between the consciousness of the self and that of the not-self, we must also break down the wall of division between both and the consciousness of God. And instead of thinking of ourselves as confined to the finite to the exclusion of the infinite, we must rather recognize that everything we can learn of the former is also a step in the knowledge of the latter. The consciousness of the finite is based on the idea of the infinite as its first presupposition; nor can it become knowledge in the highest sense till it understands this presupposition; till, in other words, it recognizes the consciousness of the finite subject and the consciousness of the finite object as elements in the consciousness of God."¹

The infinite is therefore the presupposition and the first real object of all knowledge.

"Our ignorance of God is then, in one aspect of it, the effect of too much knowledge. For it is simply the incapacity of rising to the idea of a unity, which yet is implied in all our knowledge."²

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, Vol. i. p. 136. ² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

Caird's unsatisfactory deduction of the knowledge of the infinite should not blind us to the fact that he brings a correction for Spencer's fundamental error. Spencer studies matter, mind, the religious nature of man, etc., and finds everywhere lines which run up and converge in an infinite principle of unity; and yet he asserts of this principle we can only know that it is. It is manifest that if our reason is trustworthy, this principle must be adequate to account for the world, and so we know much more about it than its bare existence. The Hegelian contention, and in general it is a noble and true one, is that the laws of our thought are reliable, and therefore we are justified in assuming what logically holds good of this infinite as invincibly true. The unwarranted and misleading element in the Hegelian exposition is, that the remote logical inference that there is an infinite principle of unity is treated as though it were immediately known in the simplest act of knowledge,—the "God-consciousness" so mysterious to the plain man. This has come about for the Hegelian because he has unwarrantably destroyed the self-subsistence of the world and of the finite personality, and therefore the unity of consciousness, the "transcendental unity of apperception," is only possible in God.

The Spencer-Harrison discussion has brought out some valuable results, in so far as each has shown conclusively that the other has no religion; and in the end each frankly admits this fact. At the start, however, each plainly gives the impression that he is prepared to furnish the world with the genuine religion. Harrison appears first as a Comtist, full of enthusiasm for the religion of humanity.

"Humanity is the grandest object of reverence within the region of the real and the known, Humanity with the world on which it rests as its base and environment. Religion, having failed in the supernatural world, returns to the human world."

The lyric strains which immediately follow as to the glor-

ies of the religion of Humanity, are in very striking contrast to Harrison's sobriety of utterance after Spencer's criticism.

"In plain words, the religion of Humanity means recognizing your duty to your fellow-men on human grounds. I have no wish to 'worship' humanity in any other sense than as a man may worship his own father and mother."

In short, Harrison does not claim for his religion of Humanity in the upshot of the debate, any more than that it is what mankind has always designated as morality, as Spencer does not claim that his religion of the Unknowable is any more than the "ghost of religion," and is willing to admit it is not even that.

Spencer has gravely announced to the world his purpose to reconcile science and religion, and does so by showing that science and religion agree in recognizing an absolute power or being as the basis of the universe. Beginning with the principle that there is a "soul of truth in things erroneous," the plain implication is that Spencer holds the true and permanent core of religion to consist in the feeling of awe and veneration before this mysterious supernatural power. This is the natural inference from the closing paragraphs of the essay on Religion.

"Science under its concrete forms enlarges the sphere for the religious sentiment. From the very beginning the progress of knowledge has been accompanied by an increasing capacity for wonder."

"And this feeling is likely to be increased by that analysis of knowledge, which, while forcing man to agnosticism, yet continually prompts him to imagine some solution of the Great Enigma which he knows cannot be solved."¹

All the world has supposed that religion to Spencer was wonder and awe before the Unknown Infinite; and so Mr. Harrison took it, in the "Ghost of Religion." Harrison says,

"In any reasonable use of language religion implies some kind of a belief in a Power outside ourselves, some kind of awe and gratitude felt

¹ Essay on Religion, pp. 33, 35.

for that Power, some kind of influence exerted by it over our lives. A religion which gives us nothing in particular to believe, nothing as an object of awe and gratitude, which has no special relation to human duty, is not a religion at all."

And now in Spencer's "Last Words" he asserts that he never meant to advocate a religion of the Unknowable at all.

"I have nowhere 'proposed' any 'object of religion.' I have nowhere suggested that anyone should 'worship this Unknowable.' . . . I have simply affirmed the permanence of certain components in the consciousness which is 'concerned with that which lies beyond the sphere of sense.' I have said nothing about the adequacy or inadequacy of this surviving sentiment, as a religion."

Mr. Spencer then comes out at the end with a "surviving sentiment," which he is ready to admit is not religion. What becomes, then, of his reconciliation of science and religion? It is apparent that the reconciliation has been effected, or is in Spencer's opinion to be effected, by the simple elimination of the religious factor,—religion is to vanish entirely so far as any real significance can be attached to the term, and leave science in complete possession of the field. This is not the conclusion one finds suggested in Part I. of the "First Principles." The sentiment in relation to the Unknowable was there discussed in such a fashion as to give the impression that a satisfactory religious content was being considered; and the whole force of Spencer's reconciliation depended on giving the reader this impression. When, therefore, after a lapse of twenty years, Spencer coolly announces that he is perfectly willing to admit that this "surviving sentiment" is not a religion at all, that after all he does not claim that there is any permanent "soul of truth" in religion, the reconciliation of science and religion must appear as a most transparent humbug. And we can well understand Harrison's evident astonishment at this extraordinary position, where Spencer wins a trifling argumentative victory at the price of a fundamental inconsistency, and even of apparent dishonesty.

"On one point I certainly did misunderstand Mr. Spencer, and that in all good faith. When he said, 'if veneration and gratitude are due at all,' I confess that I took him to admit that they are due. He now says that is not his meaning. Be it so. But if his view of religion is, that veneration and gratitude have no part in it, that it has no object and is 'altogether unconcerned' with devotion, hope, worship and consolation, the pertinent question occurs, Why all these chapters and articles about religion at all?"

And, we may add, why the labored attempt at a *permanent* reconciliation of science and religion, if the religious factor is to disappear?

ARTICLE III.

TENNYSON'S "IN MEMORIAM."

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THERE are few readers of Tennyson who, if compelled to select one of his poems to the exclusion of all others, would not choose the "*In Memoriam*" as the most representative single production. Whatever praise may rightfully be accorded to the "*Idyls of the King*," to "*Maud*," or "*The Princess*" or to "*Becket*" as the best of his dramas, this magnificent threnody is so comprehensive and vital, so full of mind and soul and art and suggestion, that it stands alone, and unapproachably alone, among the poems of the author and among those of any of his contemporaries.

It is, in fact, a poem so much greater than the theme of it, or the sad event that suggested and inspired it, that there is almost an incongruity in the contrast, and the wonder increases, upon every renewed reading of it, that such a work of thought and feeling could have been based upon a foundation so limited and local. Our purpose in the study of this poem will best be subserved by noting, with some degree of regularity, the various topics of interest that arise as we peruse and examine it.

I. As to its Occasion. This is a matter of historical fact, and is found, as we know, in the death of Arthur Henry Hallam, the poet's college companion and intimate personal friend. His death at Vienna, September 15, 1833, marks the actual origin as well as the occasion of the poem, inasmuch as it was in this year that Tennyson began

its composition, not completing it fully until seventeen years after, the year 1850, the middle year of the century, and the forty-first of the author's long and illustrious career. It is thus that he calls it, An Elegy, while it is also a Eulogy, as he reiterates and impresses the varied virtues of his beloved Arthur; taking occasion, thereby, to exalt the personal qualities of all true characters in every age and clime. As already suggested, such an event as this, the untimely death of a college friend, would scarcely seem a fitting theme for so elaborate a production, and seems like magnifying one of the most ordinary incidents of our every-day life into a place of undeserved prominence; and yet the poet deals with the theme, both in its local and universal character, as a specific event of sorrow in his personal history as a man, and, also, as a general event of historic character in the developing history of men. The death of the gifted Hallam is thus but the text of a broad and thoroughly elaborated system of truth—a fact in life and providence and human history awakening attention to a thousand other related and wider reaching facts—a germinal idea or principle whose prolific fruitage is as undying as it is abundant.

Just as the "Idyls of the King" grew from small beginnings to spacious proportions as a poem of epic range, so did the death of Hallam occasion the author's greatest poem; the most notable elegy of the English tongue or of modern literature, and one of the representative poems of the literary world.

2. As to its Structure, we note that it is made up of one hundred and thirty sections, exclusive of the Prologue and Epilogue, containing in all seven hundred and twenty-four stanzas, of the peculiar Tennysonian order, the Quatrain, with its rhyme of the first and fourth lines, and of the second and third.

Throughout the poetry of Tennyson, various orders of

verse are found—Blank Verse, as in his "Harold" and other dramas, in the "Idyls of the King," and "Enoch Arden," "The Princess," and others of the longer poems; the Couplet, as in the "May Queen" and "Locksley Hall"; the three-line stanza, as in the "Two Voices"; the Quatrain, as in the "Palace of Art," "The Talking Oak"; the six-line stanza, as in "The Sisters"; the seven-line stanza, as in "Fatima"; the eight-line stanza, as in "The Miller's Daughter"; the twelve-line stanza, as in "Mariana"; while in so short a poem as "Eleanore" the stanzas vary from the minimum of nine lines to the maximum of twenty-four lines, in which a large variety of combinations is expressed.

The peculiar Quatrain of "In Memoriam," however, is Tennyson's own, as much as the Spenserian Stanza of the "Faerie Queene" is Spenser's, used here by him in its best form and made by its use an historic English stanza.

Here and there, outside of "In Memoriam," Tennyson employs it, as in his significant lines to the Queen, in 1830, three years before the death of Hallam.

"Revered, beloved—O you that hold
A nobler office upon earth
Than arms, or power of brain or birth
Could give the warrior kings of old,

"Victoria,—since your Royal grace
To one of less desert allows
This laurel greener from the brows
Of him that uttered nothing base."

So, in the poems entitled, "The Blackbird" and "To J. S.," written in the earlier years.

Further, as to structure, it may be stated, that critics and commentators have gone to the extreme either of denying any unity of plan in the poem, or to that of reducing it to a close and technical, logical analysis, as if it had been so divided according to the canons of the schools.

Professor Genung, in his interesting study of the poem, falls into the latter extreme, and gives us an elaborate plan

of Prologue, First, Second, and Third Cycles, and Epilogue, stating the specific stanzas that belong, as he thinks, to the respective divisions. In fact, more than one-half of his book is taken up with the statement and attempted proof of this theory, so that, in not a few instances, he is compelled to adopt forced analyses in order to reach such a result. He even goes so far as to suggest, that the poet gives us in the poem the hint of his own plan that we are to discover and unfold. This, to our mind, is not only impossible to find, but undesirable.

In order to the fullest enjoyment and understanding of the poem, as well as to the fullest expression of its poetical character, all that is needed is, to bear in mind its definite occasion, its general order of thought and form, and the double purpose, specific and general, which it is intended to subserve.

In fact, even the general method of it is often at fault, if we press closely the claims of logical rule, in that topics once treated are reintroduced, and in that additional stanzas were composed after the poem had been subsequently written. This afterthought could not have been in the original plan, so called, while the manner in which such stanzas adjust themselves to the general object of it shows that any such principle as a logical nexus was absent, and that the author wrote what he wrote on a comprehensive and flexible method.

In this respect, the poem is in keeping with "The Idyls of the King," the parts of which were composed at different periods, and to the latest critics still present the open question as to how little and how much sequence and logical connection exists, and as to just what the author's plan and aim may be said to have been. The poet himself never saw fit to solve these questionings, which in itself is but an additional proof that he preferred to leave the matter of method to itself.

The actual content or subject-matter of the poem is the best answer as to what it is and what it is designed to teach.

3. If we thus inquire as to the Purpose of the poem, the best general answer is, that it is an attempt to state and solve the problem of life—as life is inseparably connected with death and destiny and immortality. Professor Genung prefers to state it in the form of a proposition, "That Love is Intrinsically Immortal." This he calls the "fundamental idea" of the poem, as expressed in the first stanza.

"Strong Son of God, immortal Love,
Whom we, that have not seen thy face,
By faith, and faith alone embrace,
Believing where we cannot prove."

We revert, however, to the purpose stated—the attempt to examine and solve the problem of life, as it presented itself to the poet's mind. This includes the doctrine of Immortal Love and others equally and more important,—those of man's origin, and history and destiny; his hopes and fears; his joys and sorrows and struggles; his victories and reverses; his successes and disappointments; his relation to God and the world and the eternal life beyond.

It is here that the poem sweeps out beyond the local and temporal into the immensities and infinities, and embraces, as Dante's "*Divina Commedia*," the confines of heaven, earth, and hell.

The poem is thus essentially inquisitive and interrogative. It investigates phenomena, scientific and religious, if so be it may come at length to the disclosure of the hidden truth, the resolution of the complex problem, the successful finding of the way. The question of Pilate to Christ is the question of the poet—What is Truth? only asked and presented in the reverential spirit and, therefore, with the promise of an approximate solution. In the course of this inquiry, manifold questions and teachings arise—as to the transientness of all things human; as to the folly of

ambition and worldly preferment; as to the depressing effects of sorrow, and the mission of the divine discipline; as to the blessedness of friendship, and the moral relation of the present to the future. It is in fine "this search for reality" that constitutes the purpose as well as the inestimable value of the elegy—an earnest, and often an intensely passionate, attempt to reach foundations, and mark the limits of truth and things; to discover certainty amid ceaseless change, and "justify the ways of God to man." "*In Memoriam*" is Tennyson's *Essay on Man*, with a deeper meaning and a wider purpose than belonged to the poem of Pope, and a representation of Victorian England as that was of Augustan.

4. This last statement naturally calls to mind the Relation of "*In Memoriam*" to the Age in which it was produced. Stedman speaks of it as "an eminently British poem, in scenery, imagery, and general treatment." In this sense, it is national as well as universal. More specifically, it is a poem of nineteenth-century England, as distinct from any preceding period, as much so as Chaucer's "*Canterbury Tales*" was a picture of fourteenth-century England, or Addison's "*Spectator*" that of the age of Anne. There is a sense, moreover, in which all antecedent English thought and life, from the days of Elizabeth to Victoria, had accumulated and expressed itself in this closing century, the individual life of the century itself being added thereto, and being, as the latest factor, the most impressive and vital. It was in 1809, just as the century had fairly opened, that Tennyson was born. Beginning his great *Elegy* in the third decade, its completion is coterminous with the close of the first half of the century, and may be said, in time and in character, to mark the high tide of the nation's thought and life. It was a time when scientific research, after the modern method, was taking on its positive and pronounced forms. Metaphysicians and theologi-

ans, stimulated by continental thinkers, were speculating, as never before in England, on the great questions of philosophy and ethics. English politics and the English church were alike stirred to the center.

It was now, as historians have been quick to note, that such representative men as Dr. Arnold and Frederic Robertson, Maurice and Newman, and the leading exponents of the great Oxford movement were agitating, in their own way, the fundamental questions of state and church and human life. The great English writers of the time in Fiction, Miscellany, History, and Sociology, were doing phenomenal work, while Thackeray and Carlyle protested against the imposing frauds of the era, whatever their guise or name or sanctions.

As Matthew Arnold and Browning, so Tennyson, aimed to reach and disclose the deepest instincts of the age, and thus to make his poem but a reflex of his nation's thought. There is a sense, therefore, in which, as we read this Elegy, we seem to see the faces of Keats and Shelley, Coleridge and Wordsworth, Southey and Scott, Morris and Clough, and all the cardinal characteristics of the period. It was Tennyson's aim and high vocation to gather up and express in verse, as he only could do it, the prevailing ideas and feelings of these epoch-making minds, and with them all to express his own profoundest self. It is thus historically as well as poetically just to answer the question propounded, as to whether or not Tennyson is a great poet, in the words in which a recent American critic has answered it, by saying, "That will depend on whether you think the nineteenth century is a great century, for he is the clearest, sweetest, and strongest voice of the century."

So true is this that Tennyson, in so far as we can see, would have been a poet out of place in the Augustan, and even in the Elizabethan age, and, if, indeed, out of his own epoch, far more at home in the ever-developing civilization

of the twentieth century than in the conservative history of the eighteenth. In his "Second Locksley Hall," as in the "*In Memoriam*," his eye often peers beyond the limits of the present age, and looks far on into the century just at hand.

5. As to the Relation of "*In Memoriam*" to Other Poems, something may be said. If the question of time of composition is taken into account, we note, that, the poems published before 1833 apart, the first Collection closely connected with the Elegy was that published in 1842 under the title, "Poems by A. Tennyson," in which such pronounced examples as "Ulysses," "Locksley Hall," "The Two Voices," and "Morte d' Arthur" appeared. Then followed, previous to 1850, the "Princess" in 1847, it being noticeable that, in 1850, the year of the publication of "*In Memoriam*," there occurred the marriage of the poet to Miss Sellwood, and his appointment, as the successor of Wordsworth, to the English Poet Laureateship, which he held to the day of his death, in 1892. The year 1850 thus marks the completion of the first half of his life, the second half being coterminous with the possession of the Laureateship.

It is natural to infer, therefore, that many of these antecedent poems, between 1833 and 1850, were more or less preparative to this one consummate work, as Chaucer's "*Canterbury Tales*" show the preparative influence of his earlier work. Especially is this presumable in reference to the poems of 1842; "The Two Voices" being, perhaps, as significant as any in this historic and literary sequence.

The opening three-line stanza indicates its character,

"A still small voice spake unto me,
'Thou art so full of misery,
Were it not better not to be?'"

So, the sixth—

"I said, 'When first the world began,
Young Nature thro' five cycles ran,
And in the sixth she moulded man.'"

So, later—

"And men, thro' novel spheres of thought
Still moving after truth long sought,
Will learn new things when I am not."

So, on through the poem, we are reminded of the reflective lines of the *Elegy* seeking after the light and the truth and the solution of the pressing problems of time and eternity.

If this relation of the *Elegy* to Tennyson's other work, preceding and subsequent, be examined apart from the principle of time, and mainly with reference to those poems that breathe the same spirit and seek the same ends, the subject will assume a wider and fuller form.

Referring, at this point, to Van Dyke's sixfold classification of Tennyson's poems:—

I. Melodies and Pictures.

II. Stories and Portraits, including Ballads, Idyls, and Character Pieces.

III. Epics.

IV. Dramas.

V. Patriotic and Personal Poems.

VI. Poems of the Inner Life [of Art, Life, Love and Death and Doubt and Faith],

this last division—Poems of the Inner Life—would almost, without exception, indicate the line of thought in the *Elegy*, particularly those dealing with Doubt and Faith, such as, "The Higher Pantheism," "Vastness," "De Profundis," and "Crossing the Bar," while others, such as, "The Vision of Sin," "My Life is full of Weary Days," "Love and Death," suggest the same great truths and questions. So, in each of the other five categories, pertinent examples may be found, as in, "Nothing will Die," "All Things will Die," "The Death of the Old Year," "A Farewell,"

"A Dirge," "Ode to Memory," "Far, Far Away," "The Golden Year," "Despair," and the two Locksley Halls.

It is thus that "*In Memoriam*" may be seen to stand as a poem midway in the author's work, as midway in his life, looking before and after, expressing in most fitting form what had been and what was yet to be expressed, though in less effective manner, and thus concentrating in one supreme effort all the best qualities and tendencies of the author's genius.

It is for this reason, if for no other, that it may be called the poet's most representative work, as it is his richest and greatest—the one that could least be spared from the large volume of verse which he has written. The relation of "*In Memoriam*" to "*Paradise Lost*," as of Tennyson to Milton, is a difficult question and has recently been ably discussed by a living American critic.

6. We may now turn to one or two of the more specific Characteristics and Qualities of this poem.

And, first, as to its Poetic Form or Type. The author has distinctly called it, An Elegy, while the nature of the theme, as well as that of the method, sentiment, and purpose, would so indicate. Thus, critics such as Genung and Davidson have sought to establish close parallelisms between it and other English Elegies, notably, Milton's "*Lycidas*" and Shelley's "*Adonais*," and the autobiographical Sonnets of Shakespeare. In so far as each is an elegy, "*In Memoriam*," "*Lycidas*," and "*Adonais*;" in so far as each refers to the loss, on the author's part, of a beloved personal friend, of Hallam and Edward King and Keats, the comparison may be said to hold; while the Sonnets of the great dramatist also point to his sincere affection for some unnamed friend. Here, however, is the limit of the resemblance, while in comprehensiveness of plan, in imaginative outlook, in range of power, and intrinsic poetic quality, the Laureate's dirge is so incomparably superior to

any other elegy of our language that any attempt to institute extended likeness is as invidious as it is impracticable. Emerson's "Threnody" over the loss of his son, or his "In Memoriam" over the loss of his brother, or Arnold's lament of Clough in his "Thyrsis" are suggestive and beautiful poems, but can with no more justice be brought into favorable comparison with the *Elegy upon Hallam* than can Tennyson's "Harold" or "Queen Mary" be closely compared with "Julius Caesar" or "Richard III."

It may be noted, further, as to Form, that "*In Memoriam*," being specifically elegiac, is essentially a Lyric, and would thus take its place among the poems of the author's first collection of 1830, "*Poems chiefly Lyrical*." Devoid of anything like a distinctive dramatic type, it has not enough of the epic or heroic element to modify its general lyric character, while the nature of the theme and the prevalence of deep emotion would constitute it of the lyric order.

The external form of "*In Memoriam*" apart, its most striking feature is its masterly combination of the intellectual and artistic, so that each is expressed in appropriate measure and manner, and each is made to contribute to the highest excellence of the other. It is questionable whether such a fusion is so fully effected in any other English poem—certainly not in "*Paradise Lost*," nor in Pope's "*Essay on Man*," nor in Browning's "*Ring and the Book*," nor in Longfellow's "*Evangeline*." In each of these, one characteristic, the mental or artistic, is conspicuously prominent over the other, nor would it be aside from the truth to suggest, that the author's "*Idyls of the King*" is the closest approximation to his own ideal established in the elegy.

What Dowden calls the "mind and art" of Shakespeare, is here seen in Tennyson. When Bagehot speaks of the "ornate art" of Tennyson, intimating that it is lacking in the mental quality, and is ornate only, however just the criticism may be as applied to other poems, it has no valid

illustration in the Elegy. Here there is seen artistic unity, the unity of art and nature; of idea and form; of thought and feeling and taste; of the creative and constructive, in such a masterly manner that we view them as one and the same thing in the sum total of the effect that the poem has upon us.

In other words, "*In Memoriam*" represents the union of poetry and philosophy, and in a way superior to that of any of its poetic contemporaries. Herein lies one of the author's chief claims to a precedence over Robert Browning, in that where Browning deals with the intellectual only, Tennyson has presented the intellectual in vital union with the æsthetic.

It is one of the impressions ever deepening as we read "*In Memoriam*," that we are reading an author who is a master of thought and imagination as well as of words and meters, and the question starts ever anew, as we read a stanza, which is the greater, the depth and reach of its ideas, or the exquisite finish of its construction. We read—

"Our little systems have their day;
They have their day and cease to be;
They are but broken lights of thee,
And thou O Lord art more than they."

"I held it truth with him who sings
To one clear harp in divers tones,
That men may rise on stepping stones
Of their dead selves to higher things."

and, as we read, we are instructed and enchanted, for we have found a thinker and a bard in one, and, in so far as "*In Memoriam*" is concerned, the thinker is always present. We may allude here to a possible and tenable criticism of Tennyson in the love of art for art's sake, in the undue emphasis of the elaborative and decorative, but the criticism does not hold in the poem with which we are dealing, nor, we may add, does it hold to any marked degree in the longer poems, but chiefly in the shorter mis-

cellaneous lyrics, as in "Lilian" and "Madeline" and "The Ballad of Oriana" and odes and songs.

Mention has been made, in speaking of the subject-matter of "*In Memoriam*," that it deals with the most vital and profound problems of the day, and, in doing this, it is necessarily a thoughtful and a philosophic poem. It could not be other and be successful. The seventeen years spent in its preparation would indicate this. The evident manner of the poet as sedate and serious indicates it. He had written snatches of song and lighter lyrics and playful verses on life and love—"Claribel" and Isabel," "Sea Fairies" and the "Mermaid," "The Miller's Daughter" and the "May Queen," "The Day Dream" and the "Beggard Maid"; but now every faculty was at its fullest, every sober purpose was in exercise, imagination stirred to its sublimest function, and the poet's whole nature was lifted in Miltonic manner "to the height of his great argument." As a result, we have a poem instinct with thought and life and lofty ideals, and developed with all the grace and charm of poetic art,—a philosophy of man in finished verse,—a presentation of idea and expression thoroughly unique and Tennysonian, and evincing to all less gifted souls what the possibilities of poetry are and how a genius in song may think aloud in verse. The relation of the poem to man is one of the additional features of "*In Memoriam*." This indeed is a characteristic of Tennyson's poetry as a whole, as clearly evinced in the first collection which he published with his brother in 1826, as in "*Demeter and Other Poems*," published in 1889.

This, apart, however, there are some of his poems that evince this personality more fully than others, such as, "The Idyls," "Enoch Arden," "Maud," "Dora," "A Dream of Fair Women," "Lady Godiva," and many of those Character-Pieces and Poems on Love and doubt and destiny to which attention has been called.

"*In Memoriam*" however, stands out, to our mind, conspicuously prominent over all others in this respect. It is the most representative poem of the author, as it is of the age, more Tennysonian than any other, and one which an unprejudiced reader would most naturally select as Tennyson's, rather than Browning's or Swinburne's or even Matthew Arnold's. Mr. Howells has spoken of a feature which he terms, Tennysonianism. It is this which is here so visible that no one can mistake it; seen, partly, in the external structure and character of the poem, in stanza and rhythm and artistic beauty, but, more manifestly, in the intrinsic qualities of it, in its underlying sentiments, thoughts and ideals, and what may be called the genius of the poem.

The progress of the poem from 1833 to 1850 may be said to record the progress of the poet's mind during these seventeen memorable years. The very continuousness of its preparation made it a part of his own being and literary life. It was in his heart and thought as a growing entity until the fullness of time came for its appearance. Hence, the attempt made by some critics to institute a comparison between "*In Memoriam*" and Shakespeare's Sonnets, on the basis of their common autobiographical element, not only because each is written in the memory of a loved and lost friend, but because of the intense beauty and tenderness of the poems.

However this may be, "*In Memoriam*" is a revelation of the author's personality as well as a memorial of his friend.

Not a few of its stanzas are so lifelike that we can almost hear the poet say, This is my experience and my trust; this, my joy and my hope; and this, my faith and doubt.

Thus as he writes in the use of the first personal pronoun—

"I sometimes hold it half a sin
To put in words the grief I feel;
For words, like nature, half reveal
And half conceal the soul within."

we see in characteristic connection the sorrow over the death of young Hallam; the enunciation of a general principle as to the relation of feeling to utterance, and, also, his own state of mind as he pens the quatrain. This frequent repetition of the I, so notable in the poem, is far from egoistic but thoroughly natural, as the expression of the author's own state of mind.

And this leads us to note, in closing, that the special feature of "*In Memoriam*," as of Tennyson's best poetry, is its latent meaning, ever alluring the literary student to new investigations, and ever promising as his reward new discoveries of truth and beauty. Next to Shakespeare's plays, this poem must be ranked, in its suggestiveness or undeveloped thought. No one can read it or enjoy it without a kind of Hebraic sobriety of mind, and no one can rise from its reading without being stronger in mental vigor and possibility.

It is not at all strange that Tennyson has written nothing better since, in that here he may be said to have surpassed himself in range and imagination, and, in later years, but reiterated and reflected the essential excellencies of this masterpiece.

No poem has so permeated and suffused modern English verse. Tennyson, it is said by the critics, has founded a school or method of verse, and this is true; but in such a superb production as this he has done something better—he has expressed, in artistic oneness, the literary and the mental; has shown that lyric verse may retain all its charm and yet be expressed with epic dignity and range, and that the profoundest problems of human life may be presented in poetic form. In the conscientious attempt worthily to commemorate the character of a departed friend, he has made the memory of his own name as lasting as earth and time and the life of man.

ARTICLE IV.

THE COSMOGONY OF GENESIS AND ITS RECONCILERS.

BY PRESIDENT HENRY MORTON, PH.D.

WHEN the famous Gladstone-Huxley controversy in the *Nineteenth Century* for 1885-86 had been closed and its results placed in the most satisfactory shape for the best interests of theology by the admirable paper of Henry Drummond in the same journal for February of 1886, it might have been supposed that the efforts of the Reconcilers of the Cosmogony of Genesis with the results of scientific investigation would have been intermitted, at least as to the questions thus far disposed of.

Recent as was this controversy, and great as was the attention which, by reason of the distinguished position of its participants, it attracted, it however seems already to be largely forgotten even by some of those who have been so attracted by this subject as to add themselves to the long list of the "Reconcilers."

The same also appears to be true in reference to another almost cotemporaneous controversy on the same subject between the leading geologist of America, Professor Dana, and the leading Hebrew scholar of England, Canon Driver.

As the papers containing these controversies are scattered through numerous journals,¹ and involve reference to a number of books not easily accessible to many, I have thought that an abstract of the literature of the subject

¹ E. g. the *Nineteenth Century*, the *Expositor*, the *Andover Review*, and the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

would have some value and be of interest to readers of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

As I propose, moreover, to make this not a mere abstract of documents, but to introduce explanations and comments of my own, it will, I think, be well for me to place myself in touch with my possible readers, by a brief introductory expression of views on the general subject of the Reconcilers and their work.

In my opinion, this work, in past time, has been invaluable to the cause of religion, and those who have labored at it have been actuated by the highest and best motives, as well as possessed of distinguished capacities in their several lines. In view, however, of the advances in biblical science made during the last century, which are at the present time attaining general recognition and acceptance, these works of reconciliation are like the earthworks thrown up from time to time by an advancing army, which, notwithstanding the invaluable protection they have afforded, must be abandoned, because any attempt to continue their occupation would be inconsistent with a safe advance and with a successful prosecution of the campaign.

Until the beginning of the present century, and indeed in some quarters much later, the cosmogony of Genesis was on all sides accepted as a strictly literal narrative of the creation of the universe, and of the earth with its various species of living things, by a series of Divine acts or fiats occupying the space of six natural days.

About this time, however, the sciences of astronomy, geology, paleontology, comparative anatomy, and the rest, began to reveal facts concerning the actual or probable history of the earth's development, which year by year rendered it more and more difficult for thinking men to accept the old view; and, after various attempts to discredit the conclusions of these sciences, the theological teachers little by little recognized that they must be accepted, and that

some modification of the old views or interpretations must be made, to save them from the position of absolute conflict with the growing mass of scientific knowledge.

To accomplish this work appeared a succession of able writers, about evenly divided among reverent men of science and broad-minded theologians, who proposed scheme after scheme, having a general unity of plan but many modifications of detail, by which the account in Genesis might be so interpreted as to bring it into harmony with the proved facts and reasonable deductions of science. These schemes, one and all, were admirable in motive, highly creditable as a rule to the learning and eloquence of their authors, and for the time very efficient in securing their object, a *reconciliation*. I can myself well remember the satisfaction with which Hugh Miller's "Testimony of the Rocks" was read, and how well it appeared to meet the requirements of its day.

Able, however, as were these writers, and admirable as was their object, yet as time went on, partly through the developments of scientific knowledge (e. g. the growth and finally the general acceptance of the theory of evolution), their schemes one after the other fell out, and were seen to be inconsistent or incomplete, until it looked as if the former impossibility of accepting the *record of Genesis* and also the *record of the rocks* must again be faced.

In this crisis help came from a new quarter. Contemporaneously to a certain extent with the development of scientific research into the physical records of nature, had grown up the scientific research into the literary records of religion, or the science of Criticism as applied to the Bible.

As the student of geology, by a careful study of the surface of the ground, had been enabled to recognize successive strata underlying one another, and to reach some reasonable conclusions as to their relative dates or order of formation, and also as to the methods by which one or

another layer had been produced; so the critical student, by a careful study of the text of the Bible, had been enabled to recognize in it the various strata, consisting of the work of successive writers and editors, and to assign with greater or less precision their date or succession and also the conditions involved in and controlling their production.

The result of this was to show that the writers of the Bible were first of all *men*, influenced by the ideas and customs of their times, and addressing their cotemporaries in language such as they understood and used, running counter to none of their ordinary conceptions as to the objects around them or the phenomena of nature. Also that these *men* were truly *inspired* with such knowledge, as neither they nor any human being since could attain to unaided, as to the relations of the *Creator to his universe* and of *God to man*, including the picture of a good God, hating every kind of iniquity and punishing transgression of his moral law, and yet long-suffering and patient with erring man, holding in fact the relation of a loving Father to his wayward children.

This was a knowledge then and forever beyond the reach of the human intellect as a deduction from observed phenomena, and with this knowledge were the writers of the Bible in various measure *inspired*; but they were not inspired as to matters of science, art or history, either near or remote, but were left to such sources of information, accurate or otherwise, as might be available to them, with no other guidance and protection from error than that which was involved in their lofty moral aim, perfect candor and honesty of statement.

To quote the words of one of the highest living authorities among biblical critics in reference to the special subject now before us, the Cosmogony of Genesis: "It neither comes into collision with science nor needs reconciliation with it; its office lies on a different plane altogether; it is

to present under a form impressive to the imagination, adapted to the needs of all time, and containing no feature unworthy of the dignity of the subject, a truthful *representative picture* of the relation of the world to God." ¹

Again, turning to a source from which we would hardly have expected such very liberal utterances, we find in the works of the Abbé Loisy entitled "*Les Études Bibliques*," ² and "*Les Mythes Chaldees de la Creation et du Deluge*," ³ statements which are in substance to the effect, that the science of the Cosmogony of Genesis is that of the age in which it was written, and has been in part derived from the Babylonian myths, and moreover that, in the opinion of this author, those who strain the meaning of its words for the purpose of securing a harmony with the science of to-day are risking injury to faith, and bringing discredit on the Scriptures themselves and the church which accepts them.

To those holding these views, the entire process of "reconciliation" was obviously unnecessary. It would involve no loss of confidence in the *real inspiration* of the writer of the first account of creation in Genesis (whether he was Moses, or an antediluvian poet, or a priest in the year 450 B. C.) to suppose that he intended to picture the creation as accomplished in six natural days by successive and distinct fiats or acts of the Creator, and that he arranged the order of these fiats or acts according to his own best judgment as to their natural sequence, placing, for example, vegetation in its full development before animal life, because he saw that animals required such vegetation for their support; also that he intended to describe the sky as a dome or vault from which the sun, moon, and stars were supported as moving and movable lamps.

¹ Canon Driver in the Expositor for 1886, 3d Series, Vol. iii. p. 45.

² Published at Amiens in 1894, at pp. 23, 33, and 81.

³ Published at Amiens in 1892.

The story thus told and interpreted has served for at least twenty centuries to bring to the hearts of great, good, and wise men of every age and country, the fundamental truths it contains as to the relations of the Creator to his universe, and it will still so serve, as well as if it could be interpreted in agreement with views of the actual details of the cosmogonic process which were substantially undreamed of until the present century

Yet further, to the biblical critic the work of reconciliation would appear futile as well as unnecessary, for even if the first cosmogony of Genesis could be reconciled with the results of scientific investigation, there would then present itself the second cosmogony, beginning in the fourth verse of the second chapter with the words, "In the day that Jehovah God made earth and heaven," and which goes on to describe how God made the man (Adam only) out of dust, then planted for him a garden and made trees good for his food, then made animals for companions, and finally Eve out of a part of Adam's body. This certainly could neither be "reconciled" with the first cosmogony nor with scientific results by any rational method of interpretation, and it is worthy of note that most reconcilers ignore this second narrative altogether.¹

¹ It is of course true that many apologists have attempted the impossible task of reconciling these absolutely inconsistent statements, but their conspicuous failure is a sufficient refutation, and I believe that the all but universal opinion of intelligent commentators is well expressed in the following quotation, from "The Handbook for Bible Classes—Genesis (edited by Professor Marcus Dods, D.D., and Rev. Alex. Whyte, D.D., Edinburgh), which is found at p. xviii of the "Introduction": "But the most convincing proof of the regardlessness of scientific accuracy shown by this writer is found in the fact, that in the second chapter he gives a different account from that which he has given in the first, and an account irreconcilable with physical facts. For in the second chapter he tells us that after God had made man he saw that it was not good for him to be alone, and said, I will make a helpmeet for him. And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them.

Such (though, as I feel, very crudely and inadequately expressed), being the situation, after the development and general acceptance of the results of critical investigation; the problem worked on by the reconcilers simply vanished from the horizon of those accepting these results, or, to refer again to our former metaphor, it was seen to be a position which had lost its strategic importance on account of a general advance of the line, whose defensive works must necessarily be abandoned, especially when, as at once appeared, their longer occupation seriously embarrassed the advance of the general line of battle by obstructing its line of supplies.

In the words of Professor Henry Drummond: "From this standpoint (that of biblical criticism) the problem of the reconciliation of Genesis with geology simply disappears."¹

There were, however, some, notably those who had already committed themselves to theories of reconciliation, who declined to accept the results of the new science of biblical criticism or who failed to realize their bearing upon the problem of reconciliation, and who still sought to maintain their defense of the old fortifications.

Conspicuous among these was, and is, Sir J. W. Dawson, who may be considered as at once one of the earliest, as well as one of the latest, of the recent reconcilers, since in 1893 he has published a volume on "The Origin of the World according to Revelation and Science," which, as he

That is to say, he represents the creation of man as preceding the creation of the lower animals, an order which both the first chapter and physical science assure us was not the actual order observed."

"But here again, though the statement is not in literal accordance with fact, the impression made upon the mind is true and right. It is merely the writer's way of saying that man was the important part of the creation, and that the other animals were made for man—a fact which science also assures us of in its own strictly literal and demonstrative manner.'

¹ *Nineteenth Century* (Feb. 1886), p. 209.

there tells us, is in the main identical with his volume "Archæia," on the same subject, which he published in 1860.

This author is a conspicuous example of that conservatism which adheres to ancestral conclusions, and finds itself unable to assimilate the new ideas which constitute the life of progressive science. Thus in view of the all-but-universal acceptance of the doctrine of evolution at the present day, not only among men of science but among liberal-minded theologians and men of cultivation generally, it is almost amusing to read as follows in the above-mentioned work by Dawson: "There are what I would term the five fatal objections to evolution as at present held as a means of accounting for the introduction and succession of animals."¹

It is again curious to compare a recent statement, as to the results of the higher criticism, made by Professor W. H. Green, of Princeton, who is almost the only Hebrew scholar of eminence who stands out against the general consensus of opinion among Hebraists on that subject, with Sir J. W. Dawson's disposal of the same in his preface of 1893.

Dr. Green says: "The critical partition of Genesis has been gradually elaborated during more than a century by a succession of scholars of the greatest eminence, who have expended upon it an immense amount of learning, ingenuity, and patient toil, until they have at length brought it into a shape in which it is accepted with substantial unanimity by European critics of widely different schools of thought and every various grade of belief and unbelief."²

Such being the deliberate judgment of an acknowledged master in Hebrew scholarship as to the opposing school, let us see how Sir J. W. Dawson disposes of the matter. On pages v and vi of his preface he says: "Besides this

¹ The Origin of the World, p. 228.

² Art. "The Pentateuchal Question," *Hebraica*, Vol. v. (1889), p. 140.

the greater part of the methods and conclusions of the higher criticism, as applied to the earlier books of the Bible, while complicated, dreary, and based on minute points of verbal detail, seem to be neither scientific nor historical, but rather a diseased product of the hypercritical and skeptical spirit of the age." A mind on which the scientific developments of the last thirty-three years could produce no more effect than this, would of course remain firm in its early impressions, and hold in 1893 the views which appeared reasonable in 1860.

Turning now to the direct consideration of the reconcilers, I would first state that I will confine myself to what may be considered the cotemporary class (i.e., those who are now living, or those whose work was done at about the same time, and is in a way intermingled by quotation and reference with that of the others). Arranging them in the chronological order of their earliest work as reconcilers, this class includes Professor Arnold Guyot, Sir J. W. Dawson, Professor J. D. Dana, and the Right Honorable Mr. Gladstone.

Before entering upon the discussion in detail of the systems or modifications of a system developed by these writers, permit me to say a few words as to the broad features of the problem before them. The two accounts to be reconciled were:—

1st. The account of Genesis, which, taking the plain meaning of the words employed, described a creating of the earth, with its occupants, atmosphere, and surrounding heavenly bodies, by a series of distinct acts or fiat in a given order or succession during six natural days.

2d. That of Science, which describes, (*a*) in the general terms of the nebular hypothesis, the progressive development of the earth and heavenly bodies; and (*b*) in the general terms of the theory of evolution, the development of all forms of vegetable and animal life from the lowest germs

or protoplasm, whose simplest form now recognized is the *Amœba Proteus*.¹

At the first glance the reconciliation of these two accounts would seem rather hopeless, to say nothing of any minor questions, such as the exact order of succession or the like. The scientific record was distinct, and not capable of any considerable flexure in the way of interpretation, and therefore the burden of accommodation was thrown mainly on the interpretation of the Hebrew narrative.

For this one would have supposed that a profound knowledge of the Hebrew language would have been an essential qualification on the part of the reconciler. Curiously enough, however, not one of the gentlemen above named possessed or made claim to any such knowledge of the Hebrew language as would give him weight as *an authority* in matters relating to the proper rendering of Hebrew words and phrases.

Most of them have been contented to found their conclusions mainly on the translation of our Authorized Version, and in one case at least Professor Guyot founds an argument on an error corrected in the Revised Version.²

So much being premised, I will now turn to the scheme of reconciliation proposed by Professor Guyot as the same is developed in his volume entitled "Creation,"³ and this I can most clearly and fairly present in the first instance by quoting the tabular statement which he gives in the last two pages of this volume.

¹ See *The Whence and the Whither of Man*, by Professor J. M. Tyler of Amherst College (Scribner's Sons, 1896), p. 33.

² *Creation* (Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1893), p. 87.

³ The edition of 1893.

ERA OF MATTER.
Introduction.

THE BIBLE.	SCIENCE.
In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth. And the Earth was desolateness and emptiness, and darkness was upon the face of the deep.	Matter is not self-existent. Primitive state of matter. Gas indefinitely diffused.
<i>First Day:</i> And God said, Let Light be, and Light was. And God separated the light from darkness.	<i>First Activity of Matter.</i> Gravity. Chemical action. Concentration of diffused matter into one or more nebulae, appearing as luminous spots in the dark space of heaven.
<i>Second Day:</i> And God said, Let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters. And God made the expanse, and separated the waters under the expanse from the waters above the expanse.	<i>Division.</i> The primitive nebula is divided into smaller nebulous masses. Formation of the visible, lower, starry world.
<i>Third Day.</i> a. And God said, Let the water under the Heavens be gathered to one place and let the dry land appear. b. And God said, Let the earth bring forth vegetation.	<i>Concentration.</i> The nebulous masses concentrate into stars. Our sun becomes a nebulous star. Formation of the mineral mass of the earth by chemical combination of the solid crust, the ocean, and atmosphere. The earth self-luminous; a sun. First appearance of land. Azoic rocks. First infusorial plants and protophytes.

ERA OF LIFE.

<i>Fourth Day.</i> And God said, Let luminaries be in the expanse of the Heavens to separate the day from the night, and they shall be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years.	Chemical actions subside. The earth loses its photosphere; sun and moon become visible. First succession of day and night, of seasons and years. Differences of climate begin. Archæan rocks. Photophytes. Protozoans.
<i>Fifth Day.</i> And God created the great stretched out sea monsters and all living creatures that creep, which the waters breed abundantly, and every winged bird.	Plants and animals appear successively in the order of their rank.—marine animals, fishes, reptiles, and birds. First great display of land plants. Coal beds. Palæozoic and mesozoic ages.
<i>Sixth Day.</i> <i>a.</i> And God made the beasts of the earth, and the cattle, and every creeping thing of the ground after its kind. <i>b.</i> And God created man in his image.	Predominance of mammals; the highest animals. The beasts of the earth, Carnivorous; the cattle, Herbivorous animals. Tertiary age. Creation of man. Quaternary age.
<i>Seventh Day.</i>—Sabbath. And God saw all that he had made, and behold it was <i>very good</i>. And God rested on the seventh day.	No material creation. Introduction of the moral world. Age of man.

In considering this tabular statement, it will be first observed, that what science recognizes as the primitive state of matter, i.e. gas indefinitely diffused, is, according to our author, indicated in the Hebrew text by the words translated in the Revised Version as "The earth was waste and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." Now what do Hebrew scholars say as to the meaning of the Hebrew words here used?

Canon Driver, in reference to the use of these same words in the same connection by Professor Dana in an article indorsing Professor Guyot's system, says: "Were the Hebrew words concerned of rare occurrence or doubtful significance, were there any ambiguity of construction or sense, the latitude claimed would be cheerfully and cordially granted. But no such doubt or ambiguity exists. Professor Dana's accommodation of the nebula theory to the cosmogony of Genesis is purchased at too high a price. It implies that in verse 2 "earth" and "waters" denote nothing resembling what those words expressed to the ancient Hebrew, but matter in that unimaginable condition when it was not yet endowed with force."¹

Turning to the work generally referred to as the "Speaker's Commentary," and to the volume on Genesis in which chapters i.-xix. are treated by Canon F. C. Cook, I find on pages 31 and 32 as follows: "*And the earth was without form and void. Desolate and void.* These two words express devastation and desolation. . . .

"The purpose of the sacred writer is to give a history of man, his fall, his promised recovery, then specially of the chosen seed and the rise of the Theocracy."

"He therefore contents himself with declaring in one verse, generally the creation of all things, and then in the

¹ Art. "The Cosmogony of Genesis," Andover Review for 1887, pp. 648, 649.

next verse passes to the earth, man's place of abode, and to its preparation for the inhabitation of man."

"The meaning of the verse before us evidently is, 'In the beginning God created the universe,' but at the time now to be spoken of, the earth which is our chief concern, was shapeless and waste"; "*darkness was upon the face of the deep*. No light penetrated to the desolate and disordered ruin. The deep may mean either the confused mass itself, or, as more frequently, the abyss of waters and the clouds and mists with which the earth was surrounded."

In the first volume (that on Genesis) of Lange's Commentary¹ we find the same ideas developed as to the meaning of the words translated "desolate," "void," and "deep," though the passage is too long for insertion here in full. I can only quote a fragment as follows: "It is clean against the text to say that the chaos, as something that is primarily the earth, embraces, at the same time, the heaven that exists with and for the earth. For it is very clear that the language relates to the original condition of the earth, although the genesis of the earth may serve by way of analogy for the genesis of the universe."

Again, in the large work of Professor George T. Ladd, D.D., of Yale College, entitled "The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture," occurs the following: "The correspondence of the *Tohu-va-Bohu* of Gen. i. 2, and the cosmogonic period when the heavens and the earth were 'in the condition of a gaseous fluid,' is specious. For, according to the Mosaic Cosmogony, the heavens were made from the earth-mass which was at that time unillumined, and moreover the term תהום (a mass of raging waters) has no resemblance to a gaseous fluid. (This is certain from the etymology of the word תהום, to roar), and from its use elsewhere: compare Gen. viii. 2, 'and the waters assuaged'; Ezek. xxvi. 19, 'when I shall bring up the deep upon thee and the great

¹ Edited by Dr. Philip Schaff (Scribner's, 1893), p. 163.

waters shall cover thee'; Jonah ii. 5, 'The waters compassed me about, even to the soul; the deep was round about me'; Ps. xlii. 7, 'deep calleth unto deep.'"¹

Turning next to the second pair of comparisons in Professor Guyot's table, we find the work of the first day given in the biblical narrative as, "And God said, Let Light be, and Light was. And God separated the Light from the darkness."

This is said to correspond, in the science-account, with "First Activity of Matter, Gravity, Chemical Action, Concentration of diffused matter into one or more *nebulæ*, appearing as luminous spots on the dark space of heaven."

As to the above I would remark, in the first place, that the omission of the important words, "And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night," is entirely unwarranted and misleading, because these words clearly exclude the interpretation which would make the statement in the Bible the equivalent of a reference to the formation of the *nebulæ*. In the text of his book on page 46, Professor Guyot dismisses this serious difficulty in the way of his theory, in an off-hand manner as follows: "'And God called the light *day*, and the darkness he called *night*.' Both words are here specific names used without reference to any period or succession of time."

In other words in this connection, the Creator is represented as applying the word "day" not to any period of time, but to *nebulæ* appearing as spots of faint luminosity in the otherwise dark space of heaven; and as applying the

¹ The word *הַיָּם*, according to Gesenius, is a poetic word, and means properly "a mass of raging waters, so called from their noise and roaring; specifically *the sea, ocean, the deep* (Gen. viii. 2; Job xxviii. 14, etc.; Amos vii. 4). More rarely used of any other *mass of waters*, as those covering the earth at creation (Gen. i. 2; Ps. civ. 6). Or the subterranean waters, *the deep, the abyss*, whence springs, fountains, streams (Gen. xlix. 25; Deut. xxxiii. 13). Also used in the description of roaring waters or floods (Ps. xlii. 8; Ezek. xxxi. 4)."

word "night" not to any period or succession of time, but to the dark spaces between the nebulæ.

Is this good Hebrew? We can only reply, What do Hebrew *scholars* say about the meaning of these words, as here used? Turning to page 2 of "Genesis"¹ by Professor Marcus Dods, D.D., I find as follows: "Besides, the writer immediately goes on to say that the light and darkness had their boundaries fixed, and were called *day and night*, that is to say, the division which still continues was then made, and that which now distinguishes light from darkness was then introduced. (Any allusion, therefore, to other light than that which the sun supplies is here quite irrelevant)."

In the volume on Genesis by the Very Rev. R. Payne Smith, D.D., belonging to the series of Commentaries for Schools, edited by C. J. Ellicott, D.D., Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, I find on page 69, "God called the light Day . . . Night. Before this distinction of night and day was possible there must have been outside the earth, not as yet the sun, but a bright phosphorescent mass such as now enwraps that luminary; and secondly, the earth must have begun to revolve upon its axis."

Without indorsing the strict scientific accuracy of the expressions here used, the entire statement may be accepted as showing that the terms "day and night" in the opinion of this Hebrew scholar indicated what they do to the ordinary reader, periods of successive light and darkness, and not "specific names" for "nebulae appearing as luminous spots in the dark space of heaven."²

¹ Handbooks for Bible Classes (T. & T. Clark).

² In reference to the Hebrew words דִּי and לַיְלָה Gesenius says, of דִּי : *a day* so called from the diurnal heat, root דִּי . Same word used in Aramaic, Samaritan, and Arabic. "Spoken of the natural day, from the rising to the setting sun (Gen. i. 14, 16; vii. 4, 12; viii. 22; xxxi. 39. Also of the civil day of twenty-four hours which includes the night." (Compare our English usage.)

Gesenius says of לַיְלָה : *night*. Same in Arabic, Syriac, Aramaic, Ethi-

So far as to the propriety of the interpretation which Professor Guyot puts upon the Hebrew words and phrases expressing the work of the first day; but I think that a word is here in place also, in reference to his statement of the scientific narrative.

This, taken in connection with the related portions of the text of his book (pp. 43-48), amounts to the assertion that, according to the scientific view of this subject, the matter of the universe as first created was inert, or void of such properties as are indicated by the words Gravity and Chemical Action, properties capable of producing in it motion, and consequently light.

On this, in its relations to the science of physics, I think that I may, without presumption, express an opinion to the effect that such an assumption is entirely discordant with all physical conceptions of the nature of matter. As a *metaphysical conception*, that of matter in an inert state, or devoid of the properties by which we recognize it, and which necessarily involve motion as one of its conditions, is perhaps capable of being entertained.

I am not prepared to go so far as some, and say that the idea of matter without properties is "unthinkable," but I am entirely confident that such an idea is contrary to all the conceptions to which the science of physics leads us. We know matter only by its properties, and to whatever department of human thought the idea of matter without properties (which result from the action of forces) may belong, it is certainly no part of physical science, or such as

opic, etc. "By many regarded as a primitive word and its etymology is at least very doubtful. But as דַּי *day* comes from the idea of heat, so לַיְלָה *night* may come from that of cold, viz., as causing one to *roll* or *wrap* himself in his cloak or bed-covering from root לָל to *roll*." (This etymology is generally discredited now, but for the very reason that לָל being a "primitive root," its meaning is so concrete and invariable that any "philosophical" idea is inadmissible.)

one trained in the methods of physical science could indorse.

This idea as to the necessary relation between matter and its properties, and indeed between matter and motion, is no novelty. As long ago as 1874, the present writer, in an address delivered at the fiftieth anniversary of the Franklin Institute, said as follows: "If the matter of the universe were to be brought to a state of rest, it would no longer be the universe, it would no longer be matter as we can comprehend that idea; or in yet other words, matter is matter, the universe is the universe as much by reason of the motion of its individual atoms as by reason of their actual existence."

To illustrate this, two views, one the exterior or artistic, the other the interior or scientific, are then given of the same scene.

"We are in a valley among snow-capped mountains and before us a lake spreads its mirror to the sky. No breath of air ripples its surface, no wavelet breaks upon its beach, nothing is there but absolute repose. So says the artist, and painting such a scene, he calls his picture 'Silence,' Repose, The Lake of Dreams, or some such appropriate title."

"Now, however, let us look at the same scene with eyes touched by the wand of science, and opened to see beneath the surface of things. What do we then behold? Is there any longer an impression of repose? Of rest? Of sleep?"

"Look at that mass of water with its mirror-like surface. We see there a perfect Sebastopol of flying missiles, water molecules hurled in clouds from the surface into the air, water molecules hurled back from the air into the water surface. It is by such action as this, science shows us, that evaporation takes place, or the invisible though rapid passage of the liquid water into the viewless air."

"The whole mass of the water is likewise thrilling

through with those heat motions, of which if deprived partially, it would freeze into ice, and if robbed utterly, would shrink into some formless horror, of which even the imagination of science can form no picture."

"We turn now to the breezeless air, and here again we see that it *is* air, and not some densest, solid, or nameless nonentity, only because of the ceaseless flight of its countless molecules, which, rebounding, jostling, ricochetting, glancing, but ever on the wing of motion, make it the light elastic fluid which we know as air."

"And if we next turn to the towering rocks and snow-capped peaks, we will find the same conditions in a modified form. All undoubtedly thrill with the quick heat-pulse which is the very soul of matter, and in all probability owe their distinctive characteristics to peculiar modes of motion among their atoms."

The above expresses no new or individual opinion of its author, but only a pictorial statement of the views long before announced by Helmholtz, Sir William Thomson, Faraday, Tyndall, and others.

Turning next to the work of the Second Day as indicated in Professor Guyot's table, we find this as set forth in the biblical account in the following words: "And God said, Let there be an expanse in the midst of the waters. And God made the expanse, and separated the waters under the expanse from the waters above the expanse." In connection with this statement we find Professor Guyot laying down the law most emphatically as to the proper meaning of the Hebrew word *rakia*, which he renders expanse, meaning thereby open space, but which the Authorized and Revised versions both render "firmament," with the idea of a solid dome or partition. Let us now see what Hebrew scholars have to say about this; but, first, I would call attention to an argument in support of his translation,

to which Professor Guyot appears to attach some weight, but which is in fact founded on another imperfect translation. Thus on page 55 Professor Guyot says, "and further, verse 20, that God created the birds to fly in the open firmament of heaven," meaning in the open space.

But, as the margin of the new version shows, this expression is equivalent to "on the face of the expanse of the heaven," which implies not an open space, but rather a solid surface or dome. Moreover, this same phrase is used in verse 2, "The spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters"; also in Lev. xiv. 7, "into the open field" (R. V.), but literally "upon the face of the field"; Ezek. xxxii. 4, "cast thee forth upon the open field"; xxxiii., "in the open field" (R. V.), and in many other places, always denoting in front of a surface.¹

Evidently, then, in assuming that because the Authorized Version says that birds are to fly *in* the open firmament of heaven, this "firmament" must be a clear space in which birds can fly, Professor Guyot is simply relying upon an inadequate translation, corrected in the margin of the Revised Version and elsewhere.

Returning now to the opinion of Hebrew scholars as to the proper signification of *rakia* in this place, the retention of the word "firmament" in the Revised Version is of itself very significant, even though "expanse" is placed in the margin.

Turning to Genesis by Dr. Marcus Dods, we find on page 3: "The chaotic darkness having been dealt with, the watery mass is next reduced to order. This is effected, in the first place, by separating the waters into under and upper waters by means of a *firmament*. *Expanse* is a more accurate rendering of the word. But the purpose served by the expanse seems to involve the idea of solidity conveyed by the word *firmament*. . . . That the sky was a

¹ See Canon Driver, Andover Review, Dec. 1887, p. 664, Note 2.

structure, more or less solid, capable of upholding the upper waters, and with windows (sluices) which could be opened to let these waters through, was probably in primitive times believed."

The story of Babel would indicate that this view of a solid "firmament" was accepted at the date when that narrative was written, and the theory of Cosmas, the Egyptian monk, which obtained such general acceptance in the early church and down through the Middle Ages, shows that a like conception was agreeable to the educated minds of much more recent periods.¹

In Lange's Commentary of Genesis, I find at page 168, after, "Let there be a firmament. . . . 'The heaven was to the Hebrews a material substance (Ex. xxiv. 10), a fixed vault established upon the waters that surrounded the circle of the earth (Prov. viii. 27), firm as a molten mirror (Job xxxvii. 18), and borne up by the highest hills, which are therefore called the pillars and foundations of the heaven (2 Sam. xxii. 8; Job xxvi. 11); openings or doors are ascribed to it (Gen. vii. 11; xxviii. 17; Ps. xxviii. 23).'"

Again, turning to the article by President W. R. Harper, in *Hebraica* for 1888, on "The Pentateuchal Question," I find on page 28 as follows: "8. In P. the universe is conceived of as a diving-bell in water תהום (i. 2); the vaulted roof is the רקע השמים (i. 6) with the ירשה (i. 10) as the floor, (cf. how the flood is produced in P. by water let in from top and bottom at once (vii. 11; viii. 2 a), the sluice-gates (נתינות) in the floor (תהום) broken up, and the openings (אריכות) of the heavens opened.)"²

¹ See History of the Warfare of Science, A. D. White, 1896, Vol. i. p. 89 *et seq.*

² Gesenius: רָקַע is properly "a solid expanse." The root means "to beat out," i.e. to spread or expand by beating, as God did the Earth (Ps. cxxx. 6; Isa. xlii. 5; xli. 24; in Syriac the *Aphel* means to *found* pro-

The most serious question of translation or interpretation in this place, however, comes in reference to the Hebrew word rendered "waters." Is it consistent with sanity, not to say accuracy in interpretation, to make the word "waters" stand for great and small primitive nebulae and "the visible lower starry world"?

It does not seem to me, aside even from a knowledge of Hebrew forms of expression, that anything short of a wild devotion to a theory could enable any one to find in this division of the waters, the separation of the luminous primitive nebulae into the "visible lower starry world."

But let us see what Hebrew scholars think about this word and its meaning in this connection. The quotation recently made from Dr. Marcus Dods shows what his opinion is, and Canon Driver in reference to the same rendering, given by Professor Dana in his indorsement of Professor Guyot, says: "I protest against the assumption, which Professor Dana's theory involves, that an attenuated vapor or nebula could be denoted in Hebrew by the word 'waters.' . . . The ordinary interpretation of verses 6-8 must be acquiesced in. The verses describe something which, in the conception of the narrator, took place subsequently to the 'making' of the earth, presupposed already in verse 2, and this, no doubt (without raising the question whether the firmament was conceived as solid or not), was the separation of the waters which the Hebrews regarded as stored in the clouds [or in the heavens above the solid firmament, perly by beating and stamping in order to make a solid foundation. The noun *רָקִיעַ* *the firmament* of heaven (Gen. i. 6), etc. The Hebrews supposed the firmament to be spread out like a solid hemispheric arch over the earth, shining and pellucid as sapphire (Ex. xxiv. 10; cf. Dan. xii. 3); in it were fixed the stars (Gen. i. 14-17); and above it was the celestial ocean with windows in the firmament through which the waters fell as rain upon the earth (Gen. i. 7; vii. 11; Ps. civ. 2; cxlviii. 4); this latter being the common notion, although the true state of the case was not unknown to the Hebrews (see Gen. ii. 6; Job xxxvi. 27-28).

H. M.] (Gen. vii. 11: 'The windows of heaven were opened'; Ps. civ. 3: 'Who layeth the beams of his chambers in the waters,' etc.), from the waters on the surface of the earth."

Turning now to the work of the third day, as given in Professor Guyot's table, we find under the biblical account:

"a. And God said, Let the water under the Heavens be gathered to one place and let the dry land appear."

"b. And God said, Let the earth bring forth vegetation," and under the Science account—"Concentration. The nebulous masses concentrate into stars. Our sun becomes a nebulous star. Formation of the mineral mass of the earth by chemical combination of the solid crust, the ocean, and atmosphere. The earth self-luminous; a sun. First appearance of land. Azoic rocks."

"First infusorial plants and prototypes."

Confining our attention at first to section a, can we be anything but lost in astonishment at finding the simple, straightforward statement of the separation of the oceans from the continents of the earth by the upheaval of the latter transformed into the whole history of the earth according to the nebular hypothesis, including a stage in which it was a self-luminous sun?

And if we regard this as a possible rendering of the Hebrew account, must we not, with Professor Huxley, "stand aside and admire the marvelous flexibility of a language which admits of such divers interpretations"?

I must freely confess that when I first read this part of Professor Guyot's scheme of reconciliation I could hardly trust my eyes and senses, and even felt for a moment that this might be intended as a sort of *reductio ad absurdum*, to expose the weakness of such schemes.

There is, however, no mistake about the seriousness with which this part of the scheme is propounded; but I do not think it requires serious consideration or proof of its un-

reasonableness; this is manifest on mere perusal. Even Professor Dana, in his article intended to be, and in fact constituting, a general indorsement of Professor Guyot's scheme, cannot accept this element, but throws the formation of the earth as well as the solar system from the primitive nebula, into the work of the second day, as part of the separation of the waters from the waters. He regards this part of the third day's work in its natural sense as consisting in the upheaval of the continents.

Turning to Lange's Commentary on Genesis, I find, on pages 168 and 169, "That the physical dividing of the earth-mass and of the water-mass is here presented, is clear. . . . It is thereby implied that the elevations and depressions of the earth's surface—the hills and vales, the highlands and the ocean depths—are here formed, just as it is so precisely set forth; (Ps. civ. 6–8, with which compare Prov. viii. 24)." The same view is expressed or implied in every commentary I have consulted.

We now come to Professor Guyot's second part of the work of the third day.

It will be noticed that the biblical account is given as "And God said, Let the earth bring forth vegetation." This, of course, is not intended as a quotation or translation, but only as a statement of what Professor Guyot thinks himself at liberty to substitute for the very different statement of the biblical writer, in order to make the biblical record match the geological record. The geological record shows that only the very lowest forms of vegetable life existed at this early period, and that grasses and trees and seed-bearing plants generally did not make their appearance until long after many animal forms had appeared in large quantities. The Bible, however, says in this place, not "And God said, Let the earth bring forth vegetation," but "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his

kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth, and it was so." If these words, however, are to be understood as meaning what they say, then, as Professor Guyot himself admits, "Geology would assuredly disprove" their statement.¹

To meet this difficulty, the Professor asserts that the writer of Genesis, for a sort of economy of statements, describes these vegetable forms as appearing at a time when only their *germs*, according to the theory of evolution, were present, and makes no reference to them at the much later period when they were actually brought forth.

Not for one moment is any question of the sincerity, honesty, and high moral purpose of this writer to be entertained; but it is certainly a subject of some surprise to find how readily he allows himself to take the greatest liberties with the biblical statements in order to bring them into accord with the scientific records. Another instance of this is furnished in the same connection.

The Hebrew word *barâ*, "create," is used in connection with the original formation of matter, of the animals and of man. This suggests to him that there was something radically peculiar in these three instances, which distinguished them from all the other processes of the earth's genesis. As regards the second example, the introduction of *life* would seem to be the distinguishing characteristic. Here, however, a difficulty presents itself. As regards the property of *life* or simple *vitality* it is quite impossible to make any distinction between animal and vegetable structures, and indeed, in the lowest forms of each, a distinctive definition is all but impossible, and yet, in the biblical account, *barâ* is only used for the strictly *animal* creations, while vegetation in all its forms is described as being *brought forth by the earth*, two days or periods before the *creation* of animals.

To meet this difficulty, Professor Guyot resorts to the

¹ See Creation (1893), p. 89.

following remarkable lines of arguments. First, he says, "If it [the development of plant life] is not indicated in the text by *barà*, it is because it is but the peristyle of the temple of true life, the *sentient* life, and the condition of its existence." Second, he says in effect, The words actually used in describing the advent of vegetation are "Let the earth bring forth," but these words are used in verse 20, for the creatures developed in the waters, which manifestly were possessed of sentient or animal life, therefore we are authorized in writing-in *barà* in place of "Let the earth bring forth," in verse 11.

In other words, having founded an argument and based a distinction on the special force and meaning of the word *barà*, "create," our author proceeds to show that this word is used, in the very same connection, as the equivalent of an expression so different as "the earth, or the waters, bring forth," and that therefore the *distinctive barà* may be written into the account in place of the apparently contrasting phrase "Let the earth bring forth."

If Professor Guyot had been aware that the original meaning of the word *barà* is "to carve," he would not have gone to such lengths in his effort to transfer it from the twenty-first verse into the eleventh verse.¹

A third argument founded on the erroneous translation of the fifth verse of the second chapter of Genesis, given in the Authorized Version, need not be noticed, as its foundation vanishes when the correct translation of the Revised Version is substituted.

¹ Gesenius, פָּרָא means, properly, *to cut, to carve, to form by cutting or carving*, compare the cognate Arabic root. The notion of breaking, cutting, separating, is inherent in the radical syllable פָּר, the same belongs also to the softer syllable פָּר.

See also article on "Cosmogony," by Professor Cheyne, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (9th ed.), where he also refers to Schrader and Mr. R. Martineau; Lange's *Genesis*, p. 127.

What shall we say with reference to such a process of reconciliation as this?

Does it really need comment? Returning, however, to the main issue now before us, the attempt to reconcile the specific statement of Genesis, that all sorts of plants and trees, including the highest orders, were developed in the third day or period, with the evidence of geology that none but the lowest forms were produced until long afterwards; this also would hardly seem to require comment. Its distinct statement is an adequate answer. However, as Professor Dana, in his article on the same subject,¹ substantially accepts and indorses what Professor Guyot says in this relation, I will quote what a few modern Hebrew scholars say on this subject.

Dr. Marcus Dods says, "The work of clothing the earth with plants is included in this same day. *Let the earth bring forth grass*, etc. The word translated *grass* means all tender, fresh green vegetation in general, of which two kinds are specified as being of importance to man, or as embracing the chief products of the soil, *the herb* and the *fruit-tree* (cp. verses 29 and 30). God said, *Let the earth bring forth*, conferring on the earth power to reproduce annually the requisite food. Hence, too, the mention of *seed*."²

Turning next to Dr. Driver's article in the *Andover Review*, 1887, p. 646, after quoting the eleventh verse in full, the writer says: "Can words express more plainly that, in the conception of the narrator, vegetation, including the higher kind of plants, such as fruit-trees, had appeared on the earth during the third day, two days—that is, *ex-hypothesi*, two periods—prior to the first appearance of animal life, on the fifth day? I ask Professor Dana, Is this in accordance with the teachings of science? Certainly it is not

¹ In *Bibliotheca Sacra* (April, 1885), p. 211.

² Genesis, pp. 3, 4.

in accordance with the teachings of his own 'Manual of Geology.' I there find it stated that land plants (such as alone are indicated by the words of Genesis) first appear contemporaneously with such invertebrata as mollusks, corals, and crustaceans, and that prior to this period nothing but the remains of *marine* plants are discoverable in the earth's strata."¹

Turning to the work of another Hebrew scholar,² we find "The Early Narratives of Genesis" to adopt throughout a position, like that of Dr. Driver, opposed to the reconcilers, but for brevity we will quote here only a few words on the present topic: "But were it possible that the well-known difficulties of 'the days,' the formation of the heavenly bodies, *the priority in creation of vegetable to animal life*, and of birds and fishes to reptiles, could be successfully met," etc. (p. 28). The italics are mine.

In this connection I would note that Professor Asa Gray of Cambridge, in his book "Natural Science and Religion,"³ refers to the impossibility of separating the lower grades of vegetable from those of animal life, even by the analysis of scientific methods, as a settled opinion of science.

This, of course, is not the expression of an opinion as to the geological evidence of the contemporary developments

¹ "Manual of Geology (ed. 3), p. 157, where, with reference to the graphite of the earliest or Laurentian rocks, which Professor Dana regards as 'strong evidence that plants of some kind, if not also animals [is this in agreement with Genesis?] were abundant, the words occur, 'The plants must have been the lowest cryptogams, or flowerless species; and mainly at least marine algæ or seaweeds; for the Primordial beds next succeeding contain remains of nothing higher. This argument from the Primordial examples exclude all mosses, and the *ordinary terrestrial plants*; but not necessarily lichens, since these grow in dry places, etc.' Even through the main periods of the Lower Silurian, in which the radiates, mollusks, etc. (animal forms), appear, 'algæ or seaweeds, of the kind called fucoids, are the only forms observed' (pp. 169, 186); the first traces of fernlike land plants are named on pp. 197-198."

² Dr. H. E. Ryle, Hulsean Professor of Divinity at Cambridge.

³ Scribner's Sons (1891), p. 10 *et seq.*

of the lower forms of animal and vegetable life, but is **only** the foundation for a strong inference in view of the theory of evolution, that their origin was a common one, and therefore contemporaneous.

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE V.

NO NATIONAL STABILITY WITHOUT MORALITY.

BY PRESIDENT CHARLES W. SUPER, LL.D.

THERE is, perhaps, no thought that occupies men's minds more frequently at the present time than admiration for the wonderful age in which we live. Nor is this surprising. When one compares the close of the year 1896 with that of the latter years of the sixties, and examines somewhat in detail the inventions and discoveries of the intervening period, he finds himself indeed in a new world. In no one particular has public opinion undergone a more marked change than in the estimate placed upon the value of knowledge, *per se*. So many secrets have been wrung from the keeping of material nature, and the knowledge thus gained has been turned, in so many ways, to the effective service of man, that the world seems to be looking for its temporal salvation in this direction. That the increase of the public welfare is commensurate with the advance of knowledge is an axiom that has influenced public opinion within the last few decades to a remarkable degree.

The most tangible expression of this belief is the liberality shown, both by states and individuals, in the establishment and support of institutions for the highest education. It is entirely safe to say that more money has been donated and voted for this purpose during the last ten or fifteen years than during the entire preceding history of our country. Most of it has come from men, and by the votes of men, whose scholastic qualifications are not above the average. They have been influenced in their action by the

tide of popular opinion, perhaps far more than by their own inclination, at least in a majority of instances. But this estimate of the value of knowledge is not confined to the United States. France has been extraordinarily liberal in its provision for both elementary and higher education. The Republic has literally covered the country with normal schools and faculties, corresponding to some extent to German universities. Germany has for a long time been conspicuous for its liberality in educational matters. Strangely, too, the Germans, under a government verging on a despotism, promote education, in order to maintain their political institutions; while France and the United States are pursuing the same course, in order to strengthen their free institutions. We have been persistently reminded that we must educate, or we must perish by our own prosperity; and that, unless we do so, we shall inevitably lose the liberties that have been handed down to us from our fathers. It is hard to see how anything can produce two diametrically opposite effects, and it may be profitable to examine the foundation upon which the popular belief rests.

If the effect of the general diffusion of knowledge is to promote the highest welfare of the largest number, it is probable that the form of government has little to do with the question. But it will be profitable to consider, whether those periods of the world that are most conspicuous for intelligence were, on the whole, the happiest; whether there are not other factors of the social organism, such as national traits, individual characteristics, and creeds, that are more potent for good than mere knowledge; and whether, conversely, we are not mistaken in assuming that all we need to do to make men better is to make them more intelligent. It is taken for granted that to make men more intelligent is to make them more reasonable. Is the assumption correct? Is it true that, as the

majority becomes enlightened, as the world judges enlightenment, they will be more ready to help those, always a large proportion, of the population who need help and guidance and encouragement?

One cannot read attentively the history of the ancient Greeks without feeling all the time that many of them clearly recognized the horrors of war, and the futility of engaging in it with a view of gaining any permanent good. This is plainly indicated in their historians, their philosophers, and their dramatic moralists. They recognize clearly, too, the existence of a rule of right that was not dependent upon the changing beliefs and impulses of men. They nevertheless were compelled to yield to public opinion in the midst of which they lived, and Greek civilization decayed under their eyes and through forces against which they continually protested. A modern historian even goes so far as to say that the Greeks were not naturally a warlike people, in spite of the fact that they were almost constantly engaged in war. Even in the Homeric Poems the transcendent value of obedience to law and the rule of right are clearly recognized. Yet how little influence did this recognition have on the progress of events. It is almost literally true that the most civilized and intelligent people of antiquity went to their destruction with their eyes open. Though wanting to do good, evil was ever present with them. It was impossible to make head against an all-powerful, pernicious public opinion that received its inspiration not from reason but from sentiment.

On the other hand, the Roman state was built up and maintained by the intense feeling of patriotism which made its citizens always act in the spirit of the maxim, "My country, right or wrong." The Romans possessed a genius for government which was not founded on intelligence, but on a national trait. Passing over a large interval of time, we find this genius the most marked in the English.

Yet, taken on a whole, it will hardly be claimed that they have been the most intelligent people of Europe for the last three or four hundred years. On the other hand, it seems clear that the moral forces have, during most of this time, been more active and more influential in England than in any country on the Continent.

Though there is some apparent injustice in comparing the two periods, owing to the difference in time, we are safe in saying that the Reformation in Germany had much less influence on the morals of the people than the movement inaugurated in England by the Wesleys and Whitefield. In mere scholastic learning Germany was unquestionably far ahead of England in the middle of the eighteenth century, and probably for a long time before. The same is true in a more marked degree of France. Yet, while France and Germany were filled with scholars and men of genius, the country was going from bad to worse, and, so far as a regeneration came, it was not inspired or carried out by them. In England, moral and religious forces have always been active and vigorous, as they still are; on the Continent, except at rare intervals, weak. No matter how much we investigate, no matter how large a stock of facts we accumulate, if one has no inclination to use them, of what advantage are they? And while England is doing less to-day than either France or Germany to promote intelligence, and put the highest learning within the reach of all, we do not hear of much that is done to promote practical morality in the latter countries. If we are to judge the situation from the testimony of Germans and Frenchmen, the moral condition of their countrymen is becoming worse as they are becoming more intelligent. Plainly the salvation of the world does not come through worldly wisdom. This is a truth confirmed by past experience and present observation.

In view of the testimony just cited, the man who be-

lieved that "righteousness exalteth a nation" may well ask, What then shall we do? Evidently to fill the land with scholars is not to fill it with men of character, with men who believe in doing right because it is right. If the more intelligent members of a community are truthful and commercially honest because the practice of truth and honesty are the characteristics of a gentleman, but take no interest in the weak and degraded, it is not hard to see where and to what such indifference will lead.

If there is any good reason for the somewhat widely diffused faith in the efficacy of mere education to promote the happiness of mankind, it ought to become strikingly manifest in the growing aversion to war. Is this so? A recent writer truthfully says: "If men forsake the use of swords and spears, it assuredly is not to convert them into plough-shares and pruning-hooks, but to substitute rifled cannon for these antique instruments of slaughter, now found ineffectively murderous. Surely never was the aspect of Europe so threatening as it is at the present hour. Standing armies of a vastness hitherto undreamed of confront one another. The frontiers of every country are embattled. Railways are converted into military roads. The physical sciences are ransacked for engines of carnage. The whole continent is an immense parade-ground, destined,—who can say how soon?—to become a vast battlefield." "'Tis pity, and pity 'tis, 'tis true." In this willingness of the nations of the earth to engage in deadly conflict with each other, upon a trifling pretext, we see the power of irrational motives operating destructively. It is the spirit of a pack of mastiffs ready to fly at each other's throat as soon as an opportunity is offered. One does not need to have been a very profound student of history to know that when two governments wanted to go to war with each other they easily found a reason for so doing. Most of these professed reasons were flimsy enough, but

they served their purpose. The world is still ready, as it always has been, to applaud a weak nation for taking up arms against a strong one, though the outcome is plain beforehand. It at least shows pluck,—a praiseworthy trait, certainly, but it needs proper direction.

We all know the story of the German professor, who, when told that his house was on fire, said to his informant, "Go tell my wife; I never meddle with domestic affairs." He was a typical student; absorbed in some insignificant matter, he took no account of what was going on around him. In truth, the people have never perished for lack of knowledge, but for lack of the will to use it. When we see on what utterly useless trifles many men have spent their lives merely because they hoped to find out something never known before, we need to beware of expecting the world's salvation to depend on mere worldly wisdom. There has never been a time in what we may properly call the history of the world when there was not sufficient available knowledge to make all men as happy as they can ever expect to be, if they had seriously tried to use it. John Howard was a man of slender intellectual attainments as the world estimates attainments, but he was inspired by the noble motive to use what he knew for the uplifting of the neglected and vile of his race. And thousands before and after him have done the same. Not many wise are called, as the world counts wisdom; yet, except for these, the present generation would be far worse off than it is.

The moral law is founded on reason, but it does not appeal primarily to the reasoning faculties. To not more than three of the commands of the Decalogue is added a reason for obeying them. They seem to have been framed on the principle that men should obey as children are taught to obey their parents, in the full reliance that obedience may safely be trusted to justify itself. It is a maxim well established by experience, that he who stops to reason

when temptation assails him is in great danger of yielding. The only safe course is to turn resolutely away from even the appearance of evil. We do not believe that those who know most are the best. If this were so, the professional men in every country would be models of uprightness. There is much justification for the intuitive dread with which many a mother sees her son go away to college. It is not surprising that the plain people fear the effect on the moral character which the larger outlook gained by increasing knowledge brings with it. We need not wonder that in so many ages of the world some of the best men and women have looked back to the good old times with an inexpressible longing.

There has always been a movement of the population to the towns, and from the towns to the cities. It has never been more marked than in our day. No one can be blind to the fact, that, where the population is most dense, the elevating agencies are most powerful; but it is equally evident, that these agencies are often utterly inadequate to the demands made upon them. Yet it is to-day as it has been always; we look to the cities as the centers of intelligence and culture. No one who is morally weak seeks the city that he may be reformed, because he will find there many intelligent people, many fine churches, many eloquent preachers, great lawyers, and distinguished physicians. He will seek his own regeneration rather by reversing his course, and going where these conditions do not prevail. It is a well-established maxim, that cities are centers of moral turpitude of every form, and it has always been so.

The more one studies the epistolary writings of the New Testament in the light of the conditions under which they were produced, the more he becomes impressed with the marvelous insight into the needs of their time exhibited by the writers. They developed and applied the simple teachings of the Founder of Christianity in a manner that can-

not fail to command our admiration. Every Epistle is different from every other, according as the circumstances of those addressed were unlike, yet the fundamental theme is everywhere the same; the motives to which appeal is made, are the same. The various schools of Greek philosophy had each essayed in vain to provide a regenerative force. They were all originally too intellectual, and had in time degenerated into mere idle speculation, or into quiescent introspection. So far as they had any definite aim, it was to know, not what and how to do. The author of the "Education of the Greek People" well says, "Until the supernatural sense can recognize as its object a living God, or Being with perfect intelligence, love, and will, supernaturally correlated, but in no sense identical with the spirit of men, so that his perfections are their goal and not his being, their grave, it will never be able to maintain itself against abstracting reason or supply the basis of moral life." And again, "The lesson of history is, that of all the faculties of the human soul, that which demands the most careful training is the supernatural sense. While it remains undeveloped all other education leads ultimately to nothing. It was the failure to recognize this that made Greek education impotent to save the world, and forced it to crown itself with Christianity, whose function is to train the supernatural sense to a recognition of the living God as the Father of Spirits, the guardian of the moral law, and the bond of institutional life."

Passing again to modern times, for we are not here concerned with chronological sequence but with parity of conditions, we find many points of resemblance between western Europe in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century and the Roman Empire in the time of Christ. What is called the literature of these periods takes singularly little account of the common people. They are not the submerged tenth, but the neglected two-thirds or

more. The classical writers of these periods rarely mention them, except to stigmatize their brutality, rail at their ignorance, or sneer at their stupidity. It is true there exists a considerable body of devotional literature called into existence by the spiritual wants of those who aspired to a better life, but these books rarely found their way into the hands of the educated, and certainly did not exercise any influence on them. As in England, so in Germany and France, there was always a considerable portion of the population that were genuinely pious and sincerely desirous to lead pure and holy lives. But the masses were little, if at all, influenced by their example. Not until our own day did it occur to any one to write a *History of the English People*,—apparently because hitherto readers were only interested to know what the upper class, those who were more or less concerned in shaping the political destinies of the country, did.

A brilliant passage from Kidd's "*Social Evolution*" (page 236) sums up briefly the result of the forces and counter forces. "It has to be confessed that in England during the nineteenth century the educated classes, in almost all the great political changes that have been effected, have taken the side of the party afterwards admitted to have been in the wrong. They have invariably opposed at the time the measures they have subsequently come to defend and justify. This is to be noticed alike of measures which have extended education, which have emancipated trade, which have extended the franchise. The educated classes have even, it must be confessed, opposed measures which have tended to secure religious freedom and to abolish slavery. The motive force behind the long list of progressive measures carried along during this period has in scarcely any appreciable measure come from the educated classes; it has come almost exclusively from the middle and lower classes, who have in turn acted, not under the

stimulus of intellectual motives, but under the influence of their altruistic feelings."

I am aware that he who undertakes to show the influence of motives generally classed as irrational in the development of society and to set forth their potency for good lays himself open to the charge of returning to the text on which the school of Rousseau preached so many powerful sermons in the last century. The influence and vitality of the doctrines so forcibly proclaimed by a man who was almost without education is a strong tribute to their truthfulness. In Germany a man of different mould, but aroused by the same conditions, was spurred to action while his French prototype was content to talk and write. The new doctrines were promulgated at a time when Europe was at least to some extent prepared for them, though this preparedness consisted rather in dissatisfaction with the old than a clear recognition of the needed remedy. The conservatism of the upper classes had become well-nigh unendurable. Their rule of life was regulated by the thought that for them the state existed; for them government performed its functions; it was right for them to exploit the resources of the country to the fullest extent it would bear. Almost all who had the courage to cry out against the existing conditions were proscribed; were often in danger of incarceration and even of their lives. That one man is as good as another; that all men are brothers and bound together by obligations to mutual helpfulness; that it is the duty of the weak to protect the strong, are not articles that are found in the creed of those who stand foremost in the ranks of the intelligent. It is Christianity, and Christianity alone, that has always insisted on the supreme importance of such teachings to the welfare of mankind in the widest sense. And it was just because the intelligent classes, not excepting those whose calling made them the exponents of Christianity, had long

ignored these teachings, that a protest arose against the wretched condition in which the poor were perforce kept, from so many of those who had no sympathy with the prevailing religious creeds. It was altruistic feeling breaking through the crust of custom that had been hardened by the conservatism of centuries.

This brief sketch of facts and inferences is not intended as a protest against the growing intelligence of our time. It is written for the purpose of calling attention to a serious danger into which we seem to be rapidly drifting. Some of the European nations are already on the verge of a precipice over which they may topple at any moment. There are few things for which it is impossible to find a reason. The most atrocious crimes have had their defenders; the most unjust institutions their apologists. Sentiments and ideas, too, are often misleading; yet it is in obedience to these mainsprings of action that the world has grown better. They are the prime motors in human progress. They furnish motives to which all men in every progressive country naturally respond. It is with them that reformers have primarily to reckon; it is to them they must chiefly look for support; against them it is impossible to make head. We may enlighten the head as much as we please, if we do not succeed in filling the heart with proper sentiments we shall not inspire any one to activity or to self-sacrifice for the good of others. It will hardly be denied that a large proportion of those who are engaged in research have no interest whatever in the welfare of mankind. Unquestionably the wisest activity is conditioned by the largest knowledge; but he who never acts until he is sure of being familiar with the entire situation will usually never act at all. I know of no caution that the enlightened nations of the world need more at this time than that against depending on mere human learning to bring about the state of affairs for which all good men wish and for which they devoutly pray.

ARTICLE VI.

IS THE RECOGNITION OF THE CHURCH YEAR
BY ALL CHRISTIANS DESIRABLE?

BY THE REV. R. DE WITT MALLARY, D.D.

THE annual recurrence of the season of Lent reminds us that a considerable part of Christendom is not accustomed to observe the church year, and it is the purpose of this article to plead for the judicious reinstatement of what has not inaptly been called "the chronological creed of the church."

In the history of the Christian church a very early and a very important place is assigned to the church year, which grew very naturally with the growth of the church, just as national holidays grow with the progress of the nation's life and stability. It is natural to keep anniversaries: nations thus honor the memory of their remarkable men and events; families thus observe the various occasions of interest which have taken place in the home circle. Precisely in the same way grew up the church year in the history and practice of the Christian church. The inception of the idea of celebrating by annually-recurring festivals the various events in the life of Christ was born of affection, and very early, doubtless in the apostolic age, it became the custom to observe the anniversaries of the passion, death, and resurrection in an Easter festival, and the outpouring of the Holy Ghost fifty days afterwards in a Pentecost, or Whitsunday festival, the two corresponding to the Jewish feasts of Passover and Pentecost. Thus dimly was the church year foreshadowed. In the three ensuing

centuries, embracing the period of the long and bitter persecutions of Christianity and the early history of its adoption as the state religion of the Roman Empire,—the period of the Fathers and antedating by a long interval the later corruptions,—this church year had grown out of outline into a well-defined and settled practice, out of shadow into reality. It is true that there was not during this period entire unanimity as to the times of observing certain feasts, as is seen in the original keeping of Easter, concerning which the Roman and Greek churches have always more or less differed, though the Council of Nicæa (325 A.D.) ordered that Easter should be observed on the same day by all the churches. It is true also that in different sections there was the recognition of certain feasts which were not included in the calendar of other sections; as Epiphany, which came from the East, and Christmas, which was of Western origin. It is true, also, that there was a wide difference of opinion as to the length of the observance of certain anniversary seasons; as, for example, in the case of the fast before Easter, variously observed as one day in certain places, forty hours in others, and forty days (Quadragesima) in still others. The very disagreements observed, however, point to an affectional and spontaneous origin, rather than to a studied inception in hollow spectacularism. Moreover, the principal feasts of the church which formed the skeleton of the church year were not only Christological, as Christmas, Epiphany, Easter, Ascension, Whitsunday, but were a part of the church practice when that was nearest to the original fountain-head of apostolic wisdom.

Other feasts of a doubtful character crept in even during this early period; but we must remember that what may have become the worship of the saints in a later age, and what has in an unlimited way expanded the hagiology of the church, was in the outset only the memory of the saints. On February 22, for example, we remember Washington;

but not the remotest suspicion was ever advanced that such a holiday conduced, or could ever conduce, to the worship of him who was "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen." The early church expressly inhibited the worship of saints, while it sanctioned and practiced certain memorial observances in honor of the apostles, and of certain distinguished Christian teachers and workers in the apostolic age, as, St. Stephen, St. Mark, and St. Barnabas. If the commemoration of the saints lapsed early into a degraded worship,—a worship which seems to have the sanction of certain great names at least in the fourth century,—we must not forget the high initial purpose which underlay the institution of fixed festal seasons named for the martyrs:—a purpose that meant no more than we every Sunday affirm when we say, "I believe in the communion of the saints;"—a purpose that was originally as pure as that of certain sections of Christendom in keeping "Forefathers' Day."

It is interesting to observe, also, as a feature of that early practice, that the reasons for assigning certain feasts to special seasons or days of the year were not always arbitrary. Sometimes a festival was fixed with reference to its appropriateness to striking peculiarities of the seasons; as, Easter in the spring, because of returning life; Christmas at the winter solstice, because of increasing light day by day; and the feast of the nativity of John the Baptist (June 24) at the summer solstice, for the opposite reason with reference to the words of John, "He must increase, but I must decrease." Sometimes a festival day was appointed with reference to some special feature in the life of the person whom the church wished to remember. St. Stephen's day was thus fixed for December 26, the day after the Nativity, because Stephen was the first martyr to seal with his blood the faith in Christ. St. John the Evangelist's day was appointed for December 27 so as to be near

the day of Christ's birth, because of the intimacy between Jesus and the "beloved disciple," and because John's Gospel contains the enunciation of the doctrine of the Incarnation: "The Word was made flesh." Innocents' day is assigned to December 28, in order to emphasize with St. Stephen's and St. John the Evangelist's days the martyrology of the church. But the feast-days which marked the church year, including by that term those which were movable, occurring on Sunday and for the most part Christological, and those which were fixed, being mainly, with the exception of Christmas and Epiphany, in honor of the apostles, martyrs, and saints, and falling upon any day of the week,—amounted, all told, to very few, compared with the multitudinous feast-days and holy-days which crowded the calendar of a later age.

The Anglican, Lutheran, and German Reformed churches at the time of the Reformation purified the church year of the accretions with which the ecclesiastical calendar had become overloaded to the extent of minimizing its Christological, or even Christian, features, but they left the idea of a church year intact. What they specifically attempted was to bring the church year back to its original purity and simplicity, and any one may see in the Book of Common Prayer of the Episcopal Church approximately what the custom of the Christian church in its early period was in this respect. It is more than likely that a considerable part of the Christian world would wish to carry the principle of exclusion farther than the Anglican revision has attempted, which left in the calendar some feasts of a known late origin, and some of a character which would not be acceptable to all Protestants; but it would be the height of childish sectarianism, because we do not wish to emend the church year, to expunge it! The Anglican cycle includes two Marian festivals: The Annunciation of Mary, assigned to March 25, the first

trace of which appears about 430 A.D., though not sanctioned until 656 at Toledo; and the Purification of Mary, fixed for February 2, which became general after the middle of the sixth century, both of which were the outgrowths of an excessive veneration of the mother of Jesus, which indeed early manifested itself, but received no specific place in the cult of the church until later. Inasmuch as our purpose is not polemic, but irenic, we decline to discuss here the right of a Marian festival to a place in the church year; but we may say, that she who was "highly favored among women," she whose Magnificat forms one of the most valued treasures in Christian hymnody, she who sustained the nearest relation to the Saviour of mankind, does not deserve to be contemned, if she is not worshiped.

Still the retention of the church calendar is consonant with the excision of these two festivals; yes, and consistent also with the rejection of a good many more which find place in the cult of some of the Reformed churches. The Feast of the Circumcision (January 1) is late; probably originated in the sixth century. The Feast of the Transfiguration (August 6) cannot be traced farther than the middle of the seventh century. Michaelmas, or the Feast of St. Michael and all the holy angels (September 29), is first mentioned as a feast of the church by the Council of Maintz (813). Even the Feast of the Trinity (the Sunday after Whitsunday), which gives its name to the last half of the year, is certainly late, not having been decreed until 1334 by John XXII., and All Saints' day (November 1) was not established till the eighth century. Of all these later feasts the one which has most justified its right to be is the last mentioned, presenting as it does a convenient time to freshen and perpetuate the memory of those who have departed from our midst during the year. Relieved of these specified features, the Anglican cult has

preserved to us a church year, sung by Keble and linked with folk-lore by Brand, which reflects the early practice of the Christian church, and as such is not the creation or the possession of any one section of the church, but is the common heritage of the church catholic, using that term as inclusive of all its parts. It is a calendar at once primitive and sufficiently embracive, and it aims at the exaltation of the great Head of the church. It distributes the gospel story through the year, and it links the church of each succeeding age with a hoary and holy antiquity; and if there is any argument in the potency of immemorial usage, certainly this should commend the church year to all Christians, if not for their adoption, at least for their consideration.

It may be asked, then, How have the majority of the evangelical churches so-called lost out of their life and thought that which early formed an integral place in the cult of the church?

It is the peril of all reformations that they go too far in the substitution of one *régime* for another. Revolution is blind, unreasoning change effected with resistless celerity; and while reformation is "slower of foot," more thoughtful and more methodical, it always attracts to itself fanaticism, which it with difficulty represses. An ultra spirit of merciless vindictiveness is evoked which is not easily exorcised. The work of the Protestant Reformation is an instance in point. It was not completed in England for a century and a half after the initial protest of Luther at Erfurt. The Anglican, and the Independent, nonconforming churches had their birth in this epoch of intellectual and ecclesiastical unrest, and in their origin were not far apart, though in their constitution and practice they were widely separated, and bitterly at enmity. It was a period—that hundred and fifty years ending with the flight of James II. from Whitehall—when now the Anglican Church, now the Independ-

ent, and now the Catholic, was at the helm of government.

The Puritan stream of religious history and activity, swelling proudly onward, and bearing on its bosom the enrichment of the nations, took its rise in the poisoned springs of rancor and hate so prevalent at this period. The genesis of Puritanism, essentially a reform-movement, stamped upon the churches that grew out of it an ineffaceable inheritance of deep and cherished hatred towards all formalism, and also gave to them a contempt for historic continuity, and we have been looking at the splendid history of the Christian church with warped judgments ever since. Puritanism turned and overturned, but particularly overturned. It refused to kneel at Communion, and so received the sacrament, sitting or standing; and in some places even walking. It objected to crosses, or the signs of the cross, and so in the day of its triumph it hewed down altars and melted up statues. It abominated the Prayer-Book, and called it a Mass-Book. It derided the vestments of the clergy, and, abhorring read prayers, substituted in its "conventicles" extemporaneous prayers, concerning which Bunyan, himself a Dissenter, said, "He is counted nobody now that cannot at any time, at a minute's warning, make a prayer of half-an-hour long"; yes, and sometimes two hours long! It eliminated from worship all bowings, and the judgment of its ecclesiastical posterity has favored and ratified from age to age its action in that respect; but it also read out of that worship of God in his holy sanctuary the Lord's Prayer, the Decalogue, and the Apostles' Creed, and the same posterity has been quietly undoing the work of the fathers in that particular, though not until the lapse of nearly two centuries, the replacement of these liturgic features having been effected, in spite of much opposition, almost within the memory of the younger generations. And finally it abolished all holy-days, turned Christmas and all feast-days into fast-days, effaced the whole calendar of saints, and ob-

literated the Christian year; and all this it did as effectually as the Inquisition crushed out heresy from Spain and Bohemia, so that hardly the memory of it exists. The General Assembly of Scotland, August 6, 1575, resolved "that all such days which heretofore have been kept holy, besides the Sabbath days, such as Yule [Christmas] saints' days, and such others may be abolished, and a civil penalty be appointed against the keepers thereof by ceremonies, banqueting, fasting, and such other vanities." The Directory issued by the Long Parliament (1644) contains this: "Festival days, vulgarly called holy days, having no warrant in the Word of God, are not to be continued." These two edicts are three generations apart, showing how rigorously and ceaselessly the Puritan movement held to its basal ideas, substituting for the harmonious sweep of the diapason a monotonous thrumming on one note; and if we add to that gestatory period between 1575 and 1644 the two centuries which have elapsed since, during which the practice of the New England and cognate churches which grew out of that movement has perpetuated early religious prejudices, the attitude of these churches towards the church year will be explicable.

It goes without saying, that the Puritan Reformation went altogether too far. The churches which were born out of its womb have been proclaiming it in these latter days. It seems hardly possible that it is only within three short decades that we have restored Easter to its place in the Christian year and in Christian worship. We have become reconciled to floral cruciform emblems, if not to brazen ones. We are not afraid of Holy Week any longer, and Good Friday is losing some of its terrors though not generally recognized, significant as the fact is that Massachusetts, the cradle of Puritanism in the New World, is considering the project of making it a holiday in lieu of her recently abolished fast-day. Aside

from these indications of a conservative and moderate reaction from Puritan extremism, there is practically no recognition of the church year by the churches which grew out of the revolt against Anglicanism. Even Christmas day is by them hardly ever religiously observed, although they shrink no longer from mince-pie in the celebration of that festival, as it is soberly stated by Professor Green that the Puritans did. Their children know not the meaning of the terms "Epiphany," "Ascension," or "Whitsuntide," scarcely even the terms themselves; and Lent, if it has any significance to them, has mainly an ichthyological one, owing to their comradeship in the public schools with children of other faiths. The special days set apart to the memory of the apostles and martyrs have no place in their calendar; and thus the churches of the Puritan faiths, in severing themselves from Romanism and Anglicanism, have separated themselves from much that was their common Christian heritage. Will they perpetuate the cult of their iconoclastic fathers, or are the present reactionary symptoms favorable to the establishment of an historic continuity between them and the church of the ages?

We contend for the reinstatement of the church year throughout Christendom upon the following grounds, prefacing our argument with only this single remark, that three things should govern us with reference to the reinstatement of any custom of the church which a fervid reaction may have laid ruthless and destructive hands upon, viz., its venerableness, its inception at a time when the state of the church was proximately pure, and its appropriateness for the glorification of Christ or for the inculcation of Christian teaching. These principles seem to be fundamental and determinative, ruling out indeed some of the days now observed by the Anglican Church which greatly simplified the church year. A cycle of festivals that should reproduce the practice of the early church in part, and that

should contribute to the worship of Christ and the life in him and for him, would rule out the later hagiology, and would purify the earlier. The marrow of the Christian calendar would then be constituted of those feasts which the church has found to emphasize the great central facts and truths of Christ's life and of the Christian religion. It is such a cycle as that which should be revived and conserved by that part of evangelical Christianity so-called which has paid little or no attention to the observance of the church year.

What, then, are some of the reasons why the church year should be observed by all Christians? Let it be noted, in the first place, that it emphasizes the essential idea of the church, as a something "called out" (*ἐκκλησία*), an institution separated from the world with a life, a history, and ordinances of its own. It may be said that in some countries of Europe where every other day seems to be sacred to the memory of some canonized mortal, and where shrines are placed in little niches in the street walls, the church is prominent in the life of a people not overgiven to the cardinal virtues and graces. It is only necessary to reply, that the indefinite expansion of the church year is not primitive; tends to prevent reverence for holy things by cheapening them; and, like a letter every word of which is underscored and therefore no word is emphatic, such a calendar defeats what it was designed to promote. In an "Ahab-served-Baal-a-little-but-Jehu-shall-serve-him-much" sort of way, it is destructive of the significance and spirit of the whole idea. A festal cycle of observances which tend to idleness and spiritless formalism is no better than a rotation of unhallowed days each one of which is only a little more intent than the one preceding upon forgetting God and his church. In America every day is St. Midas' day, when everybody is scrambling to get place in the pathway of the oncoming Golden Car of Juggernaut. A "church

year" judiciously determined by a consensus of Christendom (so far as possible) would emphasize and enhance the idea of the church in the world's thought, would introduce no disturbing element into business or secular affairs by the frequency of its holy-days, would, in the language of the late Dr. Schaff, who, true to his Lutheran antecedents, felt intensely the neglect of the church year, "interweave religion with the life of the people by continuously recalling to the popular mind the most important events on which our salvation rests."

The Christian year, it is to be observed in the second place, presents Christian truth in its completeness, by these anniversaries commemorating the basal facts of Christianity: the incarnation, the humiliation, the sufferings and death, the resurrection, ascension, and risen life of Jesus of Nazareth. Churches and ministers are thus helped to keep out of thought-ruts, the tendency of isolated thinking. The church year is in a certain way the objectifying of Christian truth, lending it not only prominence, but symmetry. If it be said that some of these festival-days are kept now by the universal church, it would be more correct to say that one of them is kept—Easter. Christmas is celebrated religiously by only a small part of Protestant Christendom, which exaggerates its pagan features early imparted to it and its votive offerings at the shrine of St. Nicholas, at the expense of its real significance. It is indeed within the memory of those who are not yet in middle life that Easter has come to be recognized in any but the Anglican and Roman churches. Advent, Lent, Ascension, Whitsuntide—eminently Christian in their original significance and tendency—have not only suffered from the indifferentism, but from the hostility, of many sections of the Protestant world, which even would be for reading out of their communions any one who should plead for their reinstatement. Why? Did not these seasons originate in primitive, Christian prac-

tice? Do they not conduce to the exaltation of Christ? Do they not afford opportunity for helpful and symmetrical presentations of Christian truth? Or is it because they are a part of the cult of the Roman Church? Ah! "there's the rub." The goldenrod might as well disdain the air which the aster breathes as for the Protestant Church to ignore its common inheritance and life with the Roman Church. Or is it because the tendency of festivals and fasts is toward that degeneracy which the prophets everywhere rebuke? Then why did Jesus "keep the feast"? Yea, more! we who characterize, yes and caricature, people who observe Lent, as doing up all their penitence as a *coup de théâtre*, are we quite willing to be judged by the same standards of charity concerning our "Week of Prayer"? Would we like to hear it said that we do up all our intercessory prayer in one short week at the beginning of each year? The recognition of the tendency of a form to produce mechanical piety is the best guard against its baneful effect, but it does not follow that we should seek the abolition of the form. What reproduces primitive Christianity, exalts Christ and emphasizes Christian truth in its entirety, must have some other reason than prejudice or fear or sectarian uncharitableness to warrant its discontinuance.

Another reason which should impel Christendom to its duty in this matter is the sentimental one of being in touch with its own Past. The accentuation of an important doctrine may not always be needed to enhance it or impress it; but when, by an anniversary of some event or teaching, the individual is one with the continuity of historic thought and custom it is seen that a powerful argument pleads for the reinstatement of the church year. The church is thus unified, and harmonized with its own past. The spectacle of seasonal celebrations is thus presented on the background of the ages. We enjoy in them a mystic commun-

ion with the saints. We are one with the splendid progress of the Christian faith, going forth with stately triumph over its enemies, and celebrating with each recurring cycle the victory of truth over error, of righteousness over unrighteousness, of God over the conspiracies and malignities of evil:—a steady, onward, mighty, and resistless progress from age to age. We breathe the inspirations of the past; we feel its power behind us and about us. England's greater stability than other European nations grows out of its glorious Past from which it has been steadily evolved. No church has any right to monopolize the common domain of antiquity; and with that antiquity the church year puts us closely in touch. And not only has this feeling of union with the Past power over those who are inside the pale of the church, but over those who are outside. Hawthorne's comparison of Christianity to a stained window whose outside is somber and dull, but which, seen from the vaulted aisle, is instinct with significance and beauty, is not quite true. There is a splendid attractiveness to external Christianity, her history, her ceremonial, her feast-days, her worship and ritual, her contribution to art, literature and music, and her church year, all of which force her influence through the outworks of the senses to the citadel of the heart.

A final consideration to be emphasized is, that the recognition of the church year by all Christians would be a most practical and valuable step in the right direction towards Christian unity. If the prayer of the great Head of the church is ever to be realized, it will be by the deepening in Christian hearts of the spirit of concession and conciliation up to the point where we do not trench upon conviction as to the great and fundamental truths. To insist on the invalidity of any ordination but Episcopal, would provoke and intensify opposition to any scheme of union until doomsday; to make subscription to the Vatican de-

cree of infallibility obligatory would be to postpone unity forever; to foist impossible conditions into the question of Christian unity would be cold Mephistophelian hypocrisy, showing us to be intent on our shibboleths, and little concerned for the aggressive and progressive work of the church of God. To consent, however, to the reëstablishment of the church year in all parts of Christendom ought to be no impossible requirement, but a measure which all parts of the dismembered church of Christ should be swift to adopt, if by so doing the cause of Christian unity would be furthered. Such a reinstatement of the calendar would do violence to no Scripture, outrage no sentiment of conviction worthy the name, produce no evil result but only good, and, aside from interweaving religion with the daily life and emphasizing the truths of Christianity, aside from linking the church with its past and making her more attractive to the common people, would help to unify the church. As the distinguished leader of the Presbyterian host, the late Professor H. B. Smith, has said, "These festivals which make up the church year are a standing proof against infidelity by a public and solemn recognition of essential facts, and all different denominations could unite in their observance without sacrificing any article of faith or discipline."

We believe the time is coming when all portions of the church year will be as loyally and universally observed as is the restored festival of Christ's resurrection. It is the trend of the mighty march of a tolerant Christian spirit, and all prejudices and sophistries will be as chaff before its approach. It is the swing of the pendulum backward, seeking equilibrium. It is the growth of the leaven of the gospel in the church. Nevertheless, this increasing observance of the church year will be brought about, not by a fiat, but by natural processes. Those churches which have not hitherto conformed to the calendar, and which

desire so to perpetuate an olden and cherished custom of the church, can speed such a consummation in many ways. In their midweek prayer-meetings there could be such flexibility of arrangement that their gathering for conference should fall in the week in which there was a special day set apart by the church upon that holy-day. Again, one of the serious objections to the International Sunday-School Lesson system has been that it gave almost no recognition to the church year, so that the children are often preparing (?) for Advent and Easter by a course of study in the historical books of the Old Testament, a difficulty that could be easily adjusted, and still retain the benefits of the International Lesson system wherever there were schools which preferred this method of studying the Bible. The hymn and tune books of all churches could be adapted to the church year without destroying their devotional value or interfering with the convenience of their topical method of arrangement. Whitsunday was observed in the early church by large numbers of baptisms, so that it might have been called with truth "Baptism Sunday." We have a day (May 1) when baptisms very generally take place, particularly infant baptisms. How much better to let that day harmonize with Whitsuntide in the church year! Then there is a day, "All Saints day" (November 1), which was not established till late, but which is valuable for Christian teaching and for its appropriateness as a memorial-day. How pleasant it would be if each church were to remember on that day those who have laid down their earthly industry and warfare during the year, or if it were to enforce some of the lessons of immortality and the heavenly life! Epiphany (January 6) brings to mind crowds of Old Testament theophanies, and by contrast the grand manifestation of manifestations! St. Stephen's, St. John's, and Holy Innocents' days afford an introduction of the most direct and pressing kind with which to begin the winter special

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seasons of service, if such are desired, when men are perhaps more urgently entreated to "stand up and be counted" on the side of God and righteousness. Lent affords a long and precious opportunity to get attention to biblical doctrine, as does Advent. Indeed, it is hardly possible to conceive how the church year may not be utilized effectively by all of Protestant Christendom in the regular work and worship of their churches, and when we think of the reasons which clamor for its reinstatement, we wonder that they have so long permitted themselves to be severed from this historic calendar, which is at once their inheritance, a mighty factor conditioning their own growth, and an olive-branch towards the reunion of Christendom.

ARTICLE VII.

THE IDEAL OF CHURCH MUSIC.

BY PROFESSOR EDWARD DICKINSON.

ST. AUGUSTINE, in the tenth book of his "Confessions," speaking of the dangers to the welfare of his soul which lie in the pleasures of the senses to which he is susceptible, thus describes the conflicts which he was compelled to undergo in resisting the seductive influences of music:—

"The delights of the ear had more powerfully inveigled and conquered me, but Thou didst unbind and liberate me. Now in those airs which Thy words breathe soul into, when sung with a sweet and tranquil voice, do I somewhat repose; yet not so as to cling to them, but so as to free myself when I wish. But with the words which are their life do they, that they may gain admission into me, strive after a place of some honor in my heart; and I can hardly assign them a fitting one. Sometimes I appear to myself to give them more respect than is fitting, as I perceive that our minds are more devoutly and earnestly elevated into a flame of piety by the holy words themselves when they are sung than when they are not; and that all affections of our spirit, by their own diversity, have their appropriate measures in the voice and singing, wherewith I know not by what secret relationship they are stimulated. But the gratification of my flesh, to which the mind ought never to be given over to be enervated, often beguiles me, while the sense does not so attend on reason as to follow her patiently; but having gained admission merely for her sake, it strives even to run on before her and be her leader. Thus

in these things do I sin unknowing, but afterward do I know it."

"Sometimes, again, avoiding very earnestly this same deception, I err out of too great preciseness; and sometimes so much as to desire that every air of the pleasant songs to which David's Psalter is often used be banished both from my ears and those of the church itself. Notwithstanding, when I call to mind the tears I shed at the songs of Thy church at the outset of my recovered faith, and how even now I am moved not by the singing but by what is sung, I then acknowledge the great utility of this custom. Thus vacillate I between dangerous pleasure and tried soundness, being inclined rather (though I pronounce no irrevocable opinion upon the subject) to approve the use of singing in the church, that so by the delights of the ear the weaker minds may be stimulated to a devotional frame. Yet when it happens to me to be more moved by the singing than by what is sung I confess myself to have sinned criminally, and then I would rather not have heard the singing. See now the condition I am in! . . . O Lord my God, give ear, behold and see and have mercy upon me and heal me,—Thou in whose sight I am become a puzzle to myself; and 'this is my infirmity.'"

A similar attitude of distrust toward artistic music in worship was taken by Cardinal Newman. He says, in his "Idea of a University":—

"These high ministers of the Beautiful and Noble [viz., the fine arts] are, it is claimed, special attendants and handmaids of Religion; but it is equally plain that they are apt to forget their place, and, unless restrained with a firm hand, instead of being servants will aim at becoming principals. Here lies the advantage, in an ecclesiastical point of view, of their rudimental state, I mean of the ancient style of architecture, of Gothic sculpture and painting, and of what is called Gregorian music, that these in-

choate sciences have so little innate vigor and life in them, that they are in no danger of going out of their place, and giving the law to Religion. But the case is very different when genius has breathed upon their natural elements, and has developed them into what I may call intellectual powers."

After speaking of the way in which painting ceases to be helpful to the church when it attains the fullness of its function as an imitative art, Dr. Newman goes on to say:—

"What I have been observing about Painting holds, I think, analogously in the marvelous development which Musical Science has undergone in the last century. Doubtless here too the highest genius may be subservient to Religion; here too, still more simply than in the case of Painting, the Science has a field of its own, perfectly innocent, into which Religion does not and need not enter; on the other hand here also, in the case of Music as of Painting, it is certain that Religion must be alive and on the defensive, for, if its servants sleep, a potent enchantment will steal over it. Music, I suppose, has an object of its own; it is the expression of ideas greater and more profound than any in this visible world, ideas which center in Him who is the seat of all beauty, order, and perfection whatever, still ideas after all which are not those on which Revelation directly and principally fixes our gaze. If then a great master in this mysterious science throws himself on his own gift, trusts its inspiration, and absorbs himself in those thoughts which, though they come to him in the way of nature, belong to things above nature, it is obvious that he will neglect everything else. Rising in his strength, he will break through the trammels of words, he will scatter human voices, even the sweetest, to the winds; he will be borne upon nothing less than the fullest flood of sounds which art has enabled him to draw from mechanical contrivances; he will go forth as a giant, as far as ever his in-

struments can reach, starting from their secret depths fresh and fresh elements of beauty and grandeur as he goes, and pouring them together into still more marvelous and rapturous combinations; and well indeed and lawfully, while he keeps to that line which is his own; but should he engage in sacred themes, is it not certain, from the circumstances of the case, that he will be carried on rather to use Religion than to minister to it, unless Religion is strong on its own ground, and reminds him that, if he would do honor to the highest of subjects, he must make himself its scholar, must humbly follow the thoughts given him, and must aim at the glory not of his own gift but of the Great Giver?"

The warnings of these great churchmen must appeal with much force to those who may be led to study the ever-recurring problem of church music. This problem simply concerns one phase of the broad question of the relation between art and religion, a question which in some form every religious organization is compelled to consider. St. Augustine and Cardinal Newman are representatives of a class of devout thinkers who attach no value to art as an embellishment of worship, or rather they look upon such art as positively mischievous; true worship to them involves a complete absorption from all secular concerns and associations, and only the art that furthers this absorption are they willing to tolerate in the church. The warnings of such men cannot be met by the rhetorical eulogies of the religious value of music which are so frequent in sermons, and in works written from the standpoint of a special musical enthusiasm. The alliance of religion and art, although inevitable and philosophically justifiable, contains more or less of danger, for the natural man is far more susceptible to the fascinations of the senses than to appeals to his conscience, and nothing is easier than to mistake æsthetic thrills, and those melting moods which are

only the reaction from nervous excitement, for an actual uplifting of the heart. The problem of church music simply resolves itself into this simple inquiry—how the sensations of delight which follow the revelation of beauty in sound may be made to blend with conscious devotional impulses, so as to reinforce the longings of worship, and aid in giving them a permanent and salutary direction.

A little thought will make it plain that among all the arts that have been employed in the service of religion music is the least prone to limit and degrade spiritual conceptions. The reason why a large section of the Christian church has rejected pictures and images from its places of worship while retaining music strikes at the root of the whole matter. Painting is an imitative art, it is representative, conveying to the mind exact and definite conceptions, arousing emotion mediately and indirectly through the agency of sensible forms which are but the idealization of objects of common observation. It appeals less than music and poetry to the imagination; it can suggest the unseen only symbolically through the agency of actual forms and colors, and the observer is inevitably more impressed by the beauty of the image as a concrete limited object than by the idea that may be symbolized. And even although it may properly concern itself with certain historic embodiments of religious belief, painting does not willingly restrain itself within that austere and spiritualized range of subject and treatment which is alone helpful in the promotion of pure religious feeling. Theoretically pictures in the church are for the purpose of instruction in the historic aspects of Christianity, or else they furnish allegorized types of godliness as objects for contemplation or imitation. In the early ages of Christian painting, this art doubtless had usually an edifying influence. And so in many instances it has to-day. Yet the very definiteness of painting which, up to a certain point, is an advantage,

has often proved a facile means to the expression of conceptions which tended to sensualize or belittle spiritual ideas. So long as painting was in its immature state it undoubtedly reinforced the teachings of the church, but as soon as it became fully developed it strove to break away from the restrictions of religion, to revel in the representation of the glory and gladness of nature and the goodness of human earthly life; and even when it concerned itself with sacred themes, it could scarcely refrain from beguiling the attention of the beholder away from the religious lesson to an æsthetic joy in ravishing color and form.

It cannot be denied that music has passed through analogous phases in the course of its history, but in the relation between music and religion the proper balance is more easily restored; the tendency to profane sacred ideas is not so strongly inherent in music's nature. For music does not imitate external images, it does not employ symbols or natural forms to express definite ideas; it is only by a violent and unauthorized straining of the fancy that abstract music can be connected with positive conceptions of the intellect. Music carries changes of mental state directly to the sympathetic mind, while the other arts can reveal them only by the words, bodily attitudes, or facial expressions which flow from them as a consequence. But it is only in a very limited degree that these mental states indicated by music can be definitely characterized by it. Music is symbolic, suggestive, call it what we please,—it is not definitely representative. From one point of view this mysterious abstractedness from all that is concrete and tangible is a weakness,—music cannot in itself alone exert a moral or intellectual influence. In another aspect, however, this peculiar nature of music is an element of unique power, for by its very constitution it is able to unite itself with definite ideas as set forth in words, and by its magic spell upon the emotion lend a moving potency to intellectual and

moral conceptions. Music possesses a subtle and almost boundless pliability and adaptableness. It is not wholly abstract and vague; the comparison of musical forms to arabesques and kaleidoscopic figures which writers of the formalistic school assert, as though music apart from words were entirely meaningless, a mere agreeable sense-play without intellectual or spiritual content—this view of music is altogether untenable.

Musical enthusiasts have certainly made claims for their art which do not bear analysis, but absolutely unexpressive music is not. If it were, then Beethoven's "Pastoral" symphony might just as well be called heroic, and the "Heroic" symphony pastoral; dirges and wedding marches might be interchanged; there could be no common basis of feeling between a melody of Schubert and the poem to which it is set. The elements of musical effect are pure tonal sensations set in free ideal motion under psychologic impulses. The nature of these psychologic impulses is revealed in the quality and intensity of the tone and character of the motion. Music is thus able to convey impressions of broad, fundamental moods, but does not indicate the personality of the subject of these moods, or their causes or relations. It is doubtful if music can express even such general emotions as love or grief, but it can typify those states of tenderness or longing which are the basis or result of these, and of other describable emotions. Solemnity, joy, fury, mirthfulness; notions of grace, power, immensity, resistless motion—these and more may be suggested by music, but it does not, like painting, present objects in which such qualities inhere, or, like poetry, describe both qualities and objects by means of symbols that appeal to imagination and memory. So far as music deals with action also, it is the reflection of passion or volition in potentiality, not yet issuing in definite result. The missing elements of localization or direction may be supplied by words

which direct the current of musical effect into positive channels, the two factors blending into a composite art which is adequate to excite the sensibilities more profoundly than either agent could do alone. The power of music is chiefly that of an intensifier of conceptions, moods, desires, etc., which lie outside of itself. Given a style of music that symbolizes that state of sensibility in which the sentiment of the words is likewise grounded, and the music is infinitely docile, seeks not to deflect the impression through any previous association of its own, for it resigns all assertion of a meaning which it might be supposed to possess in an isolated capacity, and lends all its subtle charm and appealing sweetness to enhance the thought which the text seeks to convey.

It is this pervading, intensifying power of music, free from material sensuous suggestion, that has given it so large a place in the observances of worship in all religious systems within the record of history. It has always been felt that there is some special consonance between music and religious feeling, such that it would be hard to find a form of religious ceremony in ancient or modern times in which music has not held a more or less conspicuous place. And it is in the most spiritual of all the historic religions, viz. Christianity, that music has been developed to its highest degree of expressiveness and beauty. Piety falls into the general category of the profounder, more absorbing emotions, such as love and patriotism, which naturally utter themselves not in prose but in poetry, not in ordinary unimpassioned speech but in rhythmical tone.

"In acts of devotion," says Dr. John Caird, "we give manifestation and embodiment to our inward elevation to that unity which lies beyond all differences; we gather up our fragmentary temporal life into its anticipated eternal harmony; we forecast and enjoy amidst the efforts and struggles of time the sweetness and rest of the blessed life

that is to be. The peculiar significance of prayer lies in this, that therein we rise above ourselves; we leave behind the interests which belong to us as creatures of time; we enter into that sphere in which all the discords and evils of the time-world are but deceptive appearances and illusions, or possess no more reality than the passing shadows of the clouds that lie here beneath our feet. The world in which we outwardly live is only the unreal and the evanescent making believe to be real; the true, the real, the world of unchangeable and eternal reality, is that in which we pray. . . . But even when we pray that evils may cease, it is, if our prayer be the prayer of faith, because in spirit we realize that they have already ceased, because we are in a sphere in which we discern the nothingness of all that is not of God; even when we pray that new blessings may be communicated to us, it is because we realize that already all things are ours."¹

Taking this as an accurate statement of the experience of devotional self-surrender, it is not difficult to understand how music is the one art most competent to enter into such a state of mind. For the ecstasy aroused in the lover of music by the magic of his art is more nearly analogous than any other emotion to that depicted by Dr. Caird as the mystic rapture of devotion. So much so that musical enthusiasts often speak of all high-class music as sacred and devotional, while no one would say the same of painting, sculpture, or architecture in general. The reason of this is, as I have said, that music does not definitely characterize, it does not employ forms which are borrowed from nature; it is pure, it cannot in itself suggest evil, it refines and exalts everything it touches. So worship is disconnected from all the concerns of physical life, it raises the subject into a supersensuous region, it has for the moment nothing to do with temporal activities, even moral

¹ The Philosophy of Religion.

conduct belongs in another sphere. The absorption of the mind in contemplation, the sense of inward peace which accompanies emancipation from the disturbances of active life, and the effort to fix the thought upon that which is holy and divine, has a striking resemblance to those phases of musical satisfaction where the analytical faculties are not called into exercise. Hence the readiness with which music combines with religious experience as illustrator and intensifier. Music in its mystic indefinable action seems to render the mood of prayer more self-conscious, to interpret it, as it were, to itself, and by something that seems divine and celestial in the harmony to make the mood deeper, stronger, more satisfying than it would be if shut up within the soul of the individual and deprived of this means of expression. Music also, by its universal, impersonal quality, furnishes the most efficient means of communication between all the individuals engaged in a common worship, the separate personalities are, we might say, dissolved in the general tide of rapture symbolized by the music, and the common mood is again enhanced by the consciousness of sympathy between mind and mind to which the music testifies, and which it, more than any other single agency, seems to promote.

Here then we touch upon the borders of the mysterious relation between music and religious emotion. But at this point we are again challenged by the warning of St. Augustine and Dr. Newman, reminding us that music is not always or necessarily an aid to devotion, and that there may even be a snare in what seems at first a valuable ally. However strong our conviction that music in its very nature is a powerful adjunct of devotion, we must always bear in mind that the analogy that exists between religious emotion and musical rapture is, after all, only an analogy; that æsthetic delight, though it be the most refined, is not worship, that the mood of melting tenderness that follows a

grand strain of orchestral music is not contrition. Those who speak of all good music as religious simply do not understand the meaning of the terms they use. For devotion is not a mere vague feeling of ecstasy; it must involve a positive consciousness of an object of worship, a reaching up, not to something undefined, but to a God plainly revealed and cognizant of the sincerity of the service offered Him; it must involve also a sense of humility before an Almighty Power, a contrition for sin, a desire for pardon, reconciliation, and blessedness, a consciousness of need and dependence, and an active exercise of faith and love. Into such spiritual conditions music may come, lending her aid to deepen them, to give them tangible expression, and to enhance the sense of peace and joy which may be their divinely permitted consequence; but let not music presume to offer her own felicities as an equivalent for the higher experiences of the soul in pure communion with its Maker. The office of music, so far as it concerns itself with definite ideas at all, is not so much to arouse precise sentiments as to intensify feelings already existing; the sentiment proper to the sanctuary is one of worship and that only, and it is the function of music to purify this mood, to separate from it other moods and reminiscences which are not in perfect concord with it, to establish it in a more complete self-consciousness and a more permanent attitude.

And let it once for all be said that music in the sanctuary must not assume to do its work alone, because pure unalloyed musical enjoyment is not worship, although easily mistaken for it, and a musical impression disconnected from any other cannot in the very nature of things conduce to the spirit of prayer. It is only when the prayerful mood already exists as the definite tendency of the mind, induced by the sense of love and duty, by the associations of the time and place, by the administration of the other portions

of the service, or by any other agencies which turn the heart of the believer in longing toward the Mercy Seat—it is only in alliance with such a state of desire and expectancy that music fulfills its true office in the sanctuary. It is not enough to depend upon the influence of the words to which the music is set, for they, being simultaneous with the music, do not have time or opportunity to act with full force upon the understanding, since the action of music upon the emotion is so much more powerful and swift than that of the words upon the understanding that the latter is but feebly affected and often unregarded in the stress of musical fervor. How this preliminary mood of devotion, this antecedent condition of expectancy, is to be aroused is a question that would lead into quite another field than that now under discussion. Certain it is, however, that the spirit of worship must first exist,—music may enhance and direct it, but cannot be expected to cause it. The case is with music as Professor Shairp says that it is with nature:—“If nature is to be the symbol of something higher than itself, to convey intimations of Him from whom both nature and the world proceed, man must come to the spectacle with the thought of God already in his heart. He will not get a religion out of the mere sight of nature. If beauty is to lead the soul upward, man must come to the contemplation of it with his moral convictions clear and firm, and with faith in these as connecting him directly with God. Neither morality nor religion will he get out of beauty taken by itself.” With some such principle as this, I believe, we come to the heart of the problem of the relation between religion and art. If the love and study of art are to make man more faithful, more truthful, more holy, then he must approach it with moral convictions firmly fixed by means other than those of art, that he may find in the manifestations of the beautiful the embodiment of truth as well as of beauty, and be able to

weave the better teachings of art into the fabric of his higher spiritual experience.

These principles do not, of course, solve the whole problem of church music in detail. The attitude of the worshiper is not the only point involved in that great controversy over the proper style of music in worship which has perplexed the church ever since the days of St. Augustine, and is still far from settlement. It never will be settled to the satisfaction of all religious bodies, for a form of music that is edifying in a Salvation Army barracks would be an offense in an English cathedral, and a musical performance that would lift a French Catholic to the very gates of heaven would have a very different effect upon a Scotch Calvinist. The Gregorian chant, the unaccompanied contrapuntal chorus of the Palestrina age, the Lutheran chorale and motet, and the Anglican chant and anthem, are all the expression of a devout piety, and are all claimed in turn as the worthiest expression of religious emotion in artistic form. Their common ground consists in elevation of tonal character, distinction, dignity, conformity to æsthetic laws, and sincerity as utterances of genuine piety. The growing demand in this country for a prevalent style of church music that shall be worthy alike of the church and of the rising national artistic taste can be met only by the subjection of music to the ideal needs of devotion rather than to the needs of æstheticism. Artistic perfection certainly, for music that is an offense to taste can never be worshipful; but first of all a humble devotional spirit on the part of choir and people. There must be a return to the conception of the early Christians, of the pious monks of the middle ages, that church music is prayer. There are many abuses in American church music, and voices are heard from all sides calling for reform. The only reform that is really to be desired will inevitably come when clergy, congregation, and singers submit their artistic attainments to

the precept so beautifully expressed by the Synod of Carthage in the fourth century, in the formula which it prescribed for the ordination of choristers: "See that what thou singest with thy lips, thou believest in thy heart; and what thou believest in thy heart, thou dost exemplify in thy life."

ARTICLE VIII.

THE TELL-EL-AMARNA LETTERS.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN M. P. METCALF.

I READ some months ago that the only Professor of Egyptology of whom our American universities can boast, delivered an address in Chicago about "The World's Greatest Reformer." I felt confident that the subject of that address was the man to whom we owe the fact, that the most important archæological find in recent years took place in Tell-el-Amarna. That man was Amenophis IV., an Egyptian king of the eighteenth dynasty. The same Professor has called him the "most interesting figure in Egyptian history."¹ He was all this because, in a land having such a mighty pantheon as Egypt, he sought to establish and perpetuate the worship of the god of the sun-disk, 'Aten, as supreme, blotting out so far as possible the names, memory, and worship of the others; in a word, he sought to establish a sort of solar monotheism. He abandoned, therefore, Thebes, whose special god, Amon, shared the greatness of the capital, and built a new city far down the Nile, upon its right bank, almost half-way between Thebes and Memphis, upon the plains where Tell-el-Amarna now stands.

This city he called "Brilliance of the Sun." Here he built a magnificent temple to the sun, and a palace as royal residence. This enterprise was only the more likely to succeed, if, after deposing the priests of Amon in Thebes

¹ See art. "Sketch of Egyptian History," by Professor J. H. Breasted, in *Biblical World*, Vol. vii. p. 451.

and blotting out the god's name from the inscriptions, he should, in a new capital, away from the old associations, seek to advance the purposes of the reform. To this new city also Amenophis brought the royal archives, as a hieratic note upon one of the Amarna tablets informs us. Letter 23 in Winckler's edition of the letters has an Egyptian note which has been thus translated:— "[Year] 2 + X, first month of winter, . . . day, at the time when the court was in the Southern capital (Thebes) in the castle, *ḳim i' ḥwt*. Copy of the Naḥarina letter which the ambassador Pt-r-zi, and the ambassador [Bubri] brought." Part of the royal archives of Amenophis have come to us from the ruins of his royal city, but his efforts at religious reform were miserably defeated. With his death the movement came to an end, and the new capital was abandoned. It fell into decay, its royal archives were buried beneath the accumulations of time, only to see the light in our own day.

In 1887, some Arabs discovered on the site of Tell-el-Amarna some of these archives, and they proved to be— not Egyptian papyri, not records in the hieroglyphics of the Nile Valley, but clay tablets inscribed with the cuneiform characters of the Euphrates Valley. A sensation was created at once, and several wild guesses were hazarded as to the find, which it is not worth while here to recount.¹ The tablets were soon disposed of by the Arabs, and found their way, a few of them to the great Egyptian museum at Boulak, but most of them to the museums of Berlin and London,—two or three into the hands of private individuals. Berlin has more tablets than London, although perhaps London has proportionately more that are in good condition. In all there are about three hundred. It is greatly to be lamented that a large proportion of them have come to us in a badly mutilated condition,—the old story

¹ Cf., for example, the later suggestion that one of the letters mentions an Ionian (No. 42, line 16).

in these matters. In very many there is no context at all, and often an otherwise well-preserved letter is broken off just where we had thought to get a valuable piece of information. The tablets themselves are much like other Assyrian and Babylonian tablets, but vary greatly in size, in shape, and in the composition of the clay. Some tablets from the same author are distinguished with comparative ease by the individuality of the clay. Those from Mitani are of a very red clay, unusual and noticeable. Some of those from Mitani are also unusual in size, being the largest letter tablets yet discovered, and find prominent exhibition in the British Museum.

The London texts were published by Dr. Karl Bezold, and the Berlin, by Dr. Hugo Winckler, the London texts being printed, and the Berlin autographed, giving the latter a distinct advantage. The Berlin edition embodies also the Boulak tablets which Dr. Winckler copied in Egypt, under commission from Berlin. Dr. Bezold also published later, under the title "*Oriental Diplomacy*," a transliteration of the texts in his London edition, without translation. Very many magazine and newspaper articles have discussed these letters in English, French, and German; some of them have contained translations of some of the letters. Prominent among the latter are those of Sayce,¹ Delattre,² and Zimmern,³ the latter being the most valuable. The entire collection is now made available by Dr. Winckler's transliteration and translation of the whole, with vocabulary and list of proper names.⁴ The book contains also Sheil's transliteration,⁵ with Winckler's translation of the tablet recently discovered by Dr. Bliss, our own fellow-country-

¹ *Records of the Past*, New Series.

² In *Proc. Soc. Bib. Arch.*, Vol. xiii. p. 317.

³ *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, Vols. v. and vi.

⁴ *Die Tafeln von Tell-el-Amarna*. Berlin. 1896.

⁵ *Maspero's Recueil*, xv.

man at Tell-el-Hesy, or Lachish. An English translation of this work has also already appeared.¹

Before coming to an account of these letters, a brief discussion of the fortunes of Palestine up to the time of the letters will be useful, and necessary to an understanding of the conditions then prevailing. According to the earliest light we have from the monuments with regard to Palestine, the country was under Babylonian influence and domination, more or less fully maintained.

The first rulers of Babylon, of whom we have records,² are Sargon of Accad, and Naram-Sin. According to a cylinder of Nabonidus,³ Sargon reigned thirty-two hundred years before him, making Sargon's date, if these figures are to be believed, of which I have much doubt, 3800 B.C. Sargon tells us in his inscriptions⁴ of his successful campaigns in the Mediterranean coast lands, including Palestine, and even Cyprus. His son and successor, Naram-Sin, also made successful expeditions to the far West, and even into the Sinai Peninsula.⁵ It seems likely that this influence and control from the Euphrates continued in all the centuries following, at least occasionally. About the year 3000 we have inscriptions of Gudea telling of cedars and stone brought from the far West for his building operations.⁶ About 2300 again, Babylon was under the domination of the Elamites, and their kings claim rule over not only Babylon, but also over all the lands of the West.⁷ This is about the time of Abraham, and helps to make the fourteenth chapter of Genesis historically possible. This chap-

¹ The Tell-el-Amarna Letters. Berlin. [Professor Metcalf is the translator.—Eds.]

² Passing by the rulers lately brought to notice by Hilprecht in his publication of Texts unearthed by the Pennsylvania expeditions.

³ See Schrader's *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, Bd. iii, 2. Hälfte, 104.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1. Hälfte, 102. ⁵ *Ibid.*, 98-106.

⁶ Keil. Bibl., Bd. iii, 1. Hälfte, 34, 36.

⁷ Cf. Hommel, *Geschichte des alten Morgenlandes*, 59.

ter tells us of the pre-Semitic inhabitants of Palestine, viz., Rephaim, Zuzim, Emin, Horites, all non-Semitic peoples, and of the Amorites, of whom later. It was also about this time when King Hammurabi, according to some the Amraphel of Gen. xiv., united North and South Babylonia, putting an end to the Elamite domination. According to Hommel,¹ this king had made himself known in the West. His son and grandson at any rate bore Canaanitish names, and the latter's son, Ammi-Satana, calls himself in his inscriptions "King of the West lands."²

Babylonian power, influence, and culture seem then to have largely prevailed through all these years, as we shall more fully see, even on down to the time of the Tell-el-Amarna letters. This seems to have been true, even during and despite the fact of long years of Egyptian domination, of which we come now to speak.

Aahmes, the first king of the eighteenth dynasty, drove out the Hyksos from their seats of power, ending their rule in Egypt, and building on the borders of Palestine a fortress as basis of future operations and as a protection against future invasion. So began militarism in Egypt. Aahmes' grandson, Thothmes I., marched triumphantly through all Palestine and Syria, even pressing on to the Euphrates, but made no permanent acquisitions. The following rulers, Thothmes II. and his sister, made no further expeditions, but Thothmes III., on coming to the throne, carried on the work of conquest in fifteen great campaigns, reducing the whole country as far as the Euphrates to tribute, building fortresses and establishing garrisons,—those garrisons whose maintenance in Tell-el-Amarna times was neglected to the great sorrow of the letter-writers. Thothmes III. has left us long lists of the conquered cities, valuable geographical and historical data. Among these cities it is that the names Jacob-el, Joseph-el,

¹Gesc. des alten Morgenlandes, 59. ²*Ibid.*

and Beth-ya occur. The following kings, Amenophis II. and Thothmes IV., maintained, even if with difficulty, their possessions in the North. Then come the two kings to whom our letters are addressed, Amenophis III. and IV., or, as they are called here by their titles, Nimmuria and Naphuria (Neb-wa'-a(b)=Re and Nofer-Cheperu=Re). Egyptian records give no account of their expeditions into Palestine, and the presumption at least is against the possibility that the latter, the great Reformer, could have had time for expeditions of war.¹ Where Egyptian records are wanting, the Tell-el-Amarna letters bring us information, giving a vivid picture of the state of affairs in Palestine and Syria.

From Aahmes to Amenophis III. was a period of nearly two hundred years. We must believe that, during this time, Egyptian influence was powerfully felt in all the life and culture of Palestine, but our letters will lead us to the conclusion already mentioned, that, despite these long years of Egyptian domination, the influence of Babylon was still felt, and her civilization and culture prevailed. Some account of the letters themselves is now in place.

SUMMARY OF THE LETTERS.

I. There are, in the first place, letters between Egypt, and Babylon, Assyria, Mitani, and Alasia, countries maintaining relations of friendship with Egypt, possibly as a result of a wholesome fear of the great conquerors who had gone before. They sought by correspondence, by exchange of presents, and by intermarriage, to preserve hospitable relations. They invariably address one another as "Brother," and all the letters begin with long and profuse greetings, in stereotyped forms; such, for example, as this: "To Nimupiria, king of Egypt, my brother:—from Kalli-

¹ For these facts of Egyptian history see any good history of Egypt.

ma-Sin, king of Karduniaš [Kasshite name for Babylon]. It is very well with me and my land. May it be well with you, your wives, your sons, your daughters, your horses, your chariots, and your whole land."¹

1. Egypt and Babylon.—At this time in Babylon the Kasshite dynasty was in power. Very little has been known of these rulers, and these letters have made possible quite a reconstruction of the kings of the period, although absolute clearness and certainty has not yet been obtained. The latest reconstructions of these facts are to be found in Hilprecht's Introduction to his new Edition of Tablets, found by the Philadelphia Expeditions, in Niebuhr's "Chronologie," and in Winckler's "Altorientalische Forschungen." The following Babylonian kings are mentioned in the Tell-el-Amarna letters: Karaindaš,² with whom friendly relations with Egypt began; (here possibly a break); Kallima Sin's father,³ name unknown, his daughter was, however, wife of Amenophis III.⁴; Kallima-Sin, to whom Amenophis III. writes one letter,⁵ and from whom went four letters to Egypt³; (here Burnaburiaš I., not named here, but from whom some inscriptions have come⁶); Kurigalzu I.,⁷ son of Burnaburiaš I.,⁸ and father of the following; and Burnaburiaš II., who wrote six letters to Amen-

¹ Winckler, No. 4, Kallima-Sin of Babylon to Amenophis III. of Egypt, p. 13.

² No. 8, line 8; name also in the "Synchronistische Geschichte," Schrader's Keil. Bibl., Bd. i, 194, an inscription from him in Bd. iii, 1. Hälfte, 152.

³ Often in Kallima-Sin's letters, Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5.

⁴ So No. 1, line 12. ⁵ No. 1.

⁶ So Winckler in the above, and see Syn. Gesch., Keil. Bibl., Bd. i, 194; Bd. iii, 1. Hälfte, 152.

⁷ Another king of the same name is known, mentioned in No. 7, line 19, and No. 9, Reverse, lines 16-17; in the former place, as refusing to join an alliance with Canaanites against Egypt, out of respect for Amenophis III. See also Keil. Bibl., Bd. iii, 1. Hälfte, 154, and Bd. i, 97.

⁸ According to Keil. Bibl., Bd. iii, 1. Hälfte, 154.

ophis IV.¹ The new names are those of the second Burnaburiaš and Kallima-Sin.

Intermarriages occupy much of the correspondence. Kallima-Sin's father married his daughter to Amenophis III.; Kallima-Sin himself married his daughter to the same Pharaoh, and he also negotiated for an Egyptian wife. A son of Burnaburiaš II. had married a daughter of Amenophis IV., and was residing at the Egyptian court. Amenophis requested a daughter from Burnaburiaš, and was refused, although another woman was promised. There is much dickerings over these marriages, the required dowries, the prices paid for the wives, and over their proper escort; showing that bargains in royal marriages are not a modern invention, but one of hoary antiquity. Amusing things are said; for example, Kallima-Sin's request for Amenophis III.'s daughter was refused, but the latter writes² that he would be well enough pleased with any beautiful woman whom he could pass off for a king's daughter.

Relations of friendship had been prevailing during the reigns of six Babylonian princes, the time covered being, however, not so very long, as Amenophis III. was cotemporary with the last part of the reign of Kallima-Sin's father, and with the reigns of Kallima-Sin, Burnaburiaš I., Kurigalzu I., and Burnaburiaš II. Amenophis III., in a letter to Kallima-Sin,³ speaks of the fact that his father, Thothmes IV., had been in treaty relations with Kallima-Sin. Presents were freely exchanged,—chariots, horses, slaves, couches, gold and silver, enamel, precious stones and woods, inlaid ivory objects, and stuffed animals,—and not much bashfulness is manifested in plainly asking for such favors. Mutual promises are made for transfer from one land to the other of whatever products are desired. Trade relations were active; merchant caravans, though often subject to plunder, were passing back and forth; the inter-

¹ Nos. 6-11. ² No. 3, lines 15-18. ³ No. 1.

change of products, yes travel, visits from one land to the other, must have been frequent. One of Burnaburiaš' caravans was waylaid in Ḫinatôn, the city mentioned in Joshua xix. 14. In such cases international law required of Egypt, as holding suzerainty over Palestine, indemnification, and punishment of the guilty parties. As to the treatment of ambassadors, there was often complaint, and Burnaburiaš seems to have felt the weight of the proverb, "If you would have a thing done well, do it yourself," for he tells Amenophis III. that there is no trusting to officers. Amenophis III. says Kallima-Sin's ambassadors are liars, who misrepresent and falsify his messages. Despite these active relations, Burnaburiaš seems to have had no adequate idea of the distance of Egypt from Babylon, and was angry because Pharaoh had not immediately heard of his being ill, and, consequently, had sent no letter of sympathy. From a note dropped in No. 7, line 31, it seems that the Kasshite Babylonians were lords over Assyria,—which at this time was probably under Aššur-uballit. One note of correction to "Oriental Diplomacy" might be made. There Bezold has ascribed L. 4 to Burnaburiaš, probably because of mention of a marriage with Pharaoh. The heading of the letter is broken off. It may, however, with almost absolute certainty, be ascribed to Kallima-Sin. The marriage may equally well apply here, and in line two of the text the sign "KA" is found, which in this connection can only be explained as the first sign of the name Kallima-Sin.¹

2. Assyria and Egypt.—One letter from Aššur-uballit of Assyria to Amenophis IV. He says his father, Aššur-nâdin-aḫî, had been on good terms with Egypt. We find here the same mutual exchange of presents, the same demand for gold, and the same readiness to supply whatever is wanted. Aššur-uballit is already known from the monuments²; his father, however, is not mentioned there.

¹ So in Winckler, No. 5, although no reason assigned.

² Syn. Gesch., Keil. Bibl., Bd. i, 194.

3. Mitani and Egypt.—Here are five letters of Duš-ratta, king of Mitani, to Amenophis III., and three to Amenophis IV., and one to Ti, the mother of Amenophis IV., and wife of Amenophis III. The location of Mitani and the character of the native language have been, and are still, in doubt. The king of Mitani could write better Assyrian than the Palestinian writers, even though the language of Mitani was one of a different family. Among the Tell-el-Amarna letters is one written in the language of Mitani,¹ an unknown language, but apparently an agglutinative Mongolian dialect. Several attempts at translation have been made, most notable by Zimmern, Brünnow, and Sayce.²

In this connection might be best mentioned the fact, that there are, besides, two other letters in unknown languages, one from Tarhundarauš of Aršapi (=Rezep of 2 Kings xix. 12?).³ Of the other letter, even less is known.⁴ It is very interesting to see this use of the cuneiform in writing different languages. Originally the invention of the pre-Semitic inhabitants of the Euphrates Valley, and the medium of their language,—the Sumerian,⁵—it was adopted, along with religion and culture, by the Semitic Babylonian conquerors, and not without difficulty made to express the Babylonian. And here we find it compelled to do duty in expressing the language of three other

¹ No. 27 in the Berlin edition of the texts, not embodied in Winckler's new work.

² *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, Vol. v. 169, 209, 260. Also by Conder in *Quart. State. Pal. Explor. Fund*, 1839, p. 245. Commented on also by Winckler in *Sitzungsbericht Berliner Acad. Wissensch.*, 1888, p. 1341.

³ No. 10 in Berlin texts. Sayce has made this Hittite, and calls it a Tartar dialect, in *Proc. Soc. Bib. Arch.*, June, 1839. From this letter and other sources he has made out one hundred and fifty Hittite words. Conder in *Quart. State. Pal. Explor. Fund*, 1839, p. 115, follows Sayce.

⁴ No. 238 in the Berlin texts. C. J. Ball in *Academy*, Vol. xxxvi. (1889), No. 916, p. 343, has compared its language with the Chinese.

⁵ Strange to say, McCurdy, in *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, has given his voice against the Sumerian theory.

non-Semitic peoples and, as we shall see, it was used also to write the allied Semitic language of the Canaanites.

But we must return to Mitani, and its location. One of the many hieratic notes found in these letters, identifies Mitani with Naḥarina.¹ The country is called in the letters either Mītani² or Ḫanigalbat.³ In an inscription of Tiglath-Pileser I.,⁴ Ḫanigalbat is named, and in close connection also, Mitani. The great conqueror in the course of a campaign against the Nairi lords, to the east and north of the Euphrates, marched against Milidia in Ḫanigalbat, probably on the upper Euphrates. Later he says he hunted wild oxen in Mitani, and in Araziki which lies before Ḫatti. This would also indicate a region near the Euphrates, probably on its eastern side.⁵ The Egyptian Naḥarina=Naḥaraim (compare Mesopotamia of the Greeks, Hebrew, Aram Naḥaraim, and Padan-aram in the Bible, though the mutual relation of these words is not sure) is now usually located between the Euphrates and its tributary, the Balih, on the east.⁶ That some territory in this neighborhood is meant, seems sure. The inscriptions referred to accord fairly well with its location between these rivers.

Relations of friendship had prevailed between Egypt and

¹ No. 23. There are about a dozen of these Egyptian notes in all; many of them are unintelligible, but several have been deciphered by the Egyptologists.

² Usually.

³ In No. 1, line 38, from Amenophis III. to Kallima-Sin; in No. 15, line 22, and Reverse, line 1, from Assyria; and in the Mitani letters, No. 18, line 17, and No. 21, line 49; also in one Palestinian letter, No. 256, lines 10, 20.

⁴ Keil. Bibl., Bd. i, 32, 38.

⁵ Winckler thinks he finds another reference to the country in Esarhaddon, Keil. Bibl., Bd. ii, 129, where "Pitanni" is read. So in Sitzungsbericht Berliner Acad. Wissensch., 1888, p. 134.

⁶ See, for example, Hommel, *Gesch. des alten Morgenlandes*, p. 75. Much discussed in English journals. In McCurdy, Vol. i. p. 84. Some have been disposed to locate the biblical "Aram of the two rivers" here.

Mitani since the time of Dušratta's grandfather, Artatama, confirmed from the first by intermarriage. Thothmes IV. married Artatama's daughter. Amenophis III. married Giluhipa, a daughter of Šutarna, Dušratta's father, and also a daughter of Dušratta, Taduhipa. There was much diplomacy over these marriages, with discussion of dowries and prices for the wives, outfits, and faces. There is the same interchange of presents, chariots, horses, slaves, oil and precious stones, including personal adornments for the women, especially for Tí,¹ mother of Amenophis IV., who plays an important rôle in the letters, and perhaps in Egyptian history. One of these letters,² addressed to Amenophis IV., is really a very skillful piece of diplomatic correspondence, bringing all possible influences to bear to lead Amenophis IV. to send some golden images promised by his father to Dušratta. It is a long letter,—nine pages,—and tries all that flattery, persuasion, convincing proof of the promises made, withholding of things promised, and threats could do to secure his end. On the same subject he writes the Queen mother Tí, urging her to remind her son of the promise her husband had made.

A few other points in these letters are interesting. Dušratta tells³ Amenophis III. that he had completely defeated the Hatti-Hittites—who had made an inroad into Mitani, this being, perhaps, the beginning of the operations of the Hittites, of which we shall soon hear. Again, a religious item, for we are told that Ištar of Nineveh had in Šutarna's day gone down to Egypt, and there had been revered by the Egyptians, and later returned, and now in Dušratta's reign the same thing is repeated, the king sending her with the hope that she would be honored as before, and in due time returned.⁴ This is also important, as prov-

¹ The question of her origin has been much discussed; for example, by Sayce in English periodicals.

² No. 21. ³ In No. 16, line 30. ⁴ No. 20, lines 13-32.

ing apparently that Dušratta's dynasty had extended its sway over Nineveh, and therefore speaks much for the greatness and power of Mitani. In leaving Mitani it is worth remembering that Brugsch, the Egyptologist,¹ in 1880, found mention in Egyptian records of a marriage, contracted by Amenophis III. with a Mesopotamian princess, Kirgipu, daughter of Šutarna of Naḥrina, and at the time of his discovery expressed a hope that some time the fact might be confirmed from the cuneiform inscriptions of the East. Thus strangely has his hope been fulfilled by tablets found not in the East, but on the Nile.

4. Egypt and Alašia.—There follow a number of letters² from Alašia, some of which, however, having no headings, are only with probability here assigned. As to the identification of Alašia, there is difference of opinion. Sayce³ has identified it with the Alosha or Arosha of the Egyptologists; so also Tomkins⁴ and Maspero.⁵ Hommel⁶ takes apparently the same view in making it a country stretching along the coast to the north of Phœnicia. Winckler, without assigning reasons so far as I know, identifies it with Cyprus. This conjecture is, at any rate, supported by the fact that the Alašian was continually sending large quantities of copper to Egypt, and by the mention of ships, as bearers of the Alašian messengers. A hieratic note⁷ says at the close of one of these letters, "Letter of the prince of —." Cyprus was known in Assyrian records from the earliest days as *mât Yatnana*. The present king's father had had dealings with the former kings of Egypt. The transfer of a great variety of articles is mentioned. One matter of extradition is interesting. An Alašian had died in Egypt, and his king requests Pharaoh to collect his prop-

¹ See Adolph Erman in *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache*, 1890, p. 112.

² Nos. 25-33. ³ In *Records of the Past*, New Series, Vol. ii. p. 60.

⁴ According to Sayce in *Acad.*, Vol. xxxvi., No. 869, p. 424.

⁵ In *Recueil*, x. pp. 3-4. ⁶ *Gesch. des alten Morgenlandes*, 75.

⁷ To No. 29.

erty and return it to his family. The Alašians seem to have regarded the Hittites as threatening, urging Pharaoh to have no dealings with them. Müller has referred No. 36¹ to the king of Ḫatti, the name being broken off except the last syllable, "ti," and Winckler thinks it possible that No. 35 is Pharaoh's reply; but, as the letters have no context, no information is obtainable. Before leaving the letters of these royal friends of Egypt, mention should be made of one,² apparently a traveler's pass, given by one of the Asiatic kings to his messenger, Akia, and addressed to the kings of Canaan, vassals of Egypt, claiming for him their protection and their help.

¹ *Asien und Europa*, 396. ² No. 14.

(To be concluded.)

ARTICLE IX.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS.¹

BY MR. Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK.

THIS book has in it so much that is commendable and worthy of praise, that it would be an injustice not to make full and frank acknowledgment at the outset of its freshness, its vigor and originality. Dr. Abbott is far from being a prosaic or platitudinous writer. A preacher who could arouse a continent upon so trite a question as the real meaning of a phrase in the Declaration; or who could stir up, not only the Manhattan Association, but the entire theological world, by a single address on Jonah and the whale, has a mind to be reckoned with in these times of much speaking and cheap printing. To what extent it is possible to become conspicuous by saying *outré* things from a distinguished pulpit, is not my province here to discuss. Any clergyman, however, is to be commended who does not pass the dead-line of laziness, as Dr. Behrends calls it, and permit his pulpit to lapse into a state of innocuous desuetude, where conservatism degenerates into dry-rot, and "orthodoxy" is like charity in one particular at least,—a mantle that covers a multitude of sins.

No one can accuse Dr. Abbott of being icily regular and splendidly null, as Tennyson expresses it, for he is nothing if not heroic, frank, fearless, unconventional, and always interesting. He reminds one of Dr. Herron in his manner of saying some things so startling and provoking, that,

¹ By Lyman Abbott, D.D. Pp. 370. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. \$1.25.

though he awakens thought, he does it at too great an expense, for it costs him our confidence in his judicial poise. It does not help the matter any to dodge behind Jesus for indorsement and protection, if such an expression may be pardoned. These essays are many of them sermons preached from Plymouth pulpit and, as such, deserve high praise. Many so-called gospel sermons are flat, stale, and unprofitable, simply because they lack intellectual and moral earnestness. They might as well be delivered by a phonograph, for they are not born of hard work, nor do they reflect the individual power or convictions of the preacher. They are not what he thinks, so much as what he thinks he ought to think. They fall flat, not because of people's hostility to truth, so much as that the audience is simply starving for the truth. There is not a live church in Chicago that is not comfortably filled, and some of them crowded, each Sunday, to hear some good news; and though some eminently respectable churches are dying a natural death, the fault in every instance is found in one word,—dry-rot in the pulpit or mildew in the pews.

Dr. Abbott is to be praised for his earnestness, his push, his enterprise, his fearless attacks on monopolies and trusts, on stock gambling, and selfishness in all its forms. It requires heroism to speak from his pulpit such plain truths to respectable sinners in New York and Brooklyn. It reveals a faith in the triumph of right principles that in these days, when there is more or less of pew degeneracy and pulpit sycophancy, is simply refreshing. He is keenly alive to social questions, and is in deep sympathy with democratic principles and institutions,—a lover of humanity and the friend of the common people. His exalted conception of the character and mission of the Ideal Unit of society is brought out in his chapter on the Founder of Christianity, and is a fine piece of word-painting. It is Christ the Ideal, the embodiment of beauty, whom Dr. Ab-

bott worships; for Christ's personal character is beyond criticism, and his teachings are truth in the norm. Art is the expression of an idea in material form, and it is fine art when it has no relation to utility. It is when Dr. Abbott departs from the sphere of fine art and approaches the useful, the practical, that we begin to part company from him.

Ruskin says that the entire vitality of art depends upon its being either full of truth or full of use; and that, however pleasant, wonderful, or impressive it may be in itself, it must yet be of inferior kind, and tend to deeper inferiority, unless it has clearly one of these main objects,—either to state a true thing or to adorn a serviceable one.¹ Now the world has appreciated and paid homage to Christ as the wisdom of God, the flowering of truth or beauty,—a piece of fine art, having no relation to utility: but the new conscience, the outgrowth of the demand for better social conditions, as reflected in all modern social ethics, is looking to Christianity as the Art of Social Control. Utility as well as beauty; the Real as well as the Ideal; the practical no less than the theoretical. As the truth and the life for individual needs, Christ has been worshiped, but now the social reformer would find in him the social Way. Reality, sincerity, practicality, like art in the days of Pindar, before the beginning of the change of Greek ideal art into a beautiful expediency.²

The new social conscience thus awakens the new hope that Christ is coming to earth again, not in bodily form but in a practical way, for a dwelling-place in the midst of new and just social conditions. The clouds that parted to receive him from human eyes, and left him to the world as a beautiful ideal which it has attained to but slowly, must roll away and bring him back to earth, the leader and friend of the common people, of the downtrodden and the

¹ Relation of Art to Use, p. 100.

² Ruskin, Relation of Art to Religion, p. 39.

poor, who are waging an unequal warfare with organized injustice and tyranny. It is an interesting question as to how far Christianity, even practically applied, is the solution of all of the so-called evils of poverty. Christ disappointed those who would make him king in order to bring a release from the yoke of Roman bondage. "My kingdom is not of this world," said he to the question, "Art thou a king?" We hasten to record Dr. Abbott's name, however, high among the apostles of the New Coming of the king. Not for the accuracy of all his conclusions, but for the spirit, the purpose, the heroic faith that breathes through all his sayings. And the same is true of Dr. Herron.

What the outcome will be of this intense desire to demand of Christianity the remedy for unjust social conditions, and thus to unite utility with beauty, no one can predict. One thing is certain: if literature is now to come forth on Christ the Banker, the Merchant, we must know him, not as the creation of any particular imagination, nor as an impracticable idealist, but as he was and is,—interpreted through the enlightened Christian consciousness of to-day. The state recognizes two kinds of corporations,—one for pecuniary profit, and the other philanthropic. Does Christianity demand the repeal of laws making this distinction, and insist that all corporations must be philanthropic? Does it oppose the current ideas of sound principles of banking? Does it deny the right to acquire, destroy the sense of ownership, and ignore the natural rights of man? Shall the laws of economics be re-written at its behest, that consumption, production, distribution, accumulation, may revolve around a new center,—duty to neighbor, instead of self?

So long as Dr. Abbott keeps Christ upon the Mount of Transfiguration, all must join him in his deep homage. The moment he brings Christ down, and makes a working factor of him, healing diseases and casting out devils; and

especially advising bankers and merchants how to run their business, that moment he begins to draw somewhat upon his imagination, and picture a Christ that is not altogether like the one of the New Testament. The cogs slip between the ideal and the real. Commerce must hitch its wagon to a star; but to do so requires a knowledge, not only of astronomy, but of the marts of trade. The man of affairs views the facts of the external world inductively, and obstinately resists the introduction of a poetical and artistical idealism, such as Plato's Republic is founded upon, in place of actuality. Aristotle's practical work is nearer to truth, in the mind of the educated business man of to-day, because it is not deductive but inductive. Commerce is not a hungering and thirsting after ideal beauty so much as for utility.

The teachers of practical social reforms; those who are showing us how to control trusts and monopolies; how to bring the natural monopolies under the supervision of the state; how to house the poor in model tenement-houses, and pay dividends on the investment; how to avoid the asperities of competition, and yet retain individual liberty; how to bring woman to look with charity upon her fallen sister; how to distribute charity, and not rob the recipients of their self-respect,—all such social reformers and teachers are practical and Christian. This is the way to move onward and upward toward the attainment of the ideal social condition, for it is a union of idealism and practical sense, a steady growth. But a Christ, born of the imagination and not a historical fact; put forth as a theory for a working hypothesis, not inductive but deductive, will simply lead social reform out into the wilderness, and cast reproach upon his name.

The obstacles in the way of practical social reform are sufficiently numerous and difficult to surmount, with human nature as it is, and the historical Christ as he is; but

these obstacles simply become infinite, and the task becomes hopeless, when we have pictured to us a human nature that does not exist, and a Christ for an ideal who never was born, and never will be. Such a pseudo-Christ would at once usher in a flabby and insipid social condition, where every man is minding his neighbor's business, and paying no attention to his own; where the fruitage of a proper regard for self, such as self-respect, self-reliance, and a host of similar virtues, are positive sins; where life, liberty, property, reputation, are meaningless terms, because the ego has been so lost in alter that a cartilaginous substance has taken the place of the backbone; where mental and moral virility and heroism have been supplanted by a senseless sentimentalism. This is the new human nature of Bellamy; and all we need to fit to it to make the picture complete is the Christ of modern birth, and we have some problems to solve that make the present social problems seem as child's play.

But the Christ of history and the forces which he set in motion have spoken now for more than eighteen centuries, and, by the docile student, their voices may be heard in tones of authority, and not as the scribes. They speak for both poles of truth on every subject: self and neighbor; individualism and societism; liberty and law; ownership and stewardship; democracy and aristocracy; idealism and realism; theory and practice; subjectivity and objectivity; the spiritual and the material; beauty and utility; faith and works; competition and coöperation; worship and work.

The world has moved forward in each age too largely by fits and starts, by over-emphasis of some half-truth, and its progress has been intermittent,—a succession of chills and fever. The pendulum swings from one side to the other, and a century is lost in extremism. Many social reformers and teachers are trying to set the pace for the new century

along these same old lines of error,—of seizing upon a half-truth, and pressing it into service for a whole truth. Dr. Abbott has done this in many places, though in others he seems to answer his own arguments. He gives an estimate of self that is a denial of the fundamentals of Christian ethics; a view of individualism that makes practical socialism a pressing necessity; a conception of stewardship that denies ownership; an estimate of the evils of competition that makes it supreme selfishness, instead of the law of social development and of individual worth; a definition of liberty that is license; a conception of retributive justice that is not a vindication of law, nor even vengeance, but revenge; and incidentally he seems to favor single tax, and the quantity rather than the quality theory of money.

The commercial world will never hitch its wagon to such a star. Because the age is one of invention and discovery, revealing beauty in utility; leading men on to attain the ideal through the real; because it is a commercial age of ingenuity in combining, concentrating, and coöperating for the accomplishment of its purposes; for these very reasons it will never be led into the wilderness of quagmire and fog, into ethical and economic transcendentalism. Transcendentalism in theology may secure an audience, but in economics and ethics it will not be heeded for a moment. While the country is in debt to advanced thinkers like Dr. Herron (though he is simply a voice crying in the wilderness, and makes no pretension to accuracy of speech or precision of definition; and though such religious newspapers as the *Kingdom* are the outgrowth of the demand of the times and meet a want); yet the obligations to the conservative universities like Yale, Harvard, and Princeton, and to the standard weekly religious press, for their defense of fundamentals, can scarcely be estimated.

Let us now examine critically some of Dr. Abbott's propositions, and discover their true import and ultimate bear-

ings. The most fundamental of these is found in his ethical conception of the value of self compared with neighbor. ✓ Many social critics, observing the abnormal development, in this day, of the passion for acquisition, and that manhood seems devoured by the canker-worm of selfishness, and that the proper regard for neighbor has too little show of recognition, imagine that this state of affairs must be cured by extremism in the other direction,—*similia similibus curantur*. Hence the absurd teaching, that self must be withered to zero, while neighbor must be exalted to unity. But the very cure for the mad haste to be rich, it seems to me, is not to cure one exaggeration with another, but to do as Christ did, hold up to rich men the very importance of self and the accountability of each to God.

For many years I have known that Dr. Abbott sympathized with Dr. Herron in his philosophy of the comparative importance of self and neighbor. Dr. Abbott was the author of that ingenious interpretation of the Royal Law that made it the Judaistic law of justice, and not a remedial law of sacrifice. Years ago he said that the Christian law demanded, not that thou shalt love thy neighbor *as thyself*, but *better* than thyself, for did not Christ say: "A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another as I have loved you"? In other words, neighbor equals unity, while self equals zero. He quoted a mother's love as ideal; forgetting that it is an instinct, and not the harmony of the will with the reason, which is righteousness.

In the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for October, 1894, I took the pains, at great length, to show the fallacy of this reasoning, and have never had occasion to change my mind, that this equation is not founded on sound Christian ethics. I speak of it again, because it leads to some absurdities in Dr. Abbott's book, as I shall try to show. It obstructs the view of the natural rights of man,—life, liberty, property,

and reputation; it ridicules subjectivism; it warps the notions of the right of ownership in property and land; it takes one-sided views of individualism, of arbitration, of stewardship, even of liberty. If the remedy for extreme individualism is the exalting of the state into paternalism; or, in ethics, the reducing of self to zero; or a denial of the right of ownership, then the remedy is worse than the disease.

The intimate relations between ethics and economics are such that an absurd and unsolvable equation in ethics calls for the substitution of sentiment for reason as a working factor, and the result is the Sentimental school in economics. Against this, not only all sound economic scholars protest, but the unerring instincts of practical business men revolt, with the sure result, that a contempt for scholastics and collegians will permeate the marts of trade as it did the mind of Horace Greeley. For a bank to attempt to save men's souls, instead of their financial credit, or, for courts of justice to attempt to follow Dr. Herron's advice and become "courts of redemption," accomplishes no practical good; it simply awakens, and justly so, the contempt of sound business men for theorists and sentimentalists. Commerce and trade will never come into the kingdom on such a philosophy.

The theory that neighbor equals unity, and self equals zero, finds no sanction in Christian ethics, and any philosophy founded on such equations will never become a working principle in commercial circles. It sounds good, but it is not the gospel of the practical and sensible Christ. Phillips Brooks' well-known sermon on "Son of man stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee," is an answer to such a sentiment; and likewise Paul's saying: "They have beaten us openly uncondemned, being Romans, . . . let them come themselves and fetch us out."

Nor is it because the world practically is so far from the

ideal that men are principally concerned with their own business, and are too selfish to care for that of their neighbor's. The very laws of Christ's kingdom enforce the same truth; for no one can become interested in the salvation of neighbor, until he has first been concerned about his own. Love worketh no ill; but that love is good-will, and the highest fruitage of good-will is justice, not sentiment. The theory of non-resistance, according to Tolstoi and his follower, Ernest Crosby, would raise havoc in business circles. A bank run on such a theory would close its doors, and thus rob its depositors.

The same line of reasoning will apply in a measure to the law of stewardship in matters of property. It is a spiritual law, and is not to be taken into account by courts of justice or in deeds of transfer. For all practical purposes, absolute ownership is the commercial idea. The letter killeth, the spirit giveth life, must be observed when the attempt is made to govern commercial circles by laws intended to govern man in his personal relations to God. The Calvinistic argument advanced by the colored brother, who had fallen from grace and stolen a chicken, will illustrate. "I am not personally responsible, your Honor, for stealing that chicken; it was foreordained that I should take it." Said the Justice, "Then it was also foreordained that I should send you up for ninety days." Bronson Alcott confused the doctrine of stewardship with that of ownership, if he helped himself, as it is said he did, to his neighbor's melon patch. It does not impeach a whole system of truth because some evils grow out of it. Every virtue has its corresponding vice. Let the tares grow with the wheat. The desire to acquire cannot be held responsible for the ravages of avarice any more than mother's love can be charged with the crimes of lust, or the spirit of genuine faith be held responsible for the caprices of credulity.

In speaking of Christ's first sermon at Nazareth, Dr. Ab-

bott says: "The spirit of this sermon has entered the church and has gradually changed the avowed function of religion from the selfish one of seeking the personal salvation of the worshiper to the unselfish one of inspiring him to become a saviour of others. With this change in the conception of religion has come a change in the organization of the church" (p. 34).

When he characterizes the desire for personal salvation as "selfishness," his error is an ethical one, in confusing self-love with selfishness. Much confusion of thought can be avoided by distinguishing always between the higher self and the lower self. True piety is not a growth in self-consciousness, nor in sentimentalism, nor in selfishness; though it is a positive and persistent growing consciousness of the real value of the higher self compared with the lower self. Through a vision so clarified, the communion becomes deeper and sweeter, as the years go by, with Him who is, and is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. The inner world becomes the great reality, and the outward the shadow; the seen and the temporal fade away in the light of the unseen, the immortal; and over the horizon of the soul rises the Light of the world. In his Bampton lectures, Barry says, "The soul in its supremest moments is conscious of but two existences,—God and self."

In his "Philosophy of Kant," E. Caird says: "We must, in the first place, remember that analysis and subjectivity on the one hand, and synthesis and objectivity on the other hand, go together in Kant's mind."¹ The two poles of thought necessary to any perfect philosophy are revealed in two sayings: "What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The fruitage is practical piety and Christian altruism. As Hegel said: "Christianity, we know, teaches that God wishes all men to be saved.

¹ P. 413.

That teaching declares that subjectivity has an infinite value."¹

Battoni's Magdalene, in the gallery at Dresden, reveals a woman, physically beautiful, lying on the ground in a cave reading the Scriptures. It is not true to life or to nature. It may be a half-truth. Asceticism, monasticism, medievalism or orientalism, whether in art or religion, must give way to modern progress, for this age is eminently practical; but when the paramount importance of personal piety is overlooked, and individual man is lost in social man, the result will be materialism. Subjectivism (a word that Ruskin so abominates), no less than individualism, comes in for indiscriminate censure with Dr. Abbott, when all we need is to remember Aristotle's tribute to the golden mean. As Ovid says, *Medio tutissimus ibis*.²

But this age is not so practical nor so civilized, nor will any other age become so, that duty to God can be supplanted by duties to society, or that man's obligations to himself can be overlooked in any assumed enthusiasm for altruism or social reforms. A labor church was started in Chicago, and the first sermon was preached by a labor leader, a demagogue whose profanity on other occasions was well known and notorious. The effort was simply blasphemy.

A peculiarity of Dr. Abbott's is seen in his lack of judicial poise; for, when he is developing one pole of truth, his intense desire to make his point clear leads him to over-emphasize its importance, and thus it may become essentially error. For instance, in one place (p. 16) he speaks clearly of liberty once being another name for lawlessness, thus holding to old Governor Winthrop's distinction between liberty and license, but later on (p. 42), in defining what is liberty, he enters upon a discussion that ends as follows: "Democracy begins self-government with the in-

¹ Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*. ² *Metamorphoses*, ii. 137.

dividual, leaves him free to do what he will, to perpetrate what blunders and inflict what self-injuries he chooses, so long as he does not directly or indirectly wrong his neighbor by his blunder or his self-injury" (p. 44).

Here is the self-equals-zero theory again, and the logic of it is, that the highest prerogative of a noble Roman is to commit suicide. But democracy does nothing of the sort, as any man will learn if he is detected in an attempt at self-destruction. If a man does too many foolish things, even in matters of property, his friends may have a conservator appointed for him to protect him from himself. The definition of liberty, "to do as one pleases," is fit scarcely for the animal kingdom, much less for civilized human beings. It is not even a definition of natural liberty, and much less of civil liberty. Carlyle's well-known "brass collars, whips, and handcuffs" argument, to which Dr. Abbott objects so strenuously, is a way of stating Christ's view, that true liberty comes through bondage to truth,=natural or civil liberty. Natural liberty is freedom from all restraint, except such as nature imposes; while civil liberty is freedom from all, save such as is imposed by government or by society. It must be said, in justice to Dr. Abbott, that in other places his conception of liberty assumes a normal shape.

On the question of Single Tax, he would seem to sympathize with the views of Thomas G. Shearman, the noted advocate of Mr. George's views. As he does not assume to take up the economic question in detail, neither will I, except to suggest, that, if individual ownership of land has multiplied the size of the earth by bestowing upon it the advantages of individualism, thus making it more productive and fruitful, it would devolve upon Single-taxers to show that public ownership would do the same, and that the taxes on unproductive land are more than offset by the unearned increment. It is an economic question, and not

purely an ethical one. The effect of private ownership of land on individual character, awakening the sense of ownership and of self-respect, has been generally overlooked by Single-taxers.

When Dr. Abbott comes to socialism, he exposes its weakness in clear language. He attempts no definition of socialism; but in the *Outlook* of December 26, 1896, this definition is furnished us: "Any system which assumes that the present evils in society are due, in whole or in part, to social malorganization, and which proposes as a remedy, in whole or in part, a reorganization of society." I assume that this is from Dr. Abbott's pen, because it is preceded by sentences taken *verbatim* from his book. Barnum's entire menagerie can be driven through such a definition. It is too general, and will let in every scheme of visionary reform that to-day is seeking a foothold on this long-suffering earth. Socialism would substitute coöperation for competition, and place all the means of production in the control of the state. It would change environment, not man. It would make men holy by machinery, and happy by legislation. It works from without inward; from the top downward. It reverses the processes of nature in social evolution. To the extent that Christian socialists, like Maurice and Kingsley, would effect these results of making men fraternal through the spirit of goodwill inspired by Christianity, no one can object; for it is voluntary, and in no wise interferes with individual liberty. Socialism can never be made to work without Christianity as its guiding spirit; and when men are imbued with that spirit, socialism is not needed.

Dr. Abbott's views of individualism again reveal this want of judicial instinct. He says: "We have definitely abandoned *laissez-faire* and the Manchester school. It has no longer any place in our industrial conceptions. It is sometimes attacked by men as though it were an existing

thing. It is not an existing thing. . . . Government has definitely, distinctly, and finally declared that the relations between men in industry cannot be left to the conflict of self-interest." It is undoubtedly true that the state has stepped in to suspend some rights assumed to be individual and has greatly enlarged its duties and functions; and by wise and humane legal enactments is doing more to protect the weak from the strong, the poor from the rich, the wage-earner from the corporation. To this extent individualism has been superseded by state intervention. All good citizens wish it would discover some way now to protect us all from the monopolies and trusts that are such a poor tribute to the principle and wisdom of coöperation as well as to individualism. But in what manner and to what extent has the *laissez-faire* doctrine in economics been superseded? The competitive warfare was never so strong among merchants as now. Manufacturers combine, but middlemen compete. Individualism and human selfishness are not synonymous terms. Christianity discovered individualism as the lost sheep on the mountains, but now is turning its attention to the ninety and nine. To abandon individualism completely in a government like our own would be to return to the democracy of Aristotle, which exalted the state, and made the individual a zero.

The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path, and is conscious of her surroundings, said Socrates.¹ This principle should govern in viewing modern social questions. The new fashion of thought that is setting in is an old fashion with new trimmings. A practical sympathy for the masses in all their needs, and for the lowest in their degradation, is born of Christianity. It is praiseworthy, and should be helped onward by every means; but, as sure as it neglects the reclaiming of individuals one by one, it will end as all fashions do,—in a passing fad. The preju-

¹ Jowett's Plato, Phædo, Vol. ii. p. 256.

dice against Christian clergymen and churches, on the part of wage-earners, is deep-seated and outspoken. Personal friendship and contact alone can overcome this. Settlements that would lift men up to the highest level must seek change of character, no less than of environment; a change of will, no less than an awakening of æsthetic emotions, for men need life more than light, regenerating more than refining. To exalt Humanity upon the throne of the universe, and bid all fall down and worship at the sound of the cornet, flute, harp, sackbut, and psaltery, is simply to adopt the utilitarianism of August Comte. Its fruitage will be skepticism, rationalism, materialism. Good citizens are simply good people. Civic righteousness, clean politics, sound economics, ethical culture, are all the fruitage of faith. As Mazzini says: "Every political question is rapidly becoming a social question, and every social question a religious question."¹

The following are quotations from Dr. Abbott's book to which reference is made in this article:—

"That danger of land monopoly, which history has proved to be so great and so common a peril, was guarded against by the declaration that all the land belonged to God" (p. 6).

"We can hardly fail to see that the burden of his [Christ's] ministry was far more sociological than either ecclesiastical or theological. He intimated that there was to be a church, but he gave almost no instructions respecting its constitution or its laws" (p. 17).

"Liberty is ability to do as one pleases" (p. 42). "Whether liberty is wise, safe, or even possible may be open to discussion" (p. 43).

"Liberty is possible only through society, and society is a condition of interdependence" (p. 119).

"There are not wanting indications that a fifth small body [of men] will soon exercise a practical control over our currency, or medium of exchange" (p. 61).

"Christianity recognizes neither absolute good nor absolute evil in man. The highest faculties have their perils, the lowest their useful purpose" (p. 68).

"According to the communist, the family is the ideal of all social organism, and we shall not reach the ideal until we come to be one household and own all property in common. Nor can we set this notion of common property aside as unworthy of serious consideration. We cannot forget that this was the dream of Plato,—and Plato was a wise man. From his time to the days of Looking Backward it has been an ideal of noble men" (p. 71).

¹Quoted by Dr. Abbott, p. 36.

"Property is a trust. Whatever a man possesses is given to him, but the gift is not absolute ; it is a gift in trust. He is to use it for the benefit of the whole community" (p. 81). "Property is a trust. . . . Any man who uses his property, or any part of his property, for himself alone, is guilty of a breach of trust. He is a defaulter before God. . . . It is not his to use. No part of it is his to use. . . . No man owns anything" (pp. 83-84).

"There is neither moral nor scientific basis for the notion that the land and its contents belong, or can by any possibility belong to the accidental owner to use for himself, in disregard of public welfare" (p. 87).

"I will define the man of wealth as one who, after fulfilling his trust to his own family by providing adequately for their best equipment, and fulfilling his trust to his co-partners, without whose coöperative industry his accumulations would have been impossible, still has a surplus. That surplus belongs to the community ; it has been derived from the community ; and it is to be administered for the benefit of the community" (p. 94). "In the light, both of Christian teaching and of scientific teaching, all wealth is to be held and administered as a common wealth" (p. 99).

"The same individualism which entered the church and split it into sects, and entered government and led on to anarchy, entered industry and founded what is known in political economy as the Manchester School. This doctrine treats man in an industry, as governed only by self-interest. It expects and encourages a perpetual conflict of interests, and trusts that an equable balance and a true justice will be secured by the interaction of purely selfish forces" (p. 108).

"The function of government is reduced to a minimum,—the function of protection" (p. 109).

"Such, very briefly described, is individualism in church, state and society. It has not fulfilled its promises" (p. 110).

"In religion, there is an evident reaction against the individualism of the past. We believe in religious liberty, as Luther did ; but we no longer think that 'liberty' is the only word, and we are striving in religion to bring about fraternity as well" (p. 114).

"Government has definitely, distinctly, and finally declared that the relations between men in industry cannot be left to the conflict of self-interest. There must be in some measure, government control exercised over them. From that declaration we shall never, in any Anglo-Saxon community, go back to the old pagan individualism" (p. 121).

"Christianity is not individualism, in state, church, or social organization. Liberty is not independence" (p. 365).

"Wealth first, man afterward, says political economy. Man first, wealth afterwards, says Christ. Wealth the standard of value, says political economy. Man the standard of value, says Christ" (p. 183).

"Not that is the best government which best governs to-day, but that which, by the very process of government, is developing the best manhood for to-morrow" (p. 184).

"As the church, the state, and the school are to be measured by the character which they produce, so is the industrial system. . . . An industrial system, then, must produce good men and good women, or tend to produce them. If it does not, it fails, measured by Christ's standard" (p. 186).

"But the doctrine that labor is a commodity, and that capital is to buy it in the cheapest market, is not even temporarily sound; it is economically false as it is ethically unjust. There is no such commodity as labor; it does not exist" (p. 200).

"And as there is no labor commodity to be sold, so there is no labor market in which to sell it" (p. 200). "Both are fictions of political economy" (p. 202).

"Ethically, it is the duty of the employer to pay not the lowest, but the highest possible wages; as it is the duty of the employed to render, not the least, but the largest possible service. Selfishness will not solve the labor problem" (p. 203).

"Economically, it is wise for the employer to pay the largest possible wages; for the larger wages produce better men, and better men produce better work" (p. 203).

"No industrial system is righteous which does not make such a division of the profits as to give all who are engaged in it a living wage. What is a living wage I will not here undertake to discuss. It must at least provide for food, shelter and clothing. It ought to provide books, pictures, education. And it ought to enable the man to earn the livelihood for his wife and his younger children" (p. 204).

"But, meanwhile, what shall we do when labor controversies arise? Capital is organized; labor is organized. How can we settle controversies between them and put an end to strife? What alternative is there for strikes and lockouts? Christ replies: Conciliation, arbitration, law. See Matt. xxviii. 15-17" (p. 283).

"The authority to inflict such [retributive] justice is not conferred upon us,—is, indeed, emphatically denied to us by Christ himself. Judge not, he says" (p. 307).

"What we call the administration of justice, is the administration of social revenge" (p. 310).

"The object of punishment is not the protection of society from the criminal classes. This is a purely selfish purpose, and a purely selfish purpose is never beneficent and rarely accomplishes its end" (p. 310).

"Our penal systems should be animated by a different spirit; they should seek a different end; they should employ different means. The spirit should be that of love; the object should be the reformation of the offender" (p. 311).

"In brief, we are to bring the problem, How shall we deal with our criminal population? the spirit of Jesus Christ; we are to seek his ends and we are to employ his methods" (p. 312).

ARTICLE X.

THE HOUSING QUESTION AND SCIENTIFIC REFORM.¹

BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM CALDWELL, M.A., D.SC.

IT seems fitting that a Conference like the present should be conscious to some extent of the relation of the special topic of its consideration to social science as a whole, and to the whole course of contemporary social evolution, and to the science of reform—if there be such a science—to scientific reform. The very fact that this conference is held under the auspices of a University Settlement, and of settlement workers, and philanthropists, and public officials, is enough to prove to the general public that the topic of our consideration is a rational one, one that is thoroughly in line with the best modern tendencies of economic and social reform. The people who meet here to consider this topic of the Housing of our Working-Classes cannot, by their very existence, be mere visionaries, or mere revolutionists, or mere sentimentalists, or mere busybodies and agitators. Taking, then, all this for granted, I wish, ladies and gentlemen, with your permission, to bring before you *some*—I do not say all—some of the principles of social evolution and reform on which this movement for the better housing of working-people may be said to rest. A movement that could not bear inspection in the light of scientific principles of human nature, and that might be out of harmony with social evolution,—which is a thing we

¹ An opening address before Improved Housing Conference, at Northwestern University Settlement, 252 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, February 1 and 2, 1897.

may help to mould, but not wholly or arbitrarily control,—would be condemned as irrational, unreal, unworthy of the consideration of scientific and serious people, as not destined to have a future.

But the first thing that may be said about the proposal to insure better homes for people in the crowded part of our cities is, that it strikes a fundamental note, so far as both human nature and social science are concerned. It proposes, that, if anything is to be done for the people in crowded districts of cities, we should proceed by trying to organize or reorganize civic life by taking hold of the fundamental unit of society—the family. No person outside the family life, no person who has nothing at stake in the process of social evolution, can understand that very process. No person who is unacquainted with the evolution of the family in the social process and progress of humanity can have an adequate idea of the importance of this movement of modern cities to strengthen the very roots of family life by seeking, in a measure, to insist that families shall live in places where family life can take real roots. It may be that some people in our midst think, with some socialists, and some utopists, and some would-be devotees of the ideal of complete personal freedom, of the family as a transitional institution. To such people I can only say, in the name of social science, that the tendency of the best social reform in regard to the development of all classes of society, of the free and enlightened, and of the average citizen, and of the so-called laboring-classes, and of the so-called abnormal classes of society—dependents and delinquents and degenerates—is to emphasize the importance of the upbringing and training of individuals in the stable ethical family, and of the assumption, by the effective portion of modern men and women, of the duties and responsibilities of the life of the stable ethical family. In strengthening the roots of family life in house and home, the housing-re-

form movement strengthens all the reality, and all the value, and all the healthful influence of the ethical family for our modern life.

Again, in thinking of social evolution, we must always think of two factors: the so-called subjective or personal or human factor, and the so-called objective or material or environment factor. There can be no normal, ethical, effective family life for people who live, or are allowed to live, in dwellings which do not constitute the environment rational and sane and safe for the development of family life, the environment that is also safe and sanitary from the point of view of society as a whole, and of political and economic development. There can be no proper family development where there is not possible a certain minimal "standard of comfort," even so far as the mere physical development of two or three or four or six or more individuals of the two sexes is concerned. There can be no nursery for civic life in homes where the evils of loose morality, "sweating," the non-observance of civic provisions about sanitary and other matters, want of cleanliness of body, want of free air-space, want of play-space for children, utter absence of motives to purify and beautify the family domicile,—where all these evils are manifest in all their dismal bitterness. The ideal of the housing-reform movement is that the various grades of our toiling citizens, of our humble and dependent and ignorant citizens, should be taught to feel the civic and uplifting value of private, healthy, adequate, and pleasant domiciles; and not only to feel the value of adequate houses or homes, but to feel this so strongly that they would strive, at personal sacrifice, to obtain such houses or homes. It is true that the housing-reform movement began out of the efforts of society to protect itself from slums and congested living areas,—blocks of unhealthy human habitations that bred disease and degeneracy, crime and discontent, apathy, ignorance; that

permitted selfish men to make a living out of the huddling together of creatures too helpless to help themselves; that led to the perpetuation and the multiplication and the spreading of conditions utterly at variance with the conditions of national and human and civic development. But it is true that the experience of cities in tearing down insanitary and bad tenement-houses and blocks, and rear and basement dwellings, very soon led people to see that the best way of attacking the housing problem was to attack it in such a way as to insure the best coöperation of the working and economically weak people themselves, in such a way as to enlist the ambition and effort, moral and economic and vital, of these people themselves. In short, the second thing about the housing-reform movement of modern times is, that it recognizes the objective or the environment conditions of family life, as well as the subjective or personal conditions.

And the third is, that while society is compelled, in the interests of self-protection—of the survival of its own life as greater than that of any mere section of it,—to consider the housing of its members, the housing-reform movement has not hitherto neglected the fact, that the individual family ought to be willing to undergo struggle and sacrifice for its own perpetuation and advancement; that the motive of self-help and the factor of personal effort and ambition ought to be borne in mind in seeking to uplift people by bettering their environment. People ought to be made to desire a better environment for themselves. A word or two will make this apparent.

It has been found that the best way to reform people through proper housing is to begin with the better class of the occupiers of tenement-houses. Indeed, the movement naturally begins to take effect there. True it is, that insanitary dwelling-areas have been condemned and demolished by municipalities acting in accordance with govern-

ment or state provisions, and that such municipalities have seen to the thereby displaced people by building and renting house accommodations for them only out of a sense of justice, and not directly out of any socialistic or philanthropic impulse. But, generally speaking, even municipalities and private individuals or companies who have put up new housing accommodations have always put up better accommodations than had previously existed—such accommodation, in fact, as is dictated by modern science, by the economic motives of making profitable investment. The houses put up were such as would prove attractive, and modern, and economical, to all who thought of occupying them, which would draw a good kind of tenant, a tenant who would be thrifty, and reliable, and apt to be inspired with the desire of personal improvement in consequence of living in model quarters. Cities as a rule have first endeavored to induce private parties to purchase the land of condemned areas, and to build model houses which would at once yield a good return on investment, and also exhibit to some extent the philanthropic and scientific and the civic purpose. That is, they have tried to induce certain citizens, if only out of a first mere desire of profitable investment, to become individually and indirectly the benefactors of their fellow but less fortunate citizens. It has been found, too, that families, after being in model tenement-houses, begin to have the desire to acquire and own independent houses of their own, possibly somewhat removed from the immediate centers of their industrial occupations. The housing-reform movement thus goes hand in hand with the movement for cheap transit facilities in cities for the great mass of toilers. New York is recognizing this fact, and already thinking of improved independent private dwellings for workingmen at some distance from the actual business centers of the city. Towns in Great Britain have found a connection between the putting up

of improved tenement-houses and of improved lodging-houses, and the desire of workingmen to acquire finally homes for themselves.

It is a noteworthy thing, by the way, that the kind of coöperation which has best succeeded in the United States is not that of coöperative production (as in France), or of coöperative distribution (as in Great Britain), or of peoples' banks (as in Germany), but that of building associations. Workingmen have already to a considerable extent in this country been helped by building associations to the erection of independent houses in large numbers. The first occupiers, in short, of model tenement-blocks are generally apt to be the better, the self-helping portion of the working-classes, and the dwellings that they leave—partly through a fall in rent—are resorted to by the section immediately beneath them in social and economic effort. And if the first occupiers of model dwelling-houses are led finally to seek in some way houses of their own, there would thus be a double grading-up rendered possible, a grading-up which would finally affect stratum after stratum of our congested populations. And many workingmen have become actual investors in the improved dwellings they live in, and in other philanthropic enterprises connected with the housing movement. The rigid enforcement of rules about the payment of rent and the observance of sanitary laws, the increased social intercourse, the furtherance of intellectual life and development, of civic feeling, the growth in self-respect and ambition which adequate housing accommodation seems to foster:—these things, and the things to which they naturally lead, all show, in the fourth place, that the housing movement does not fly in the face of what is roughly called *Darwinism*, the natural struggle to which all individuals are, and ought to be, subjected in the development of their lives.

A good field is opened up for the work of citizens who

have leisure to help the owners—whether individual, municipal, or corporate—of model dwelling-houses in collecting the rents from the inhabitants when they fall due. By voluntarily performing this routine duty they relieve at once tenant and landlord of the undesirability of meeting through an objectionable or unscrupulous middleman or tax-gatherer, and become the means of extending the social horizon of the occupiers of tenement-dwellings. The purchase, on the instalment plan, of self-contained dwellings by workingmen can very easily be combined with the obligation of taking out at the same time an insurance policy. So that in various ways the motive of self-effort after increased welfare is called forth by the housing-reform movement.

But, fifthly, the philanthropy of housing reform is a modern, scientific, economic enterprise, which, irrespective altogether of the future of the benefited individuals and the community, from the business point of view, may be, has been, and is, a strictly financial success, an eminently good investment for people with capital, or for working-people themselves. Dr. Gould's investigations¹ into the improved-dwellings movement in America and Europe show that more than eighty per cent of such enterprises have been, and are, a financial success. This immediate business success of the movement, and the possibility it reveals of the coöperation of rich and poor in this matter, and the decreased death-rate in districts where improved dwellings have been put up, and the removal of the environment conditions of civic and national disobedience, crime, dependency, physical debility of children, immorality, political corruption, and so on, surely show the movement to be more than justifiable from the standpoint of the community, the money of the tax-payer. I should be the last to

¹ See Eighth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1895, *The Housing of the Working-People*.

deny a certain amount of inevitable moral and physiological degeneration caused by the excessive activity and overstraining of modern life, and also the last to deny the danger of adding to state and municipal machinery while the conditions of human nature remain what they are. But the housing-reform movement is a plea for self-help on the part of workers themselves, and for the voluntary interest of all the members of a community in each other, for business reasons if for no other. "Civilization," says Professor Giddings, "is menaced by dangers perhaps as grave as those that overshadowed it at the beginning. It was threatened then by the barbarians beyond its walls. To-day it is threatened by savagery within its gates."¹ All barbarism, ladies and gentlemen, all barbarism must be fought! If the present barbarism is not fought, the barbarians in our midst will overturn us or drag our society down into ruins upon which humanity or God himself may erect some better form of civilization. Society, it must be remembered, must struggle to preserve itself against all the forces that are tending to overthrow it.

America, of all countries, should take the lead in this very matter. Why should we deliberately allow areas of dwellings to be erected that will have—at the cost of the public money, and to the public shame, with a view to public safety—to be mown down to the ground. European cities have grown from small beginnings, from the bottom upwards. American cities we begin to build with all the resources of modern science, all the experience of the Old World, all our unspeakable and justifiable civic and national pride behind us, and with the unspeakable future of humanity before us. The American democracy, if it is to go on governing itself, makes the greatest possible demand upon the average citizen. It demands the most enlightened citizenship in the world, and by beginning at the home, the nursery of all the virtues in this world, all the character and all the force, by beginning in a proper, natural, justifiable, considerate, enlightened manner with the housing problem we shall begin with one of the most important factors in economic and social development.

¹ Principles of Sociology, p. 351.

ARTICLE XI.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

GOVERNOR ALTGELD OF ILLINOIS.

A CHARACTER sketch of John P. Altgeld, late Governor of Illinois, has been drawn by Mr. Francis F. Browne in the *National Review* for December. We call it a character sketch; but, as Macaulay said of Gleig's memories of Warren Hastings, it is full of undigested correspondence and undiscerning panegyric. A fair estimate of a character can seldom be made by political enemies or partisan friends. To charge a public man with all the faults that his friends concede, and credit him with all the virtues that his enemies admit, is about the safest way to arrive at a proper estimate of his character. But Mr. Browne sees no faults at all in Altgeld, and his estimate is one of simply indiscriminate praise. On the contrary, the enemies of Altgeld, and their name is legion, can see no redeeming features in the man who sympathized with Debs and pardoned the Anarchists.

We are not called upon to find a reason for Mr. Browne's admiration of his subject, but simply suggest that he is a poet, genial and imaginative, with a happy faculty of reading into a subject what is not there. As Josh Billings said, "the trouble with some folks aint in knowing so many things as it is in knowing so many things that aint so." Governor Altgeld's public career, both as Judge and Governor, has extended over many years, and he ought to be known and read of all men by this time, despite the asperities of politics and the passions of party zeal. The most prominent leaders of his own party hate him about as cordially as his political opponents do, and the reasons for it are not because he was opposed to Cleveland and favored Debs, so much as that he has the happy faculty, that belongs to a strong individual, of making warm friends and bitter enemies.

The entire press of Chicago opposed Altgeld's re-election. One exception, if it can be called a newspaper, was a vile sheet whose editor has been convicted of sending obscene literature through the mails and has been sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of years. This paper supported Altgeld, but in Chicago it has entrance to no homes of respectability, and is the paper that Editor W. T. Stead called the hedonism of journalism.

With no personal animosity and surely with no political prejudice, we will sum up briefly why, in our opinion, the voters of Illinois repudiated Altgeld by a majority of 113,317 in the State, and of 41,882 in the county of Cook, of which he is a resident. Those reasons are these:—

1. When he was a Judge on the bench, he secured a judgment against the city for assumed damages to some of his property caused by the construction of a bridge. He at once assigned the judgment, and then sold his property for more than he paid for it. It is a fair inference that it was not seriously injured.

2. His animosity toward President Cleveland for sending Federal troops into Chicago to suppress the Debs insurrection, when, as Governor, he himself refused to raise a finger until he was justly rebuked by the President for his great concern about the sacredness of state rights. This issue was forced upon the silver party by Altgeld, and, ex-President Harrison claimed, was the leading issue in the campaign.

3. The pardon of the anarchists, and the venomous attack on Judge Gary, who presided at their trial and whose life was endangered by his fearless decision against them. No law-abiding citizen could overlook the crime of these anarchists, and their most eloquent apologist was first found in the Governor who pardoned them.

4. His espousal of the silver cause when the leases of his own building were made payable in gold. This was in a measure a political argument, but did reveal a tinge of inconsistency.

5. His misrepresentations in his speech at Madison Square, New York, as to the real condition of affairs in Chicago at the time of the Debs strike on the day when the President sent the troops to protect government property. The postmaster of Chicago, Hon. Washington Hession, quoted from the records of the post-office to show that mail-trains were tied up, which Altgeld denied. The writer of this article quoted Debs' own statements at the time of the strike to the railway managers to refute Altgeld's charges that the affair was "local," and not a suspension of interstate commerce.

6. The alleged use of state funds for personal ends, and other serious charges, which Altgeld ignored.

7. A passion for pardoning criminals, not so much in quantity as in quality.¹ Judges and jurists alike have expressed their indignation in many instances, because of the unwarranted use of the pardoning power.

8. The undignified and vindictive spirit shown toward the Chicago *Tribune*, because it opposed him, by pardoning the cashier that embezzled its funds, and using the occasion to denounce the paper for evading its taxes.

Governor Altgeld has shown a commendable opposition to monopolies

¹ Of 328 convicts who were pardoned fifty were burglars and forty were murderers; nineteen burglars and sixty-nine murderers had their sentences commuted.

and trusts, and has been fearless in his espousal of the cause of the lowest classes. But he imagined that they were in the majority and could re-elect him. Here he made his mistake, and he misled Bryan at this point. An aspirant for office may not need the wealthy nor those who live in the sphere of luxury for constituents, but he cannot afford to offend the great middle class of voters, who are the mainstay and the ballast in this Republic, and this is what Altgeld did, for which he has been retired to the ranks of private life. He is a man of some virtues but of many faults, and will probably never again be heard of in politics.

Z. S. H.

SOME CHICAGO ALDERMEN.

It may be interesting to our readers to have a classification of the characters and professions of that part of the Chicago Council whose terms of office expire this spring.

Chicago is districted into thirty-four wards, and each ward is represented by two aldermen; so that the Common Council has sixty-eight members, the wards electing one alderman each spring. The Municipal Voters' League has sent out the following letter:—

“TO THE VOTERS OF CHICAGO:—The Municipal Voters' League is about to enter upon its second campaign to secure the election of honest city officials. Men are still seeking to obtain office, whose only aim is self-enrichment, and who have no regard for the sacredness of their official oath. Our city is staggering under a heavy weight of fraud and corruption, which must be met and conquered.

“We have seen but two rifts in the clouds within the past two years:

“1st. The passage of the Civil Service Law, forced upon the unwilling machine by an outraged public, and certain if inflexibly maintained to put an end to the corrupt use of offices as party spoils.

“2d. The uprising last spring which placed in the City Council an able and aggressive minority of honest men, who have stood like a rock against the tide of corruption and impeded its progress.

“These achievements prove that our city can be rescued by earnest work; and to unite honest citizens and rally the forces in favor of better government, the Municipal Voters' League has opened headquarters at 59 Dearborn Street, where each day until after the election, some of the officers will be on hand to consult, advise and cooperate for a municipal administration which shall be worthy of Chicago.

“Good citizens must no longer dally with the situation, but face the plunderers and drive them from public life.

“The League has three objects in view:

“1st. The choice of aggressively honest men for local offices.

“2d. The strict maintenance of the present Civil Service Laws.

“3d. The securing of proper compensation to the city for all franchises and special privileges.

"We invite the cordial and active coöperation of all honest citizens at the approaching election, to the end that our municipal administration shall be redeemed from political parasites and be made the pride rather than the reproach of this great city.

"The League wishes to enroll all voters who desire the election of honest and capable men. If you will sign the enclosed blank and mail it to Hoyt King, Secretary of the League, at 59 Dearborn Street, he will mail you from time to time the publications and recommendations of the League. No membership fee is charged or expected. However, as this is a popular movement, cash subscriptions of any amount, whether large or small, to meet necessary expenses are earnestly solicited. Remittances may be made to the Secretary or Treasurer at above address.

"By order of the Executive Committee."

Following is the report of the League on the record of the members whose terms of office expire in April:

WARD.	BUSINESS.	RECORD.	WARD.	BUSINESS.	RECORD.
1st.	Plumber	Bad.	18th.	Saloon-keeper	Horrible.
2d.	No business	Bad.	19th.	Hat dealer	Good.
3d.	Lawyer	Good.	20th.	Watchman	Bad.
4th.	Pres. of corporation	Bad.	21st.	Clerk	Bad.
5th.	No business	Bad.	22d.	Pres. of Coal Co.	Good.
6th.	Retail furniture	Bad.	23d.	No business	Bad.
7th.	Saloon-keeper	Rotten.	24th.	Warehouse owner	Good.
8th.	Saloon-keeper	Disgraceful.	25th.	Blacksmith	Bad.
9th.	Grain merchant	Bad.	25th.	No business	Bad.
10th.	Cigarmaker	Good.	27th.	Lawyer	Corrupt.
11th.	Life insurance	Bad.	28th.	Grocer	Bad
12th.	Real estate	Corrupt.	29th.	Com. merchant	Bad.
13th.	Contractor	Bad.	30th.	No business	Bad.
14th.	Picture framer	Bad.	31st.	Lawyer	Corrupt.
15th.	Hat dealer	Bad.	32d.	Real estate	Good.
16th.	Coal dealer	Unworthy.	33d.	Real estate	Bad.
17th.	No business	Bad.	34th.	No business	Mixed.

It may be observed,

1st. Out of thirty-four members only six are unquestionably good.

2d. The profession or business of an alderman is no indication of character, except in case of saloon-keepers.

3d. Only one has a mixed record.

The record of these men is made up from their votes in favor of corrupt ordinances, and this is quite a sure indication of boodile.

It is difficult to secure "good men" to serve as aldermen, for the office is not honorable nor remunerative. Church-membership does not yet include unselfish duty to the state. When civics is made a branch of religion, it may be otherwise. The desire to acquire and the love of a good name take on two manifestations: it urges the poor man into politics,

where he is tempted beyond his power of resistance; and it deters the "respectable" and wealthy from entering into it, because they are busy acquiring in other directions, and the newspapers are conscienceless in their abuse of public servants, even when clean, if they do not as they are told. The daily newspaper does much to purify politics, but it seeks to control votes of public officials when honor is not at stake. Good men are not seeking office to be called thieves and robbers because some editor favors some measure which they cannot support.

One of the first steps in the direction of civic reform, in order that honest men may be induced to enter politics where there is no money inducement or honorable distinction, is a more strict law on libel, making it dangerous for newspapers to attack honest men for the purpose of controlling their votes. Another step in the right direction will be for the clergymen to urge duty at the polls as one of prime importance, and for men of Christian standing and culture to be willing to serve in public positions of responsibility and trust without the incentive of gain either in money or public applause. Such men are rare, and it is unfortunately true that church-membership is yet too largely a subjective matter, having more to do with religion than with civics or politics, and in too many instances, even with ethics. Hence the cry of the socialist that wage-earners should also seek a corner lot on earth, not in heaven; a larger share of earth's products, and not a crown in some heavenly sphere for they see Ruskin's definition of religion¹ too true to life and practice.

Z. S. H.

THE CANONS OF CRITICISM.

ENVY no less than death loves a shining mark. If a clergyman is successful and distinguished, he must pay a high price for such a crime. A prominent clergyman, a man of most lovely spirit and of genuine worth, has been charged by a Chicago evening newspaper with using the thoughts of others without quotation-marks, in a series of sermons which he has preached and printed. The real instigator of the article proves to be a dissolute critic, the brother of a well-known poet; but the columns and the head-lines of a supposedly reputable newspaper are open to his virulent pen, because, forsooth, the paper must live, and sensation is its meat and drink. The proprietor personally apologizes, the editors hang their heads in shame when the facts confront them, but not a word of retraction appears in print to help undo the great wrong done to a Christian gentleman.

This is modern journalism, enterprise, the exercise of the desire to acquire, not by the greedy capitalists, but by literary men who have large

¹Our national religion is the performance of church ceremonies, and preaching of soporific truths (or untruths) to keep the mob quietly at work while we amuse ourselves.

theories of altruism and find this practical way of expressing it. This clergyman dictates to a stenographer, and in two instances single quotation-marks might have been used without injustice to the authors quoted; but because the stenographer omitted them, the author becomes a criminal, a purloiner, a plagiarist. What matters it that in fourteen discourses seventy-two thousand words are used, each one in its place and full of meaning, and that the discourses are full of genuine merit. That awful fly-speck, a period, must mar the feast and scatter the guests. An invited friend without wedding garments, not like him of old—speechless, would that he were! rudely pushes back his chair, slams the door and rushes forth to slander the host, to revile the feast as one fit for harpies. Like one who hath no music in himself, but is fit for treason, stratagems, and spoils; like the idle gossips of the lazy port who hinted at worse in either when Enoch Arden was on the dreary island, so the literary critic must look for fly-specks and for dirt.

Not such was that great critic, George Ripley of the *New York Tribune*, for he found merit where it existed; and if there were none, then charity closed the book and was silent. But the modern newspaper critic, the dudes and dudines of literary walks, know not Ripley, for they have forgotten how to spell some simple words like civility and truth. The Ingersolls find only weeds and poisons in nature, and then, forgetting the utility of even these, revile their Author, when all nature is but a tribute to his love and intelligence; so the narrow critic looks for the fatal spot in the heel of Achilles that he may wound to the death. To him all precious stones are barbaric pearls and gold. And this spirit finds its counterpart in every place where human nature seeks expression. It crops out in churches, colleges, theological seminaries, and ministerial associations. In higher circles it is not the crude oil, of course, but is refined and disguised under the forms of good-will. It is not the desire for the truth that inspires, however, so much as it is the love of error, because it affords an opportunity to drag down some growing author, some popular professor or pastor. Then envy, hatred, jealousy, finds some ingenious outlet, and it differs not a whit from the spirit of the vulgar homicide, but only in the refinement of its cruelty. There is not a place where men act in an organized capacity that this spirit does not threaten dissolution. General Grant became familiar with it no less than every clergyman that has ever become distinguished.

Such critics are usually parasites, and the slight admixture of pietism with this parasitism is all that confuses the zeal that ill-will inspires with the earnestness that is born of love. Defenders of "the faith once delivered," heresy hunters, and haters of mankind may all be from the same piece of cloth. A genuine desire to know and follow the truth and to prevent teachers of error, like grievous wolves, from entering the fold and destroying the sheep, bears all the marks of the Master,—good-will to the wolf, and a shotgun for his teachings. A model of perfection of

such a spirit is seen in the review of Dr. Lyman Abbott's views of Genesis by Professor William Henry Green, D.D., LL.D., and in an article by ex-President Samuel C. Bartlett in the *Advance*.¹

The true critic is a broad and generous nature who hopeth all things, who believeth all things, who thinketh no evil. A book or a sermon is a feast to which one is invited, and the guest must have enthusiasm for the truth, lack of suspicion, a glowing good-will, or the shadow will cross the threshold, and the joy of the feast will be turned into a hollow laugh. Like the one who, after wandering through our World's Fair, could remember nothing but that statue with the arms broken, little realizing that even then the Venus of Milo is a tribute to genius; so hypercriticism finds in every book and in every sermon a missing arm.

Judged by this standard, Tennyson must return from the great beyond to give an account of the deeds done in the body before the bar of human judgment,—the sanctum of the associate editor of an evening newspaper; for in his "Edwin Morris" Tennyson has quoted from Horace's Ode to his Friend and has given no credit. Virgil borrowed from Homer, and Milton from both, and Shakespeare from every source under the sun, but the quotation-marks are missing. Does Tennyson in his "May Queen" need to remind us that he quotes from Job, or may we find so much of merit in "Locksley Hall," "In Memoriam" and "Enoch Arden" we can pass over the punctuation-marks in the poet-laureate? Every poet, from the Elizabethan age to our own Longfellow, Whittier, and Browning, has thumbed the classics for material and form of speech. The patents on ideas, no less than on inventions, expire by limitation, and then ideas become public property. A hundred thousand graduates of Oxford and Cambridge need no footnotes, asterisks, quotation-marks, or parallel lines in their editions of Tennyson in order to detect the beauties of Horace, and the songs of Dante and Tasso. Only the Dick Bottom in literature needs them.

The artist who painted Daniel in the lions' den, and explained that Daniel could be told from the lions by the green cotton umbrella in his hand, would be the ideal in the mind of such a modern newspaper critic. The ignoramus, not the scholar; the frank fool, not the honest thinker, needs such explanations. The farmer brings his produce to market, not his farm machinery; his eggs, not his hens; his milk, not his cows. So the preacher, the artist, the poet, need not show us his raw material, if only he will convince us that his own powers of assimilation have worked upon it and given us a new combination, the fruitage of his own genius. Each one has his own word to give the world, his own poem, or picture that must be himself, given generously and lovingly as a part of his very being and when this is done he passes into the great beyond for his reward.

Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch about him
And lies down to pleasant dreams.²

Z. S. H.

¹ For a reprint of this, see *infra*, pp. 383-386.

² It is not necessary to explain that this is a quotation from Bryant's *Thanatopsis*.

ARTICLE XII.

CRITICAL NOTES.

THE PLACE OF THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT IN THE
CHRISTIAN SYSTEM.

A SERIOUS error seems to be increasingly prevalent concerning the place which the Sermon on the Mount was designed to occupy amid the remedial agencies of the gospel. We hear much said about going back to the Sermon on the Mount, as if by so doing we should gain a distinct vantage-ground, and clear ourselves from later and useless excrescences ; whereas the fact is that the Sermon on the Mount, by reason of the time at which it was delivered, if for nothing else, is occupied with only one phase of Christian truth, and would be extremely defective if made to stand by itself. The Sermon on the Mount is the law, and not the gospel, and, like the law of Moses, is but the schoolmaster leading to Christ. The more distinctive elements giving power to Christ's works and words were brought to light subsequent to the delivery of this sermon. Indeed they were not available to the world until after Christ's death and resurrection and the spiritual manifestation of Pentecost, and would now be largely beyond our reach but for the apostolic epistles which unfold and enforce them.

The truth of these statements will appear from even a hasty glance at the sermon. The Beatitudes pronounce blessings only upon those who have kept the law, and the standard set up is one to which none of the hearers could say that he had attained. Who of Christ's hearers could have said that he was one of the really poor in spirit, of the meek, of the merciful, of the pure in heart, of the peacemakers, and of those that hunger and thirst after righteousness? But only they were to be blessed. What chance therefore did the multitudes have, or does mankind in general have, to become partakers of these promises?

In the specific sections upon the fulfilling of the law, the exalted character of the standard set up appears in most emphatic terms. "Whosoever shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven. . . . But I say unto you, that every one who is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment ; and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council ; and whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of the hell of fire. . . . Agree with thine adversary quickly, . . .

lest haply . . . the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the last farthing. . . . If thy right hand causeth thee to stumble, cut it off, and cast it from thee. . . . Resist not him that is evil; but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. . . . But I say unto you, Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you, . . . Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men, to be seen of them; else ye have no reward with your Father which is in heaven. . . . Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors. . . . If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. . . . Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth, . . . but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven. . . . For where thy treasure is, there thy heart will be also. . . . Be not therefore anxious, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? . . . Judge not that ye be not judged. . . . All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them. . . . Enter ye in by the narrow gate . . . for narrow is the gate and straightened the way, that leadeth unto life, and few be they that find it. . . . Not every one that sayeth unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven. Many will say unto me in that day, Did we not prophesy by thy name, and by thy name cast out devils, and by thy name do many mighty works? And then will I profess unto them I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity. . . . Every one that heareth these words of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened to a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand."

It thus appears that the Sermon on the Mount is little else than a reiteration of the moral law, emphasizing all of its requirements by declaring them to have respect to the thoughts of the heart, and not merely to the outward action. If we are to be forgiven only as we have forgiven others, how can we hope to be forgiven at all? The motives essential to the securing of this high obedience are largely absent from the Sermon on the Mount. The preaching of this sermon was calculated at the time, and if unconnected with doctrines unfolded at a later period in Christ's history, is always calculated, to produce conviction of sin. The contemplation of the truths here presented is not adapted to the production of faith and hope. The hearers upon this occasion were not *converted* like those who heard Peter upon the day of Pentecost: they were simply *astonished* at the authority with which the Saviour spoke. The only intimation of mercy in this sermon appears in the seventh chapter, where we read, "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; . . . for every one that asketh, receiveth"; but even this is followed by the most terrific warning against hypocrisy in asking. It is only they who ask aright who shall receive.

In explanation of these facts, it should be noted that the Sermon on the

Mount was preached before the most characteristic facts of the gospel were enacted. The sermon makes clear the duties of mankind, but does not reveal, and at that time could not reveal, the love of God as expressed in the sufferings and death of Christ. The preaching of the apostles was successful because they had, as the theme of their discourses, the culminating exhibition of God's love in the death of Christ which in a mysterious way makes effective to all believers atonement for the sins of the past, and, at the same time, furnishes the most melting motives to obedience which have ever been presented to mankind. The sufferings of Christ which pave the way for the forgiveness of sinners are at the same time the most powerful of all motives to induce repentance, and to establish men in the observance of all the requirements of the law.

As an enforcement of the law of duty resting upon man's spiritual nature, the Sermon on the Mount is invaluable; but it needed, and was designed to have, as a supplement, the motive power found in the later story of Christ's sufferings, and in the unfolding of the theme preserved for us in the writings of the apostles. Happily we are not limited to either of these alone. The church is not compelled to choose between the law as emphasized in the Sermon on the Mount and the gospel consummated on the cross; but, firmly holding to both, she lifts on high the lofty standard of the one, and at the same time the all-powerful motives of the other to make it effective. With the use both of the law and of the gospel the church has hitherto prevailed, and, by this means only, will she continue to conquer.

NOVEL BIBLE HISTORY.¹

[As illustrating the outcome of most of the disparaging criticisms of the Pentateuch, the following bit of thorough exegesis is worthy of more permanent reference than it would receive in the weekly periodical for which it was prepared.—EDS.]

THE law of Moses, whatever else may be said of it, has always been commended for its striking sanitary character. But we have recently read the charge against it of criminal inhumanity, stated in these terms: "It may be that many believe that the Law of Moses, Deut. xiv. 21, *permitting diseased meat to be sold to foreigners* was the law of God. But if any one in this country should be *caught* acting on the *provisions of that law* he would soon find how decided is the disapproval of it by courts and people."

One should be quite sure before making the statement in so offensive a form. It would be a very singular conjunction of incongruities in the same humane code which forbids even the capture of the mother bird from her nest in any tree or on the ground, the muzzling of the ox when he

¹An article by ex-President S. C. Bartlett, D.D., in the *Advance* for January 7, 1897.

treads out the corn, and plowing with the ox and ass together, to find also express, universal, permanent provision, and therefore encouragement to the Hebrew to sell diseased meat to the foreigner. Is there in the Deuteronomic code a positive "provision" for every member of the Jewish race to do what any one in this country "caught" in doing would be punished by the courts?

There is not. Does the Hebrew word (*nevelah*) so unhesitatingly pronounced "diseased meat," actually mean that? It does not; no competent scholar will pretend that it does. Can the word be shown in any case definitely to designate diseased meat? It cannot. Can it even be shown in any instance distinctly to include diseased meat as such? In no instance.

Indeed, a clause in the very verse cited, but not alluded to in the reference, is itself sufficient to refute the assertion. It is the clause which assigns to "the stranger within thy gates" substantially the same treatment in this respect as the "foreigner." The writer selects from the first clause of the verse one word which somewhat vaguely renders the Hebrew word, curiously omits the second clause, and fixes on the third. The second clause, taken in connection with the injunction of the very near context and numerous other injunctions in this same book of Deuteronomy, effectually disproves the charge. Now, replacing the Hebrew word in the text, and inserting the omitted clause (in parenthesis, to call attention to it), the passage reads thus: "Ye shall not eat of any *nevelah*; (thou mayest give it to the stranger that is within thy gates, that he may eat it); or thou mayest sell it to the foreigner." Is it possible for any man to understand that the "diseased meat" which the Jew was to sell to the foreigner, he was to induce the favored stranger within the gates to eat by *giving* it to him? Still further; the constant and strenuous commands given in this very book of Deuteronomy, and in close connection with this text, preclude the possibility of such an interpretation.

How was the Jew commanded to treat "the stranger within the gates," thus coupled with the foreigner? In this same chapter, only eight verses later, we find one of the many commands requiring the *kindest treatment* of this same "stranger" (the same word, *Ger*), who in this respect is steadily classed with the widow and the fatherless and the Levite, one or all. Thus in this very chapter (verses 28, 29), when at the end of three years the tithe of increase is brought in and laid up, the command is given, "The Levite, because he hath no portion nor inheritance with thee, and the fatherless, and the *stranger*, and the widow, which are within thy gates, shall come and eat and be satisfied; that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine hand which thou doest." So, still more strongly, chapter x. 18, 19, "He [God] doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and the widow, and loveth the stranger, in giving him food and raiment. *Love ye* therefore the *stranger*; for ye were strangers

in the land of Egypt." Similar injunctions for the kind treatment of the stranger, with the same classification with the widow and the fatherless, and for similar reasons, are given in connection with the feast of weeks (xvi. 11) and of tabernacles (xvi. 13). The Hebrews were not to oppress the stranger (xxiv. 14), nor to pervert the judgment of the stranger, nor hinder the stranger, the fatherless and widow from gleaning in the grain-field (xxiv. 19), the olive trees (verse 20), and the vineyard (verse 21). The same three classes are commended to special kindness with a double enumeration in chapter xxvi. 12, 13, with a reminder of the Israelites' own bondage in Egypt.

Now it is to be noted that in the passage where our friend finds his "diseased meat," the same thing is to be *given* to this stranger which is to be sold to the foreigner. But in view of these steady and urgent requirements in the same Deuteronomic code and in the near context, to find the injunction or permission to give him diseased meat is an interpretation entirely precluded if any other is admissible, or I might say, possible. And with the case of the stranger resident within the gates, that of the foreigner in the same passage also falls.

A different interpretation is very obvious, and has been very commonly and easily recognized down to the present time. A ceremonial restriction was laid on the Jew which was not laid on the stranger within the gates nor on the foreigner. What is contained in the prohibition and the permission of the verse in question (and other similar passages), is simply this: The Jew being forbidden to eat blood, was therefore forbidden to eat any bird or animal that had not been regularly slaughtered and drained of its blood.

The assertion or implication that *nevelah* means diseased meat, as has been already said, is destitute of foundation. It means the dead: as Gesenius renders it (in the Thesaurus), *cadaver*, translated by Robinson, corpse, carcass; Fuerst defines, the sunk, the fallen, hence a corpse; Knobel and Dillmann render in this passage, the fallen, as does Strack in Lev. xvii. 13; Oettli renders here, corpse (Leichnam). Not all dead animals or carcasses were forbidden to the Jew; but we have a long catalogue of clean animals which he was permitted to eat, yet not until the blood had been thoroughly drained from them (Lev. xvii. 14, 15). For this very reason in the passage just referred to, the torn by wild beasts is prohibited, and also *nevelah*. Now, what carcasses of wild animals might be covered by this word (and for the reason rendered), not included in those torn by wild beasts? All others not regularly slaughtered and drained; such as all birds and beasts killed by the hunter and not bled, all killed by accident, or by battling with one another, those caught in traps and snares, struck by lightning, as so often happens, destroyed by tornadoes, as has happened to hundreds and thousands during the present year, and, we might add, destroyed by hail as in Egypt, and as in North Dakota on the 25th of last May. All these would fall within the reason rendered, and

put the *nevelah* in the same general class with the more specific and perhaps more common one of those torn by wild beasts. This is the simple, consistent and long received explanation. Any one who shall attentively read the first twenty verses of the chapter containing the passage in question, and other partly parallel ones (Lev. xvii. 14, 15; Ex. xxii. 31; xxii. 8; Ezek. iv. 14), and observe the reason rendered, and the association of the act with ceremonial uncleanness and prohibition of blood, will see the perfect validity of the received interpretation. The stranger and the foreigner might eat; the Jew under his ritual law might not, although in the Levitical code which claims to be many years earlier, this was forbidden to the stranger and the foreigner also. A slight modification had been made during the intervening forty years.

This, I say, is the accepted interpretation of the best modern scholars. Dillmann says, "From the prohibition of blood it follows also not to eat the *fallen* or torn, of which the blood is not drawn off" (Lev. xvii. 15). So Strack: "In case of the fallen and torn the blood is not duly poured out." The somewhat radical Kalisch says (Lev. p. 223): "Such flesh was partially if not chiefly interdicted because it allowed but an imperfect removal of the blood." And the Higher Critic, Driver, says (Deut. p. 165): "The ground upon which this flesh was prohibited being, doubtless, partly because it *might* be unwholesome, but *principally* because it would not be thoroughly drained of blood."

The Hebrew Archæologists have taken the same ground with the best expositors. Jahn more than sixty years ago said (Upham's translation, p. 154) that both of these things, the *nevelah* and the torn of beasts, were interdicted, "inasmuch as the blood remained in the body." Benzinger in 1894 says (Archæologie, p. 483), "Even for this reason they ate no corpse and nothing torn by wild beasts, because here was the blood." Saalschuetz, midway between (1853), says of this verse under discussion, that "the law speaks of only one kind of forbidden thing, namely, of beasts which had not fallen by the knife." (Das Mosaiches Recht, p. 252, note.)

After what has been said it scarcely need be added that the English phrase, "that which dieth of itself," on which alone the charge against the law of Moses is understood to defend itself, is a very loose rendering, not supported by the Septuagint, Vulgate, or so far as I am aware by any modern lexicographer or careful scholar, but used and retained for want of an English word or brief phrase that exactly covered the case, and without a thought, probably, that it would ever be put to such a use. The Douay Version renders a little more, though not quite, exactly, "whatsoever is dead of itself," easily understood to mean, not properly slaughtered. But waiving the question what would be the best brief rendering, it is obvious that the assertion that the law of Moses permitted diseased meat to be sold to the foreigner is unjustifiable.

ARTICLE XIII.

SEMITIC AND ORIENTAL NOTES.

THE PERIOD OF THE JUDGES.

IN the December (1896) issue of the Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology, Professor Flinders Petrie has a very interesting and suggestive article on the vexed matter of the period of the Judges, which seems to promise that the whole matter may soon be completely understood, and the differences reconciled. And the importance of the relation of the thorough understanding of the Judges period to the whole Egyptian question cannot well be overestimated. Professor Petrie fixes the date of the Exodus at about 1204 B.C., or later, which it seems is certainly late enough, though his method of arriving at the date is clear and reasonable enough. He reasons from the inscription of Merenptah stating that he fought and subdued Israelites, that he did not restrict his campaign to the Philistines, and that, had the Jews been in Palestine at that period, the record of the war would have appeared in the book of Judges. This is in general a safe inference, though it is possible that, from so composite a book as the Judges, a portion of the record may have been lost or dropped out. In addition hereto, there is no sign of a Palestinian campaign of Ramessu III. and that hence, the Jewish invasion must have been subsequent to Ramessu III.'s last campaign. His date appears to have been not later than 1180-1148 B.C., which puts the date of the Jewish invasion at 1164 B.C., or lower; and hence the date of the Exodus at a point very near 1200 B.C.

He also discusses the reigns of the kings and the priestly genealogies, and then proceeds from these results to discuss the period of the Judges itself. Professor Petrie, as others have often done before him, shows the careless use of the expression "forty years" in connection with the reigns of Saul and David, and illustrates, from the probable facts concerning Saul's reign, how productive of misunderstanding that expression has been. For example, Saul was warned in his second year, that his successor was already chosen (1 Sam. xiii. 14), and David comes to the front almost immediately in the Amalekite war. Now if Saul died when David was but thirty (2 Sam. v. 4), David probably not being less than twenty years old in the war just mentioned, Saul's reign is limited to about three years before David, and ten years after, making about thir-

teen years in all. This, it may be mentioned, is but one of many such examples of Old Testament use of figures.

From this it would appear that, taken with the genealogies and other data, the period of the Judges covers about one hundred and five years between 1150 and 1045 B.C. Now the book of Judges, as Professor Petrie again points out, consists really of three histories, which may be designated about as follows: The history of Galilee and the North, that of Moab and the East, and that of the Philistines and the West or Ephraim. This has always been clear, and has frequently been shown, and has been fruitful in much explanation of the matters discussed in the book of Judges itself. The analysis of the periods within the book is thus given:—

Judges iii. 8 North, 1st captivity and deliverance.

“ iii. 14 East, 1st captivity and deliverance.

“ iv. 3 North, 2d captivity and deliverance.

“ vi. 1 West, 1st captivity and deliverance, continuing

“ x. 3 East, history to the end.

“ xii. 11 North, to end.

“ xii. 14 West, to end.

In this way we see the growth of the power of the Judges, the connection of the various districts with each other, and a picture of the rise of central authority. In each history, before the monarchy appears, there is a stable rule effected in the district.

Now the total period in these districts thus arranged, is in the North 118 years, in the East 122 years, and in the West 121 years. But here is the complicating “forty years” period, included in each one of them; and if the experience in connection with Saul’s reign is taken as a fair basis of calculation, these periods are very materially reduced. But this leaves the period according to Egyptian history, as stated, 105 years; according to the genealogies, about 116 years; and according to the book of Judges, 120 years, subject to some other modifications as indicated. The reconciliation completely of these differences, Professor Petrie says, is hardly practicable yet, though he indicates some ways in which it can be aided. But in the main, the three sources compared in this way, as our author has compared them, is at least very suggestive, and so approximately correct that it may well stand until something much more definite appears to modify his view. This is by far the most careful discussion of the date question of the period covered in the book of Judges we have seen, and gives hope that it will aid us in fixing some other matters which are intimately allied to the period of the Judges. Professor Petrie’s chronology of the whole period is worthy of being reproduced here for comparison and further study. It is as below:—

Exodus.....	1192.
Invasion of Canaan.....	1152.
First oppressions about	1142.
First deliverances.....	1135-1125.

Abimelech in West	1114-1111.
Jabin in North	1112-1092.
Tola in East	1111-1088.
Jair in East	1088-1066.
Abdon in West	1089-1081.
Philistines in West (including Samson-Samuel)	1081-1042.
Philistines in East	1066-1048.
Jephthah in East	1048-1042.
Elon in North	1052-1042.
Saul	1042-1029.

This table is subject to slight variations ; but will be found, as Professor Petrie thinks, a fair working chronology of the period it covers. Certainly the way in which the results have been worked out, and the reasonableness of the general grounds assigned for them are very satisfactory, and entitle the table to great consideration.

A. A. B.

ARCHÆOLOGY AND LITERARY CRITICISM.

PROFESSOR FRANCIS BROWN in his annual address, before the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, on "Old Testament Problems," devotes a section or two to the question of the proper relation of archæology to the literary problems of the Old Testament. He appears to think that the discoveries of archæology, though interesting enough in their way, have little real force and bearing as related to the matters of literary judgment and criticism which the higher critics have been discussing.

His view of the case is simply that all such discoveries are themselves historical material which must itself be subjected to careful analysis and criticism, and that its interpretation is often a matter no less difficult than that of the Old Testament documents themselves,—a statement which is certainly very true. Used, he says, as other historical evidence is, it is as good as any, namely, having been itself critically sifted and properly classified and authenticated. Professor Brown thinks that, as an ally of conservatism, it is useless in a battle of literary criticism, because it is not designed to win that kind of a struggle. It may be important as determining a historical fact, but has no influence and can have none in determining a literary fact. Archæology, he says, for example, can have nothing to offer on the question, as to whether Moses did or did not write the Pentateuch.

From Professor Brown's position there can be very little dissent ; first, because what he says is true ; and secondly, because he does not touch the real point at issue in the battle between archæologists and the literary critics. The most casual examination of the materials out of which literary criticism has been constructed in the last fifty or seventy-five years will show, that the higher criticism has been giving itself not mere-

ly to purely literary matters, but to arbitrarily reconstructing history. No plain statement of fact, if of a certain textual character, has been important enough not to be swept away by an assertion totally unjustifiable from the mere literary contemplation of the facts. The presence of a word, or a series of words, or a form of expression, has been sufficient to discredit, in the mind of the literary critic, any number of matters of historical fact. Literary criticism has not confined itself to matters literary, but rather undertaken to reconstruct and alter, each according to the personal inclination of the critic, the most fundamental statements of the document under review. It is just this part of the assumption of the higher critics that the archæologists have punctured, and it is this which causes the resentment of the higher critics. To say that writing did not exist in the time of Moses in any such form as would make the Pentateuch possible, is not a literary fact, but a statement of historical possibility. And to base an argument against Moses' authorship of the Pentateuch upon such a statement, certainly is not literary criticism, whatever else it may be. Yet this has been done. Archæology has shown how insufferably arrogant the cocksure attitude of the higher critics has been; and it may be observed, in passing, that the higher critics have grown more cautious in recent years in the matter of predictions and date-making. Archæology has certainly justified its being, if it does no more than remind a coterie of petty infallibilities that the Almighty reserves such attributes for himself alone.

On the other hand, archæology has rendered positive service in the reconstruction and revivifying of periods of biblical history concerning which we had little or no knowledge. One thinks of the attention now given to the material of Assyriology as contrasted with Robertson Smith's contemptuous dismissal of it as without much significance,—a matter which before his death he saw to be a blunder. Has textual criticism nothing that it owes to Assyriology? and, on the mere literary side, have the Assyrian accounts of biblical themes no significance or weight in the literary argument? Not the weight of the decisive witness, but weight surely. The same is true of Egyptian research, as the preceding note will abundantly show. Professor Sayce certainly has the best of his opponents in this matter. They were sure they knew everything from the literary side. He proved to them that there were many things concerning which they evidently knew nothing, and more concerning which they were mistaken. It is not strange that he should go farther, and apparently seek to discredit them in everything, as they did him.

For the Tell-el-Amarna tablets, Professor Brown has but a single paragraph. In a word they have not been sufficiently "acquired and assimilated." True enough; and there are people who say precisely the same thing about the book of Isaiah. But it seems to a considerable number of persons at least intelligently enough acquainted with the main facts, that the Tell-el-Amarna tablets have been sufficiently "acquired and as-

simulate¹ to make a considerable portion of the critical world pause and think twice before venturing to settle offhand some of the fundamental questions of Christian interpretation.

One single statement in Professor Brown's address it will be well not to overlook, and to remember in view of all we have been saying, namely when he says, "With reference to questions of date, there is manifest an increased recognition of the force of arguments diminishing the amount of pre-exilic Hebrew literature that has come down to us, and increasing proportionately the exilic and the post-exilic, particularly the latter." This is not now the time to discuss this statement, but we venture the criticism of the remark, that from this time out a more rational and thorough examination of the literature of the Old Testament will tend to prove precisely the reverse.

A. A. B.

BABYLONIAN PALÆOGRAPHY AND THE OLD TESTAMENT.

THE linguistic history of the Old Testament has in recent years developed into one of the most interesting, and in some respects one of the most important, branches of Old Testament study. More than ever the Old Testament is seen clearly to be a rational development of ideas, customs, ritual, and laws which must be suitably placed in their order of development to be thoroughly comprehended. There being no inspired or final authority known on the subject of the arrangement of the material contained in the books of the Old Testament, it becomes the work of scholars and others to grapple with the matter of arrangement; and this, for the most part, is what gives the question of the dates of the documents the importance it has, though, at first glance, the ideas seem to be the only important thing. But obviously the understanding of the ideas depends in great measure upon the knowledge of the conditions from which they emerged, and the necessities which required their enactment into institutions and laws.

Until within a comparatively recent period, the whole tendency of critical study of the Old Testament was to lower all the dates, and thus bring the material and ideas of the Old Testament institutions closer to our own era; and it must be admitted that there seemed to be much to justify the procedure. Many of the books were placed by the present arrangement in a period to which they obviously could not belong. And many documents alleged to be of early or antique origin showed a skill in arrangement and compilation which proved without question that they belonged to a more highly developed literary period than that in which they were alleged to have been created. Consequently there was a general quest for a productive literary period, and one such was found in the exile and the period succeeding. Professor Brown's statement, commented upon in the preceding note, is a type of the prevailing notion. But the interesting thing in connection with the subject is, that it did not seem to oc-

cur to any one that a productive literary period might be found earlier than the alleged date of the documents referred to. Take, for example, the Mosaic books, so-called. The assumption that there might have been such a literary period contemporary or earlier than Moses was dismissed with a contemptuousness that made argument about it almost impossible. To a later period one must look, and the result was that the seventh century B.C. blossomed out into what must have been, if one can credit that it produced all attributed to it, one of the most astounding literary developments in the history of the world.

There was, however, just one shadow across the sunlit landscape of seventh-century beauty and simplicity. It was in the linguistic difficulties, which everywhere persistently protruded themselves, and perplexed, and often stultified the overconfident expositors of seventh-century sunlight and productiveness. The discovery and the remarkable expansion of Assyrian knowledge and literature has still further beclouded that seventh-century brightness, and, what is more amazing still, seems to threaten to make the erstwhile standing-ground *par excellence* as precarious a foundation, for secure results, as the floating reeds upon which Noah's dove in vain essayed to rest her feet. The date-making business took a new turn, and the gaze was and is turned backward, and we have learned to wait more patiently and have no longer the "cock-sure" noisiness of seventh-century self-satisfaction. It is well that it is so, and we shall probably learn more with the latter attitude than with the former, though we shall have less of the dogmatic certitude once so common.

Aside from the great light thrown upon the Old Testament by the comparative Semitic linguistic study, there have been made strong and vigorously eloquent beginnings in a science of Babylonian palæography under Professor Hilprecht's leadership, which will still more begloom the advocates of seventh-century sunlight and productiveness. Not content with the development of words and texts, the very letters themselves, and the history of their form and arrangement, are being studied, which is throwing great light upon the relative age, not merely of texts, but of ideas, because these happen to be expressed in one form or another; and this, too, promises a revolutionary field of activity. It has been pointed out before in these Notes, that there was a striking relationship of form and meaning, with some lateral variations, between the characters of the Babylonian and the Chinese; and from this and similar sources, with the patient comparison of form and palæographic development, we may get more intelligence from a most unexpected source upon these very questions over which we have for a century been struggling, even though it will take a long time to "acquire and assimilate" the material before sound conclusions can be developed.

The instances in which ideas and dates in respect to the Old Testament literature have been clarified and modified have been abundantly shown ever since the publication of Schrader's "*Keilinschriften und das Alte*

Testament," and this knowledge has gained general acceptance. But no one has as yet attempted what some new Robertson Smith must attempt, the revision of Old Testament religious ideas with the modifications which the knowledge and light of Assyriology compel. That great work is still to be accomplished, and from the new palæographic discoveries and elucidations will come important aid to completer understanding of what more and more is demonstrated to be incomparably the most interesting antique literature in the world. With respect to the New Testament also, this has a most vital relation; because one of the first and most valuable of the Assyrian contributions to our knowledge was a large fund of matter dealing with the Semitic social customs and life, and these in turn have a most decided bearing upon the rise of social institutions. Marriage, property, land tenure, taxation, and a host of other questions are thus made clearer in their development, and bring to the New Testament a better comprehension of the existing ideas and their history, upon which the social mutations proposed by Christ and his disciples were to be imposed. New Testament morality and New Testament doctrine will not be least among the gainers from the increased interest in the letter and form of the primary languages from which the now complex Semitic development arose.

A. A. B.

ARTICLE XIV.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A MAN'S VALUE TO SOCIETY. By NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS, D.D. Pp. 327. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell & Co. \$1.25.

The Rev. Newell Dwight Hillis, D.D., of Central Church, Chicago, the successor of David Swing, has written a book. It is not an ordinary book, and reveals clearly why Central Church is so crowded to hear this poet-preacher. It would well repay many clergymen who are painfully conscious that their audiences are acquiring that tired feeling, to make a little study of the secret of Dr. Hillis' power, and then ask, if a new interpretation may not be placed upon that much-abused and long-suffering word,—gospel. Dr. Hillis sets before us a feast of good things.

“ 'Tis manna to the hungry soul,
And to the weary, rest.”

As the sheaves did obeisance to Joseph, so the dusty books upon forgotten shelves come down to greet their friend when he approaches, for books know their friends, though they are closed in the presence of one who has eyes but sees not; they are dumb to the one who has ears but hears not. Not such is Dr. Hillis. His soul is open to the voice of the past, as his heart is open to the friends of the present. To whomsoever God hath spoken in the past, whether to Moses or to Socrates, him Dr. Hillis loves. Hence books are to him not simply an intellectual life, they are soul life, and bring the valuable part of yesterday into to-day. Thus he brings the people of to-day in a busy, hustling city like Chicago to know and love the great souls of yesterday who have left their message and then have passed into the great beyond.

He sets a feast of good things each week; hence the thoughtful and the observing dine at his table. The fruits from every clime are here; the flowers with their fragrance, from every byway and from every nook and cranny under the sun, are thrown about with a profusion suggestive of extravagance that is like a breath of spring through the open window when the buds are opening and the throstle calls to nature's feast. Like Him who drew his illustrations from the lilies of the field, the birds of the air, the sages of the past, and yet left the impress of his own mind upon all, and the crowds gathered to hear him; so Dr. Hillis sees in the word gospel not simply the inexorable laws of logic,—the foreordination and predestination of Calvinistic interpretation, the ribs and the backbone,

the skeleton of religious truth : but his mind finds the beautiful, the attractive, the loving. He is a worshiper of Ruskin, the apostle of the beautiful no less than of the practical. His theology is clothed with flesh and blood ; it has the glow of health upon its cheeks ; the light of love is in its eye, and it is like unto the Son of man. This is his interpretation of the word gospel, and his success illustrates that the people do yet love it and hear it gladly.

Like the bee sipping the sweetened water from every flower, and yet, becoming its own alchemist, it gives of itself, and thus transmutes this into honey by the gift of its own genius ; so Dr. Hillis has by his own power and personality put his own interpretation upon these garnered truths, and thus has given them a new life and meaning. He is himself a poet. He has a soul full of harmony that hears the lost chord ; he is close to nature's heart. Hence he speaks to us our own best thoughts and sincerest moods. When we would die of the song that our lips cannot sing, we hear it from his own lips, for this is the poet's mission. Hence we read ourselves in him, for he voices the unsaid things of the heart. The touch of pathos, the soul's own harmony here finds a language, and we love the singer. This is the gospel of to-day, for long ago men erected the scaffolding and then took it away, and now we love to pour up the broad steps into this completed temple. Christianity is now established, it is in our songs and in our national life, and its miracles need no defense. Paul and Calvin builded well, and we now rejoice in their work, because it is all past, and we behold its meaning in the completed task. The greatest preachers have assumed the fundamentals of Christianity, and gone on to build thereon. So wise was this plan that Harvard College forgot to question the fact of the resurrection when Phillips Brooks assumed it as a truth, but went on with him admiringly into the beauty and power of the corollaries. Christianity no longer needs the scaffolding and the props brought into every sermon, for the truths of the Son of Mary have filled the world with fragrance. The greatest miracle of the New Testament is now seen to be the character of the Nazarene.

Such a book as Dr. Hillis' is most useful in this day, when the tendency is to exalt the state and belittle the individual. Social man is absorbing individual man. Dr. Ely's excellent work on the "Social Law of Service" is a fit companion book, therefore, for this plea for individual culture and development. The two poles of thought need emphasizing, the building up of society through its ideal units and the highest development of the individual through his social instincts. Dr. Hillis' book stands for the first, and Dr. Ely's for the second, of these lines of thought. But Dr. Ely no more ignores the highest and best self-culture than Dr. Hillis does the social instincts and nature of man. Each has simply placed especial emphasis upon his own line of thought. To find the highest self in neighbor is a truth that needs emphasis in this day. The discovery of this, not by the intellect alone but through a larger unfold-

ing of the spiritual consciousness, will usher in a good-will that actually becomes a fad, and fashionable. Dr. Hillis has written a book that is full of this spirit, for it is a part of himself.

Z. S. H.

MORAL EVOLUTION. By GEORGE HARRIS, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Pp. x, 446. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1896. \$2.00.

Professor Harris should have called his volume "Moral Science," rather than "Moral Evolution"; for, in fact, it does not differ in compass and design from ordinary books giving a systematic treatment of ethics, and, in general, his conclusions are in harmony with the ordinary interpretations of Christianity. The reasoning is usually sound; while the literary style is uniformly of a high order. But the author's theory of evolution is not thoroughgoing enough to help him over the hard points. At any rate he abandons it when he comes to accounting for Christ, and says that he believes in the miraculous conception of Jesus and in his resurrection from the dead. Nor does he accept evolution as an adequate account of the origin of man, and of the moral nature upon which all ethics is based. In short, he seems to have adopted the word "evolution" without accepting its full significance, and to have used it without clearly defining the limitations put upon it. He therefore plays fast and loose with it, deceiving himself probably as much as he will his readers.

The chapter upon "Ethics and Theology" brings to the surface more of the author's divergences from the standard statements of the Christian church than does any other. But even in this the divergences are often more apparent than real. Few Calvinists would accept the caricature which he rejects. It is idle to attempt to make out that the love of God was absent from the Calvinistic creed, or that it denied the Fatherhood of God. One can exalt the dignity of the parent without destroying the tenderness of his affection. In general, also, it must be said that the author does scant justice to the New England theology, which he freely criticises.

THE PURITAN IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND. By EZRA HOYT BYINGTON, D.D., Member of the American Society of Church History. With an Introduction by ALEXANDER MCKENZIE, D.D., Minister of the First Church in Cambridge. Pp. xl, 406. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1896. \$2.00.

A history must needs be more than the relation of events. To this must be added such an insight into the relation of the order and sequence of events as to set forth with the narration, or rather through it, that philosophy of history which is, after all, but another name for the working of Providence in human affairs. Not every man qualified to chronicle facts possesses the insight and acumen which are equally necessary to constitute his work history. The first feeling of the reader of this robust volume is that its author has brought to his task this peculiar fitness for it, and that, in a field already well covered by histories not a few, he has

explored with good success. The volume shows the zest of a sympathetic inquiry, the ripeness of mature thought, and the strength of wide and well-balanced study in other and related departments of thought.

The book contains eight chapters: "The Puritan in England"; "The Pilgrim and the Puritan"; "The Early Ministers of New England"; "William Pynchon, Gent."; "The Family and Social Life of the Puritans"; "Religious Opinions of the Fathers of New England"; "The Case of Rev. Robert Breck"; and "The Religious Life in the Eighteenth Century in Northern New England." The general research and the biographical and local interest are pleasantly blended. The book has human interest as well as historic value. It is a question whether the order of the chapters might not well have been varied, placing all the general topics first and the local and biographical studies at the end; but this is unimportant, and the special studies are in the best place for their illustrative value.

On the whole, the best work is in the analysis of the Puritan life and character, as set forth in the chapters on the home life of the Puritan people and the public and personal life of the ministers. In this last department, especially, the contribution to current knowledge is large.

Dr. Byington has no unkind words for the Pilgrims, but he comes to the defense of the Puritans against overzealous friends of the Plymouth colony. He shows that in their enterprise, social standing, vigor and power, the learning and ability of their ministry, and the intelligence and literature of their people, the Puritans were in the lead. Over against this he acknowledges the greater tolerance and more truly Christian spirit of the Pilgrims. This seems to us as fair an estimate as we are likely to obtain of the relative virtues of these two kindred movements.

The work did not need an introduction from any one, but no one more fit could have been found than Dr. McKenzie, and his forewords are well chosen and characteristic.

ANNALS OF KING'S CHAPEL from the Puritan Age of New England to the Present Day. By HENRY WILDER FOOTE. In two Volumes. Vol. II. Pp. xxviii, 690. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1896. \$5.00.

King's Chapel, Boston, and the religious society worshipping in it have a unique history. The organization was founded in 1636 to meet the wants of the English officials and a few of their sympathizers who were not satisfied with the puritanical *regime* of the early Congregationalists. Up to the time of the American Revolution, it gradually grew in importance until it occupied the present substantial and really noble stone edifice which is such a landmark in the city at the present time. But during all this period the Episcopal Church of America was entirely English in its organization and government. The breaking out of the Revolutionary war scattered the adherents of King's Chapel; their pastor, Rev. Henry Caner, with a large part of his parish, sailing away with the British fleet when it evacuated Boston Harbor on March 10, 1776.

Left pastorless, and bereft of its main supporters, the remnant of the church made the best of the situation by opening its audience-room for a while to the services of the Old South Church. In conducting their own services, also, it was found expedient to omit prayers for the king; while it became evident that the Unitarian sentiments prevalent not only in Boston, but in certain influential quarters in England, had deeply affected the remaining membership. As a result of these conditions, it was difficult to secure a regularly ordained clergyman who would be acceptable to the people. The problem was finally solved in the Congregational way by the church itself ordaining, on the 18th of November, 1787, James Freeman, who had acceptably served as a reader for several years. Under Mr. Freeman's guidance, the Episcopal service of the English Church was revised so as to eliminate the Trinitarian clauses, and to adapt it to the conditions prevalent in America. Many of these changes have since been adopted by the Protestant Episcopal Church.

During the present century King's Chapel has continued to fill a most prominent position among the religious, patriotic, and benevolent agencies of Boston. Its history, so faithfully recorded here, is a history of no small part of the most cultured, philanthropic, and devoutly religious portion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The numerous engravings, coupled with the full biographical sketches, give great value to the volume for general historical reference. Indeed, neither the civil nor the religious history of Boston and New England can be fully understood until one has perused this admirable work.

IMMORTALITY AND THE NEW THEODICY. By GEORGE A. GORDON, Minister of the Old South Church, Boston. Pp. xii, 130. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1897. \$1.00.

This volume contains an admirable statement of the true grounds upon which our belief in immortality rests. The evidence is not demonstrative, but probable. But in this respect it is like that of all other inductive conclusions (p. 5). No man knows enough of the nature of mind and matter to affirm with positiveness that the mind cannot exist independent of the body. There is much to show that the mind is independent of the body. There is something which gives unity to the varied bodily sensations, and which survives numerous changes to which the body is subjected. So great is man, and such are the limitations of his life in this world, that the possession of a life beyond the grave is necessary to justify the wisdom of God in bringing him into this existence.

The author argues, however, not merely for immortality, but for the blessed immortality of all, using the old-style Universalist arguments. His chief new argument should not pass without an additional word. In justification of his dogmatic statement, that "no intelligent person who for an hour takes in the new situation, and allows it its legitimate influence upon the mind can ever again support the traditional idea which limits God's saving interest in the race to this earth" (p. 82), the author

appeals to evolution, and the antiquity of man, which he thinks is proved by that doctrine. "No man in his senses," he says, "can survey the bewildering total of humanity that evolution puts before him, and admit that the saving interest of God in mankind ceases at death, and still believe that God is a moral being" (p. 87). The misconception in this rather dogmatic assertion is twofold: In the first place, it accepts with too little question extreme views concerning the antiquity of man; and, in the second place, it overlooks the abundant evidence that prehistoric men were comparatively few in number. During that indefinite time in which mankind eked out a scanty existence by the use of rough stone implements it would require one hundred thousand years for as many men to live in the world as now come on to the stage of action in a century. Dr. Gordon's appeal to this argument here, and in his previous work, but illustrates how imperfectly he has thought through the premises upon which his arguments are based. Evolution has not materially changed the basis of reasoning upon ethical questions and the methods by which we would justify the ways of God with men.

RECENT ADVANCES IN THEISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., B.D., B.Sc., F.R.S.E., F.G.S., Corresponding Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, Letters, and Arts of Padua; author of "The Significance of the Old Testament for Modern Theology," etc., and Minister of St. Andrew's Parish, Kilmarnock. Pp. lvi, 548. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1897. 12s. 6d. *net*.

This well-printed and substantial volume fitly supplements the author's previous treatise upon "The Progressiveness of Modern Christian Thought." One is impressed in reading it with the author's great familiarity with the modern literature bearing upon the subject, and with the judicial treatment accorded to all authorities. The author, however, is not so "judicial" as to have no mind of his own. In the midst of the din and confusion of modern speculation, Dr. Lindsay hears the undertone of truth concerning God which has come down from early times through the literature of the Old and the New Testament. While recognizing the truth underlying the doctrine of the divine immanence, so greatly emphasized by many theistic writers of the present day, he is not carried away, as some are, to the extent of practically denying the transcendence of the Deity. His own position is, "that it has grown always more evident that no Philosophy of Religion can be satisfying to the most clear-sighted thought of to-day, which, while postulating personal and self-existent being as the immanent principle of the world and the world's development, fails to pass outwards and upwards to the conception of this personal being as transcendent" (p. 109).

In the same strain he maintains that it is unfair to demand of physical science that it shall demonstrate the existence and attributes of God; for the causes which enter into the theistic conception of the universe lie "outside and beyond the universe of things. It is only a higher and

more philosophic science, than that which is commonly so designated that "can turn theist and search for the first cause.

Naturally enough, also, the author defends the realistic view of the universe as the outcome of modern science. "There can be no doubt that the science of our time, in its most thoughtful aspects, very truly apprehends the dualistic character of the causation principle, by which it is seen to mean, on the one hand, sequence, dependence, manifestation, and, on the other hand, to signify substance, continuity, a persistent dialectical core of being through all phenomenal changes" (p. 159).

The author maintains, also, "for God that infinite freedom which is the equivalent of a self-determination that is perfect" (p. 400). Nor is the author blinded by the physiological speculation which would confound mind and body and destroy the idea of the liberty of the will. "No doubt, the delicacy and the exactness of the correspondences between mind and body are much more keenly appreciated than they were, but nothing that science has been able to set forth as to these relations of 'psychosis and neurosis' is of a kind to invalidate the theistic position in the remotest degree. From such effects of disease or accident neither the non-existence nor even the inaction of the mind has been proved" (p. 409).

The volume is one to be carefully studied, and not carelessly read, and attains the high-water mark of theistic discussion in the last quarter of this century.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY: Its Principles, its Branches, its Results, and its Literature. By ALFRED CAVE, B.A., D.D., author of "The Scriptural Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement," "The Inspiration of the Old Testament Inductively Considered," etc., and Principal, and Professor of Theology, of Hackney College. Second Edition, largely rewritten. Pp. xiv, 610. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$4.50.

This revision and enlargement of the first edition, which was published ten years ago, makes the volume unrivaled in its line. The enlargement is most timely, since it allows the author to take account of the great number of works relating to the new phases of theology which have recently arisen. Indeed the volume in its present form is well-nigh indispensable to every student of theology.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By FRANK BYRON JEVONS, M.A., Litt.D., Classical Tutor in the University of Durham. Pp. 443. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1896. \$2.50.

Altogether this is the most satisfactory treatise upon the origin of religion which has as yet appeared. The author's familiarity with original sources is ample, and he has welded the vast mass of facts into a logical system which commends itself with increasing force as the reader proceeds from chapter to chapter.

The author maintains that "from the beginning man believed in a su-

pernatural spirit (or spirits) having affinity with his own spirit and having power over him" (p. 15). "Man being man began with a spiritual consciousness of the same content as now" (p. 408). It is in the explanation or development of this spiritual consciousness that diversity arises. There is an evolution of religious beliefs, but evolution is by no means always progress. The author would prefer the word "continuity," and say that "there must be a *continuum* in religion, something which is common in all religions, so far as they are religious, and which, however its forms may change in the course of evolution, underlies them all" (p. 393).

The various stages through which religion runs are animism, totemism, polytheism, monotheism, but these are by no means in lineal, but rather in divergent, direction. But monotheism in its highest form has not arisen unaided. Its appearance is connected with the special manifestation characteristic of early Jewish history. Polytheism has in some countries risen towards pantheism, but in most cases it has degenerated into fetichism, while sacrifice has degenerated "from a sacrament into the making of gifts, and then, except in the case of Christianity, into mere magic used to constrain the gods to do the will of man" (p. 395). "Progress in higher matters is always due to the minority, to individual thinkers, discoverers, reformers. . . . Religious progress moves wholly on one line, that of personality. . . . The divine personality impresses itself unequally on different minds, and it is to those most impressed by it that religious progress is due : to them monotheism was disclosed ; . . . and we cannot maintain it to be impossible or even improbable that such revelation may have been made even to primitive man" (pp. 395-397).

THE ELEMENTS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM. By ANDREW C. ZENOS, Professor of Biblical Theology in McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill. Pp. xiv, 256. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1895. \$1.00.

Though professedly dealing with the methods merely of the higher criticism, this volume contains much, by way of illustration, touching the matter with which higher criticism has to deal. In both respects the volume will prove itself of the highest value not only to the general reading public, but to such of the higher critics themselves as have their mental horizon unduly limited by the narrowness of the field to which they confine their investigations.

Higher criticism is nothing new ; it has always been employed by intelligent students of the Bible. It "is the discovery and verification of the facts regarding the origin, form, and value of literary productions upon the basis of their internal characteristics and contents. . . . It is a branch of Introduction" (p. 9). Origen and all of the church fathers used it in reaching their conclusions concerning the New Testament canon. It is idle to inveigh against higher criticism itself. Each higher

critic must stand or fall by his individual success in using facts and principles which are the common property of all.

But no greater mistake can be made than to assume that the higher critics form a kind of infallible council, or that the temporary agreement of a few of them is equivalent to an infallible decree. So far as they are to be trusted, they are able to give a reason for the faith that is in them, and it is of the utmost importance that our clergymen, who hold the position of leaders of religious thought, should go behind the names of the critics to a careful examination of the reasons which they give as the basis for their revolutionary views of sacred history.

In the present volume the ordinary reader will find much helpful direction, both in methods of study and in classified references to authors of various shades of thought. After glancing at these references, one is not deeply impressed with the argument from general consent which is so clamorously urged in favor of the latest reconstruction of Old Testament history. Most will be willing to match William H. Green against S. R. Driver; Howard Osgood against T. K. Cheyne; C. M. Mead against C. H. Toy; W. J. Beecher against C. A. Briggs; T. W. Chambers against H. P. Smith, and E. C. Bissell against E. W. Bacon; while Germany and Holland still have a respectable list of most eminent scholars who maintain in general the ordinary view of Pentateuchal history. Within the last two years O. Naumann and Hoedemaker, and a little earlier A. D. Zahn, have vigorously maintained the unity of the Pentateuch.

A NARROW AX IN BIBLICAL CRITICISM. By Rev. CHARLES CAVERNO, A.M., LL.D. Pp. 300. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1897.

On every page of this interesting volume the reader is made conscious that the subject is in the grasp of a strong and well-furnished mind. Indeed we do not know any book of this size which contains more helpful discussions of the subjects in hand than are found here. The volume contains chapters upon the interpretation of the Apocalypse, of Job, Jonah, Isaiah, the Imprecatory Psalms, the story of Eden, and several other topics. The chapter upon the Imprecatory Psalms is unexcelled in the wisdom of its treatment and the vigor of its style. The literary merits are throughout of a high order.

THE BIBLE AS LITERATURE. By Professor RICHARD G. MOULTON, Ph.D., the Rev. JOHN P. PETERS, D.D., Professor A. B. BRUCE, D.D., Professor G. F. WRIGHT, D.D., and Others. With an Introduction by the Rev. LYMAN ABBOTT, D.D. Pp. 375. New York and Boston: T. Y. Crowell & Co.

This is such a book as the people in the churches are seeking. It differs from Professor Moulton's "Literary Study of the Bible" both in content and method, and the two admirably supplement each other. That is analytical, while this, for the most part, is topical and inductive. That considers the several kinds of literature, and illustrates them from the Bible: this takes up the books or groups of books in the Bible for order-

ly and systematic study. There are twenty-two authors, each one treating in a few pages of what is ordinarily considered in volumes.

It is unpleasant to pass without a word so many of the excellent chapters in the book, every one of which deserves appreciative mention. There is not space even to speak of Dr. Vincent's chapter on the Parables, nor Dr. Stevens' on Paul, nor Dr. Lowrie's admirable analysis of Hebrews. Professor M. S. Terry's brief introduction to the Apocalypse is of unusual merit, and sets forth the only tenable view of the authorship and date and purpose of that book.

The volume closes very appropriately with a chapter on the influence of the Bible on English Literature, by Professor Albert S. Cook, whose books on this subject are well known.

THE TELL-EL-AMARNA LETTERS. By HUGO WINCKLER. Pp. xlii, 416, 50*. New York: Lemcke & Buechner; Berlin: Reuther & Reichard. 1896. \$5.00 *net*.

This volume contains on one page a transliteration of the documents and on the opposite a translation into English made (by Professor John M. P. Metcalf) from the German of Winckler under his supervision. Professor Winckler says: "I owe special thanks to the translator of the English Edition, John M. P. Metcalf. This work required acquaintance with the cuneiform dialects, as well as a thorough working over of the texts. With both, Mr. Metcalf assisted me in reading the endlessly laborious proofs" (p. vi). Professor Metcalf's article on the subject renders further notice here unnecessary.¹

THE CAUSES OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL TEXT OF THE HOLY GOSPELS; Being the Sequel to The Traditional Text of the Holy Gospels. By the late JOHN WILLIAM BURGON, B.D., Dean of Chichester. Arranged, completed, and edited by EDWARD MILLER, M.A., Wykehamical Prebendary of Chichester. Pp. xiv, 290. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$3.50.

This is a most lively and interesting defense of the late Dean Burgon's well-known positions respecting the results of textual criticism of the New Testament. In opposition to Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Westcott and Hort, the authors maintain that the Sinaitic and Vatican manuscripts, with a small number coinciding with them, are of little value as witnesses when standing alone. Indeed, in their opinion these manuscripts are "totally depraved," and owe their existence to the fact that they were not worn out by use, as all good manuscripts of that day were. The authors endeavor to reverse most of the rules of textual criticism which have been followed of late, and to sustain most of the readings of the *textus receptus*. The great learning and ability of the authors, together with their earnestness and remarkable power of literary expression, make the volume indispensable to all students of textual criticism.

¹ See *supra*, pp. 334-347.

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE. (The International Critical Commentary.) By the Rev. ALFRED PLUMMER, M.A., D.D., Master of University College, Durham, formerly Fellow and Senior Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. Pp. lxxxviii, 590. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$3.00 *net*.

This volume will add materially to the reputation of the Series of which it forms a part. It is packed full of just the information one wishes to find in a commentary; while the discussion is remarkably free from the narrowing limitations so often imposed upon commentators by their bondage to scholastic learning. It is in every way to be commended. We have found fewer points of disagreement with the author than in almost any other commentary with which we are conversant. Three copious indexes render it easy of consultation.

With reference to the date of the Gospel, Dr. Plummer easily disposes of the theory that it was written about the year 100; but we do not so readily see his ground for favoring the date of 75 or 80 in place of 63. We should not agree with him in his confidence in asserting that A.D. 63 was too early for the many attempts at writing the history of Christ to which Luke refers. On the other hand, thirty years would seem to us a very natural period for the rise of such imperfect documents. Nor does it seem to us that the advocates of the later dates give sufficient weight to the abruptness of the termination of Paul's history in the Acts.

The author's treatment of the apparent discrepancies between Luke and other writers is extremely satisfactory. A single specimen will be sufficient. Speaking of the reference to Quirinius's governmentship of Syria (chap. ii. 2), he says, "We are warranted in maintaining (1) that a Roman census in Judæa at this time, in accordance with instructions given by Augustus, is not improbable; and (2) that some official connection of Quirinius with Syria and the holding of this census is not impossible. The accuracy of Luke is such that we ought to require very strong evidence before rejecting any statement of his as an unquestionable blunder" (p. 50).

A DISSERTATION ON THE GOSPEL COMMENTARY OF S. EPHRAEM THE SYRIAN. By the Rev. J. HAMLYN HULL, D.D., formerly Senior Scholar of S. Catherine's College, Cambridge; author of an English Version of "Marcion's Gospel," and of "Tatian's Diatessaron." Pp. 177. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00.

The long-lost Diatessaron of Tatian was first brought to light again during this century in a commentary upon it by Ephraem Syrus, discovered in the library of the Armenian monastery of S. Lazzaro, near Venice. A Latin translation was published by Dr. Moesinger of Salzburg, in 1876. Soon afterwards an Arabic translation of the Diatessaron itself was discovered in the Vatican library, and later still another Arabic copy in an Egyptian monastery. The present volume presents in order the fragments which are found in Ephraem's Commentary, which occupy

between forty and fifty pages. The introduction contains an ample discussion of the principles upon which Ephraem made use of the Diatessaron, and a comparison of these fragments with similar passages in other writings ascribed to Ephraem. The Scriptural Index to Ephraem's Works occupies fifty pages.

The rediscovery of the Diatessaron establishes beyond controversy the fact that the Fourth Gospel was accepted as of equal authority with the other three in the early part of the second century; thus adding very greatly to the evidence that it is of apostolic origin. Dr. Hill's critical discussion of the document is of the very highest value, and leaves scarcely anything to be desired.

PEOPLE'S COMMENTARY ON THE ACTS. Giving the Common Version, 1611, the Revised Version, 1881 (American Readings and Renderings), with Critical Exegetical, Applicative Notes, and Illustrations from Life and History in the East. By EDWIN W. RICE, D.D., author of "People's Commentaries" on Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, "People's Dictionary of the Bible," "Our Sixty-six Sacred Books," etc. Maps, Engravings from Photographs by Bonfils, Good, Jordan, and others, and from Original Sketches. Pp. iv, 372. Philadelphia: The American Sunday-school Union. 1896. \$1.25.

The recent rapid increase of knowledge concerning the scenes of early Christian development has rendered a new commentary upon the Acts desirable. Valuable as were the volumes of Conybeare and Howson, and the commentaries of Hackett and Meyer, they are now to a considerable extent antiquated. It is, however, proper to say that the new discoveries have done nothing to shake our confidence in the historical character of the Acts, but have rather confirmed it.

A special feature of value in the present volume is to be found in the large number of full-paged illustrations of the scenes, beautifully prepared from photographs. These give a lifelike aspect to the history such as has not heretofore been possible.

The work is marked by deep reverence for the sacred character of the literature, combined with scrupulous regard to all facts which can shed light upon its interpretation. Pastors and Sabbath-school teachers will find it unrivaled in its adaptation to all their wants.

ST. PAUL THE TRAVELER AND THE ROMAN CITIZEN. (The Morgan Lectures for 1894 in the Auburn Theological Seminary, and Marshfield College Lectures, 1895.) By W. M. RAMSAY, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Humanity, Aberdeen. Pp. xvi, 402. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1896. \$3.00.

In this beautifully printed volume, Dr. Ramsay continues the elaboration of his interesting and original views concerning the work of the Apostle Paul. Read in the new light which his investigations have thrown upon the great Apostle to the Gentiles, the providential preparation for the spread of Christianity seems even more wonderful than before. In rejecting the ordinary theory that Paul visited Galatia proper,

and in limiting the Apostle's journeys to the southern part of the Galatic Territory, he firmly believes that he has chosen the only method possible by which to maintain "the first-century origin and Lukan authorship of the Acts" (p. 9). The date assigned to the book of Acts is the early part of the ninth decade of the first century. The author would account for the omission of all reference to Paul's death, on the theory that Luke intended to write another volume, but that he died before the plan was completed, and before he had put the finishing touches upon the second volume.

The topics are treated so fully that the present volume may well serve as a new and complete commentary upon the book of Acts. Whether one agrees with all the theories or not, the book is indispensable to a full understanding of Paul's work as seen in the light of the latest geographical and historical discoveries.

DISCOURSES ON THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE PHILIPPIANS. By Rev. FREDERICK A. NOBLE, D.D., Pastor of Union Park Congregational Church, Chicago. Pp. 385. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1896. \$1.25.

It has always seemed to us that the shorter Epistles of Paul could be best commented upon in a series of connected discourses, and that the Epistle to the Philippians was preëminently adapted to this method of treatment. The present goodly volume of Dr. Noble strengthens this conviction. In twenty-three discourses based upon this loving Epistle, the author has consecutively commented on the whole book, and treated as many separate themes naturally suggested by it. The result is a volume which is extremely satisfactory, both in its exposition of the text and in its application to the topics that are uppermost in the minds of the present generation.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE APOSTLES PETER AND PAUL in their Own Words. By AUGUSTUS SCHULTZE, D.D., President Moravian College, Bethlehem, Pa. Pp. xii, 138. Bethlehem, Pa.: The Comenius Press. 1896.

Dr. Schultze has conferred a great favor upon the world, both in the conception and in the execution of this unique system of theology, which consists simply in classifying and collecting together the words of Peter and Paul which relate to the various doctrinal and practical subjects of theological discourse. It will be found most useful and convenient both in private study and in class exercises.

THE STARS OF GOD. By E. FITCH BURR, D.D., LL.D., author of "Ecce Coelum," "Pater Mundi," "Ad Fidem," etc. Pp. 284. Hartford: The Student Publishing Co. \$1.25.

This book well maintains the reputation of the author for remarkable accuracy in his comprehension of scientific facts, and for rare facility of expression in bringing them within reach of the general public. It merits a wide circulation.

HISTORY OF DOGMA. By Dr. ADOLPH HARNACK, Ordinary Professor of Church History in the University, and Fellow of the Royal Academy of Science, Berlin. Translated from the third German Edition. By NEIL BUCHANAN. Vol. II. Pp. viii, 380. Boston : Roberts Bros. 1897. \$2.50.

This second volume carries on the author's discussion to the close of Origen's life. The period is one which brings out most clearly Dr. Harnack's point of view, and gives widest scope for the application of his vast erudition. The influence of this point of view is specially manifest in his chapter upon the formation of the New Testament canon in which, while in the main he recognizes the value and authority of the books, he fails to give due weight to much of the earliest evidence of the recognition of their sacred character. For example, he affirms (page 42), that Tatian was the first "in whom we find the Gospel of John alongside of the Synoptists"; while "from the assaults of the Alogi on the Johannean Gospel we learn that about 160 the whole of our four Gospels had not been definitely recognized even in Asia Minor." This must be an old opinion of Harnack, for it does not accord with the present state of the evidence. For it is now proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that Justin quoted from the Gospel of Peter; thus placing that document before Justin's time. But an examination of this so-called Gospel of Peter proves it to have been not in any sense an original Gospel, but, like Tatian's Diatessaron, a Harmony or Compend of Gospels already in existence. This compend, it is evident, made use of the Fourth Gospel as an authority equally recognized with the first three; while it incorporates no facts which are not in the four Gospels. This throws the acceptance of the canonical character of all four of the Gospels well back towards the first part of the second century. It is in vain for Harnack or any one else to resist this cumulative evidence.

THE THRESHOLD COVENANT; or, The Beginning of Religious Rites. By H. CLAY TRUMBULL, author of "Kadesh-barnea," "Studies in Oriental Social Life," etc. Second Edition. Pp. xii, 326. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$2.00 net.

The present volume of Dr. Trumbull has naturally grown out of the author's previous important work on "The Blood Covenant," in which he maintained that the origin of sacrifice was connected with the significance of the initiatory rites in which friendships were cemented, and tribes consolidated, through the transfusion of blood from one person to another. In "The Threshold Covenant" it is maintained that the origin of this sacred regard for the shedding of blood is to be traced back to the shedding of blood ordinarily accompanying the consummation of marriage, so vividly referred to in Deut. xxii. 13-21. This shedding of blood upon the threshold of the mysteries of married life came to prevail among all nations and ages in the consecration of the threshold of the house and the temple. As a corollary to this interpretation, the Passover

of the Jews is interpreted to mean that Jehovah, instead of passing by the houses of the Israelites, crossed over the threshold which had been consecrated by blood, and so became a guest instead of an avenger. The volume is full of information, and has been very warmly received by the leading specialists who have devoted themselves to the study of the origin of social and religious customs.

THE GOSPEL FOR AN AGE OF DOUBT. (The Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1896.) By HENRY VAN DYKE, D.D. (Princeton, Harvard, Yale), Pastor of the Brick Church in New York. Pp. xiv, 458. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1896. \$1.75.

Dr. Van Dyke wisely chose to vary the style of the lectures on preaching which are annually given to the students of Yale College, and presents us in this volume a valuable treatise upon apologetics. The volume is preëminently stimulating and suggestive, rather than instructive, since it deals with subjects that do not admit of exact treatment. The titles of the chapters are: "An Age of Doubt"; "The Gospel of a Person"; "The Unveiling of the Father"; "The Human Life of God"; "The Source of Authority"; "Liberty"; "Sovereignty"; "Service." The Appendix, occupying more than one-fourth of the book, is filled with well-selected extracts from modern writings.

IN PULPIT AND PARISH. (Yale Lectures on Preaching.) By NATHANIEL J. BURTON, D.D., late Pastor of Park Church, Hartford, Conn. Edited by RICHARD E. BURTON. With Memorial Addresses. Pp. 639. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. \$1.75.

Dr. Burton was one of the ablest preachers of his day, and his Yale Lectures on Preaching are among the very best. These have been available hitherto in a forbidding-looking volume at a high price. This volume is a vast improvement upon it in every way, and costs less than half as much. Besides the lectures referred to, it contains sermons, addresses, and letters by Dr. Burton, with the funeral addresses by Drs. Dwight, Twichell, and Parker.

RICHARD ROLLE OF HAMPOLE and his Followers. (Library of Early English Writers.) Edited by C. HORSTMAN. Vol. II. Pp. xliv, 458. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$2.60.

This second volume continues the high grade of work already spoken of as characteristic of the first. Even as a source of facts for the study of the Anglo-Saxon language the book is beyond value to students in that department. At the same time it contains original documents of the highest importance for the study of the social and religious conditions which preceded the Reformation in England. It is of extreme interest to find here a version of the Psalms a hundred years before Tyndal. The volume is beautifully and closely printed, and packed full of matter of interest to those engaged in studying the early development of Anglo-Saxon Christianity.

THE AGE OF THE GREAT WESTERN SCHISM. (Ten Epochs of Church History.) By CLINTON LOCKE, D.D. Pp. x, 314. New York: The Christian Literature Co. 1896. \$2.00.

This book covers that most interesting and important period when the Popes were in exile at Avignon under French dictation, and when Wyclif and Huss were vainly struggling for religious liberty in England and Bohemia. The author does not profess to add to the original information concerning the subject, but simply contents himself with aiming to give a clear and vivid narrative of the period. The style is unusually attractive, and the volume cannot fail to be widely read.

A DISSERTATION ON JOHN NORRIS of Bemerton. By FRED J. POWICKE, Ph.D. Pp. 218. London: George Philip & Son.

The reader will find in this work an excellent specimen of that thorough treatment of the philosophical writings of the leaders of thought in Cambridge during the seventeenth century which their high character deserves. In many respects the literature of that period is fundamental for a proper understanding of all subsequent development of Anglo-Saxon religious thought. In this profound analysis of the writings of John Norris and his associate, Dr. Powicke has set a worthy example to his brethren in the ministry, and has conferred a lasting benefit upon the students of modern philosophy and theology.

THE BUDDHIST PRAYING-WHEEL: A Collection of Material bearing upon the Symbolism of the Wheel and Circular Movements in Custom and Religious Ritual. By WILLIAM SIMPSON, R.I., M.R.A.S., F.R.G.S., Hon. Associate R.I.B.A., etc. Pp. viii, 304. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1896. \$4.00.

The preparation for this learned and interesting work began during the author's visit to Tibet in 1860, when he collected much curious information concerning the praying-wheels which are used by the devotees of Buddhism in that country. During subsequent years the author has been continually at work collecting information until he has been able to make his volume a complete thesaurus of information upon the subject of the symbolism of the wheel. The book is elegantly printed, and contains forty-eight illustrations of great value. The volume is indispensable to all students of religious symbolism.

PRIMER OF PHILOSOPHY: By PAUL CARUS, Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. 1896. \$1.00.

A book which deals with speculative problems in order to be attractive must possess three excellencies: It must be intelligible; it either must be original, or else present old ideas in new lights; and it must show independence of thought. Tried by these tests, the "Primer of Philosophy," by Dr. Paul Carus, is a very acceptable contribution to Metaphysics. Here are mooted many of the profoundest problems which have engaged thinkers in all ages; and they are presented with such vigor, accuracy,

and clearness, that they compel attention. It does not matter whether you agree with the author or not : the manner in which he presents his thoughts has such a fascination that you are carried along with him ; either feeling in concord with his utterances, or aroused by the unflagging interest which hostility awakes. You cannot dismiss at will his audacious hypotheses, and you feel disappointed when he ends his statements. That Dr. Carus believes in himself with the faith of a dervish goes without saying. That he often palms off assertions for argument must be admitted by his warmest admirers. But there is so much originality in the method of presenting his subject, and so much freshness in his literary style, that it is a positive relief to take him up after poring over some, even very able authors in philosophy, and growing weary in the vain effort to gather their meaning. We are always certain as to what he means to say, and find side-lights thrown on the most difficult and hackneyed questions. Hence there is no time lost in determining whether we agree with his assertions or not; and we derive as much aid, when he naïvely exposes his vulnerable side, in suggestions to establish our own theses, as when we feel that he is arguing for our cherished opinions.

Every system of philosophy which can be accepted by a theist admits the existence of a personal God distinct from physical nature, and that this Being is the Author of all reality. Dr. Carus calls his system a Monistic Positivism, and says, "There is not something beyond that mysteriously produces natural processes. The natural processes themselves are the reality." It is clear that this doctrine, if consistently carried out, would make nature work by immanent causality, and exclude a personal Creator. But our author is not consistent, for he says : "God is concrete and real, being everywhere that element which makes things be" (p. 147).

Dr. Carus leaves the impression, despite his avowed and credited views to the contrary, that he believes more strongly in Revealed Religion than he is willing to admit to himself. For he evidently thinks, like Stuart Mill, that the religion of the Bible, and especially its embodiment in Jesus Christ as the exemplar for man, is the most potent factor in the world's progress. He says : "Christ is actually a living presence in humanity, and his spirit was, and is still, the most dominating power in the evolution of mankind" (pp. 188-189). His admissions, even when arguing most earnestly against the claims of orthodox creeds, are sufficient both to establish the opposite view, and, in some cases, to leave the impression of special pleading if not insincerity in his apparent hostility. He is an opponent toward whom you feel friendly despite the hard blows he delivers against cherished beliefs; and the conviction is forced upon the reader that Dr. Carus has almost persuaded himself to be a Christian.

But when our author finds himself face to face with a controverted question, and that his positions have been vigorously and successfully assailed, he becomes a trifle too dogmatic. He is unfair when he feels his position to

be in danger; and both undervalues the arguments against him, and shows egotism which we could wish less conspicuous. What is still worse is his thinly disguised contempt toward others who are at the least as honest as himself in the pursuit of truth. It should always be borne in mind that truth needs no defense. It is its own witness. The fairest statement—when men differ, as differ they must (unless all were cast in the same mould) on matters which must either be revealed by a higher intelligence, or decided by the winnowing process of dialectics—is always nearest the truth. Mill's fairness in argument toward his opponents is the great secret of his popularity, even with those who know his doctrines to be wrong, because they see that he has the right spirit. A thing is not true merely because any man, however great, says it is so; nor is it established any sooner by controversialists getting angry. We wish Dr. Carus had shown less naïve and unquestioning assurance in his own opinions, or less contempt for those who differ from him.

But there are so many excellencies in this "Primer of Philosophy" that we feel scarcely justified in dwelling on its blemishes. Though called a "Primer," and by its title intended for beginners, yet it will be found of first-rate interest to mature thinkers. And while it is primarily adapted to sow seed thoughts in young minds which are receptive of philosophical truth, it is fitted to foster the further prosecution of these subjects by the maturest and deepest thinkers. This book will be found an excellent manual to be used by classes which have already been taught system by some more methodical treatise; and have become able to think independently on problems which, in order to be rich in fruitage, need to be clearly and powerfully presented.

J. COOPER.

ELEMENTARY GEOLOGY. By RALPH S. TARR, B.S., F.G.S.A., Professor of Dynamic Geology and Physical Geography at Cornell University; author of "Economic Geology of the United States," "Elementary Physical Geography," etc. Pp. xxx, 500. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1897. \$1.40 *net*.

This is preëminently a book for general readers. It has both the accuracy of statement and the felicity of style characteristic of all of Professor Tarr's writings. Nearly three hundred illustrations, mostly from photographs, adorn and enrich the volume. To say that it is printed by the Norwood Press is to give assurance that its execution is well-nigh perfect.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY, Philadelphia.

INSPIRATION CONSIDERED AS A TREND. By D. W. FAUNCE, D.D., author of "Hours with a Sceptic." Pp. 251. \$1.00;—**MESSAGES OF TODAY TO THE MEN OF TO-MORROW.** By GEORGE C. LORIMER, D.D., Minister of Tremont Temple. Pp. 464. \$1.50;—**THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE EPISTLES.** (Bible Handbooks for Young People.) By C. R. HENDERSON, D.D., Professor in Chicago University. Pp. 121.

CONGREGATIONAL SUNDAY-SCHOOL AND PUBLISHING SOCIETY, Boston.

MARRIAGE CHIMES FOR TRUE LOVERS. Compiled by M. C. HAZARD, Ph.D. Pp. 96. 75 cents;—**SERMONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUNDAY-SCHOOL LESSONS FOR 1897.** By the MONDAY CLUB. Twenty-second Series. Pp. 387. \$1.25.

THOMAS Y. CROWELL & CO., New York City.

THE GOSPEL IN BRIEF. By Count LYOF N. TOLSTOI. Translated from the Russian Original embodying the Author's Last Alterations and Revisions. Pp. 221. \$1.25.

EATON & MAINS, New York City.

BEYOND THE HORIZON; or, Bright Side—**CHAPTERS ON THE FUTURE LIFE.** By HENRY D. KIMBALL, D.D. Pp. 250. \$1.00;—**THE CELESTIAL SUMMONS.** By Rev. ANGLO CANOLL. Edited by HOMER EATON, D.D. Pp. 280. \$1.25;—**ULYSSES S. GRANT.** Conversations and Unpublished Letters. By M. J. CRAMER, D.D., LL.D., ex-United States Minister to Denmark and to Switzerland. Pp. 208. 90 cents.

THE MACMILLAN CO., New York City.

•**THE CHRONICLES.** (The Modern Reader's Bible. A Series of Works from the Sacred Scriptures presented in Modern Literary Form. (Edited, with an Introduction and Notes, by RICHARD G. MOULTON, M.A. (Camb.), Ph.D. (Penn.), Professor of Literature in English in the University of Chicago. Pp. xxii, 276. 50 cents;—**THE PROPHETS OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.** By the Rev. LYMAN ABBOTT, Rev. FRANCIS BROWN, Rev. GEORGE MATHESON, Rev. MARCUS DODS, Rev. A. C. MCGIFFERT, Very Rev. W. H. FREMANTLE, Professor ADOLPH HARNACK, Rev. A. M. FAIRBAIRN, Rev. T. T. MUNGER, Rev. A. V. G. ALLEN, and Very Rev. F. W. FARRAR. Pp. vi, 242. \$1.25;—**THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION; A Commentary on its Nature and Growth.** By JESSE MACY, M.A., Professor of Political Science in Iowa College. Pp. xxiv, 534. \$2.00;—**THE RECOLLECTIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE.** Edited by the COMTE DE TOCQUEVILLE, and now first translated into English by ALEXANDER TEIXEIRA DE MATTOS. With a Portrait in Heliogravure. Pp. xiv, 410. \$4.50.

FLEMING H. REVELL CO., Chicago.

THE LIFE OF ST. PAUL. (Handbook for Bible Classes.) By Rev. JAMES STALKER, D.D., Kirkaldy, Scotland. Pp. 184. 60 cents;—**AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.** By J. M. STIFLER, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in Crozer Theological Seminary. Pp. 288. 75 cents *net*;—**STUDIES OF THE MAN CHRIST JESUS.** By ROBERT E. SPEER, Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions; author of "Studies in the Gospel of Luke," "Studies in the Book of Acts." Pp. 350. 75 cents;—**WITH CHRIST IN THE SCHOOL OF PRAYER: Thoughts on our Training for the Ministry of Intercession.** By the Rev. ANDREW MURRAY. Pp. 274. 50 cents.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, New York City.

CHURCH UNITY: Five Lectures delivered in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, during the Winter of 1896. By CHARLES W. SHIELDS, D.D., LL.D., E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS, LL.D., JOHN F. HURST, D.D., LL.D., HENRY C. POTTER, D.D., LL.D., AMORY H. BRADFORD, D.D. Pp. viii, 233. \$1.00;—**LIFE AFTER DEATH, and the Future of the Kingdom of God.** By Bishop LARS NIELSEN DAHLE, Knight of St. Olaf. Translated from Norse by the Rev. JOHN BEVERIDGE, M.A., B.D. Pp. xii, 456. \$3.50. Imported.

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
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THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE TELL-EL-AMARNA LETTERS.¹

BY PROFESSOR JOHN M. P. METCALF.

II. We turn now to letters from vassal princes in Syria, Phœnicia, and Palestine, from a great many different cities in all parts of these countries. They were all in a relation of dependence upon Egypt,—many of them being governors of Egyptian provinces, or rulers of cities acknowledging the suzerainty of the Pharaohs. As such they address the king as “my lord,” and sign themselves “your servant.” Despite very many letters, it is exceedingly difficult to give a true picture of the state of Egyptian possessions in Palestine. The tablets are often badly mutilated,—often just where they seem about to give valuable information. Where many letters are found from one author,—as, for example, Rib-Addi of Gebal, from whom there are about sixty letters,—it is not possible to arrange them in chronological order with any degree of certainty. Then again it is hard to tell whom to believe when two men tell facts inconsistent with one another. Identification of geographical names is not always possible. Still we may learn much, and often the state of affairs is not veiled in darkness. In briefly continuing our summary we shall speak

¹ Concluded from the April number.

of these letters in two groups—a Northern and a Southern group.

1. Affairs in the North.—To begin with, we are led to the conclusion that the many professions of friendship on the part of Babylon and Mitani are not to be taken too literally. They must have realized that the hand of Egypt on Palestine, Phœnicia, and Syria especially, was relaxing, and they saw their own opportunity therein. They played a double game,—professing friendship to Egypt on the one hand, and on the other, seeking to further their own interests in the West by negotiations with various princes of influence, by sowing the seeds of discontent and revolt against Egypt, and by urging some to attack and appropriate the lands of those faithful to Egypt.

Thus Mitani and Kaš, Babylonia, were in league with Abd-ašrat and his sons, especially Aziru, of whom later.¹ Again we are told² that the latter parties were also playing into the hands of the Hittites. The Hittites were evidently here enlarging their dominions, and widening the circle of their influence. Their expedition into Mitani was, as we have seen, repulsed. Aziru, in three different letters,³ informs us that the king of Ḫatti has entered Nuḫašši, is staying there and threatening other regions. A letter from Nuḫašši princes⁴ speaks of the capture of certain cities by the people of Ḫatti. Akizzi of Katna⁵ writes⁶ that the Ḫatti have captured one of his cities, and stolen his sun-god—the latter item interesting from a religious point of view. From three different towns, also, comes the word that Itakama of Kadeš, together with the Ḫatti, had entered Amki.⁷ Rib-Addi refers to the Ḫatti several times

¹ According to Rib-Addi in No. 56, lines 13-16; No. 86, lines 18-24; and No. 87, lines 68-71.

² By Rabimur of Gebal, No. 119, lines 20-32. ³ Nos. 45-47.

⁴ No. 125. On the location of the land, see later.

⁵ Somewhere in North Syria. See later. ⁶ No. 138.

⁷ Nos. 131, 132. In league also with Itakama were Tiuwatti of Lapara, and Arzawia of Ruhizi.

in much the same connection, as appropriating territory,¹ as making tools of Abd-ašrat and Aziru,² as plundering the liege-men of Gebal.³ The king of Nuḥašši, Ramman-nirari,—notice the Assyrian name,—tells Amenophis III. that the Ḫatti are already pressing him hard.⁴ Even far-off Alašia finally has felt the fear of the oncoming Hittites.⁵

In all this we see undoubtedly the beginning of a great forward movement on the part of the Hittites, and one that gives us the introduction to the picture presented by the Egyptian monuments some years later, the picture of the rivalry between Egypt and the great Empire centered at Carchemish. The first great Egyptian conqueror, Thothmes III., had fought with them the first of the great battles at Megiddo, about fifty years before, and had beaten back their armies and power. Now, encouraged by the weakness of Amenophis IV., they are again coming forward, and, with the rise of the active rulers of the nineteenth dynasty a little later, they have become a truly formidable foe. Rameses II., after twenty years of fighting, ending in the great drawn battle of Ḳadeš, is glad to make a treaty on equal terms with the great Hittite king. This is the scene to which the Tell-el-Amarna letters form an introduction.

In passing, a word as to the places in which the Hittites are mentioned in the Bible. The presence of colonies of them in Palestine in Abraham's day seems entirely possible, in view of the fact that even before his day Northern Syria went by the name of mât Ḫatti to the men of the Euphrates; so also their mention among the nations of Palestine at the time of the conquest, in view of the Egyptian records and of these letters. Very fitting would seem the words of Josh. i. 4, "From the wilderness and this Lebanon, even unto the great river, the river Euphrates, all the

¹ No. 79, Reverse, line 11. ² No. 87, line 71. ³ No. 104, lines 58-60.

⁴ No. 37, Reverse, line 4. ⁵ No. 25, Reverse, line 49.

land of the Hittites, and unto the great sea toward the going down of the sun, shall be your border." Compare also Judges i. 26. The Assyrian monuments also attest their presence on the field of the nations here during all the time in which they are afterward mentioned. Sargon's inscriptions are full of references.¹

But we must return to the lands threatened by the march of the Hittite conquests; and, first, Nuḥašši, the letter of whose vassal king, Ramman-nirari, we have already mentioned. Other references to the land help in determining its location. Aziru² expresses fear that the king of Ḫatti, already in Nuḥašši, will next attack Dunip. Ḳatna was in Nuḥašši,³ and is evidently in the neighborhood—more or less close—of Damascus,⁴ so that Nuḥašši could not have been too far away from Damascus. Various uncertain attempts at more exact location have been made.⁵ From these same letters the city of Nî is more probably to be located on the Orontes than on the Euphrates.⁶ The location of Dunip, whose citizens send an appeal for help to Amenophis, is also a matter of dispute, but it was somewhere here in Northern Syria.⁷ They were threatened by Aziru, into whose hands the city of Nî had already fallen. This

¹ See Winckler's Sargon, *Die Keilschrifttexte Sargons*. In reference to the Hittites and the Bible, see Sayce, *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*.

² No. 47, lines 38 ff. ³ No. 138, line 21. ⁴ No. 139, lines 63-65.

⁵ Erman and Zimmern identify with a town named in Egyptian records, see *Zeitschrift für Äg. Sprache* for 1890, p. 129. Cheyne (*Acad.*, Vol. xxxix., No. 981, p. 187) and Halevy compare with the biblical נַחֲשֹׁן and make it = נַחֲשֹׁן, making נַחֲשֹׁן = ḡubitu.

⁶ No. 41, line 28; No. 120, line 15; No. 139, line 42. So with Winckler against several, for example, Bezold in the Introduction to the London texts.

⁷ Sayce, *Records of the Past*, New Series, Vol. iii. p. 55 = Tennib; cf. also Vol. i. Note 2. Howorth in *Acad.*, Vol. xxxix., No. 981, p. 187, does not accept this view. See also, as to Dunip, Cheyne in *Acad.*, Vol. xxxix., No. 981, p. 187; Tomkins, *ibid.*, No. 983, p. 236; Neubauer, *ibid.*, No. 984, p. 260.

brings us naturally to the rôle that Aziru was playing in the North.

We have seen already that he was more or less openly in league with the Hittites. He seems to have been one of a large party, who were playing a double game with Egypt. His name brings us into the very thick of the entangling and incriminating and false diplomacies of the various governors and princes of the land under Egypt's dominion. The party of Aziru was composed of his father, Abd-Ašrat, the latter's sons (among whom Aziru was easily chief), Aziru's sons and various other princes with whom they had formed connections, or whom they had instigated against Egypt, or against other princes loyal to Egypt.

Abd-Ašrat was governor of Amurru, appointed by the king of Egypt,¹ the writer of three, perhaps five, of the letters.² He professes fidelity as a most humble slave, dog of his master, and asserts his purpose to hold the whole land of Amurru for Pharaoh, as if his good intentions were called in question. He is in bad straits, the enemy are strong, he will do all the king commands, but seeks help because some are seeking to kill him. In Amurru itself he had his enemies,³ and Rib-Addi says⁴ that in Amurru itself they were looking for help from Egypt to overthrow Abd-Ašrat.

From Aziru there are more letters still,⁵ with also one from Egypt to him,⁶ and one from his son.⁷ Aziru is even more profuse in his professions of fidelity, maintains that others are slandering him, and urges the Egyptians not to believe any reports of his rebelliousness. He cannot now come to court and personally answer these charges, because the Hatti and people of Nuḥašši are threatening invasion. He has constantly to defend himself. He will go to court, but does not; he will rebuild a city, but never does it; he

¹ No. 124, lines 30, 31. ² Nos. 38, 39, 40, and possibly 124 and 152.

³ No. 124, line 30. ⁴ No. 57, lines 15-23; No. 59, lines 47-50.

⁵ Nos. 42-49, 51. ⁶ No. 50. ⁷ No. 52.

will pay his tribute, will pay added tribute wherever he has made aggressions; he has to find excuses for evading an Egyptian messenger, and for treating a Hittite embassy more favorably than an Egyptian one. Pharoah's letter to him is also full of accusations and grave doubt as to his sincerity, and is confirmatory of his hostility to Rib-Addi, and also of his league with Itakama of Ẕadeš.

In addition to those already mentioned as belonging to Aziru's party, were Biridašja, the kings of Buṣruna and Ḫalunni,¹ and probably Zimrida of Sidon,² and last, but not least, the Habiri, of whom later. Those who were suffering under the persecution of Aziru and his associates were Dunip, Rib-Addi of Gebal, Ammunira of Berut, Abi-milki of Tyre,³ Namiawaza of Kumidi, and many others, whose names or locations or both are uncertain. From these latter come the great majority of the letters, from Rid-Addi about threescore. A full discussion of them is here impossible. Gebal is the Byblos of the Greeks. The profuseness of his writing is marvelous. No wonder Pharoah wrote him to stop writing and defend himself.⁴

His complaint to Egypt runs thus: The former vigorous administration of the Egyptian domain in Palestine is at an end. The king comes no more himself. The Egyptian garrisons are withdrawn, and various princes, no longer in wholesome fear of Egyptian armies, are appropriating the country for themselves, and the people are deserting to these more independent rulers. Various Bedawin tribes are taking advantage of this state of affairs to enter in and plunder and appropriate, often joining themselves with these native independent princes. Thus Abd-ašrat and his sons, especially Aziru, in union with the Ḫabiri and Suti, are constantly extending their aggressions over a wider territory, and confining Rib-Addi and his friends more and more

¹ No. 142, lines 13-15. ² No. 149, lines 66-69.

³ Nos. 150, 151. ⁴ No. 100, lines 9, 10; No. 99, lines 15 ff.

closely to a few walled cities, where they are compelled to sell their very children for food, after disposing of all their property for provisions, and receiving no help from Egypt. They see city after city fall to the Ḫabiri or to Abd-ašrat's crowd. The whole land will soon be lost to the king if he does not send soldiers to garrison the cities, and men to win back the places already captured. The men of Gebal, yes, even Rib-Addi's own friends, urge him to go over to the other party, as the only hope of peace. He has written again and again, now to the king, and now to his high officials, and has sent embassy after embassy, but no answer and no help is returned. He has to send his family away to Tyre, and finally goes himself to Berut, and appeals in vain to Ammunira, returns and is himself shut out of his own city.

His brother, Rabimur, from whom there are two letters,¹ it seems, assumed command of Gebal in his absence, and delivered over Rid-Addi's sons to Aziru.² Rib-Addi again seeks refuge with Ammunira, and the latter promises to care for him until the king comes to his aid,³ and this is the last we hear of him.

The complaint of Abi-milki of Tyre deserves a word of notice here, and is just as pitiable. Zimrida of Sidon has united with Aziru, the people of Arwad, and the Ḫabiri, and together they are besieging Tyre. Abi-milki is confined wholly to the island, and therefore cannot obtain food or fresh water from the mainland to eat and drink, or wood to keep him warm. Aziru holds the town of Usu, from which place these things are secured. He pleads with Egypt to send him relief, ere he perish.⁴

Of Aziru the last we hear is that he finally went to Egypt to render account, and because he was detained there, some one, perhaps his son, writes pleading for his release. Many

¹ Nos. 119, 120. ² No. 129, lines 18-24.

³ *Ibid.*, lines 15-17. ⁴ Abi-milki's letters, Nos. 149-156.

interesting questions are raised by these letters. Just the reason why sometimes Abd-ašrat, sometimes his sons, and sometimes Aziru, is named, is hard to tell, unless there was a great partnership affair involving the whole family.¹

Another question is thrust upon us; that of the word Amurru, and so of the Amorites and Canaanites. That which in the cuneiform used to be read Aḥarru, West-land, is now, with more and more certainty, read Amurru. The Sumerian Mar.tu is to be so read. The word is frequently written in these letters so as to prove the reading Amurru, A-mu-ur-ru. To judge from these letters, the two terms Amurru, Amorites, and Canaanites are not interchangeable. Letter No. 50 from the king of Egypt uses both terms. Amurru was the seat of the operations of Abd-ašrat's combination, which, as we have seen, was in the north. The governor of Sidon was instructed to write all the news he heard from Amurru.² Šumur and Beirut, towns in the neighborhood of Gebal, are located in Amurru.³

On the other hand, the governor of Tyre is asked to make report from Canaan.⁴ The city of Ḥinatōn=Hannathon of Josh. xix. 14, in Zebulun, is located in Canaan.⁵ The data here given seem to be all that is attainable, and would seem to indicate that Canaan was not interchangeable with Amurru, and that the latter was in the north and Canaan in the south. Hommel⁶ seems to accept this location for Amurru, and makes Canaan apparently the lowlands of Palestine,⁷ the latter being in accord with the idea that the Canaanites were lowlanders, and the Amorites highlanders, a theory which has still the support of Dr. George Adam Smith, and which seems to be definitely

¹ They evidently did not follow one another; at least their careers were cotemporary.

² No. 148, lines 24-26. ³ No. 81, line 14; No. 78, line 10.

⁴ No. 151, lines 49-51. ⁵ No. 11, lines 15-17.

⁶ *Gesch. des alten Morgenlandes*, 81. ⁷ *Ibid.*, 82.

taught in Num. xiii. 29.¹ The higher criticism has usually asserted the identity of the words Amorite and Canaanite, the one word belonging to the Elohist, and the other to the Jehovist.

That the terms are distinct—Amurru the North, and Canaan the South—has been recognized by several writers.² McCurdy denies their identity, though without reference to these letters.³ Winckler, in discussing the question, begins with an account of the movements of the Amorites, especially under Aziru, southward from Lebanon, goes on rather to discredit the theory of the identity of the two names, and makes Canaan the coast land as far north as Sidon, and Amurru the country stretching north from there, and especially the interior, and concludes that E, living in the North himself, knew and made the distinction, but that J, writing in the South, had no knowledge of the Amorites.⁴ The conclusions of the higher criticism would seem to be overthrown, as to the point of identity. Perhaps some additional light may come from a fact now to be mentioned. The letters from Canaan contain very many Canaanitish words, as glosses. Now it is a significant fact that the letters of the great Amorite leaders contain no Canaanitish glosses. I have by careful search failed to find one in the dozen letters from these worthies. This seems significant, in connection with the facts above mentioned, and tends to show that the Amorites were not a Semitic people. Another question is that as to the Habiri, but we will leave the discussion of the question until after we have briefly surveyed the letters from the south of Palestine.

2. Letters from Southern Palestine.—Here there is another combination of such disturbers as were active in the

¹ Historical Geography of Palestine, in the Expositor, 1892.

² Sayce in Acad., Vol. xl., No. 1013, p. 291; Delattre in Proc. Soc. Bib. Arch., Vol. xiii. p. 223.

³ History, Prophecy, and the Monuments, Vol. i. p. 131.

⁴ Geschichte Israels, 51-54.

North. There are the same pleas for help, the same charges and counter-charges, the same combinations with the Ḥabiri against certain princes and in opposition to Egypt. All are either suffering from, or combining with, the Ḥabiri. The leaders in revolt against Egypt, and in combination with the Ḥabiri, appear to be Lapaja¹ and his sons, Milki-el² and Tagi,³ whose professions of fidelity are again outweighed by the mass of accusations brought by their opponents, Addu-ašaridu,⁴ Biridija of Megiddo,⁵ Abd-ḥiba of Jerusalem,⁶ and many others. Among these letters I shall make particular mention only of those from Jerusalem.

Abd-ḥiba is using all his power to put bounds to the aggressions of the Ḥabiri, and consequently has incurred every one's hostility. He pleads for more troops to garrison his territory and protect it from the league of rebels threatening its existence. He is evidently a prince of some importance, was appointed directly by the king, and bore rule over many dependent cities. Milki-el was apparently under-governor of some of Abd-ḥiba's cities. Robbery and murder are rife in all the country; so much so that he cannot send on the king's caravans. One city after another is being lost, If the king cannot send troops, let him at least send a ship to take him to Egypt to die.

It is certainly very interesting to read these letters from Jerusalem, but I must speak of a point raised by Professor Sayce, and taken up by others. It may well be that the name Jerusalem, Urusalim, indicates that Jerusalem, centuries before David, was a religious center, but there is nothing here to indicate that Abd-ḥiba was a priest-king, and no comparisons can rightly be made between him and Melchizedek of Gen. xiv. Basing the statement on a wrong translation, or at least a wrong interpretation of some passages in Abd-ḥiba's letters, Sayce saw confirmation of Gen.

¹ Nos. 162, 163. ² Nos. 168-172. ³ Nos. 189, 190, 265.

⁴ No. 164. ⁵ Nos. 192-195. ⁶ Nos. 179-185.

xiv. He makes¹ Abd-ḥiba say that he was appointed by no earthly power, did not receive his territory from his father or his mother, but that he was appointed by an oracle of the "mighty king"—Melchizedek's god, god of Jerusalem. Hommel seems to have adopted this view,² and it has found its way also into many other books and articles.³

The passage in question is found in three letters,⁴ and reads as follows: ⁹A-mur a-na-ku la-a (amīlu) a-bi-ja ¹⁰u la-a (amīltu) u-mi-ia ša-ka-na-ni ¹¹i-na aš-ri an-ni-í ¹²zu-ru-uh šar-ri dannu ¹³u-ši-ri-ba-an-ni a-na bīt (amīlu) a-bi-ia. "Behold, neither my father nor my mother appointed me in this place. The strong arm of the king inaugurated me over my father's territory."⁵ This translation is absolutely certain. Sayce translates, "The arm of the mighty king." It is true that the Assyrian order—the Semitic order in general—would permit of this translation, for the adjective follows the genitive; thus, "The arm-of the king—the strong." In good Assyrian, however, the adjective agrees with its noun, and here is placed in the nominative, not the genitive; "dannu," not "danni." It is true, constructions are not so rigid in these letters, but in this case we could waive questions of grammar, and still be confident that ours is the correct translation. Abd-ḥiba simply says he was appointed to his position by Pharaoh, just exactly what many another writer says of himself,⁶ and there is no more reason for calling Abd-ḥiba a priest-king than several others.⁷

¹ So in preface to *Records of the Past*, New Series, Vol. iv.; also in *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, p. 175. Cf. also *Bibl. World*, September, 1896, and *Expository Times*, June and July, 1896.

² *Gesch. des alten Morgenlandes*, 63.

³ E.g., *Buried Cities in Bible Lands*.

⁴ Nos. 179, 180, 181. ⁵ No. 179, lines 9-13.

⁶ E.g., No. 124, lines 30-31.

⁷ E.g., Abd-Milki in No. 252; like many others, this name is made up of two words, one of which is the name of a god.

Of the other letters very little can be said, but we hear from a host of other cities, very many of them making mention of the Ḫabiri letters from Akko, Šir-Bashan, Ha-šor, Gezer, Ashkelon, Lachish, Wurza, Gaza, Joppa, and many others. Very many are, however, fragmentary, containing little if any information, names often being wanting.

A few words seem in place about the two letters from Lachish which were found at Tell-el-Amarna, one¹ from Zimrida, which I will quote entire, because it is short, and representative of letters from vassals. "To my lord, my gods, my sun, the sun in the heavens:—Zimrida, the prince of Lachish, your servant, the dust of your feet. At the feet of my lord, the king, the sun in the heavens, seven and seven times, I throw myself. I have heard very well indeed the words of the messenger of my lord, the king, whom he sent to me. And verily, I will do according to his command." The other letter² is from Jabni-el,—the name along with Milki-el above, to be compared with the Jacob-el and Joseph-el of the Egyptian lists,—and contains almost exactly the same message as that given above. Jabni-el must have succeeded Zimrida, for we read in one of Abd-ḥiba's letters³ from Jerusalem, that Zimrida's servants were seeking to put him to death.

But the thing for which I specially referred to these letters, is the fact that the only piece of cuneiform writing yet found on the soil of Palestine was found at Lachish. The story of the excavations there of Flinders Petrie and of Mr. Bliss is well known; how they laid bare many cities of Lachish as they dug down into the heart of the earth.⁴ But most marvelous of all, at about the level supposed to represent the Tell-el-Amarna period, Mr. Bliss found what he had long hoped for—a clay tablet inscribed in cunei-

¹No. 217. ²No. 218. ³No. 181, lines 42, 43.

⁴See *The Story of a Tell*, by Flinders Petrie, in *The City and the Land*.

form characters, with a letter, in which Zimrida of Lachish is mentioned. It appears to be written by some one who had accusations to bring against Zimrida, and the letter was perhaps captured by Zimrida, and so not delivered in Egypt.¹ Mr. Bliss found also a bead inscribed with the name of Amenophis II.'s wife, Tí, and also alabaster vases inscribed with the king's name, and that of his wife.²

This suggests again the very important rôle played by this Queen Tí in the Mitani letters. She was evidently a woman of great influence. In connection, I would say that there are here at least four letters from women. One³ is perhaps from an Egyptian princess in Babylon to her father in Egypt. Another⁴ seems to be from a woman who is governor of a city, like any other governor, signing herself "the king's bondmaid." There are also two other letters⁵ from women, both of which are addressed to women. So much for an account of the letters.

NOTES UPON THE LETTERS.

The writers have varying proficiency in Assyrian—both in sign-making and in construction. The Babylonian and Assyrian letters of course, and also the Mitani letters, are well written, much better than the letters from Palestine. The king of Egypt, who has given us three letters,⁶ was not over-proficient. The Palestine letters stand by themselves, in peculiarities of sign-making and in construction, and contain many Hebraisms and Hebrew glosses, of which later. The characters are the Babylonian, rather than the Assyrian.

¹ No. 219. Original text in Constantinople, published in Maspero's *Recueil*, xv., by Scheil, and by Hilprecht in *Babylonian Exped.*, Vol. i. Pl. 64.

² So according to Sayce in *Higher Criticism and Verdict of the Monuments*.

³ No. 13. ⁴ No. 173. ⁵ Nos. 292, 293. ⁶ Nos. 1, 50, 294.

The general state of affairs, as revealed, has been pretty fully indicated already. The letters bear witness to the long-continued dominance of Egypt, the writers saying that their fathers and grandfathers have had dealings with Egypt. Reference is made to the king's own presence in Palestine,¹ with that of his armies, governors, and garrisons. Egypt seems to have maintained over-governors or governors at large (e.g., Amanappa often, Turbiḥaza,² Pahanatí,³ Janḥamu often, Maia⁴) in addition to the rulers of individual cities. Offending governors were often required to answer for their conduct in Egypt, before the king himself.⁵ At other times Egypt sends a special commissioner to investigate charges and settle disputes between rivals.⁶ Minor offenders were usually delivered over to the wronged party.⁷ Burnaburiaš expected Amenophis IV. to punish with death the robbers who had plundered his merchants in Canaan, and to make indemnification for the lost property, because Canaan was under Egypt's suzerainty.⁸

We have already referred to a case of the extradition of property.⁹ Egypt's administration had grown very lax, and this led to many complaints and retrospects upon the more vigorous rule of the past, as we have already seen, and as is also evident from Egyptian history. McCurdy has thus stated the condition of affairs: "Northern Syria may be regarded as lost to Egypt. Byblos, Tyre, and Beirut are being held with difficulty by the governors, who, in profession at least, are loyal, at great cost and in spite of great difficulties. The troubles come from three separate sources. From without, the Hettites [as he strangely calls

¹ E.g., in No. 69, lines 70-73. ² No. 84, line 34.

³ No. 38, lines 10, 32. ⁴ No. 218, lines 23-24. ⁵ E.g., Aziru.

⁶ Rib-Addi, No. 75, line 64; No. 92, lines 5, 6, 23, 24.

⁷ No. 77, line 25, and No. 50, Reverse, lines 10-32.

⁸ In two instances, *No. 10, Reverse, lines 27 ff., and No. 11, line 8, Reverse, line 17.

⁹ No. 25, Reverse, lines 30-34.

them] are pressing southwards from their vantage-grounds lately secured in Northern Syria. Next, in their interest, an obscure foe of Canaanitish race, under the leadership of a certain rebellious plotter, Abd-ashera, is gradually seizing the outlying towns. Finally, there is dissension and rivalry among the Egyptian governors themselves, and they accuse one another to the king of disloyalty, each crediting his colleagues with the blame of the loss of cities and the lowering of the standard of the Pharaohs. The burden of the letters is the need of succor for the hard-pressed garrisons, with the reiterated entreaty that relief may be speedily sent."¹ This picture deserves supplementing in at least one particular. The obscure foe mentioned is made too isolated, in view of the fact that in letters from all parts of Palestine this obscure foe is named, as threatening the very life of the king's land, and as fast destroying the semblance of Egyptian rule.

This brings us to the first of a number of more general questions growing out of the letters—that of the character and rôle of this obscure foe, their name, and their possible relation to Israel. We have already referred to them by the name of *Ḥabiri*. They are so designated only in the Jerusalem letters.² In each of these, except two,³ the *Ḥabiri* are mentioned, and the name is written out fully, *Ḥabi-ri*. Apparently they were Bedawin, who were overrunning the country, seizing the strong cities, allying themselves where possible with native princes, and more and more bringing the whole land into their control. Such is their rôle as seen in the Jerusalem letters. In the other letters, in fact in letters from the North and the South, from pretty much all over the country, there is mention of a similar Bedawin people, who apparently were playing exactly the same rôle as that played by the *Ḥabiri* about Jerusalem.

¹ Nos. 183, 184. ² Nos. 179-185. ³ Nos. 182, 184.

Their name is, however, always written ideographically, usually SA.GAS, sometimes GAS alone. Winckler in his new book has translated this ideogram in every case by the term *Habiri* without discussion. In his "History of Israel,"¹ he discusses the question, in connection with its relation to the term "Hebrew." The words are grammatically the same, the *ע* of *עברי* being in Assyrian represented by *ḥ*. He defends the identity of *Ḥa-bi-ri* and the people represented by the ideogram SA.GAS. In two letters² this people is connected with the Suti, who were a nomad tribe, often making inroads into the more settled regions, and often employed as mercenaries. The SA.GAS were doubtless, therefore, a similar people, and were also apparently employed as mercenaries, and once or twice on the side of Egypt,³ but usually they are robbing Egypt of her territory. GAS is ideogram for "kill"; in one place the SA.GAS are also denominated "*amīlu ḥabāti*"=robbers.

Still more may be said in favor of this identification, and I think these facts have not before been brought out. In the Jerusalem letters the *Habiri* play the rôle elsewhere played by the SA.GAS, as we have seen, but more in several places⁴ they are represented as being the confederates of *Milki-el* and *Lapaja's* sons. Now in one letter where SA.GAS is found, the people so designated are represented as being in league with *Milki-el* and *Lapaja's* sons.⁵ The identification, therefore, of *Ḥa-bi-ri* and SA.GAS would seem practically certain, the latter being ideogram for the former. Thus the *Habiri* were nomad tribes, who were making systematic effort to press into Palestine. The origin of the term Hebrew would seem to have found no solution entirely satisfactory. That the *Habiri* made a terrible, a powerful impression on the inhabitants of the whole

¹ Pp. 15 ff. ² No. 144, line 27, and No. 216, lines 11-13; cf. No. 205, line 6.

³ E.g., No. 67, line 21. ⁴ Especially in No. 180.

⁵ No. 192, Reverse, lines 5-8.

country is very evident from these letters. That impression doubtless survived many years, and may have given name to the new invaders—the children of Israel. This would of course explain only how Israel came by the name. Much has been written both as to Ḥabiri and עֲבִיר, but the term Ḥabiri has been usually interpreted from the root חָבַר, and here with the meaning “confederate.”¹ In this connection the discovery of the name “Israel” upon Egyptian monuments of Merenptah, the supposed Pharaoh of the Exodus, is interesting, but its significance is not yet exactly determined.

Another question arises with reference to the Philistines. At the time of these letters they had not yet come into Palestine, but the cities, later occupied by them, were already there; so that they, on immigrating, must have taken over the cities their names and probably their civilization. The well-known Philistine cities of Lachish,² Ashkelon,³ Gaza,⁴ and Gezer⁵ are found here. They must have been Canaanitish cities. The Philistines seem also to have adopted the religion of the Canaanites. Dagan, long thought to have been a Philistine god, is now proven by these letters to have been a native Canaanitish deity. There are two letters here from Dagan-takala, a name compounded of the name of this god, Dagan, and of a word from the Assyrian root, חָכַל, to be strong, to have confidence.⁶

¹ So Müller, *Asien und Europa*, p. 396; Winckler, *Geschichte Israels*, p. 17, note 1; Sayce, *Records of Past*, New Series, Vol. ii. p. 60; *Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, p. 333; Curtiss, *Old and New Testament Student*, Vol. vii. p. 418. Sayce and McCurdy at least have connected the term with the ancient city of Hebron, the root letters of which are the same. According to Sayce, the name occurs in a hymn K. 890; according to Winckler, in IV. R. 34, 2 (Zimmern, *Z. A.*, vi. p. 247), and in Scheil's boundary stone (Maspero's *Recueil*, vi. 32).

² Nos. 217–219. ³ Nos. 207–213.

⁴ No. 182, Reverse, line 6; No. 185, line 20; No. 214, line 32.

⁵ Nos. 204–206.

⁶ Sayce in *Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, p. 325, still makes Dagan a Philistine god.

Again, consider the extent of trade and communication carried on between all these countries in these early days. There was a lively trade, not only between Egypt and Palestine, but back and forth, and all the way between Egypt and the Euphrates Valley. We read continually of merchants, of caravans, and of the activity of the interchange of commodities from one land to another. The allied rulers of Babylon, Assyria, Mitani, and Alalakh, and Egypt are ever professing a willingness to send from one land to the other anything desired, and Egypt's products found their way to the far East, and those of the Euphrates and of Mitani and Alalakh were sent into Egypt. A full account of these things would occupy too much space, but the story is one full of interest to the student of civilization and of international relations. Chariots, horses, male and female slaves, all sorts of manufactured articles, such as couches, footstools, articles of ivory and of gold and silver, valuable woods and precious stones, apparently valuable breeds of oxen,¹ all sorts of ornaments, stuffed animals,² wood inlaid with ivory, images and statues, enamel, oil, and copper, etc., etc. Some of these were sent as presents, and some merely in the way of trade. An immense interchange of gold and silver took place between Egypt and the far East. Alalakh sent quantities of copper. In Palestine there were evidently large transactions in grain and provisions.

Perhaps of greatest interest are the letters containing simply long lists of the presents, forming the dowries of the daughters of the great kings, one from Egypt to Babylon,³ and two from Mitani to Egypt.⁴ These are truly marvels in their suggestiveness as to the state of international trade, and of civilization. From Egypt is a letter of four and a half pages—a list of all manner of objects, many of the names unknown, gold and silver articles, jewelry, vessels

¹ No. 25, line 23. ² No. 8, lines 25-36.

³ No. 294. ⁴ Nos. 295, 296.

of all sorts, garments, images,—of men and animals and their young,—oil jugs, boxes made of precious woods, etc. And from Mitani are two letters, in all ten pages, closely written—a list of the dowry of Dušratta's daughter, and closing thus: "These are the wedding presents, all of them, which Dušratta, king of Mitani, gave to Nimmuria, his son-in-law. When he gave Taduhipa, his daughter, to Egypt, to Nimmuria, as wife, at this time he gave them." In these letters are found a good many Egyptian and Mitanian words.

Of not less interest are the evidences found of religious interchange. From Mitani we learn that Ištar of Nineveh had twice made pilgrimage to Egypt, had there been revered, and then returned to her own country, once in the reign of Dušratta, and once in that of his father.¹ From Dunip we hear that for years the worship of the gods of Egypt had been established there in Syria.² From Ḳatna, also in Syria, comes the information that the fathers of Amenophis IV. had made for Akizzi's father a sun-god, adorned with an inscription. Now that the king of Hatti had carried it off, Akizzi begs for another one to take its place. Rib-Addi prays not only to Ba'alat of Gebal, but also to Ammon of Egypt.

In this connection the lofty terms in which the Pharaoh was addressed seem significant. Almost the prevailing address is, "To my lord, my god, my sun." This deification of Pharaoh was in entire accord with Egyptian usage itself. They even went a step further and often said, "My lord, my gods, my sun." This reminds us immediately of the Old Testament usage of אֱלֹהִים—the plural—for God. It seems to me that Sayce has drawn just the wrong conclusion from this use of the plural in these addresses.³ I take it to be a strong confirmation of that interpretation of

¹ No. 20, lines 13-25. ² No. 41, line 9.

³ In *Higher Criticism and the Monuments*.

אלהים which makes it a plural of majesty. Note also, in connection with this matter of religious interchange, the Assyrian name of the king of Nuḥašši, Ramman-nirari, containing the name of the god, Ramman.

Another important subject is really only a part of this matter of international relations. Two hundred years before the Exodus, the Babylonian system of writing and the Babylonian language were used, not merely in the Euphrates Valley, and not merely in Mesopotamia and Northern Syria, but in all Palestine as well. Marvelous enough is it that men all up and down Syria and Palestine could write in this way, and it were strange enough had we discovered that Palestinians wrote to the Empires in the East in the Babylonian writing and language, but how much more marvelous to discover that these men write to the king of Egypt, and that the king of Egypt and high officers of his court write back to them, in the wedge-shaped characters of the Babylonians and Assyrians! Years before Moses, there were very many men, scattered all up and down Palestine, who could write letters on clay in the Assyrian character. It was no easy way of learning to write; for it involved the use of say four hundred different signs, most of which have more than one phonetic value, and many of which have also one or more ideographic values in addition.

This art of writing was very well known in Palestine. It was the universal international language, and employed not merely in high diplomatic circles, but in the trifling correspondence of petty governors and princes in all Palestine. It must have been more to that day than was the Aramaic in the same regions centuries later, or later still, than was the French in Europe. It means the decided confirmation of all we have said of the predominant influence of Babylon in the West through long centuries before the time of these letters. So powerful, so prevailing, were

the culture and civilization of Babylon in all the West land, that these influences outlived decades on decades, yes centuries, of Egyptian rule. Egyptian armies marched from end to end of the land. Egyptian rulers were recognized, her governors and garrisons were in all the cities; but, in spite of it all, Babylon was predominant in her culture, her civilization, her method of writing, and her language.

Writing was thus a well-known art, and the existence of written documents in these very early times is made certain, and can no longer be at all denied, as has been done oftentimes by our zealous critics. Especially in view of Mr. Bliss's discovery at Lachish, we may confidently expect the discovery of further cuneiform tablets in the soil of Palestine. It would seem also that Sayce¹ is right in urging the strong probability that there may have existed in Palestine written records that formed the sources for parts of our Pentateuch narratives. There seems absolutely no reason to the contrary. Sayce urges this especially for the creation story, the flood story, Gen. xi. and Gen. xiv., and brings forward one or two telling facts to show that some of these records were actually translations from the cuneiform.

That the creation and flood legends may have been in circulation in Palestine in these days is entirely probable, and is made doubly probable from the fact that among these Tell-el-Amarna tablets is one which contains a mythological text, entirely analogous to those of the creation and of the flood, and which, curiously enough, was used in Egypt as an exercise in learning to read the wedge-shaped characters. As it is often difficult for the learner to see readily just how many signs go to make up a word, this scribe had put a red ink *dōt* at the end of each word in the text. Other Babylonian legends may well have been in circula-

¹ Higher Criticism and the Monuments.

tion. Kirjath-Sepher, much discussed and laughed at, would seem to deserve consideration in this connection as the city of the scribe. May Deborah's pen of the scribe have been the stylus with which men wrote in clay, as Sayce suggests? Deborah's song is acknowledged by all critics to be very old. At any rate, the probability of written records at very early dates is abundantly established.

In closing, I must at least refer to another interesting feature of these letters. We have already given an account of one or two letters, containing other languages than the Assyrian, written, however, in the cuneiform character. In the Palestine letters we find the wedge-shaped characters used to write one more language, and in this case, not a non-Semitic one as in the cases above, but one that seems very, very like our Hebrew, in fact, practically the same language. The Palestine letters are full of glosses in the Hebrew language. That the language of those who lived in Canaan two hundred years before the Exodus was Hebrew, is conclusively proven by these letters. The Moabite stone proves that the Moabites used a language very closely allied. Here there is no room for a full account of these glosses, but some examples may be given. The writers put the Canaanitish or Hebrew word after the corresponding Assyrian word, putting a line of separation between.

A few examples must suffice, but the subject is one of considerable importance, and will deserve fuller consideration. For Ša-dî, mountains, occurs the gloss, ḥa-ar-ri, הר¹; for ḥu-ḥa-ri, cage, net; ki-lu-bi, כלוב²; for Kâ-tu, hand, זרע³; for ḥal-ka-at, perish (fem. s.), a-ba-da אברה⁴; for kaḳ-ka-du-nu, our head, ראשנו⁵; for Ša-mí heavens, שמים⁶. These are only a few. There are a great many of them, and they will doubtless greatly

¹ No. 55, line 20. ² No. 55, line 46. ³ No. 180, line 27.

⁴ No. 181, line 51. ⁵ No. 189, line 18. ⁶ No. 191, line 24.

reward thorough study from more than one standpoint. Such a study would of necessity include consideration of the Canaanitish names found among the names of early kings of Babylon, and also of the Canaanitish words found in Egyptian records; for example in the "Travels of Mo-har."

ARTICLE II.

THE COSMOGONY OF GENESIS AND ITS
RECONCILERS.¹

BY PRESIDENT HENRY MORTON, PH.D.

WE now come, in Professor Guyot's table, to the second part of the same, which is headed Era of Life, and opens with the work of the fourth day. The biblical account of this is given not in the words of Genesis, but in an abbreviated form, which we may assume as standing for the text of verses 14-18. As the science parallel of this, our author gives: "Chemical actions subside. The earth loses its photosphere; sun and moon become visible. First succession of day and night, of seasons and years. Differences of climate begin. Archaean rocks. Protophytes. Protozoans."

The gist of the problem which is here presented to the reconciler consists in this: According to the account given in Genesis, the work of this day consisted in the *making* of the sun, moon, and stars; but, according to the account given by science, these heavenly bodies must have been *made* long before. To reconcile this discord, Professor Guyot, like several others as we shall see, including Professor Dana, assumes in effect that the very emphatic statements of Genesis as given in all the translations as to the *making* of the heavenly bodies are to be interpreted as meaning that the work of the fourth day consisted in making the sun, moon, and stars *visible from the earth* by the removing of clouds, luminous or opaque according to different writers.

¹ Concluded from the April number.

Here we have a question which the Hebrew scholar should decide, as it is purely one of interpretation, and may be stated as follows: Can the language of verses 14-18 be interpreted as stating that the heavenly bodies were not *made*, but only *made to appear*, on the fourth day?

Let us see what answers are given to this question by Hebrew scholars. Dr. Marcus Dods, on page 4 of his "Genesis," says: "*Fourth Day Creation of Heavenly Bodies as Lights*. There was already light; these luminaries are created to regulate its distribution on the earth. Keil's idea that these bodies already existed, and that it is only their relation to the earth that is now described, is subversive of the idea of *creation* conveyed in the words '*Let there be.*'" Dr. Ryle, in his "Early Narratives of Genesis," 1892, page 9, says: "It is again only a non-natural interpretation which explains the formation of the sun and the moon on the 'fourth' day as . . . not the *formation* of the heavenly bodies (see, however, ver. 16), but the first *manifestation* of their orbs through the mists that had before hidden them from the earth." Dr. Driver, in the *Andover Review* for 1887, page 645, having special reference to Professor Dana's indorsement of Professor Guyot's scheme, says: "The difficulty which the work of this day occasions in every attempt to accommodate the nebular theory to the Cosmogony of Genesis, is well known. Sir J. W. Dawson labors strenuously though unsuccessfully to overcome it. Professor Dana seems strangely unaware of its magnitude. Considering the purpose of the luminaries to have been to mark seasons and other divisions of time, all that he says in reference to it is, 'The great purpose of the sources of light was, therefore, accomplished by them whether they were made or made to appear.'"

"Is there, then, no difference between *making* and *making to appear*? Or is Hebrew incapable of expressing the idea 'appear'?" The idea is expressed by one of the com-

monest words in the language, a word occurring in this very chapter. Here, on the contrary, the writer expresses as explicitly as it is possible for language to do, his sense that the luminaries had no existence prior to the fourth day, and that the work of the fourth day consisted in their formation. 'And God said, *Let there be* luminaries in the firmament of heaven to divide the day from the night, . . . *And God set* them in the firmament of heaven to give light upon the earth,' etc. (ver. 14-18). Had the writer meant 'appear,' it would have been easy for him to write, *Let the luminaries appear* in the firmament of heaven, as he had written in verse 9, 'and let the dry land *appear*.' And if there were any doubt as to the meaning of *be*, it is removed by the word *made* in verse 16, which is perfectly unambiguous and distinct."

Also, Professor Ladd, in the first volume of "The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture," says on page 263, "That the words of Genesis i. 14, 'And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament,' may be made to refer to the merely phenomenal change by which the heavenly bodies are now first made visible from the earth, is not exegetically defensible; nor does it essentially change the scientific objections."

It would thus appear that the notion of transforming the language of Genesis as to the *making* of the luminaries into expressions implying that they were only *made to appear* cannot claim the support of the leading Hebrew scholars.

There is, however, another consideration of some weight, indicating that there was no thought in the mind of the author of this passage in Genesis (nor even, we may say with all reverence, in the intention of Him who inspired this writer to make this moral revelation) of conforming his description to the actual or probable physical relations of the subject. I do not think that any one can read these

verses without getting the impression that the prominent, if not the sole, idea in the mind of the narrator, and that which he desired to impress upon his hearers or readers, in reference to the luminaries, was that they were made or introduced into the cosmical system for use as "signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years."

Light fully adequate for the full development of vegetable, and consequently for animal, life, already existed; but the luminaries furnished, in addition, those divisions of time which, to the mind of a priestly writer, were of inestimable importance as regulating those ceremonial offices, the observance of which it was his ruling idea to indorse and inculcate. The heavenly luminaries, supported from the dome of the firmament and moved about by angels under the direction of Jehovah, constituted, to his mind, a vast celestial timepiece, to guide as well as to inspire the divinely ordained ceremonial worship.

But what does reverent science, regarding the "luminaries" and the entire universe as not only the work of God the Creator, but equally as expressing the present power and will of God the Preserver, now as always immanent in his creation,—have to say as to the *purpose* of the luminaries in their relation to the earth and man? Are they simply or mainly time-recorders like some elaborate church clock, ringing out the hours and days and noting the times for feasts and fasts and ceremonial worship? These ends they undoubtedly have served, but what are *they*, in comparison with the vast and beneficent operations by reason of which we are veritable *children of the sun*, owing every particle of energy by which we live and work to his prodigal outpouring in past and present time.

The forest stream which, temporarily imprisoned in the pond, supplies power to the sawmill or flour-mill, and the vast flow of Niagara, an inappreciable fraction of whose power, harnessed to the wheels of the turbines, is able to

do the work of a manufacturing city, alike owe every foot-pound of their working capacity to the solar heat-energy, which has raised in vapor their waters from the low level of the ocean to the higher level of the streams and lakes.

Every throb of the steam-engine which weaves our garments, prepares our food, or contributes to the necessities of life in any way, owes its existence to the solar energy which in geologic or in modern times caused the growth of the vegetable matter which, transformed into coal or used directly as wood-fuel, has stored up and held for our benefit this energy, until we liberate it. Every form of energy by which we live, and (in so far as thought involves the coöperation of physical activities in the chemical laboratory of the brain) every thought we think, we owe to the beneficent energy streaming to us from the sun. Is it wonderful that with some inkling of this relation, there should have been in early times nations of fire-worshippers who adored the sun? and may we not see in the description of the luminaries as made to serve the office of a cosmical timepiece, a conscious effort to enforce a moral truth and correct a prevailing error, rather than an attempt to relate the actual process or reason of their creation?

So again of the moon; what is her value as the slow-moving hand of a celestial timepiece, compared with her work as mistress of the tides of both ocean and atmosphere?

Turning next to the work of the fifth day according to Professor Guyot, we find it to be described in the Bible substantially as follows: "And God created the great stretched out sea monsters and all living creatures that creep, which the waters breed abundantly, and every winged bird."

Then as the account given by science we find: "Plants and animals appear successively in the order of their rank—marine animals, fishes, reptiles, and birds. First great display of land plants. Coal beds. Paleozoic and mesozoic ages."

Except that it omits reference to the fact that the creatures are described as essentially aquatic, i.e., "brought forth by the water," and that the truly bird-like character of the winged birds is not as clearly made plain as when the Bible says, "and fowl that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven," we may accept Professor Guyot's rendering of the biblical narrative. But what will be thought of his rendering of the science account, when we know that there is not the least evidence of the existence of birds properly so called in the period referred to, nor until long afterwards, and that Professor Guyot himself admits as much in the text of this book (pp. 113, 114), but is satisfied with pointing to the "bird-like affinities" of the family of the Dinosaur (Lizards who stood upon their hind legs like kangaroos), to the bat-like Pterodactyls and bird-like reptiles with teeth, which "prepared the transition to the *true birds, which made their appearance, in small numbers, at a later time.*" At the opening of the chapter containing this matter, the Professor says, "The fifth and sixth days offer no difficulties, for they unfold the successive creation of the various tribes of animals which people the water, the air, and the land *in the precise order indicated by geology.*" (The italics are mine.) To what lengths will devotion to a theory carry a learned, honorable, and devout man!

Lest my statement as to the late arrival of birds should be questioned, even though it is supported as above by Professor Guyot, I will quote an authority which on such a subject as this I presume no one will question. Professor Huxley, on page 25 of his *American Addresses*,¹ says: "Nothing could be further from the facts as we find them; we know of not the slightest evidence of the existence of birds before the Jurassic, or perhaps the Triassic formation; while terrestrial animals, as we have just

¹ D. Appleton & Co., 1893.

seen, occur in the carboniferous rocks." Even Professor Dana does not find himself able to support his friend Guyot in this item of his scheme, for he says: "This course of progress accords in a general way with the readings of science, and the accordance is exact with the succession made out for the earliest species of these grand divisions, *if we except the division of birds about which there is doubt.*"

Before leaving this item in Professor Guyot's scheme of reconciliation, we must notice another astonishing discrepancy.

Science, as he states in his abstract and develops fully in his text, indicates that the age of fishes and great reptiles was also the age of preëminent vegetable development; so that, as Hugh Miller has suggested, our planet, viewed at that time from another of its group, would have shone with a green color. There is, however, not a hint of this in the Genesis account of the fifth day; but, instead, the production of vegetation in its most advanced forms is described as taking place in the third day.

Such a trifle as this, however, does not seem to trouble the robust powers of accommodation of our author; for, after describing at great length these vast forests which have given us our coal beds, he concludes his chapter on the fifth day as follows: "The accordance of these facts of geology with the Mosaic account is so evident that no further explanation is necessary." I can only add that in my opinion no comment on this statement is necessary.

Now at last we come to the work of the sixth day as given in Professor Guyot's table. The biblical account as he states it reads thus:

"*a.* And God made the beasts of the earth, and the cattle, and every creeping thing of the ground after its kind.

"*b.* And God created man in his image."

The account of science reads: "Predominance of mammals; the highest animals. The beasts of the earth, Car-

nivorous; the cattle, Herbivorous animals. Tertiary age. Creation of man. Quaternary age."

It will be observed that in the text of Genesis we read in this place, "and everything that creepeth upon the earth after his kind." Now, according to all Hebrew scholars, these words necessarily include reptiles, and science proves that reptiles (as Professor Guyot has himself shown at great length) abounded so as to be characteristic of the previous or fifth day or period.

What is to be done with this? An easy if inadequate method is adopted by our author. On page 120 of "Creation," he says: "The creeping animals of the sixth day are not reptiles, but, according to Gesenius, the smaller mammalia—rats, mice, etc."¹

¹Gesenius is the standard Hebrew lexicon, and, though not likely to be in the possession of ordinary readers, is reasonably accessible; but, to save trouble, I will transcribe exactly what I there find under the Hebrew word used for "creeping thing" in the twenty-fifth verse translated above, i.e., *remes*, as well as its verb *ramas*.

"1. רָמַשׁ, 'to creep,' 'to crawl,' the appropriate verb for the motion of the smaller animals which creep along the ground; both those which have four feet or more, as mice, lizards, crabs (and this is the proper signification of *ramas*), and also those without feet, which glide or drag themselves upon the ground, as worms and serpents. Gen. i. 26, after the mention of quadrupeds both domestic and wild, of birds and fishes [says]: 'all the creeping things (*reptiles*) that creep upon the earth' (see ver. 28, 30; chap. vii. 8, 14, viii. 17, 19; Lev. xi. 44). Sometimes the earth is said 'to creep with creeping things'; Gen. ix. 2 [literally]: 'upon all with which the earth creeps,' i.e., all reptiles which creep upon the earth.

"2. In a wider sense spoken of aquatic or amphibious reptiles; Gen. i. 21, 'the creeping animals with which the waters swarm'; Lev. xi. 46; Ps. lxi. 35. So of all land animals whatever, Gen. vii. 21 (beginning); Ps. civ. 20, 'all the beasts of the forest do creep forth,' (supply) by night from their dens—
Hence—

"רָמַשׁ, 'a creeping thing,' 'reptile,' collectively 'reptiles'; (Gen. i. 25, 26; vi. 7, vii. 14, 23); often, 'whatever creeps upon the earth' (Gen. i. 25; vi. 20; Hos. ii. 20; [18 in English], cf. Deut. iv. 18). Once of aquatic animals (Ps. civ. 25). So of all land animals whatever (Gen. ix. 3)."

Admitting as I do freely the learning and piety of Professor Guyot, I must confess myself as entirely unable to account for this assertion as to the statement of Gesenius, but must leave it, with several other passages in his book, as among the inexplicable mental operations of one advocating a favorite theory which encounters radical obstructions.

In concluding his discussion of the work of the sixth day with the creation of man, Professor Guyot again reverts to the use of the word *barà* as expressing *creative* action in a peculiarly emphatic manner at the introduction of matter, of life, and of mind.

As already pointed out, this, so far as the introduction of life in its vegetable form is concerned, is in direct conflict with the text of Genesis, and consequently, as an argument for the conclusion here reached, has little weight.

I am entirely prepared to accept the indications of a special exercise of Divine power in the development of man's moral and spiritual nature, but on this subject, as I understand, true science has of necessity nothing to say, and therefore there is, and can be, no opening for the work of the reconciler in this connection.

So far as science can deal with the problem of man's creation or development, she must of necessity limit her labors to his physical structure and perhaps his mental capacities, and what she has done on *these* lines is certainly (incomplete and far from conclusive as it must be admitted to be) distinctly in the direction of bringing him into line with the general evolutionary series in which we find the lower forms of life, animal and vegetable, year by year more completely arranging themselves. Every reverent scientist will cordially agree with Professor Guyot's statement when he says, in reference to the series prior to man, "Whether or not we view this order as the result of evolution, God's guiding hand must be discerned, without which

nature alone could not have produced it," and will willingly extend this view so as to include the origin of man; but when the position is taken that science agrees with or supports the view of man's creation as a radically new act of divine power, not involving and being a link in a continuous and gradual process of development still going on and to reach its culmination in the future; then I can only say that such is not my understanding of the teachings of science, and refer as my authority to such works as "The Ascent of Man," by Professor Henry Drummond; "The Destiny of Man," by Professor John Fiske; "The Whence and the Whither of Man," by Professor J. M. Tyler; "Sermons on the Old Testament," by Canon Driver,—all of which treat the subject from a religious standpoint; and Huxley's "Lay Sermons," "Man's Place in Nature," etc., and Darwin's "Descent of Man," where the subject is regarded from a purely scientific point of view.

In fine, it seems to me that, with the highest personal respect for its author, it is impossible to judge this work of Professor Guyot more favorably than as an earnest and conscientious but necessarily unsuccessful attempt to solve an insoluble problem.

I have discussed this scheme of Professor Guyot thus in detail, because it is not only the earliest in date of the class to be considered, but also because it develops in an orderly manner the various important features of the subject, and will enable me to treat the other schemes quite briefly by alluding to their resemblances or differences.

I will now consider the scheme of Professor Dana, because, though not next to that of Professor Guyot in chronological order, it was so closely related in other regards as to be most conveniently treated in this order.

As already indicated, this scheme of Professor Dana appeared in the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA for April, 1885, under the title "Creation; or the Biblical Cosmogony in the Light

of Modern Science," and in the form of a review of Professor Guyot's work with the same title which I have just been considering, and which Professor Dana desired to defend from attacks made in the interests of the obsolete exegesis which attempted to interpret Genesis as a literally correct narrative of events, in defiance of scientific discoveries and conclusions.

In the article above mentioned, Professor Dana expresses his agreement with Professor Guyot in all but a few points; and aside from these, therefore, his scheme falls under the same criticisms as I have already made with reference to Professor Guyot's work. The first point of difference is that Professor Dana does not attempt to find the diversion of the nebulous matter of the primordial universe and the formation of the solar and other systems in the gathering together of the waters in the work of the third day, but relegates this to the separation of the "waters from the waters" on the second day. In so far as the work of the third day is concerned, this is a great improvement, and relieves the scheme of one of its objectionable features, but the extravagance of the suppositions concerning the previous periods is in no wise relieved, and Professor Dana follows Professor Guyot in his extraordinary treatment of the question of the appearance of grasses, trees, etc., on the third day.

He also follows Professor Guyot in the confusion of the use of *barà* in describing the introduction of *animal* life on the fifth day with the expression "Let the earth *bring forth*" for the introduction of *vegetable* life on the third day.

Professor Dana also accepts without comment the view that the specific and emphatic language of verses 14-18, as to the making and setting in the heavens of the sun, moon, and stars, may be understood as meaning that, by the clearing-off of clouds in the earth's atmosphere, the

heavenly bodies became visible. It may be asked, To whom? and the reply must be, To the plants and animals of the lowest forms which alone had been so far produced. In addition to all the other difficulties in this item of the scheme, it certainly seems strange that a whole day should be devoted to this raising of the curtain on a scene long before *set* in all of its details, while the audience of spectators for whom it was intended had not yet begun to come into existence. This certainly does not agree with Professor Dana's canon (p. 207) to the effect that: "II. The brief view of creation in Genesis sets forth only the grand stages of progress in the creative work, or those great events that marked epochs in the history. . . . A method of interpretation that puts among the eight epochs an event not of this epochal character should, therefore, be received with doubt." Was the clearing of the sky from clouds "an event of this epochal character"?

We now come to Professor Dana's discussion of the work of the fifth and sixth days, in which the difficulty of the order as regards birds, and as regards "creeping things of the earth" or reptiles, develops itself.

As regards birds, he does not attempt to escape it by calling saurians which stood on their hind legs, and bats or bat-like creatures, *birds*, or by taking the circumstance that these might be regarded as preparing "the transition to the true birds," as warrant for describing them as "fowl that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven," and as "every winged fowl," in the manner followed by Professor Guyot, but admits that about the division of birds "there is doubt."

As regards the creeping things, i.e., "everything that creepeth upon the earth" (ver. 25), Professor Dana seems to have accepted the erroneous statement of Professor Guyot as to the meaning given to the Hebrew word *remes*, and thus to have supposed that the animals which the

earth brought forth on the sixth day were all of the class mammalia. Working on this basis, and also assuming a remarkable liberty as to statement of facts on the part of the inspired author, as he had before done in following Professor Guyot's rendering of grasses and trees and the *making* of the sun and moon, Professor Dana runs into a very curious dilemma. Thus (on p. 215) he says: "The succession in the living tribes given in the chapter is: (1) Plants (third day); (2) Invertebrates and the lower Vertebrates (fifth day); (3) Mammals, or the higher Vertebrates (first half of the sixth day); (4) Man, the head of Mammals (second half of the sixth day). . . .

"The sixth day's work includes only that particular division of Vertebrates, to which man himself belongs, whose common characteristic, that of suckling their young, is, through the feelings of subjection, reverence, and affection it occasions, of the highest value as a means of binding child to parent, man to man, and man to his Maker." But, as a matter of correct translation or quotation of the text of Genesis, the work of the sixth day includes, after beasts and cattle, "everything that creepeth upon the earth." This most certainly includes the immense class of reptiles and other crawling creatures which do *not* suckle their young.

Whatever may be the force of the suggested appropriateness in confining the creations of the sixth day to mammals, it was not appreciated by the writer of Gen. i. 24, 25, who, even though inspired, according to Professor Dana, with a knowledge of the true order of creation or development, has chosen to place the reptiles and other creeping things of the earth, with beasts, cattle, and man, in the sixth day, while he relegated birds, whose affection for their young is one of the most beautiful illustrations of the fostering care of the Creator for his human children, to the

fifth day, contrary to the teaching of science as to the actual order.

It appears, then, that, with the exception of his reference to the division of land from water on the third day, in which the natural interpretation of the Hebrew passage is accepted, Professor Dana's scheme of reconciliation brings the biblical and scientific accounts no more into harmony than does Professor Guyot's, and contains exactly the same errors as to the rendering of Hebrew words, either expressed or implied, as when he assumes "all creeping things" to exclude reptiles, etc., and to refer only to mammals.

I do not see, therefore, how the conclusion can be avoided, that, with all his eminent learning as a mineralogist and geologist, Professor Dana also has, by a conspicuous failure, contributed to the demonstration of the insolubility of the problem which he has undertaken to solve.

I will now turn to the scheme of Sir J. W. Dawson, first developed by him, as we have already said, in 1860 in a volume entitled "Archaia," and republished in 1887, and again in 1893, under the title, "The Origin of the World according to Revelation and Science." This author tells us in substance in his prefaces, that neither the developments in biblical criticism nor in biological science as expressed in the doctrine of evolution, have led him to modify his views as given out in 1860 in any degree, for the simple reason that he regards both the results of biblical criticism and of the doctrine of evolution as substantially worthless.

In view of these statements, it might be thought, that, in reference to a subject whose treatment rests necessarily on the results of biblical criticism for a correct understanding of the text of Genesis, and on the results of the doctrine of evolution for a correct understanding of the origin of the world according to science, an author in this posi-

tion would hardly come within the category of *recent* reconcilers, or be more worthy of attention than the many members of the same class whose work closed before the date at which Sir J. W. Dawson's began. But as this author is still living and publishing on this and related subjects, it would seem needful to consider his scheme of reconciliation, also, especially in view of his high standing and wide reputation as a geologist and man of varied learning.

Considering, then, the scheme of reconciliation developed in the above-mentioned book, we find, in the first place, that it avoids most of the errors in translation of Hebrew words and interpretations of texts which render the schemes of Professors Dana and Guyot so absolutely unsatisfactory.

Sir J. W. Dawson regards the creation of the heaven and the earth referred to in the first verse of Genesis as meaning the production out of nothing of "the whole extraneous space" and of "our globe as a distinct world." This interpretation, besides being natural, is in accordance with the views of all Hebrew scholars of the present day as to the meaning of the words, though entirely opposed to the renderings accepted by Professors Guyot and Dana, as essential to *their* schemes of reconciliation.

Coming next to the second verse, we find the same natural and correct rendering of the critical words "unshaped and empty," or "formless and uninhabited," as used also by Isaiah to describe the desolation of Idumea, and by Jeremiah of nations ruined by God's judgments. There is no suggestion here of the cloud of inert matter, without properties, diffused through space, imagined by Professors Guyot and Dana, and it is also to be noticed that the nebular hypothesis is also left out of the scheme of reconciliation so far.

Coming next to the development of light and its separa-

tion from darkness, in verses 4 and 5, this is described as meaning the development of light in "luminous matter diffused through the whole space of the solar system, or surrounding our globe as with a mantle." To meet the words translated, "And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night," these explanations are, however, seriously modified or abandoned as follows:—

"To explain the division of the light from the darkness, we need only suppose that the luminous matter, in the progress of its concentration, was at length all gathered within the earth's orbit, and then, as one hemisphere only would be illuminated at a time, the separation of light from darkness or of day from night would be established."¹

In this connection, the nebular hypothesis is given a hearing, but only as illustrating what may have gone on, but is *not* referred to in the Genesis account.

Finally, it is suggested that all three of the conditions above described may have existed in succession, and be referred to in this passage. After this comes the remarkable statement: "For the reasons above given we must regard the hypothesis of the great French astronomer as a wonderful approximation to the grand and simple plan of the construction of our system as revealed in Scripture."

Our author surely has here forgotten his previous chapters in which the earth or "our globe as a distinct world, with all the liquid and aeriform substances on its surface," was referred to as created *in the beginning*, and as being "formless and uninhabited," which certainly excludes the entire series of developments described in the nebular hypothesis from any subsequent period, because, long before "our globe" was "a distinct world," etc., the sun must have reached an advanced state of concentration. In fact, the treatment of this part of the subject exhibits a failure to clearly apprehend, at one time, all the conditions in-

¹The Origin of the World, pp. 117-118.

volved in the several successive statements made by the author himself.

Indeed, the reconciliation of Genesis with the nebular hypothesis in any definite way, involves the following dilemma: To get the nebulous state of matter and its successive concentrations out of the sacred text, we must treat the first eight or ten verses in the arbitrary manner of Professors Guyot and Dana; while, if we give these verses their legitimate and natural meaning, as does Sir J. W. Dawson, there is nothing to correspond with the stages of the nebular hypothesis, and it is only as the result of a nebulous or somnolent state of mind that the natural rendering of the text and a reference to the hypothesis can be supposed to be compatible.

In this same connection may be noticed a strange oversight as to a well-established fact in physics or meteorology into which our author has fallen. On page 121, we read: "After it [the earth] had been left outside the contracting solar envelope, it might still retain some independent luminosity in its atmosphere, a trace of which may still exist in the auroral displays of the upper strata of the air." From the time of Benjamin Franklin the aurora has been universally regarded by astronomers and physicists as an electric discharge in the rarefied atmosphere at considerable elevations, of exactly the same nature as that now produced in the artificially exhausted vessels known as "Geissler tubes." That it should have anything to do with self-luminous matter is a suggestion quite foreign to physical science, and indeed contrary to all the results of observation. Indeed Lemström produced an artificial aurora by means of a network of wires presenting many points to the sky.¹

Coming next to the work of the second day, the separation of the waters above and below by the firmament, our

¹ *Nature*, Vol. xxviii. pp. 60-63, and pp. 123-130 (1833).

author accepts the old and familiar explanation, that this refers to the parting of the water in the clouds from that on the surface of the earth.

In thus translating *rakia* as the expanse of atmosphere, our author differs, as we have seen, from many of the best Hebrew scholars; but we do not attach much importance to this subject in its connection with processes or schemes of reconciliation, because this phrase is manifestly so indefinite and obscure, if not taken in its natural meaning of a solid dome supporting the celestial cisterns, etc., that it may be made to fit any part of the creative process, as we have seen, from the separation of the nebulae and their formation into stellar systems, according to Guyot, to the temporary maintenance of a cloud canopy, according to Dawson (see p. 170).

I should only remark, that to assign as the work of an entire day this merely temporary and relatively insignificant stage in the clearing-up of the earth's atmosphere, seems hardly worthy of an inspired writer, while the permanent separation of heavenly from terrestrial space by a solid firmament would be, in the mind of a writer in ancient time, a work of adequate importance and dignity.

We come now to the work of the third day, the upheaval of land and the development of plants. Though the subject is somewhat obscured by a multitude of words and much irrelevant matter, we gather that our author admits that the language of Genesis here calls for vegetation of the most advanced character, and that Geology gives no evidence of any such vegetation until much later, when it appears in the Carboniferous period, and later, in company with highly developed forms of animal life.

This Gordian knot he cuts by the extraordinary suggestion, that these higher forms of vegetable life may have existed at this early period, but have perished so as to leave no trace of their character in the geological records (p.

194). What sort of *reconciliation* shall we call this? Not of Genesis with *Science*, but rather with *nescience*.

Futile as were the attempts of Professors Guyot and Dana to escape this difficulty, they at least showed some respect to science and its results; but this simply substitutes for the records of geology the fanciful creations of the would-be reconciler. Our author himself seems not to have been quite satisfied with the above way of solving the problem; for, after quoting from Professor Dana various reasons why the earth *may* have had on it vegetable life earlier than animals, he suggests that the words of Genesis must refer to the first introduction of vegetation (see p. 197). This is evidently borrowed from Professor Guyot, and has been already shown to be absolutely inconsistent with the language of the Hebrew record.

Passing next to the work of the fourth day, we find our author vibrating in a somewhat confused and confusing way between the opinion that the words of Genesis here refer to the *final completion* of the sun, moon, and stars at this time, and the suggestion that they were now appointed to their office by having their mutual relations and regular motions, now for the first time perfected.

For neither of these suggestions is there the slightest foundation in science or in the conjectures of the nebular hypothesis, but, on the contrary, both are radically opposed to these views. In other words, at a time when the earth had sufficiently cooled to have supported in a previous "æon" a varied and highly developed vegetation, the sun, moon, and heavenly bodies generally must have been, to all intents and purposes, in their present condition. We have here again a striking illustration of the manner in which an "ignus-fatuus" of a pet theory can lead an able and learned man into a mist-covered marsh of unfounded and shifting assumptions.

Turning next to the work of the fifth day, our author

draws attention to the fact that the word for "create" is here, as in the case of the production of matter and of man, employed for the introduction of the new subject, and does not attempt to carry this back, like Professor Guyot, to the introduction of vegetable life. He, however, as we might expect from his emphatic rejection of the doctrine of evolution, here claims that in Genesis the *species* is expressly pointed out as the unit of creation.

He likewise notes that the geological period corresponding to this day includes the Carboniferous period (that on which vegetable development reached its maximum), and the Mesozoic, which was emphatically the age of reptiles.

It may be remembered that, as we before pointed out, Genesis says nothing of the vegetation developed on the fifth day, and places reptiles with "everything that creepeth upon the earth" in the sixth day. The difficult question of the birds our author disposes of as follows: "Birds also belong to this era, though apparently much less numerous and important than at present." This is unkind to Professors Guyot and Dana, not to mention Professor Huxley and other like authorities, but what will a good and learned man *not* say for a pet theory?

Before leaving the subject of the reptiles, however, it should in justice to our author be said, that he makes a long argument to prove that the words usually translated "great whales" should be "great reptiles." Admitting this, however, it still remains that all these creatures are referred to in verse 22 as those that "fill the waters in the sea," and are therefore *water*, and not *land*, reptiles, such as are found in the Mesozoic formations; so that no real progress is made towards a reconciliation of this obstinate disagreement of the records.

Coming now to the work of the sixth day, our author very candidly states the difficult facts with which all reconcilers have been obliged to struggle; but he does not

seem to us to fare any better than his predecessors in meeting them. The emphatic and repeated reference to "everything that creepeth upon the earth" he takes as indicating "the additional types of terrestrial reptiles and other creatures lower than the mammals introduced in this period." The three varieties of creatures, as our author renders verses 24 and 25, are, as first given, "herbivora, reptiles, and carnivora," and as afterwards mentioned, "carnivorous mammals, herbivorous mammals, and reptiles of the land."

Neither of these orders agrees with the geological record, which, according to our author himself, quoting from Professor Dana, is, Herbivora, Carnivora, and Herbivora of vast dimensions, then smaller varieties of both herbivora and carnivora, the reptiles having occupied an earlier age belonging to the fifth day.

To reconcile the two orders in Genesis, one author suggests that one may indicate the order in *time*, and the other the order in *rank*. But, as both disagree with the geologic record, this does not seem of much use to the scheme of reconciliation.

Indeed, while Sir J. W. Dawson's scheme of reconciliation is in advance of those of Professor Guyot and Professor Dana, in so far that it shows a much greater familiarity with the Hebrew language, and thus does not do such violence to the same in its renderings of the biblical text, it comes no nearer to a reconciliation of the same with the scientific record, because, the two being fundamentally unlike, a strict rendering of either makes agreement with the other only the more manifestly impossible, as I think appears very clearly from the foregoing detailed examination of the successive periods as they are presented by this author.

Now we come to the latest and most distinguished of the reconcilers, the Right Honorable W. E. Gladstone. To follow the fortunes of the famous Gladstone-Huxley con-

trovery, alluded to at the opening of this article, would require far too much time and space, and I shall therefore take, as the final expression of Mr. Gladstone's views, as enlightened by said controversy, the chapter in his book entitled "The Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture," which is headed "The Creation Story."

Mr. Gladstone opens his discussion by the statement of certain *a priori* conclusions as to what the narrative of creation in Genesis i. *must be*. As briefly given by himself, they are as follows: "The method here pursued is that of historical recital. The person, who composes or transmits it, seems to believe and to intend others to believe, that he is dealing with matters of fact. But these matters of fact were, from the nature of the case, altogether inaccessible to inquiry, and impossible to attain by our ordinary mental faculties of perception or reflection, inasmuch as they date before the creation of our race. If it is, as it surely professes to be, a serious conveyance of truth, it can only be a communication from the Most High" (p. 37).

In view of the anything-but-unqualified success of previous reconcilers, this would look like a rather reckless nailing of colors to the mast. It is, however, so qualified presently as to relieve us of all anxiety. Thus, on page 38, our author says as to the strict truth of this assumed Cosmogenetic Revelation: "But the truth or trueness, of which I speak, is truth or trueness as conveyed to and comprehended by the mind of man; and, further, by the mind of man in a comparatively untrained and infant state." Again, on page 49, our author says in relation to the same subject: "With this aim in view, words of figure, though literally untrue, might carry more truth home than words of fact; words less exact will even now often carry more truth than words superior in exactness. The truth to be conveyed was, indeed, in its basis physical; but it was to serve moral and spiritual ends, and accordingly by these

ends the method of its conveyance behooved to be shaped and pictured."

If these qualifying expressions are taken at their full value, they make the work of reconciliation easy to the extent that it becomes quite superfluous. In other words, we have merely to determine the "moral and spiritual ends" to be served by the revelation under consideration, and then find that the statements are not so at variance with the facts expressed in "words of figure" as to fail of accomplishing "their moral and spiritual ends." In the words of Professor Drummond: "Were the reconcilers of Geology and Genesis equal in insight to their latest and most distinguished champion, and did Mr. Gladstone himself realize the full meaning of his own concessions, little further contribution to this controversy might perhaps be called for."

The bearing of this is so admirably presented by an illustration in the same article of Professor Drummond that I will venture to quote him in this connection. He says: "George Macdonald has an exquisite little poem called 'Baby's Catechism.' It occurs among his children's pieces.

'Where did you come from, baby dear?
Out of the everywhere into here.

'Where did you get your eyes so blue?
Out of the sky as I came through.

'Where did you get that little tear?
I found it waiting when I got here.

'Where did you get that pearly ear?
God spoke, and it came out to hear.

'How did they all just come to be you?
God thought about me and so I grew.'

"For its purpose what could be a finer, or even a more true, account of the matter than this? Without a word of literal truth in it, it would convey to the child's mind exactly the right impression."¹

¹ Nineteenth Century, February, 1886, p. 212.

Mr. Gladstone's language above quoted would authorize us in treating the Cosmogony of Genesis in the manner above indicated by Professor Drummond, and, so treated, it would offer nothing for the skill of the reconciler, because it would become a figurative or allegorical composition of poetic character whose resemblance to or difference from the scientific view of creation would be entirely unimportant, as compared with its object of conveying moral and spiritual instruction.

Having provided himself with such a safe and unlimited line of retreat from any possible position of difficulty, Mr. Gladstone nevertheless proceeds with his system of reconciliation, and displays that command of language and felicity of expression which always distinguish him; but he labors under two serious difficulties, which he acknowledges with the greatest modesty and candor, but which interfere with his work much more profoundly than he realizes. On page 53 he says: "On the meaning of the words used in the Creation Story, I, as an *ignoramus* [italics mine], have only to accept the statements of Hebrew scholars, with gratitude for the aid received; and in like manner those of men skilled in natural science on the nature and succession of the orders of being, and the transition from one to the other."

Nothing can be more candid and modest than this statement; but, having made it, Mr. Gladstone presently proceeds to contradict the conclusions of Professor Driver as to the necessary meaning of Hebrew words as used in the connection in which they stand in the first chapter of Genesis, and to select, as reliable, certain of the conclusions of one or another of the prominent reconcilers, Guyot, Dana, or Dawson, in which, as I have pointed out, they disagree with each other as well as with the mass of scientific authorities who are not interested in schemes of reconciliation.

A considerable amount of scientific training is necessary to enable any one to appreciate the full meaning and weight of scientific statements; and, with all possible respect for Mr. Gladstone's marvelous mental power and vast ability in many fields, truth compels me to say that the work now under consideration cannot be read by any one familiar with the scientific subjects of which it treats without the impression that the author has not a clear and broad grasp of the subject, and has not always appreciated the true value of the statements of his authorities. Into the details of this work it is unnecessary to enter further than to say, that, in his scheme of reconciliation, Mr. Gladstone has followed Guyot and Dana in their adaptation of the first eleven verses to the requirements of the nebular hypothesis, contrary to the views of Dawson, whom he follows generally elsewhere, but avoids, as a rule, any reference to the exact language of the text, with which he takes great freedom of construction.

I cannot but agree with our author's modest statement on page 77, where, after alluding to Dana, Guyot, Dawson, and Stokes, he says: "I am well aware of my inability to add an atom of weight to their judgments." If any one is not satisfied with the schemes of the three reconcilers above named, he will not be likely to adopt that of Mr. Gladstone. (Professor Stokes is only referred to as authority for some scientific statements.)

The weakness of Mr. Gladstone's position is, that, rejecting the results of biblical criticism, and accepting the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch as he does, he deprives himself of a source of light which, as we shall see, is essential for a correct appreciation of the text of Genesis; while, on the other hand, by lack of training in scientific lines, he is led to follow scientific guides who, by reason of a bias derived from the best motives and an almost necessary result of their date and environment, are, as we have seen,

strangely unreliable on many points and apt to prove misleading. I therefore feel constrained to say that a careful and repeated perusal of the essay of the great English statesman has only impressed me more strongly with the insoluble character of the problem of reconciliation which even he has so manifestly failed in attempting to solve.

In reading the works of all these writers, the impression is the same. The more we admire their ability, learning, and pious enthusiasm, the more clearly do we see that they have undertaken an impossible task, and that their failures are in no way due to any deficiencies on their part, but only to the insoluble character of the problem they have set themselves to elucidate.

The question which the reconcilers have set themselves to answer, when reduced to its most moderate terms, is admirably expressed by Mr. Gladstone twice over in nearly the same words, on page 40 and page 42, and in the latter place as follows: "Do the propositions of the Creation Story in Genesis appear to stand in such a relation to the facts of natural science, so far as they are ascertained, as to warrant or require our concluding that these propositions proceeded, in a manner above the ordinary manner, from the Author of the visible creation?"

Mr. Gladstone of course answers this question in the affirmative, not by showing a universal and close agreement of the Genesis account with the facts of natural science, but only such a general correspondence, allowing of some points of difference and employing a broad and figurative use of words, as seems to him sufficient to warrant his conclusion.

In his introductory remarks Mr. Gladstone implies that if he could not reach this conclusion the result would be most serious. Quoting from Professor Dana, he says: "If it be true that the narration in Genesis has no support in natural science, it would have been better for its religious

character that all the verses between the first and those on the creation of man had been omitted."

From this statement I would most emphatically dissent, and am confident that my dissent is shared by every one of the leaders of conservative higher criticism and modern theology; such as, Driver, Cheyne, Drummond, Horton, Addis, Farrar, Ryle, Kirkpatrick, Robertson Smith, Davidson, Kennedy, Adam Smith, Carpenter, Bennett, Whitehouse in England; and Briggs, Ladd, Abbott, Harper, Toy, Lyon, Curtis, Peters, Jastrom, Hirsch, Haupt, George F. Moore, H. P. Smith, Batten, Brown, S. Aceustra, Gould, Kellner, Gottheil, and Prince in this country. As I hope presently to make clear, every one of the "moral and spiritual" lessons which Mr. Gladstone considers it the aim of the writer, and even of the Inspirer of Genesis, to inculcate, will be equally, and indeed better, conveyed, if the inspired narrative is seen to have no reference to natural science, and thus to be independent of support from that quarter, and unaffected by the most conspicuous failure to make its statements square with those of natural science.

It should not be forgotten that the dispute between the reconcilers and their opponents in no way involves the question of the inspiration of the sacred record, but considers only whether this record is inspired to teach scientific *as well as* "moral and spiritual" truth.

From this it follows that a failure to answer the question of Mr. Gladstone in the affirmative, in no way involves a general denial of all its elements, or the assertion of what might be considered a counter proposition. In other words, we may and do believe that, while the presence of a divine revelation in the first chapters of Genesis is not established or supported by the relation of the narratives there given to the facts of natural science, it is fully and abundantly established by the character of the moral and spiritual enlightenment which these narratives afford.

The difficulty which presents itself to Mr. Gladstone, Professor Dana, and others in this connection comes from their expressed or implied *a priori* conclusions as to the nature of revelation and the manner of inspiration, and I think can be best cleared up by the answer to a question in some sense parallel to that of Mr. Gladstone, *In what way may we regard the statements of Genesis, so as to give them full force as Inspired Revelations of moral and spiritual truth, and yet render their agreement or disagreement with the facts of natural science entirely immaterial?*

To answer this question we must consult the biblical critics as to the probable conditions of age and authorship of the first creation story in Genesis. They will tell us that it, with many other parts of the Pentateuch, was written by a learned and pious Israelite, probably a priest, about the time of the Babylonian captivity, say 450 B.C.; that its writer was inspired by the Divine Spirit directly and indirectly through the truths handed down and developed by a long line of prophets and teachers, including Moses, to teach through its pages the following lessons:—

1st. A pure and sublime Monotheism, which should assert that the One God was the sole creator of the universe and every part of the same, from the earth and heavenly bodies down to the smallest plant or insect.

2d. That this one eternal and omnipotent Creator had placed himself in peculiar and close relations to man, in so far as he had made him the crowning work of his creation, and indeed had made him in his own image, with all the near and loving association which that implies.

3d. That the observance of the Sabbath, or seventh day of rest, was an institution of strictly divine origin, and to be observed as an essential element or factor in the development of the race.¹

¹ See Ladd, *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture*, Vol. i. p. 257.

4th. That other ceremonial observances and seasons were of like divine appointment worthy of being measured and announced by the motions of the heavenly bodies.

The discrediting of polytheism is, of course, included in the first item of teaching given above; and, this being so, I think it will be found that in these four divisions I have included all the subjects of moral and spiritual teaching which Mr. Gladstone, or any of the other reconcilers here mentioned, finds in the narrative of Genesis.

As to the "moral and spiritual ends" of this revelation, the biblical critics are in substantial accordance with the reconcilers. They part company at the point where the reconcilers contend that these "moral and spiritual ends" must have been attained by a supernatural guidance of the writer in the "words of figure" or narratives with which he sought to express to his cotemporaries these high moral and spiritual ideas. At this point the biblical critics contend that in this, as in other cases, the inspired writer was left to express for himself the truths which had been conveyed to him, with such aids as his human knowledge of earlier literature and his human reason could furnish. Let us see now where these guides might naturally be expected to lead him, and in how far the result of such guidance would correspond with the narrative of Genesis and with "the facts of natural science."

In the first place, our inspired writer, being presumably acquainted with the Babylonian cosmogony, and perhaps other traditional accounts of like tenor, in which a vast and dark ocean is described as the origin of all things, the gods included, would perceive that he could best instruct his hearers by using such tradition purged of its polytheism and other unworthy elements. If this writer is supposed to be of lofty thought and capable of grand expression, which, as the recipient and transmitter of such a moral and spiritual revelation as we have supposed he cer-

tainly should be, we should expect as a natural result such a passage as we find in the first three verses of Genesis.

Guided by the ancient cosmogonies, as well as by natural experience, which would instruct even a savage that light was essential to all forms of life, the writer would put its creation next; but, knowing nothing of the nebular hypothesis or of the necessary conditions of light-formation, and having in mind the sevenfold division of time which he desired to emphasize, he would divide this light from the darkness in periods of day and night, in order that his count of time might commence.¹

Thus he would produce in substance the fourth and fifth verses.²

Again, being a man of his time, when the vault of heaven was regarded as a solid dome supporting the celestial abodes and having sluices to let down the rain, he would naturally make the next step to consist in the forming of this dome, and division of the upper from the lower waters. Thus would be composed verses 6-8 in a perfectly natural manner, and without any knowledge of the separation of nebulae according to Professor Guyot, or the development of a temporary cloud-canopy according to Sir W. J. Dawson.

It is in the highest degree natural that an intelligent man at any age, contemplating the probable formation of

¹ See Schrader's *Cuneiform Inscription and the Old Testament*.

"The august ocean was their generator."

"The surging deep was she that bare them all.

The waters thereof embraced one another and united,

But darkness was not yet withdrawn, nor had vegetation sprung forth."

Also, Sayce's Hibbert lecture for 1887, pp. 384, etc., to the same effect; Davis' *Genesis and Semitic Tradition*, 1894, pp. 1-5, 9-15; *An Introduction to Folk-Law*, by M. R. Cox, 1895, p. 254.

² The notion of the existence of light before, and independently of, the sun was common to the Babylonians and to the Aryans, as well as to the Hebrews. See Davis' *Genesis and Semitic Tradition*, pp. 18-19.

the earth as he knew it, should next describe the emergence of the land from the previously universal and primordial ocean, and experience would tell him that such land, coming out of the water, would be speedily covered with a rich and varied vegetation. The inundations of Egypt and of the country about Babylon would be object-lessons of the most instructive character in this connection.¹

Being ignorant, however, of the geological record, and of the doctrine of evolution, and of the substantially contemporaneous development of animal and vegetable forms, he would have no hesitation in placing the latest products of vegetable development in this period, and would thus furnish the reconcilers with one of their most difficult problems. The result of this natural treatment of the subject, however, would evidently be verses 9-13.

Now the inspired writer would have before him the problem of arranging the remaining elements of his subject, and as a matter of course would place man last as the final work of the Creator, and next before him the domestic and wild animals needed for his support, or as furnishing objects of chase to the hunter, and next before these the creatures of the air and sea as more remote, and, as further off still, the heavenly bodies needed for the regulation of times and seasons of ceremonial worship. Had he appreciated the conditions of the nebular hypothesis, he would have introduced the heavenly bodies before vegetation, but in the absence of such knowledge, it was natural for him to bring the development of vegetation into direct connection with the upheaval of the land from the water, and in this way came the order in verses 14-27 of heavenly bodies, then fishes and birds as coming from the sea, then land animals, and lastly man. In the arrangement of detail in this connection it was very natural to associate the birds with the fishes and creatures of the sea, both because they

¹ See W. R. Harper, in *Hebraica*, 1888, Vol. v. p. 27, second § from foot.

were alike in being removed in structure and habitat from man and the animals related to him, and also because sea-birds and flying-fish would suggest an actual relation. Had the writer been inspired with knowledge as to the facts of natural science, he would no doubt have placed the birds with the mammals on the sixth day.

In the same way it was natural to associate reptiles with the land animals among whom they were constantly encountered; but had the author known that the age of reptiles preceded that of the mammals, he would have exchanged the birds and the reptiles, and placed the reptiles in the fifth and the birds in the sixth day.

In fact, we see that where natural association would lead to an order corresponding to that given by natural science, we find a correspondence; but where a natural association of ideas or objects would give an order unlike that deduced by natural science, the former, not the latter, is followed in the biblical record. *The inference is plain, that not knowledge of the facts since discovered by natural science, but the natural association of ideas and objects was the origin of the order found in the creation narrative in the first chapter of Genesis.*¹

I cannot better comment on these results and conclude this paper than by some quotations from the admirable article by Professor Henry Drummond in the *Nineteenth Century* for 1886, to which I have already referred. Thus he says: "What we have to note is that a scientific theory of the universe formed no part of the original writer's intention. Dating from the childhood of the world, written for children, and for that child-spirit in man which remains unchanged by time, it takes color and shape accordingly. Its object is purely religious, the point being, not how certain things are made, but that God made them. It is not dedicated to science, but to the soul. It is a

¹See W. R. Harper, in *Hebraica*, 1888, Vol. v. p. 25.

sublime theology, given in view of ignorance or idolatry or polytheism, telling the worshipful youth of the world that the heavens and the earth and every creeping and flying thing were made by God."

"Here lies the whole matter. It is involved in the mere meaning of revelation, and proved by its whole expression, that its subject-matter is that which men could not find out for themselves. Men could find out the order in which the world was made. What they could not find out was, that God made it. To this day they have not found that out. Even some of the wisest of our contemporaries, after trying to find that out for half a lifetime, have been forced to give it up."

In view of the very unsatisfactory result of such great efforts on the part of men so distinguished in science and literature as the reconcilers to whom we have referred, it is indeed a subject for gratitude that the labors of another class of scholars in a very different field have solved the problem of the cosmogony of Genesis, as well as the countless other problems which present themselves to every thoughtful and intelligent reader of the Scriptures who applies his mind as well as his eyes to the perusal of their pages.¹

¹ Since writing the above, and indeed since the completion of this entire article, my attention has been drawn to the conclusions on the same subject recorded by Rev. G. Frederick Wright, D.D., in his admirable books, "Studies in Science and Religion" (1882, pp. 365 *et seq.*) and the "Divine Authority of the Bible" (pp. 196 *et seq.*), and it gives me great pleasure to find how fully my general views as expressed above were entertained and expressed by him so long ago. In this connection I may be permitted to disavow any claim to novelty in the views expressed in this article generally, which I freely acknowledge to have been derived in substance from the various writers to whom I have alluded in various places.




FIG. 1.—Appearance of the pigment in the microscope (Robin).




FIG. 2.—Micrococci [small globular microbes] from nodule upon an axillary hair (x 1000) (Hartzell).




FIG. 3.—Perineal hair, with brushlike extremity in which the Fungus is lodged (x 200) (Hartzell).



FIG. 4.—Axillary hair with Fungus growing upon it (x 75) (Hartzell).

ARTICLE III.

FURTHER STUDIES ON THE BLOODY SWEAT
OF OUR LORD.

BY W. W. KEEN, M.D., LL.D.

IN the *Baptist Teacher* for October, 1890, and in a fuller paper in the *Baptist Quarterly Review* for April, 1892, I published an article on "The Bloody Sweat of our Lord," as viewed from a medical standpoint. Since that time I have consulted a number of additional authorities and have gained from these a wider knowledge of the facts. It gives me, therefore, great pleasure, at the request of the Baptist Ministerial Conference of Philadelphia, to lay before you some of these additional facts.¹ I have selected only a very few, because it would be burdensome and also useless to attempt to quote, or even give a *résumé* of, the exceedingly extensive literature on the subject of bloody sweat, stigmatization, chromathidrosis, chromidrosis, chromocrinie, and other similar terms which are used to indicate varieties of this curious condition.

Those who desire to pursue further studies in the matter are recommended, for a more exhaustive bibliography than in the present and my former papers, to consult the literature gathered together under these headings in the Index Catalogue of the Surgeon-General's Library, United States Army, not only in the published volumes, but in the supplementary volumes soon to appear.

Of the references obtained since my first paper, the most complete and satisfactory are the following:—

¹ Read March 1, 1897.—EDS.

Fox (T. C.). On two cases of chromidrosis in which a blue-black pigment exuded from the skin of the circum-orbital regions. *Trans. Clinical Society, London, 1881*, xiv. 211-221, 1 pl.

Leroy (de Méricourt). *Mémoire sur la Chromidrose ou Chromocrinie Cutanée. Suivi de l'étude microscopique et chimique de la substance colorante de la chromidrose*, par le Dr. C. Robin, et d'une note sur le même sujet, par le Dr. Ordoñez. *Ann. d'Oculist., Brux., 1863*, Vol. 1. p. 5.

Duffy (F.). A case of Chromidrosis. *North Carolina Med. Jl., Wilmington, 1883*, xii. 260.

Babesiu (V.). Ueber die Bakterien des roten Schweisses. *Centralbl. f. d. med. Wissensch., Berlin, 1882*, xx. 146-148.

Béhier. Rapport sur l'état d'une malade adressée à la Société comme atteinte de Chromidrose, au nom d'une commission speciale. *L'Union Méd., Paris, 1861*, xi. 82.

Koch. Die Bluterkrankheit in ihrer Varianten, *Deutsche Chirurgie, Lief. 12*.

Wilson. *Diseases of the Skin, Philadelphia, 1868*, pp. 711-712.

McCall Anderson. *Treatment of Diseases of the Skin: an analysis of eleven thousand consecutive cases, Philadelphia, 1873*.

It is owing chiefly to the courtesy of the gentlemen connected with the Surgeon-General's Library that I have been able to continue my studies in this direction.

There seem to be three kinds of discoloration of the skin which should be differentiated from each other as to their cause and character. While technically different, and some not at all consisting of "sweat," scientifically speaking, yet popularly they would be confounded with this secretion.

I. There is a discoloration, usually bluish to black in color, which is due to distinct granules of coloring matter

which exude from the skin. This has not the appearance of blood at all, but should be considered as one of the curious allied phenomena. The discoloration is seen especially on the eyelids, particularly the lower eyelids and the adjacent cheek. It can be wiped off, when it stains the handkerchief from a blue to a black, sometimes a clear indigo blue. After the coloring matter had been wiped off, it has reappeared under the very eyes of the doctor. In some instances the face has been sealed up with elastic collodion, and in other cases by dressings under seal, which have remained undisturbed.

Naturally the question of simulation or fraud would be the first thing that would suggest itself, and especially because there have been certain times and places (for example, about thirty years ago, and particularly in and near the town of Brest in France) when a considerable number of persons have been so affected. But the very careful investigations referred to, especially by Fox and Leroy (de Méricourt), with whom were associated six or seven very prominent physicians, and also the report of Béhier, put fraud out of the question.

Perhaps the best way to obtain an idea of the phenomenon is by narrating some of the recorded instances.

Fox¹ records the case of a girl, a deaf mute, aet. 19, who had two brothers and sisters, also deaf mutes. She suffered from irregular menstruation, great constipation and distention of the abdomen, but was not hysterical. The pigmentation appeared on the under lids, and disappeared *pari passu* with the constipation. It could be washed off, but would reappear. Later when the constipation was remedied, it seemed to be influenced more especially by the menstrual periods. When the color appeared on the face, there was always found in the urine a coloring matter known as indican, a natural glucoside which furnishes in-

¹ *Loc. cit.*

digo by its decomposition. The skin pigment appeared as granules, a picture of which in a similar case is given by Leroy (de Méricourt), while the illustrations in Fox's article will give a very good idea of the discoloration of the skin. The pigment, when examined by the microscope, looks like granules of a black to a blue-black or ochereous color. (FIG. 1.)

Dr. Fox also describes a second case, in a girl of fifteen, practically of the same character.

Féréol¹ narrates the case of a girl of twenty who was very nervous and hysterical, who presented a blue discoloration over the lower eyelids, the breast, and in the arm-pits. It appeared almost instantly, especially if conversation led up to the subject; it could be rubbed off by a handkerchief, which became colored indigo blue. The pigment, when examined, resembled scales of Canada-balsam, and was not moist, but dry. There was no blood in it, nor did it appear from the sweat glands.

Leroy (de Méricourt) in 1884² narrates the case of a student, twelve years of age, who, apparently, sweat blood from the right side of his neck. His shirt was deeply red colored, but the microscope showed that there was no blood in the apparent sweat, but only red granules.

Dr. H. S. Purden³ records a case of light-blue and yellow-straw colored sweat in a woman of forty.

Mr. Teevan⁴ reports the case of a girl of fifteen who suffered from a black secretion over the entire forehead and the eyelids of both eyes. The plate shows the color to be almost jet black. It could be removed with soap and water, but this caused much pain. The quantity removed at one time was sufficient to make four basins of water as

¹ Bull. Acad. de Méd., Paris, 1885, 2. s., xiv. 1071-1075.

² Bull. Acad. de Méd., Paris, 1884, 2. s., xiii. 425-428.

³ Journal of Cutaneous Medicine, 1858, ii. 247.

⁴ Medico-Chirurgical Trans., 1845, xxviii. 611 and Plate VI.

black as if it were India ink. When the secretion ceased from the forehead precisely similar black matter was vomited and passed by the bladder and bowels. There was no blood in it, but the chief constituent of the matter was carbon, so that it would almost deflagrate. There was no possible deceit, as she was watched most carefully. She finally recovered entirely.

Dr. J. C. White of Harvard¹ also reports a case of unilateral yellow sweat in a man of twenty years old in apparently perfectly good health. The left side of his shirt was constantly stained yellow.

The first case of chromatidrosis ever described was published by Dr. Younge in the Philosophical Transactions for 1709. In 1864, Leroy (de Méricourt), in the article alluded to, collected thirty cases, of which he had seen seven. In 1869, Dr. A. W. Foote collected thirty-nine cases, to which Fox (in 1881) added five. Of these forty-four cases, thirty-eight were in women and six in men. In all the health was disturbed, and in women the menstrual function especially. Sometimes the attacks may recur off and on for even ten years. While most frequently seen in the lower eyelids, the discoloration may appear on the upper eyelids, on other parts of the face, and, occasionally, on other parts of the body. It is generally symmetrical, is increased or produced by emotion. Sometimes it disappears from the skin only to reappear in the stomach, as is shown by bloody vomiting. In other cases it is seen as bloody discharges from the bowels or in the urine. The mucous (or lining) membrane of various parts of the digestive tract, which is only a modification of the skin, seems, therefore, to be attacked by a true hemorrhage(?) replacing the granular pigment from the skin. Whether the blood in the urine comes from the bladder or the kidneys has not, so far

¹ Journal of Cutaneous and Venereal Diseases, 1884, ii. 293.

as I know, been determined. The relation between the skin and the kidneys will be alluded to in a moment.

The color varies from black to blue, yellow, or violet. A most exhaustive examination of this coloring matter was made by Robin, as is shown in the reports of Leroy (de Méricourt) and Béhier. He found that it differed from any pigment which could be applied by any possible fraud. It consists of indigo, iron, carbon, and fatty matters. "From these considerations, it appears probable, that, under certain circumstances, the sweat glands of certain portions of the body assist the kidneys in eliminating this indican, which readily, by contact with the air, becomes oxidized into the different colored indigos" (Fox). It must be remembered that the relation between the skin and the kidneys is very intimate. In a number of cases of high fever with marked suppression of secretion by the kidneys, I have seen the skin assume the function of the kidneys to such an extent that the salts commonly excreted by the kidneys would be found upon the skin, and a distinct urinary odor would proceed from it. "I have not," says Dr. Fox, "a shadow of a doubt as to the genuine character of the chromidrosis"; his reasons being: (1) the identity of the chemical and physical character of the pigment in a large number of patients, who, if they had been practicing deceit, undoubtedly would never have all used the same pigment; (2) its appearance after cleansing of the skin under the very eyes of critical and often skeptical physicians; and (3) its reappearance on the cleansed skin after not only cleansing, but after being sealed up by various protective applications.

II. The second variety is a discoloration of varied hues,—red, blue, yellow, or green—and is due to the presence of microbes of different kinds. In this variety the discoloration is much more commonly red than the other tints mentioned. It appears not so commonly on the face or the eye-

lids as in the axillæ (armpits), and occasionally in other parts of the body. The bacteriological origin of this red sweat seems to have been pointed out, first, in 1873 by Hoffmann¹ and Pick²; and the bacteriological origin of the yellow sweat by Eberth.³ Since that time a very considerable number of such cases have been reported. The only paper I have found published in this country is one on the bacterium of red sweat by Dr. Prince.⁴

Among these cases I may quote the following:—

Balzer et Barthelemy⁵ narrate the case of a man of thirty-four who had free sweating on the forehead and other parts of the body, but in the armpit this free sweat was colored red, and stained his shirt red in spite of daily baths. This continued for four or five months. Several other similar cases also are narrated by them, all of which are due to various bacteria.

Babesiu⁶ reports the case of a woman of twenty-six with marked nervous symptoms of uterine origin, and also the case of her sister, and of a third young woman, and a young man, who all suffered from red axillary colored sweat. The hair in the armpits was thin, pale, stiff, brittle, and covered with small reddish masses which were filled with ovoid or round bacteria. The discoloration was associated with very free sweating, and in all was found to be due to bacteria.

Temple⁷ reports two cases of a father and son affected with pink sweat due to a pink torula, a variety of fungus resembling the yeast fungus.

Hartzell⁸ gives a very excellent illustration of the masses

¹ Wiener med. Wochenschrift, 1873.

² Bericht d. naturforscher-Versamml., 1873.

³ Centralblatt f. d. med. Wissensch., 1873, No. 20.

⁴ Boston Med. and Surg. J., 1882, cvii. 586.

⁵ Contrib. à l'étude des sueurs colorées, Ann. de dermat. et syph., Paris, 1884, 2. s., v. 317-322.

⁶ Centralbl. f. d. med. Wissensch., Berlin, 1882, xx. 146-148.

⁷ Lancet, 1896, i. 513. ⁸ University Med. Mag., July, 1893, 771.

of microbes and fungi growing on the hair. (FIGS. 2, 3, 4.)

III. The third variety consists of a true escape of blood from the skin. Of this there are quite a number of illustrations. Some undoubtedly are true hemorrhages directly from the blood vessels of the skin; others are probably instances of blood escaping from the orifices of the sweat glands. By non-medical observers this fine scientific distinction would not be made, but to them all would be instances of "bloody sweat." In at least one instance what was apparently bloody sweat, when examined by the microscope, was found to contain no true blood corpuscles. This is narrated by Dyer.¹ The patient was a man of twenty-six, and the sweat appeared over the knees and between the shoulders. On one occasion two ounces of fluid were collected resembling carmine ink. The father of the man also suffered in the same way.

Among other cases the following may be narrated:—

"Hebra in his work on 'Diseases of the Skin' describes the case of a man coming under his personal observation who, although strong and well nourished, was attacked repeatedly with hemorrhage from the surface of the lower limbs. This generally occurred during the night; so that he first became aware that the bleeding had taken place by finding the sheet stained with blood when he awoke. On one occasion Hebra himself saw the blood flow from the uninjured back of the hand of this patient, while sitting near him at table. The blood formed a jet which would about correspond in size to the duct of a sweat gland. This jet had also a somewhat spiral form, and rose about one-twelfth of an inch above the surface of the skin."²

Hutchins³ reports the case of a man, aet. 39, in whom the bloody sweat appeared after repeated nettle-rash. The

¹ Medical News, June 22, 1895, 702.

² Van Harlingen, Internat. Clinics, July, 1896, 333.

³ Internat. Clinics, Phila., 1893, 3. s., III, 346-351.

disease is described as "numerous, fresh, pale yellowish pin-point stains here and there, with a minute drop of blood." In other parts of the skin were points of purpura or true hemorrhage into the skin. In this case the points did not correspond either to the roots of the hairs or the mouths of the sweat glands, but the author concluded that the oozing was certainly due to blood.

Tittel¹ reports the case of a young man of twenty who had red sweat since he was twelve years of age, especially on the neck and the hand, the thighs and the feet, so that he was obliged to change his stockings three or four times a day. The attacks followed marked nervous symptoms. Chemically it was proved to be blood by the hæmin crystals.

Deryabin² describes a very remarkable case, sometimes assuming the form of a sort of sweat oozing from the skin, and at other times of a distinct hemorrhage. She was a healthy girl of eighteen who suffered from hemorrhages on the forearms, the fingers, and the tip of the nose. It lasted for four hours, and endangered life by reason of the amount of blood lost. From the tip of the nose, there was a single fairly thick stream, but from the extremities many fine jets like those from the perforated nozzle of a watering-pot. It varied greatly in force; sometimes the jet would be a foot high, and again only oozing.

The only case of a negro that I have found described as suffering from bloody sweat, is related by Duffy (F.).³

Hart⁴ reports the case of a man of twenty-five who fell ill in November, 1894, with pains in his head, back, and body, and some stupor. Four days later in the vomitus, and also in the urine and the feces, blood, was noticed. It

¹ Arch. der Heilkunde, 1876, xvii. 63.

² British Med. Jl., Epitome, 1892, ii. 53.

³ North Car. Med. Jl., Wilmington, 1883, xii. 260.

⁴ Richmond and Louisville Med. Jl., Jan. 1895.

also oozed from almost all the pores of the body. The sweating was more marked on the trunk than on the extremities or the face. The night-clothes and bed-clothes were stained. The man died at the end of ten days.

Huss¹ describes the case of a servant of apparently sound and blooming appearance who, however, had had convulsive attacks in her childhood. In other respects she had been and was perfectly well. On August 4, 1850, she stated, that, after she had been boxed on the ears and was struck with some hard substance on the head, she became unconscious and passed into convulsions. When she came to herself, she noticed a marked bleeding from the scalp, which, however, had not been cut. The bleeding continued for eleven days. For the next two months, on account of weakness in her legs, she was obliged to remain in bed, during which time the hemorrhages were repeated almost daily, especially from the crown of her head, without there being a trace of an injury. This was followed by repeated attacks, accompanied also with the vomiting of blood, and occasionally with stupor, during the fourteen months that she was in the hospital. After leaving the hospital she had other attacks also, when it was observed that the blood oozed from the roots of the hair, forming around each hair a red point, and then coalescing with neighboring drops. Distinct, firm blood clots were formed. Examination of the bleeding spots found no defect nor any alteration in the roots of the hair. The blood appeared normal by the microscope, but the blood corpuscles did not form in rouleaux, showing that the blood was somewhat abnormal. Six times she had severe attacks of vomiting of blood.

Wilson² refers to quite a number of cases (the original references are given); but most of them seem not to have been examined with that care which modern science would

¹ Med. Central Zeitung, 1856, 97.

² Diseases of the Skin, Phila., 1868, 711, 712.

exact, or else were such ancient cases as to suggest a probable doubt as to the character of the discharge. One case, which deserves to be quoted, is that of a young woman of eighteen who bled from her nose, a little later at the tips of her fingers, and then from her hands, her navel, and the corners of her eyes.

J. Mason Good, an eminent physician of the beginning of this century, remarks that bloody sweat "has taken place sometimes during vehement terror, and not infrequently during the agony of hanging or the torture." The reference which is given¹ is too ancient for us to place absolute faith in it.

McCall Anderson of Glasgow published a book on "The Treatment of Diseases of the Skin, based upon personal observations of eleven thousand successive cases."² In these eleven thousand cases, bloody sweat only occurred once. The outline of the case is as follows:—

"The patient, a young lady fourteen years of age, was seen by me at the request of Dr. Mason, of Ayr, in the summer of 1866. The parts implicated were the face, arms, front of the chest, and legs. The hemorrhage occurred from round erythematous patches of eruption, which were remarkable for their symmetry. One was on the brow, another on the chin, and one on each cheek. On the front of each arm also there were four in a row, two on each upper arm and two on each forearm. A similar arrangement was observed upon the sternum and upon the legs. One of the most marked peculiarities of the hemorrhage was the suddenness of its invasion. An oval or round red ring, varying from the size of a shilling to that of a crown, formed almost instantaneously, and the redness quickly spread inwards over the inclosed skin. As soon as seen the patches appeared as if the cuticle had melted away, and the surface was quite wet. Sometimes the exudation

¹ Bartholinus Epistola, i. 718. ² Phila., 1873.

was like water at first, and changed into blood; at other times, and especially on the face, the patches were at once covered with a complete dew of blood. The hemorrhage did not, however, consist merely of the dew of blood; that was only at the outset: it was actual bleeding, as from a cut; the blood sometimes streaming down the face or other part attacked. There was rarely more than one attack each day, although sometimes the bleeding occurred from two separate portions of the skin simultaneously. It is very curious to note that the outbreak generally occurred at the same hour each day—namely, at 11 A.M.; but it did not seem to be under the influence of mental or bodily excitement, or to be induced by taking food or stimulants. It was evident that the hemorrhage was dependent upon defective and irregular menstruation—that, in fact, it was a case of vicarious menstruation; and accordingly it yielded, in the space of three or four weeks, to remedies directed against the latter disorder.”

One curious phenomenon, allied probably to bloody sweat, which should not be passed over, is the appearance of the so-called “stigmata” on certain persons who are believed in the Catholic Church to have been especially pious saints. St. Francis of Assisi is one notable illustration. The most recent known case is that of Louise Lateau. A quite detailed account of her case, with others, will be found in an article by Wheatley¹ and in Warlomont’s essay “Louise Lateau.” She was a healthy girl, born in Belgium, January 30, 1850. Her stigmatization came after her paroxysms of religious zeal and on Fridays. The blood flowed from the left side of the chest, the insteps of both feet, both the backs and palms of both hands, and between the shoulders. She declared that she did not sleep, and had neither eaten nor drunk for four years. She was examined by M. Warlomont for the Royal Academy of

¹ Pop. Sci. Monthly, N. Y., 1888, xxxiii. 667-673.

Medicine in Belgium, who examined the alleged blood, and found that it was normal blood, except that it had an excess of white corpuscles. He concluded, however, that she had access to food and drink, and that she ate, drank, and slept like other people, though her ecstasies and stig-mata were absolutely real.

It seems, therefore, that, under varying influences of ill health and of strong emotion, a real escape of blood from the skin may and does occasionally take place, and that the "sweating as it were great drops of blood" in our Lord's case was a real though unusual phenomenon due to intense emotion.

In my former paper I alluded especially to the cases brought on by profound emotion. To these may be added the three following cases:—

Van Harlingen¹ says, "Moral shock, as terror, may occasion hæmathidrosis. A young woman observing a mortal combat taking place unexpectedly under her eyes was seized with violent sweating of blood. Another subjected to violence during the sack of a city died with the symptoms of general hæmathidrosis. A woman subject to kidney colic suffered from hæmathidrosis, apparently the result of the severe pain during several successive attacks, and then, the habit being established, experienced other attacks of hæmathidrosis without obvious cause."

All these three cases are evidently the same as those quoted in the paper by Jules Parrot.² The case arising from pain in the kidney was reported by Caizergues in 1814, but was not studied with the care and exactness modern science would demand. The other two are cases from Leudanus and Severinus, and are so ancient as to throw great doubt upon their authenticity. Most of them, it will

¹ International Clinics, July, 1896, 338.

² Paris, 1859, reprinted from the *Gaz. Hebdom. de Méd. et de Chirurgie*, entitled "*Étude sur la Sueur de Sang.*"

be observed, are more or less remote in date, and occurred at a time when the exact requirements of modern science either were not possible or were not rigorously applied. For example, I would admit no case, medically speaking, in which there was no distinct examination of the fluid by the microscope to determine that it was really blood. If possible, also, there should be an examination of the skin in order to determine exactly the source of the blood. Of course all means to detect fraud should be employed.

Klemperer,¹ in an interesting paper on hemorrhage from sound kidneys, goes on to say, "Medical literature contains a great number of cases where even profuse hemorrhage in hysterical persons has followed from various organs without any anatomical change being perceptible in them." He also gives in detail two personal observations of hemorrhage from the lungs and from the stomach, in both of which cases a post-mortem examination showed the bleeding organs to be entirely sound.

It is not out of place, perhaps, to allude to Dr. Stroud's well-known book on "The Physical Cause of the Death of Christ," which he thinks was from rupture of the heart. Spontaneous rupture of the heart has been reported a great many times. I have personally never seen but one case.² The rupture was verified by a post-mortem examination. For an hour and a half after death, spontaneous flexion and extension of the toes occurred. The cause of such rupture is usually fatty degeneration of the muscular fiber of the heart. It occurs usually in later life, say from fifty years onwards, and results from the wearing out of the heart as a physical machine. I do not know whether there are any cases on record as early as thirty-three years of age. If there are, it would be an unusually early age for it to occur.

¹ *Deutsche Medicinische Wochenschrift*, 1897, 129.

² *Trans. Pathological Society of Philadelphia*, 1874-75, v. 94.

It is not, however, uncommon to see great emotion, even in relatively young persons, disturb the rhythmical action of the heart very profoundly and produce great irregularity of the heart-beat. This, of course, if often repeated would be followed by organic change, such as fatty degeneration and softening of the muscular wall of the heart.

Now we must remember that our Lord's life was one of peculiarly severe and excessive emotion. You gentlemen in the ministry well know how intense become your emotions during a period of particularly profound and intense religious interest, and you know how wearing that becomes both upon mind and body. Yet your emotion can be but slight when compared with that of him "upon whom was laid the iniquity of us all," and who presumably from adolescence till his death, and certainly during the three years of his active ministry, felt this burden most intensely. If bloody sweating occurs, as is certainly the case, as a result of the nervous phenomena of hysteria, how much more probable would it be from the intense nervous strain of a Gethsemane. Moreover, as, though "foxes had holes and the birds of the air had nests, the Son of man had not where to lay his head," he was undoubtedly often subject to physical hardships, spent the night on mountains in prayer, was exposed to mob violence, and finally, combining both the acme of emotion and the acme of physical suffering, passed through the awful night in Gethsemane and the physical and mental agonies of the crucifixion. Under such circumstances, with such intensified emotion beyond the limit of human endurance, and with such physical suffering as culminated on the cross, it cannot be a wonder either that his sweat became bloody, or that his heart, even at so early an age as thirty-three, should rupture.

ARTICLE IV.

JOSEPH AS A STATESMAN.

BY THE HON. JAMES MONROE, LL.D.

So general has been the interest, in our country, during the past few months, in the discussion of the merits of public men and public questions, from the standpoint of economic policy, that it may not be unsuitable to consider, in this place, the *Bible* idea of what fits a man for responsible trust under government. And as the concrete is not only more attractive, to most minds, than the abstract, but may even give us clearer views of abstract principles than we could attain without it, I have chosen for my subject, JOSEPH AS A STATESMAN.

I. In developing this theme, let us consider, first, some of the qualities which Joseph had exhibited before he was chosen to be ruler over Egypt, and see whether they were such as to justify his appointment. Afterwards we will inquire how far our ideal of a statesman is met by the character and ability which he displayed when actually in power as Pharaoh's prime minister.

1. To begin with the preparatory qualities, it is evident, in the first place, that he had been endowed by nature with remarkable talents for administration. He was a born organizer and manager. He was so made that wherever he went he must put things to rights. For disorder, unless they prevented him by force, he must substitute order; for embezzlement and fraud, uprightness and open dealing; for irresponsible recklessness, strict accountability; for bad and confused accounts, those good and me-

thodical; for waste and extravagance, economy and thrift; for disobedience and eye-service, obedience and fidelity; for dull-eyed indolence, bright-eyed industry; and for all slatternly and dirty methods, those of cleanness and scrupulous care. When one of the Greek philosophers was taken prisoner in battle, and exposed for sale as a slave by the enemy in the market-place, he was asked what he could do. "Proclaim," he replied, "that now there is an opportunity for one who would like to buy a master."

When Potiphar bought Joseph he bought a master—at least a great manager—without having it announced to him beforehand. When Joseph came into his house, he began taking charge of its interests, and every one gave place to him. Potiphar made him overseer over his house, and all that he had he put into his hand; and the blessing of the Lord was upon all that he had in the house and in the field. So perfect did his confidence in Joseph become, that it is said he left all that he had in Joseph's hand, and he knew not aught he had, save the bread which he did eat.

When Joseph was sent to prison, on a false charge, this administrative ability was again displayed. So impressed by this was the keeper of the prison, that he soon committed all the prisoners to Joseph's hand, and whatsoever was done there, he was the doer of it. The keeper of the prison looked not to anything that was under his hand, because the Lord was with him, and that which he did the Lord made it to prosper.

2. Again, when Joseph was called to power, he had already shown that he was a man of absolute fidelity to a trust.

When a mere boy of seventeen, he was placed by his father with his elder brothers in charge of the flock. He discovered evil conduct in these brothers, and reported it to his father. They highly disapproved of this course, and

hated him for it. A feeling like theirs, and, I suppose, for like reasons, exists to the present day. But Joseph reasoned that the family had common interests the proper management of which was essential to the common welfare; that his father, under God, had the supervision of these interests, and could make this supervision successful only by having full knowledge of the manner in which each member of the family was performing his part; that he himself had been intrusted by his father with a share of the common responsibility, and that, having discovered that his brothers had gone wrong, fidelity required that he should inform his father, so that, by timely admonition, the evil might be corrected. This duty he performed without regard to the consequences to himself. The needed admonition, though no doubt given, was disregarded. The brothers went from bad to worse, but the pitiful relations in which they were finally placed to their brother, abundantly vindicated his conduct.

When tempted and importuned to sin in Potiphar's house, and virtually threatened with some great calamity if he did not yield, his fidelity to his trust was again conspicuous. His master had intrusted him with all that he had: he would not betray him. God had bountifully blessed him: he would be true to his God.

3. And this brings me to notice another quality which was characteristic of him from early youth; which was with him, as we have seen, in Potiphar's house; which shone forth when he was in prison; which was strong upon him when he was first brought into the presence of Pharaoh, and which was indeed the controlling force of his whole career and his whole life,—and that was his constant recognition of his accountability to God. God was his sovereign, and he would obey him; his father, and he would love and serve him; his friend, and he would commune with him; his benefactor, and he would consecrate all to

him. For God he felt a sweet and awful reverence, which sanctified every purpose of his heart. His mind had a habit of constant reference to God in all that he undertook. "I have heard," said Pharaoh, "that thou canst understand a dream to interpret it." Joseph replied, "It is not in me. God shall give Pharaoh an answer of peace." "God," he exclaimed at another time, "hath made me forget all my toil." To his brothers who bitterly remembered their past sin, he said, "Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you, to preserve life." But the whole history so abounds with these references to the Divine Providence, that justice cannot be done to it by a few brief quotations. "I fear God," was the declaration of Joseph to his brethren, and no quality is so well fitted as the fear of God to inspire and strengthen and elevate statesmanship. With what an added glory it gilds the names of such men as William of Orange and Hampden and Wilberforce and Gladstone! No quality, when sincerely cherished, will sooner win the sympathy of the people. Bismarck has said, on several occasions, that Germans fear nothing but God. Some German university, anxious, I suppose, to encourage this nascent sentiment in the Iron Chancellor, conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Divinity, which he accepted with thanks. Let us hope that reverence for God may be a growing grace of his character.

4. I add that the character of Joseph appears to have been, from his youth, in all respects irreproachable. No charge that was true could be made against it. He seems to have been as nearly faultless as any mere man mentioned in sacred history. There was one occasion when, if anything could truly have been urged against him, it would certainly have been done; and that was when Pharaoh nominated Joseph to his royal council to be, next to himself, chief ruler over Egypt. The proposal thus suddenly

to advance a Hebrew slave, taken, perhaps, but an hour before from prison, over the heads of all the old nobility, to the premiership of the kingdom, would naturally excite a feeling of jealousy in the minds of the great lords of the court. It is noticeable that when Joseph, with no thought of the result as to himself, advised that some discreet and wise man should be set over the land in preparation for the approaching calamity, Pharaoh's councillors expressed their approval—the thing seemed good in the eyes of all his servants; but when he asked them what better man than Joseph could be selected for this purpose, they appear to have been silent—the record gives no account of any reply. I cannot resist the conviction that they had something of the feeling, though I hope not in so bitter and murderous a form, with which Haman learned, after having recommended a public triumph to the man whom the king delighted to honor, that Mordecai, and not himself, was the man—something of the feeling with which the princes of Darius saw that Daniel was to be made chief president of the realm. If anything could have been said against the character of Joseph, or even against his personal appearance and manner, now was the time to say it. But not only was his character impregnable, but his bearing was faultless. A handsome young man of thirty, with a goodly and well-favored person, he bore himself in Pharaoh's presence with deference and with self-respect. Slavery and imprisonment had not hurt the tone of his native manliness. All he lacked, when he left the prison, to make him appear before Pharaoh, as a chivalrous gentleman, was that he should shave himself and change his raiment, and this he had found time to do. And so the lords of Egypt, when asked if Joseph was not the man for the hour, were silent. But where were *Potiphar* and *his wife*? Why did they not come to the help of these disappointed nobles, with their miserable falsehood? Now is their opportunity.

Let them speak now or forever after hold their peace. Perhaps they were dead. The wicked sometimes do not live out half their days. If they were living, Potiphar may have discovered, by subsequent transactions, that, on certain subjects, the word of his wife must be taken with some allowance. And Potiphar's wife may have come to feel that the best thing that could happen to her was never to have her lie mentioned again.

I have said that Pharaoh, so far as we can learn, could get no answer from his lords to the question which he asked. And so he answered for himself. "And Pharaoh took off his ring from his hand, and put it upon Joseph's hand, and arrayed him in vestures of fine linen, and put a gold chain about his neck; and he made him ride in the second chariot which he had; and they said before him, 'Bow the knee': and he made him ruler over all the land of Egypt."

5. Again we notice that Joseph was appointed to office on the sole ground of his merit. No effort was made by him or by any other human being to obtain the place for him. No petitions were circulated, no deputations waited upon Pharaoh, no favorite's favorite was quietly solicited to use his influence, no one even asked the king's wife to talk with her husband, in order that this man might have a cabinet position. He was not a "favorite son," nor even a "dark horse." There was nothing to give him the place but simply his fitness for it. Pharaoh's reasons for appointing him have been given to the world. "And Pharaoh said unto Joseph, 'Forasmuch as God hath showed thee all this, there is none so discreet and wise as thou art: thou shalt be over my house, and according unto thy word shall all my people be ruled.'" Joseph had given two evidences of broad statesmanship: first, he had clearly foreseen a great national calamity which no one else could have foreseen; and second, he had prepared a plan to meet

it. Pharaoh thought that the man who had done all this was the man to put the plan into execution, and he committed the work to his hands. It was a piece of sound practice in the civil service. There was, practically, a competitive examination, in which Joseph was first, and all others were nowhere. There was no other human being who had any idea of the future evil or of the way to avert it.

II. Having thus spoken of some qualifications for public position possessed by Joseph before he took office, let us next briefly consider the qualities which he exhibited after he came into power, or how he did his work as a statesman.

I. And here I remark, first of all, that when appointed to the place of prime minister, he at once and wholly gave himself to the duties of the office. To him the position was no sinecure. He knew that it would task all his powers to fill it successfully, and he decided not to spare himself in meeting the responsibility laid upon him. He was no courtier, and he had no jealousies. He cherished no malice and he retained no grudges—a quality of highest value in a statesman. He had no enemies to punish. He had kept his mind pure and sweet. Sunshine itself was not whiter or sweeter or more luminous than the soul of Pharaoh's chief ruler. In return for the terrible wrong which his brothers had done him, after having administered to them enough of loving discipline to make them see and repent of their sin, he gave them a possession in the best of the land and nourished them with bread according to their families. He had no thought of staying at court to watch against the intrigues of those who wished to supplant him. Probably he did not believe in the existence of such persons, or, if he did, he had no time to give them. He lived in the field. The sacred writer says, "And Joseph went out from the presence of Pharaoh and went throughout all the land of Egypt." To protect the

land from the coming evil, we now have a man well equipped in mind and heart, with a clean conscience and a serene breast, a man free from self-seeking and with an eye single to his duty, a man with nothing on his mind but the work to be done.

2. It has been said that no man can become a great statesman by merely attending to the petty details of administration. He must have an object that will fill the mind and enlarge the heart. And this brings me to remark that the history of Joseph meets this requirement. His objects were noble, and beneficent, and worthy of a great ruler. He undertook to save a great race and a large part of the world from extinction. A famine for Egypt meant a famine also for Abyssinia, Arabia, Syria, and Palestine, and sometimes even for the remoter, populous regions around the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates. The causes of this are well understood. A writer in Lange's Commentary upon Genesis says, "Aside from the fact that Egypt, in the early times, was a granary for the neighboring countries, and that they therefore suffered also from every famine that came upon it, it is a thing to be noticed that the rain-season for these lands, as well as the rising of the Nile, was conditioned on northern rainy winds." "All countries," says Moses in the book of Genesis, "came into Egypt to Joseph to buy corn, because the famine was sore in all lands." There was no presumption in the claim of Joseph that God had sent him into Egypt as his agent to accomplish a vast, beneficent plan. "God," said he to his brethren, "meant it unto good, to bring to pass as it is this day, to save much people alive." To the same effect is a passage in the 105th Psalm: "Moreover he called for a famine upon the land, he brake the whole staff of bread. He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a servant. . . . The king sent and loosed him; even the ruler of the people, and let him go free. He made him

lord of his house, and ruler of all his substance, to bind his princes at his pleasure and to teach his senators wisdom." So far then as the greatness of his object is concerned, no statesman in history appears with more dignity than Joseph. The contemplation of it fills and warms the imagination, and imparts to the mind a noble expansion. But for some plan like that of Joseph, the highest civilization then known to the world must have perished with the dwellers by the Nile; the church of God in the earth must have been blotted out in the persons of the patriarchs and their families, and many thousands of people in adjoining countries must have perished. It was not Oriental extravagance, but a swift insight into the magnitude of the occasion, which made Pharaoh bestow upon Joseph the name "Zaphnath-paaneah," which in Lange's work is translated "Preserver of Life," or "Saviour of the World."

3. Once more, not only was Joseph a statesman with a grand object, but the means which he employed were worthy of the object, and were chosen with the greatest wisdom. His measures were adequate and reasonable—they would accomplish the object, they were not oppressive, and they were carried out with the greatest tact and skill.

To appreciate this it may be necessary to look a moment at the economic difficulties which he had to meet. Political economists tell us that a young nation which has prospered so far as to have a full year's subsistence in advance, has taken an important step in the way of progress. It is stated by statisticians that the aggregate wealth of Great Britain, which is the richest country in the world, is only equal to five or six times—let us say six times—its annual production. Its expenditure is less than its production, because it is constantly adding to its wealth. Hence it is estimated that its total wealth is equal to about eight times its annual expenditure. If, therefore, production in Great Britain were suddenly to cease, and the nation had to fall

back upon its accumulated wealth for subsistence, then, if expenditure were to continue as free as in the past, at the end of eight years the country would be reduced to absolute beggary. The lands, the houses, the factories, the docks, the harbors, the ships, the railways, the cattle, might still be there; but they would not belong to the people of England, but to somebody who should have advanced upon them the means of subsistence. I do not like to anticipate, but I cannot help thinking what joy it would then give to a great people, standing on the brink of extinction, could it be suddenly announced that they could be put back into possession of all that they had had, with production renewed, on condition that henceforth they would pay one-fifth of their annual production to the crown. And what honor would be paid to any prime minister, no matter whether it might be Lord Salisbury or Mr. Gladstone, who should have carried them through this dreary period of decay, and brought them to so happy a result!

Our knowledge of Egypt is not complete enough for the purposes of accurate comparison, but her ability to pass through long periods of unproductiveness must have been much less than that of Great Britain. To attempt to name a definite ratio between the aggregates of wealth in the two countries would be mere conjecture, but I deem it safe to say, and in this I think I should be sustained by thoughtful readers of history, that the wealth per capita of Great Britain, measured by its value in the necessities of life, was more than double that of Egypt. Moreover the expenses of the Egyptian government were very great for so small a country. Her officials lived luxuriously, and her Pharaohs thought it necessary to support an army of four hundred and ten thousand men. Production in Egypt was mostly agricultural, and when the crops failed, she was speedily impoverished. In fruitful years she had considerable manufactures and trade, but when there was no more

corn, these also languished. Years, therefore, when the Nile failed to water and to fertilize the soil were years of terrible destitution. There were now coming seven years of plenty to be followed by seven years of famine. The problem, therefore, was, how to make the years of plenty, while they lasted, support the seven million of the population, maintain the army, and pay the expenses of the government, and yield a surplus large enough to support people, government, and army through the seven years of nearly total unproductiveness. I almost think it the most difficult problem that any statesman ever successfully solved. One thing to be done would of course be to warn the people of the coming famine, to exhort them against waste, to urge them to lay up all the corn they could spare for the time of want. This would make an effective impression upon the thoughtful and prudent, but very little upon the mass of the people. The improvidence of the Eastern races is proverbial. An average Egyptian would hardly be able to see why he should lay up corn this year, for a famine that is to come seven years hence. This may seem strange, but some of our own people cannot be taught to save something in July for the following January. Joseph's plan, therefore, was that the government should supplement the partial preparation which was all that the people could be persuaded to make, by collecting each year in the form of a tax, a liberal share of the corn produced, and storing it up until it should be needed. When explaining Pharaoh's dream, he named one-fifth as the share to be taken, but from the language used in describing the execution of his plan, I infer that, in practice, he may have taken more.

We shall now see Joseph visiting all parts of Egypt, organizing the people, appointing subordinates, building store-houses, punishing speculators. Even during the years of plenty, he will encounter many difficulties. There will

be dissatisfaction, impatience, irritation, even mutiny, among the people. Some will think the tax too high; others will wonder that so much power should have been placed in the hands of a Hebrew slave; others still, as one year of plenty succeeds to another, will be skeptical about the years of famine, and will begin to think that they are an invention of the government to enrich itself. Those who are too indolent or too dull to think will have positive opinions as to the wisdom of his system; those who are too selfish to coöperate will doubt his disinterestedness; those who are watching their opportunity to steal will suspect his integrity. He must soothe, explain, rebuke, or punish, as the case may require. He must have courage, tact, patience, good-nature, self-control. But, at length, the years of plenty are passed, and the years of famine have begun. The people are encouraged to live as long as possible upon what they have saved, and then the store-houses are opened. Now Joseph can enforce a strict economy in the use of grain among the people, by limiting the amount to be sold to individuals or families. The people brought him money to be exchanged for corn so long as it lasted, and next sold him their cattle, and finally their lands. They even speak of their bodies as being for sale, and Joseph himself says, "Behold, I have bought you this day." We must not make the mistake, however, of supposing that this implies a condition of chattel slavery, such as was once known in our Southern States. The context shows that it meant nothing more than what was implied in their having parted with all they had—their money, their cattle, and their lands—and being now in a state of dependence upon the generosity of Joseph. They could ask to be nothing more than servants to the king. Everything was gone, and their condition was indeed sad enough. But if you will once more read the passage, I think you will feel that the cheerful frankness with which they acknowledge their

beggared condition, implies that the character and the very face of Joseph have inspired them with hope of something better. I think they were not altogether taken by surprise when Joseph exclaimed, "Yes, you are beggars, but you shall not remain so. Years of plenty are now coming again. Go back to your lands and sow them once more. I will give you the seed for the first year, and you shall possess the lands as heretofore, except that you shall henceforth pay one-fifth of the annual produce into the king's treasury." "Four parts shall be your own, for seed of the field, and for your food, and for them of your households, and for food for your little ones." I don't remember to have noticed whether the Egyptians were in the habit of shouting in honor of their rulers, but if they were, I will venture to say that old Nile had never before been so startled in his bed as by the shout that went up from the people that day. It was indeed a great deliverance for the people—a great triumph for the ruler. To me it appears to be the best single piece of work ever done by a statesman.

Under the circumstances, the tax of one-fifth of the produce was certainly low. No doubt it was higher than the former tax, which is conjectured to have been a tenth. It was just that the government should receive something for its extraordinary service, and it may have been rendered necessary by its growing wants. If the increase in taxation was a tenth, then that tenth is the measure of the final injury of this unparalleled famine to the people of Egypt. Did any other statesman ever reduce such a calamity to so small a minimum?

The reasonableness of this tax of one-fifth of the produce will be still more evident if we compare it with rates prevalent among ourselves at the present day. In most growing Ohio towns, the property-holder is taxed from twenty-five to thirty mills to the dollar. If we assume the

average income of the citizen from all his property to be six per cent, or sixty mills to the dollar—an estimate which is high enough—he then pays to the Government five-twelfths or one-half of his “produce.” If we can pay a tax like this without complaint, the Egyptian under Joseph certainly had no reason to feel oppressed by the payment of one-fifth.

I must not leave this part of my subject without noticing a grave charge made by some critics against Joseph as a man and as a statesman. It is said that although an able minister, at heart he was a courtier; and that, in the interest of the king, he inflicted a permanent injury upon Egypt by changing the whole body of agriculturists from a community of freeholders to a community of tenants of the crown. Before the time of Joseph, it is contended, the people owned the land themselves; after his time the king owned it. Joseph thus destroyed that class who are the pride and strength of every land where they exist—the yeomanry. At first I felt perplexed by this. On the surface of the narrative it seemed to be true. I remembered the just pride with which our New England ancestors regarded their warrantee deeds to the rocks on which they stood, and I said it would have been a great calamity to them to have been changed into mere tenants of the President of the United States. But it soon occurred to me to inquire in what sense the lands of the people were theirs before the time of Joseph, and in what sense they were Pharaoh's after that time. No doubt that before Joseph the people called the land theirs, but was it theirs in a sense which prevented the dispossession of the farmers of large districts when the Pharaoh wished to give an estate to a successful soldier? Was it theirs in a sense which would protect them from a repartition of the land whenever the royal policy required it? Certainly not. The king was an absolute monarch. His will was law. He was the only leg-

islative power. He made the laws, and he made the judges who interpreted and applied the laws. Mr. Samuel Birch, the keeper of the Egyptian Antiquities in the British Museum, a great authority, says, in his edition of Wilkinson's Egypt, that a new Pharaoh re-invested even the territorial aristocracy with their lands, either on the ground that they were only feudal tenants, or that the king was the landlord of the whole country. Wilkinson, following Herodotus, states that Rameses the Great ordered a repartition of lands among the peasants. This was indeed later than the time of Joseph, but the kings before Joseph were certainly not less absolute than those who followed him. The only security which the people had, before Joseph, for the continued possession of their lands, was found in the forbearance and good sense of their kings. This security generally did not fail them, sometimes it did. Substantially the same state of things existed after Joseph, except that growing wealth and civilization were favorable to fair dealing, permanency, and good order. Further, under the arrangement made by Joseph, which appears to have continued at least until the time of Moses, and probably much longer, the gratitude of the people to the government as their preserver, and the gratification of the government over its doubled and now adequate revenues from the lands, no doubt made the mutual relations of king and landowners more satisfactory and less liable to disturbance than they had been before Joseph's time. I will venture to say that the title of the farming class to their lands was treated with more respect, and was more like that of fee simple, after the new system had been introduced by Joseph than it ever had been before. So much for the charge that Joseph deprived the Egyptians of their ancient title to the soil.

Such, very imperfectly presented, was the statesmanship of Joseph. The subject is full of lessons upon none of

which can we dwell, but any one of which might be expanded into an essay. In what other portion of human history is the providence of God, in its relation both to public and to private life, more wonderful, more encouraging, or better fitted to produce faith in him? Where else can a finer example be found of that courage in national affairs which faces an appalling calamity at its worst, abating nothing from its terrors, and then prepares to meet it and avert its worst effects? From what other leaf of human experience do we obtain so clear a view of the value, the blessing, the irresistible might, whether for the statesman or the man, of that greatest quality of the soul which is variously named the fear of God, personal integrity, a clear conscience, a heart of love, disinterestedness, devotion to the common welfare? Disinterestedness! how respectable, how prevailing, how universally approved it is! It is the very soul of successful statesmanship. It was the animating spirit of the statesmanship of Joseph; and when that spirit shall fully take possession of and control the statesmanship of our own country, in that one expression of the divine goodness, all the dark problems that perplex us will be solved.

From this study of Joseph as a statesman, we turn, with unusual satisfaction, to consider the character of the new administration which has just assumed power at Washington. I would not introduce, in this place, anything which could be thought an expression of party feeling, but I have a strong impression that good men of all parties are looking forward hopefully to the next four years. It is occasion for deep thankfulness to all patriotic minds, that a President has recently been inaugurated, over forty-five States, who, for many years, with unaffected piety, has worshiped God as his Sovereign and his Redeemer. The genuineness of his religious character, which has not been questioned; his single-hearted devotion to such measures

as, in his honest judgment, will best promote the common welfare; the sympathy which he has constantly expressed for sound morals, general education, reverence for law, and honest government; his irreproachable private character, and the estimable personal qualities which he has exhibited in all the relations of life; his true friendliness to all Americans; the ability and candor of his official papers; the sound judgment, the moderation, and freedom from personality which distinguished the innumerable speeches which he made during the canvass; the affability, the dignity, and the courteous reserve with which he received the thousands of visitors who waited upon him at his home; the high character of the officers whom he has gathered about him in his Cabinet,—all these qualities and acts, which remind us of the statesmanship of Joseph, furnish ground for hope that the administration upon which we have now entered will prove to be one of the most useful, one of the most catholic, and one of the purest which the nation has ever seen.

ARTICLE V.

HOW TO PROMOTE THE STUDY OF GREEK.

BY PROFESSOR HENRY ANSELM SCOMP, PH.D., LL.D.

It requires no great acumen to convince the intelligent observer that the Greek language, as an instrument for *general* culture as per our college curriculum, is now on trial for its life. For years a great outcry has been raised against it as a "compulsory study" in the course. "It is too difficult"; "Students employ every possible method to evade it"; "They use 'ponies' for the authors as well as for the best-known works on Greek Prose Composition"; "Their Greek course is, for many of these students, hardly more than a humbug"; "They graduate knowing little of the language, and nothing of its literature, and lay aside their text-books gladly, and for all time," etc.

Such are sample objections urged with no small force against the continuing of Greek in the general curriculum. Every teacher of the language has felt their power, and every thoughtful student has weighed the subject—perhaps with many misgivings; for he realizes that much of the opposition is well founded. The percentage of students who "elect no Greek" has increased from year to year, and frankly, on present educational lines, there seems but little prospect of checking this adverse tide. That there will be a small band of philologists, professors, clergy, and other literary men who will continue to prosecute Hellenic studies for professional purposes, or from very love of them, is not doubted; but this number will necessarily be small, as is the case with the number pursuing Sanscrit or He-

brew. As an instrument for general culture, as education now goes, Greek will surely be relegated to the specialists; and the specialist's field has few attractions for any considerable number of students. To illustrate: How many readers can be found for an exhaustive treatise on *iota subscript*; on the irregular metres of Euripides; or on Isocrates' use of *ἴσχυμαι*? Such learned works become "antiquarian" almost as soon as they fall from the press: they cannot be popularized.

All true Hellenists look with regret upon the present tendency in education; yet the great body of our teachers of Greek continue to follow in the old grammatical ruts, for lack of a better way. The most perfect language ever spoken by man has been, by our teaching methods, sublimated, reduced almost to a chain of abstractions. For the life, the glory, the power, the beauty of Greek literature, we have no place. The writer of a treatise on a "specialty" makes that "specialty" his hobby in the class-room. Boys may spend most of their Greek years hunting for Ionic forms. Demosthenes may be studied chiefly as an exercise in inflections; and Homer, to show us the *forms* of Epic verse. The wonderful oratory of the former, the deep inner views he gives us into Grecian politics, history, religion, art,—in fine, into the civilization of Greece,—must give place to perpetual parsing and form-building; while for Homer, the treatment prescribed and accepted from of old, is scanning, parsing, and Ionic forms. With slight variations, the same clinique and regimen are followed for all the old authors, whether they wrote of medicine or mythology, geography or geometry, poetry or philosophy. The special theme of the individual author is hardly considered at all. On such lines, any wide acquaintance with the literature is practically impossible. If gained at all, it must be in spite of, not by the help of, the educational model held up before the student. The drill-sergeant de-

mands that all the parts of speech be kept on dress-parade. Nouns and verbs must be on the wing; adjectives, pronouns, and articles must "dress" for the occasion; while adverbs and prepositions must stand in their proper places in the ranks, and conjunctions must "toe" the line and keep the parts together. Very well: but what then?

Unfortunately, no further use is found for the squad: the ability to "dress" well and quickly is all that is demanded, and the parade is over. "All for show," says the critic.

Sentences from Demosthenes and Xenophon are taken as models: according to these patterns the student must build,—mere plaster-casts for the young modelers. Few English works on Greek Prose go further. The boy does not attempt to fashion the rough English ashlers after Pentelic patterns. Those more aspiring treatises which would show how to turn Macaulay, Swift, Walt Whitman, or a daily newspaper into classic Greek, are usually "laid aside" as "too hard" for fledglings. "The language is dead": ergo, handle it as a mummy; no resurrection for it. The boy wanders through a valley of dry bones and grinning skeletons. It is not wonderful that this anatomical work becomes repulsive. To adjust the skeleton's vertebrae, joints, ligatures, etc., seems dismal work for one who would deal with living organisms of flesh and nerves, of blood and brain. "If translations can furnish us with Greek philosophy, history, poetry, and other forms of literature and thought, why study the language at all for the small results to be gained by the dissecting process?" Thus reasons the average student who has tugged for years with his weary task. But is there no better way?

The world has hardly ever seen such another stagnation of thought, and ignorance of letters, as preceded the revival of Greek study in Western Europe in the fifteenth century. It will not be denied that the chief instrument for arousing men from this lethargy was the revived Greek literature.

Dare we despise or ignore a language which was equal to the mighty task of bringing forth the human mind from the ignorance of the sixteenth century? Is mind in the nineteenth century so changed from that of the Reformation era that Greek literature is now only a dreary waste, an intolerable burden? The answer is, that the methods of the study are widely different. *Then it was the essence—the content—of the language* which chiefly engaged the student's labor: *now it is the forms—the framework—* which employ our time and study.

Have men lost interest in antiquarian research? By no means. Never before have such investigations been prosecuted with such energy as in this nineteenth century. A Schliemann's work is heralded in every daily paper. The finding of a time-blurred palimpsest with a few lines of Aristotle draws the world's eager attention. No, no, that old tongue to which we must go back as the intermediary for the communication of our religion; in which we find the models for our literature, laws, art, and science,—must remain a living force to us: but our method of dealing with it must be changed. General culture in Greek must concern itself more with the thought, the literature, of the Hellenes, and less with forms and syntax.

How is this to be effected? By dealing with Greek as a living tongue. "With Greek as a living tongue!" cries the syntax-monger. "Isn't Greek 'dead'? Didn't it cease to be a literary language in the early centuries of our era?" Good friend, Greek has never ceased to be both a vernacular and a literary language: no century since the Heroic Ages, in which some works have not been added to the thesaurus of its literature. However much, especially under Turkish barbarism, Greek may have been laden with foreign and alien words, its old Hellenic stock remained. The educated Greeks alone retained any direct connection with the old Greek world and its literature.

But the Turkish night has gradually lifted. A new day is breaking over the land of the Muses. The expulsion of the Turk has been followed by the expulsion of all barbaric and alien words from the literary tongue—the *Schriftsprache*; the expurgation has been complete. Only Greek words may enter the lists for the new literary Olympiads. Indeed, no other European tongue is so thoroughly cleansed from all foreign dross. Professor Komonoudes' new lexicon contains, it is said, above thirty thousand *new* words, and these, in large part, are coined from old Greek stems, to meet the demand for the manifold expression of the advanced thought of these nineteenth-century days. This literary tongue (*Schriftsprache*) being the dialect of the schools and of the press, must very soon clear from the vulgar tongue all Turkish, Albanian, Italian, and other hybrid stocks, and leave us substantially the Greek of the weight and fineness of the New Testament era,—though greatly enriched by the vocabularies of a modern language. In other words, we have old Greek keeping pace with modern thought, growing with its growth, and strengthening with its strength. Greek holds the unique position of a modern, as well as of an ancient, speech. Fortunately, most of the languages brought into contact with the Greek during its ages of eclipse were alien in stock and structure. Grammatically, they could not "mix" with Hellenic, and no Turkish inflections could defile a Romaic word.

Have we not, through this vernacular and literary tongue, the true course indicated for Greek in our schools? Treat it as a living language—the vernacular of six or eight millions of people—just as we deal with French, German, or any modern tongue. Begin the study with the authors of to-day, as we would begin with French. In this way an ample medium will be found for the expression of modern thought through a classic mould. Thousands of words for which no rendering into old Greek can be had,

are readily turned into the enlarged and expurgated language of to-day, and are clad, moreover, in a pure Hellenic garb.

Thus, having been inducted into the living speech of a nation growing from year to year in political importance, the student finds ample expression for all his thought: nor is he cramped, nor restricted to sentences modeled after Demosthenes or Xenophon. *Then*, working backward from the authors of to-day,—through the literature of the Renaissance, the Byzantine era, the Church era, the New Testament era, to the Periclean age, and, last of all, to Homer,—the language becomes vitalized, and the dry bones of syntax will be clothed upon with palpitating life.

Our wretched jumble of Greek-pronouncing systems—never heard of before Erasmus of Rotterdam—must, of course, be given up for that native system, the heritage from unbroken centuries. The artificial pronunciation concocted in Western Europe cannot stand before the vernacular of a nation; for Greek is assuming more and more of importance in the literary, as well as in the political, world. Many foreign students annually resort to Athens to the various schools of archæology, or to study the language at home. Recently we have seen the revival of the Olympic games, which will probably become periodical contests. It is not at all unlikely that another generation will see the center of Greek learning transferred from Germany to its native land. Students of Greek will naturally go to Hellas to prosecute their studies. Every such student will abandon the “Continental” pronunciation for the native. If not, he must be placed at great disadvantage. Cramped in compass and facility of expression, scarcely grasping the meaning of the simplest sentences addressed to him, he is practically helpless, and that, too, after years of constant study. He must watch the conversational current as it flows by, himself unable to thrust out into its

stream. He may not curse the day of his birth into Erasmian Greek; but he cannot but bewail the bitter fate which holds him bound in the grave-clothes of a "dead" speech, and he longs to come into accord with the living present. The *LIVING* or the "*DEAD*" pronunciation for the same words:—which must prevail "in the future"? The victory cannot be doubtful. Can an English pronunciation of Spanish supplant the Castilian? It is impossible but that the native speech must triumph over the foreign.

Perhaps no man south of Mason and Dixon's line has taught more students of Greek than the writer. But long ago, after a residence in Greece, he abandoned the "Continental," or Erasmian, for the native pronunciation. The results have been most satisfactory. No student who masters the native pronunciation will ever abandon it for any other.

The Greek literature of the present is assuming no inferior place in the world of letters. Her freed people are yet too near the centuries of Turkish tyranny to forget the desperate valor of the long struggle for liberty. The heroic age is still in the dim vista of personal memory. There are yet living those who can recall the horrors of Missolonghi and the slaughter on the plain of Athens, and in the trenches of Janina. They witnessed those days of death in Scio, and the exile from Parga. They were compatriots with Bozzaris and Canares—heroes equal to any of "the storied brave Greece nurtured in her glory's time." Homer's heroes were not richer in daring deeds than were many of the Pallicars and Klephts who, in their mountain fastnesses from Thessaly to Crete, defied for ages the proud Turk, while all Europe was trembling before him; when her combined strength could hardly roll back the Ottoman war-tide from the walls of Vienna, and the shores of Lepanto. Naturally the martial spirit breathes through all

the verse of that long night. Every ballad was an epic. Was Pindar's strain ever more inspired than was that of the martyr Rigas? Did Demosthenes himself hardly surpass the pathos and the patriotism of Spiridion Trikoupi? Why not initiate the boy into Greek through such writers as these? Is Greek, thus prosecuted, so "*very hard*" to be mastered?

Americans, Englishmen, Germans, and Frenchmen—resident in Greece, learn the language as readily as they could acquire any other modern tongue. By intercourse a man, perhaps mediocre in attainments, arrives at fluency in *speaking Greek*,—a proficiency which the average college professor does not reach by the old method, even after a life of study.

In this way the boy may learn Christian (or Patristic) Greek and the old Attic authors with more facility than he can read Chaucer or Tyndale. Surely every sign points to Romaic Greek in its present literary form as the proper introduction to the classic language. The literature of Greece is making great advances, and the field for native writers is peculiarly rich. The heroic age, born of the long struggle with the Turk, is generating the epic, dramatic, and lyric, while contact with Western Europe is developing the philosophic, the historic, and the scientific. Thus, the nation in its new birth—*Παλιγγενεσία*—stands on the borderland of both worlds of thought and of literature—a status *unique* among the nations. It is not wonderful that the nervous, impressionable nature of the Hellenic people rather inclines them to poetry, nor that the lyric, dramatic, and narrative verse should seem to constitute a somewhat disproportionate part of their literature. Another fact patent to our observation is, that so large a number of these bards come from the islands and from Anatolia. The skies of Ionia and the bright waters of the Ægean seem to have lost none of their old charm upon the

impassioned race which peoples their shores. Lesbos, home of Sappho, contributes to modern literature Vernardakis, prince of Hellenic tragedians, and Eftaliotis, the poet and novelist. Little rocky Syra furnishes Vikelas the novelist, and author of "Lukis Laras"—that soul-moving picture of Scio's last mortal struggle with the savage Turk. Zante, old Zakynthus, offers Solomos the lyricist, whose "Hymn to Freedom," it has been said, made the Greeks believe that Freedom and the Muses were about to return to their old haunts once more. Little Siphnos of the Cyclades adds to this literary constellation the name of Prowelegios, a young author whose "Messenger from Marathon," and translation of Goethe's "Faust," are reckoned among the gems of the present literature. Rocky Cephalonia furnishes the wit and comedian Anninos, editor of *Parnassus*. Ionia appears, as of old, in the forefront of the later literature, with its poet, Joannes Karasutsas.

Constantinople presents Alexander Sutsos, the satirist, whose keen-pointed arrows made miserable the life of King Otho. Sutsos atoned for his audacity by a term in prison, and he died at last, a wanderer and a beggar, in Smyrna, where Mela's "tuneful waters" had murmured the requiem of many a bard since Homer's time. Constantinople also gave to fame the blind poet Tantalides—the Milton of later Greece, who through thirty years of night still basked in the sunlight of his own creations. The city of the Bosphorus also gave to the world the most voluminous of all the later writers, the elder Rangabes, professor, poet, and litterateur; likewise, the distinguished Professor Paparrigopulos, the Lecky of modern Greece, whose "History of the Greek People" will be a standard for generations to come. The minister and journalist Dragumis is also a Byzantine.

From Sicily comes the patriot bard Zalokostas, a soldier of the revolution, whose songs are full of the spirit and fire

of the brave old days. As the friend and companion of Bozzaris, he was well prepared to sing of the Suliote hero. His "Bozzaris" may well rank with that well-known eulogy in verse,—“Bozzaris, with the storied brave,” etc.,—by Halleck.

Sad Missolonghi—the Wyoming of the later Hellas, with its memories of a slaughter more terrible than that perpetrated by Brandt and his less savage Hurons in the fair Pennsylvania valley—gives to us the lyricist Palamas, and the historian and statesman Trikoupi, whose pathetic funeral eulogy over the body of his friend, Lord Byron, equals any of the Panegyrics of the ancient world. Little Nauplia in Argolis discharges her debt to letters with the patriot singer, Achilles Paraschos, who illustrated in his career all the vicissitudes which may affect an author's life. Only a few months ago he was borne to his grave with all Athens following his bier as mourners: yet men can remember when the poet wandered, penniless and homeless, along those same streets of the capital city. In harmony with his hard fate, Paraschos' strains are generally pitched in a minor key. To him the elegy is more familiar than the pæan. Few lyrics in any language surpass Paraschos' "Elegy upon King Otho," the exiled and dying monarch, whose heart was left in Greece, when he was banished to a foreign shore.

Thebes, home of Pindar, the singer of "honey-tipped" lips, furnished to the new world the novelist, Karkavitsas, whose life sketches of the mountains and valleys of interior Greece have portrayed to us the life and customs of the people somewhat as Walter Scott has so graphically pictured the Highlands of Scotland.

Even "barbarous Macedon," the loathed of Demosthenes' Athenian soul, which "could not furnish *one good slave*" for the market, now is represented at the court of the Muses by Athanasios Christopulos, "the Anacreon of mod-

ern Greece,"—a physician, who, like our own Dr. Holmes, was more in favor with Apollo than with Æsculapius; a Greek who never lived in Greece, whose songs were better known along the Danube than by the Ilissus. To that enthusiastic Philhellene, Dr. Boltz of Darmstadt, we owe the rendition into elegant German of some of Christopulos' best poems. We ought not to omit from even this meager list of Greek writers who lived outside of Greece itself, the Brothers Vyzantios, the "reviewers," whose *Imera*, 'Ημέρα, issued from Trieste, seeks to review everything of importance pertaining to Greece, which may appear in the literary world.

But Athens herself is now, as of yore, the intellectual center of Greece. Most of the famous literati of this century have been residents of the "City of the Violet Crown," and many of these have her for their natal place. Among these "natives" we may mention Vlachos—grammarian, poet, translator, and lexicographer; the poet Drosinis, and Antoniadès the translator and dramatist.

Of course, we have noted here only a few of the authors of Greek *belles-lettres* and "lighter literature." No mention has been made of the writers of the "specialist" literature: only the "popular" field has passed under review. Indeed, the number of authors now is legion. The skies of Hellas beam again upon an intelligent people, many of whose writers are not unworthy to follow in the wake of the mighty past. These literati are hampered by the restrictions which fetter all authors who write for a small nation, and in a tongue little understood beyond its own borders. Their "public" is necessarily a limited one; their pecuniary rewards are correspondingly small; and their circle of influence and appreciation can hardly equal that of the popular writers of great nations who have the reading world for patrons. Indeed, many of the best writers of Greece are hardly known, even by name, west of the

Adriatic. Rangabe's "History of Modern Greek Literature" has contributed somewhat to the familiarizing of the West with the New Greece and her literary progress. Within the last few months there has also appeared an excellent work among the "Lehrbücher des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen" in Berlin. This work, edited by Professor Mitsotakis,—himself a native Greek,—contains a remarkably fine collection of excerpts, in prose and in verse, from the leading authors of the present century. Both the literary and the vulgar dialects are abundantly drawn upon in these extracts, and the compendium is the most complete which, so far as the writer is aware, has yet appeared.

But the facilities for learning the vernacular of Greece are daily multiplying. Clearly, as by a beacon, the way to ancient Greek is pointed out to us. The Philhellenes who would see this most perfect of languages preserved to the general curriculum of higher education, along with its unrivaled literature, should lose no time in *having the native pronunciation of the living language, along with the language itself, incorporated into our Greek curriculum.* Thus the perpetuity of Greek in the scheme of higher study for the general student, as well as for the specialist, will be insured, and the clamor for its lifeblood will be forever hushed.

ARTICLE VI.

IMPROVED HOMES FOR WAGE-EARNERS.

BY THE REV. JAMES GIBSON JOHNSON, D.D.

ONE of the most serious among the many problems of the city is that of the housing of the poor. It is a matter that cannot be left to take care of itself. The natural drift is of the poorer people to the poorer houses, the poorest people to the poorest houses, until we have the slums. No one can have an idea of the horror of the slums until he has either visited them, or studied the subject in the light of the proper information. The subject has so forced itself upon the attention of the intelligent politician, the guardians of the public health, the patriot and the philanthropist, that investigation has been thorough, and reports have been exhaustive and graphic. No one of us need be ignorant to-day of "how the other half lives." And yet, though the publications are many and detailed, they are not read, and many a citizen to-day fails to realize the condition and the need. But they are forcing themselves upon attention, both because of the persistent and increasing cry of the poor, and because of an intelligent regard for the sanitary and moral condition of the city. Poverty breeds crime. Men are not only where they are because of what they are—they remain what they are because of where they are. That "the destruction of the poor is their poverty," was the crystallized wisdom of men in the days of Solomon.

Methods of relief of every kind have been tried; and if we have learned anything from experience, it is that to give the poor man a little money to relieve his present

wants in no way serves to solve the problem. The aid we give him, to be effective, must be in getting him on his feet and in helping him to earn his daily bread. Unqualified almsgiving usually perpetuates the condition which it seeks to relieve.

This principle applies as surely to securing homes for the poor as in securing means to sustain life. Statements concerning the condition of the slums in our great cities, and one city is very like another, are so common that I hardly need quote from them. General Booth's "Darkest England," Jacob Riis' "How the Other Half Lives," are familiar and easily found descriptions of the slums, by which multitudes have been roused to greater energy for their amelioration. The City Council of Chicago as late as last December instructed the Board of Health to inquire into "the exceptionally large amount of sickness now prevailing in the nineteenth ward." That report, dated December 14th, was in part as follows:—

"There are between seven and eight miles of streets and alleys which have never been paved at all, or from which every foot of paving has been worn away or has been carried away for fuel, or on which the paving is so worn, uneven, and dilapidated that it can be cleaned neither with broom nor shovel.

"The natural level of the most densely populated area is five or six feet below city grade; much of this has not been filled up, and houses are found four or five feet below the street level, the floors often resting on the earth—damp, filth-sodden, dark, and unventilated.

"Every character of disease-producing condition is to be found in the habitations occupied by the so-called 'poorer classes,' who make up a large part of the population of the ward."

Quoting from "Hull House Maps and Papers" the report continues:—

"Rear tenements and alleys form the core of the districts, and it is there that the densest crowds of the most wretched and destitute congregate. Little idea can be given of the filthy and rotten tenements, the dingy courts, and tumble-down sheds, the foul stables and dilapidated outhouses, the broken sewer-pipes, the piles of garbage fairly alive with diseased odors, and of the numbers of children filling every nook."

"It is customary for the lower floor of the rear houses to be used as a stable and outhouse, while the upper rooms serve entire families as a place for eating, sleeping, being born, and dying. Where there are alleys, the refuse and manure are sometimes removed; where there are none, it would seem they accumulate undisturbed. In front of each house stand garbage receivers—wooden boxes, repulsive to every sense, even when as clean as their office will permit, shocking to both mind and instinct when rotten, overfilled, and broken, as they often are."

"People are noticeably undersized and unhealthy, as well to the average observer as to the trained eye of the physician. The mortality among children is great, and the many babies looked starved and wan."

"The Council order instructs and requires the Department of Health to take immediate steps for the repression and removal of such disease and death-producing conditions as it has located and ascertained to exist in the 19th ward.

"It must be obvious from the facts set forth in this report that the department is unable to comply with this instruction and requirement. With its present powers and resources it cannot compel the paving of streets and alleys, nor the filling up of low, undrained, disease-producing areas, but it should have the power to do so through the City Council, whenever it has demonstrated, as in the present instance, that a sanitary necessity exists affecting the public health.

"Although buildings, declared by the Commissioner of Health to be unfit for human habitation, may be ordered vacated, in practice it has been found next to impossible to secure such vacation without inflicting grievous hardship on the unfortunate poverty-stricken occupants. In only three out of many attempts has the department succeeded in vacating such unfit habitations and securing their destruction, and there are hundreds of unfit buildings in the 19th ward alone which should be condemned and destroyed if there were any better shelters within the means of the present tenants.

"Chicago is in urgent need of modern tenement-houses such as other municipalities have found it to their advantage to establish. They have proved to be the best agencies for reducing death-rates, as well as for checking the growth of discontent. There is property in the 19th ward that the owners could put to no better or more useful purpose.

"It would be a sanitary measure of the greatest value and of far-reaching influence if the city should exercise the right of expropriation for this purpose, so that public-spirited citizens might form Improved Dwellings Associations similar to those in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and elsewhere, for the establishment of better and cheaper homes for wage-earners. These enterprises pay, not only financially, but in the elevation of the character of the tenants, the improvements in their habits and modes of life, their greater working efficiency resulting from better health and less sickness, and in their higher value as citizens."

There are persons who believe and declare that their own city has not reached the crowded condition which, in London and in New York, has compelled these measures. No two cities are exactly alike. It is true that the shape of New York on its long and narrow island, lying between the East and North rivers, forces an unavoidable conges-

tion. No city in the world has such density of population as New York in its crowded wards. Chicago is not as crowded as New York. It does not need to be half as crowded to be in a condition of frightful distress. Such condition of distress does prevail in parts of Chicago. Examination has been sufficient, and reports are full enough, to make perfectly plain the fact that a decent regard to the health and the morals of the city requires the utter destruction of some of the places in which families now live, and the erection of houses for decent, healthful, and orderly living.

There are basement and cellar tenements which should not be permitted to exist, where healthy and decent living is impossible. Laws should be enforced, as in Berlin and elsewhere, forbidding cellars to be occupied as places of abode. Such laws now stand on the statute-book, but are a dead letter. Unless they are closed by officers of the law they will remain, for the occupant cannot choose his locality, and the owner secures a very large profit, estimated from twenty to fifty per cent, and sometimes much greater. It is for his interest to leave these wretched buildings until they rot, and in the awful downward drift there is always some one who must occupy them. It is idle to say that as Chicago is limited on only one side, there is room for limitless expansion on the other three, and there should be no congested districts. But distance may be as impregnable a barrier as the Lake. It is unquestionably true that every family that can be enticed or persuaded or compelled to go to the suburbs should be taken there, and there provided for. Any scheme for the better housing of wage-earners that does not consider provision for suburban homes is vitally defective. But it must be borne in mind that multitudes cannot go to the suburbs. It would be utterly impossible without lower fares. But when the lowest obtainable fare is reached, time of transit cannot be annihilated.

The laborer cannot spend two hours or more a day in getting to and from his work. There are multitudes who cannot live far distant from their place of labor. And there are many more who will not. They have as much right to choose as their rich neighbor, and they choose the city as their rich neighbor does. They both prefer to remain near their club or their lodge, their church, the places of entertainment, their friends, in the crowd. The city itself with its throng and noise has charms for many people, charms which appeal to the very poor as strongly as to any other class. That the cities are so thronged with an increasing multitude is evidence enough of that fact. Undoubtedly effort should be made to lessen this crowd and to turn this current. Also effort should be made to provide for such as cannot be turned from their purpose, or saved from the necessity of living in the very midst of the crowded city. Here they are, and here, from all evidence we now have, they will remain. Our problem is to see them properly housed.

It is necessary that these enterprises to provide houses for wage-earners should pay a fair interest on the investment, for them to be extensive enough to meet the need. If our cities are to depend alone upon benevolence for the abolition of the slums, the outlook is not hopeful. We cannot be sure of the expenditure of the large sums needed, and there is question as to the effect upon the people of receiving benefits for which they do not pay.

But improved tenement-houses can be built and maintained at a profit. Experiments have been tried in many cities in Europe and America in building houses for the working-people, until it is now entirely established that such houses can be put in place of these wretched abodes of the poor, at a profit to the owners of five or six per cent. The Commissioner of Labor of the United States Government has issued a special report on "The Housing of the

Working-People" in which, in a volume of five hundred pages, the observation of a competent inspector in France, Germany, Belgium, England, and the United States, is given. Ample maps and tables make the whole subject very clear. In July of last year a corporation was formed in New York called "The City and Suburban Homes Company," with a capital of one million dollars. Its object, as it declares, is "to offer to capital a safe and permanent investment at five per cent, and at the same time to supply to wage-earners improved, wholesome homes at current rates. It will provide the best accommodations from the point of hygiene and comfort, attractive to occupants and encouraging a transformation in the existing life of tenement dwellers. The intention is to largely increase comforts and sanitary appliances." The matter has passed beyond the range of experiment. For more than thirty-five years in Great Britain, and for twenty years in America, such improved tenements have been in operation. Mr. E. L. R. Gould visited, under appointment of the United States Commissioner of Labor, forty-nine enterprises of this nature in European and American cities, and found that forty-three of them were paying dividends on the capital invested at ordinary commercial rates, and three were paying savings-bank rates. Reasons were apparent why the other three failed to pay. Does this not compare favorably with other investments?

It is hardly necessary to state in any detail what has been the success in actually alleviating the wretchedness of this class of persons, who cannot choose their locality, but who must have it determined for them by their places of work and by the cost.

Mr. Peabody, the American banker in London, gave two and a half millions of dollars for the better housing of the poor in his adopted city. Model tenements were at once erected. In 1893 there were five thousand and seventy.

tenements created by this fund, housing about twenty thousand persons. The average rent for these tenements of one, two, three, or four rooms was \$1.16 per week. There have always been applicants for them, in some cases many more than could be received. There has been but very small per cent of loss by non-payment of rent. Many improvements have been made in such structures since these were built, and these have been changed and repaired, but a very noticeable lessening of the death-rate has resulted, and there has never been an epidemic among the tenants. The fund has paid from $3\frac{1}{4}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent net earnings from the beginning, and this has gone to increase the fund, which is now over six millions of dollars. In this and similar enterprises in English cities, there is now remuneratively invested fully sixty millions of dollars. In London alone one hundred and sixty thousand persons are enjoying homes in such improved tenements, while many more have been led to live in cottages and cottage tenements in the suburbs. No one can estimate the benefits that accrue from this work—the lessening of sickness and suffering, the lessening of temptation and crime, the increase of human happiness, and therefore the incalculable benefit of the city.

Similar enterprises have been carried forward in New York and Brooklyn, with like results.

The leaders in "The City and Suburban Homes Company" are among the wealthiest and most public-spirited citizens of New York. The Company will profit by every improvement that experience teaches in the housing of wage-earners. Large areas of land are to be bought near the city, on which cottages are to be built, which may be at last owned by occupants on payments which now go for rent alone.

The first million dollars is now subscribed, and there are already over four hundred applicants for these suburban

homes. Also a block of land has been bought in the city, on which a building is to be erected, which will hold six hundred and fifty families. Every room is to have outside light and air; every apartment will have isolation in its culinary and sanitary arrangements, while opportunity will be afforded for the benefit of coöperative methods. The Company is confident that it can pay five per cent to shareholders, and carry one per cent to a fund for repairs and improvements, or to the increase of capital.

The promoters of this investment are rejoicing over the subscription of the first million dollars as a glorious day in the history of New York. They believe that the capital will rapidly increase from those who are looking for a safe investment, as well as from those who wish to use their money for the welfare of their city, and they believe that it is the beginning of the end of the slums.

There is nothing in the conditions that limit the possibility of such a movement to New York. Any city with over one hundred thousand inhabitants may profitably do the same thing. Chicago may improve on it. A similar corporation can find cheaper and more accessible land near the city on which cottages may be built, which may become the possession of the occupant on payment of cost and interest. Such payment may be made in installments running through ten or even twenty years. Such arrangement is made perfectly safe for the Company by having the tenant insure his life. The policy is held by the Company, and the premium is paid by it out of the monthly installment. At the end of the period the home with the life insurance is the possession of the tenant. With all this the monthly payment may be less than many such working-man is now paying for his wretched abode, where his children die, and his own life is a burden.

And for those who still remain in the city provision can be made in the new tenement-house, that benefits by all

the teachings of experience. Space may be found that now is a curse to its occupants and to the city, on which may be solidly built a structure which, if not fire-proof, may be on the plan of "slow combustion," as it is called. This may be four stories high, affording apartments, of one, two, three, or four rooms each, where tenants may live for less rent, or surely for no more rent, than they are now paying, with more space, and with vastly more comfort, safety, and healthfulness. If demand exist, there may be stores in the first story. Stairs should be of stone or iron laid in solid brick walls, thus making hall-ways fire-proof and easily cleaned.

Experience of twenty-five years has led to a knowledge of details in such houses both in the direction of economy and of fitness. They can be made very attractive in their architecture. There shall be no basement apartments, but in the ample and light cellar may be store-rooms and laundry conveniences to be enjoyed in turn by occupants. In the block may also be all the benefit of such coöperative industries as experience has shown to be feasible—where prepared food may be bought at cost prices, as bread, soups, oatmeal, cooked meats hot or cold, to be eaten there, or taken to the apartments. Then the opportunity exists for every philanthropic impulse of the owner to find expression. Public rooms for reading, free kindergarten, baths, for entertainments or religious services, can be made a part of the plan.

The interior of the block may also be a benefit and a joy, instead of a horror and a danger, as now. It may be laid out and cared for as a garden and a playground for children—a place of healthful enjoyment for the tenants.

Now this is not charity, it is business. It may all be done as a safe investment of capital. Shares of the stock, as in New York, may be as low as ten dollars, that the ten-

ants themselves may become stockholders, and therefore interested in the success of the enterprise.

It is sometimes said, in way of objections to such schemes as these, that it is the people that make the slums; that, put them in a palace, they would bring it down to their level; and that, to abolish the slums, you must first change the people. Whatever truth is in such statement does not destroy the fact that thousands of worthy persons are carried downward by the terrible gravitation of poverty, and that in the unclean and indecent conditions and vile associations into which they are forced, they at last suffer in character. Poverty breeds crime and disease not alone because of the absence of the things which money can buy, but because of the presence of much that is now unavoidably associated with poverty, but which can be separated from it. If it be possible for us to remove from necessary poverty that which makes it destructive of either life or character, we are morally guilty for failing to do so, and for our guilty failure we shall surely be punished. Men, women, and especially children often are *what* they are because of *where* they are. We can enforce upon the unwilling a certain degree of cleanliness and regularity of life, and we can give aid and inducement to many virtues. While we are thus laboring for the welfare of individuals, we are surely laboring for the improvement of the city.

I listened not long since to a clear and admirable paper, by an eminent architect, on the beautifying of Chicago. It was an ingenious and elaborate plan for the improvement of the entire lake front from the river to Jackson Park. A wide strip of land was to be made out in the lake, like that along the shore of Lincoln Park, but much wider, ornamented with trees, and shrubbery, and flowering plants yielding both beauty and fragrance. Lots should be sold in certain places for dwelling-houses which should be built on plans approved by the Park Commissioners. They

would add to the beauty, while the price paid for them would cover the entire cost of the improvement. This was all with view to adding to the beauty and attractiveness of the city. But the beauty thus created, and it would be great, would end at the shore of the Lake. Going a few blocks inland all the loveliness of the Lake would be forgotten in the unsightliness and wretchedness of the slums. The slums have no right to exist. No city has the right to permit them to remain. Business energy, illumined by a love for our city, and for our fellow-men, will banish them, and will eliminate from the regions of poverty every element of degradation, and the last vestiges of ugliness.

ARTICLE VII.

THE IDEA OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD:
ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-
SPEAKING PEOPLES IN THE PRESENT CENTURY.

BY EDWARD MORTIMER CHAPMAN.

OPPORTUNISM has always been the rule of most lives, and the policy of most would-be leaders of men. We naturally are time-servers, taking short views of that which has been and that which will be, and striving to adapt ourselves as comfortably as possible to our immediate surroundings without overmuch thought as to the source or issue of them. Our efforts, our policies, and even our philosophies are scrappy. We have little time and less patience with the laying of deep foundations and the toilsome search after great principles.

In saying this, I am not bringing a railing accusation against the times. I am simply stating what is natural to us, as short-lived men of little faith, who are very conscious that the night cometh when no man can work. We are ever looking to see if we cannot cut our college courses down from four to three years; we insist upon a common-school education that shall be "practical," that is to say, that shall aim as directly as possible at the getting of a dollar. We do this quite conscientiously often, and it is with a similar conscientiousness, that our historians devote a lifetime to delving among records, our scientists to the minutest specialization of research, our grammarians to a single case of the Greek article. But the result of it all is a

sort of mental and spiritual shortsightedness or strabismus. We lose our taste and desire for the large and comprehensive view, or, when we attempt it, our squinting vision distorts it woefully.

I should like to speak of the danger that threatens us in the sphere of statecraft from the influence of little, prejudiced, ignorant, and sometimes debauched men who are ever putting politics in the place of statesmanship. But in this connection I can allude only to the almost boastful contempt in which the average politician holds the teaching and authority of history, and pass hurriedly on to mention the singular vogue of a certain class of historico-philosophical writing to-day. It is lugubrious, not to say pessimistic, in tone. It is sometimes quite sensational in its suggestions, if not in its definite conclusions; and its depressing influences reach a circle far wider than that of the mere readers of the volumes themselves.

The three instances that first present themselves are Nordau's "Degeneration," Pearson's "National Life and Character," and Brooks Adams' "Law of Civilization and Decay." It seems sometimes as though it were only necessary for a man to proclaim himself a pelican of the wilderness, or a watching sparrow on the housetop, to win a following of eager disciples who vie with each other in their presages of impending doom. It must be said, upon the other hand, that the world is full of an opposition chorus of chatterers who are just as shortsighted, just as strabismic, just as vociferous, but infinitely more cheerful, inasmuch as they are ever hymning the praises of the best of all possible worlds, which needs only to be let alone to develop into heaven. The man of poise and balance listening to these contending voices may well cry to each, with King Lear,

"O, that way madness lies; let me shun that";

though at the same time, if he be convinced that madness

is his doom, his choice of the more cheerful company can easily be understood.

It is because I believe that faith in certain great and eternal verities is the most efficient conservator of sanity among men, and ministers more directly than anything else to the clearness of their vision and the justness of their ultimate conclusions; and further, it is because the large, calm, austere yet sympathetic, view of the struggle of three consecutive generations after better conditions of life, seems to give a measure of encouragement and assurance to such faith, that I venture to propose this rather pretentious theme. I cannot help but think that even to-day a man whose work must necessarily be among the brick and mortar, may be a little cheered if, in a moment's respite, his upward glance suggest to him that there is an Architect, and that some day after he is dust there will be a building—just what he does not know, but still a building, wrought out according to a greater plan than his mind can compass.

At this point it becomes necessary to define the theme a little more exactly and to say just what is meant by the Idea of the Kingdom of God. Of course the word "idea" is used in its Platonic rather than its Cartesian sense, and designates that type or pattern which, though immaterial, has often one of the realest of existences. Here it is considered as a partial and incomplete thing, present before men's eyes and making appeal to their consciences, but undeveloped as yet. It is not regarded as synonymous with the Christian church, however much correspondence might be shown between the two. But wherever a man has caught something of St. Paul's meaning when he wrote to the Romans that the Kingdom of God was not meat and drink, but righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost, and has attempted to work the meaning out in life, there the idea of the Kingdom of God is being realized. Wherever

one man has recognized the cogency of those three great possible blessings, *δικαιοσύνη*, righteousness or just dealing, *εἰρήνη*, the state of peace with one another which should characterize Christians, and *χαρά*, not the mere crackling of the fool's laughter, but the joy and blessedness that come of the indwelling of the Spirit of God, there the Idea of the Kingdom of God has exerted an influence upon history.

And, furthermore, the theme is to be limited to the English-speaking peoples, because they have been so preëminently the peoples that during the past century have put their stamp upon the world's activities; and especially, because they represent the race with which, during this period, ethical considerations have had the largest place and exerted the widest influence. Materialistic, shallow, boastful, and self-complacent though the tone of public feeling in England and America is, still England and America are the two great nations most quickly, or, if you please, least slowly, responsive to ethical appeals, and to considerations of human need. The theme is further limited approximately to this century, because this century furnishes us abundant material for suggestion and inference, if scarcely enough for the construction of elaborate argument.

There are, of course, certain most vital questions that need the far longer view. For instance, when we hear men bewailing the tyranny of the commercial spirit that would make gain of their fellows at whatever cost of suffering, and the apparent impotence of the Christ spirit of humanity and service to make head against it, it were well to recall to them the centuries of struggle which Christianity maintained against the old, inhuman, but almost universal, practice of plundering the shipwrecked. Before the Christian era all shipwrecked men were likely to be treated as outlaws, and it was only by the slowest degrees that Christian teaching began to tell upon the almost ineradicable

desire for plunder. As late as the eleventh century the Duke of Brabant asserted his right to despoil all who were cast upon his coasts. In 1231, St. Louis of France tried to compound for this right by a money payment, while a little earlier Richard II. of England had, "for the love of God and the salvation of his soul, demanded safety and protection for all shipwrecked persons and their goods in whatever land or sea." The very severity of some of these ordinances suggests the deep-seated character of the barbarities against which they were directed, and the seeming hopelessness of ever banishing them.

And yet, to-day, the vast lake and seacoast of the United States is fortified against calamity by a service that in the four and twenty years prior to July, 1895, had succeeded in saving to its owners one hundred and two million out of one hundred and thirty-three million dollars of property threatened with disaster, and out of more than sixty-seven thousand lives involved had prevented the loss of all but seven hundred and fifty. Thus in a single instance has the Idea of the Kingdom of God touched a state and moulded its activities to the ends of beneficence.

Or, to take a very different instance. When men despair of ever bringing any restraining influence to bear upon those appetites and passions whose indulgence causes so much of the suffering of our modern life, it were well to remind them of the even graver problem that Plato faced. Plato speaks in his "Laws" as though he quite despaired of ever finding any inducement that would lead the men of his day to abandon practices that were eating out the very foundations of virility. He has indeed a faint hope that piety, and the desire for honor, and the love of moral beauty, may do something, sometime, toward the abatement of these evils, if only a way can be devised by which they can be brought to bear, but he admits that it is a romantic aspiration. So far, we

might suppose that Plato found himself just about where we find ourselves in the struggle with widespread immorality, but the moment that we look a little closer we discover that he was speaking of a whole class of outrageous and unnatural vices that are scarcely named to-day, and in comparison with which even the illicit relations between the sexes seem almost venial.

As we turn to the more restricted portion of our theme, it is with the wish that space permitted some picture of the social and industrial condition of the English-speaking world a century ago. But there is room for only two suggestions with reference to it,—one bearing upon taxation, and the other upon crime and the administration of justice. The first seems like a caricature, but it reflects a sad truth. "The school-boy," wrote Sydney Smith, early in the century, "whips his taxed top; the beardless youth manages his taxed horse with a taxed bridle on a taxed road; and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine which has paid seven per cent into a spoon which has paid fifteen per cent, flings himself back upon his chintz bed, which has paid twenty-two per cent, and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a license of one hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then taxed from two to ten per cent. Large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel; his virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble; and he is then gathered to his fathers—to be taxed no more."

England then, as now, stood in the van of civilization, but even in England the law recognized two hundred and twenty-three capital offenses, one hundred and fifty-six of which dated no further back than the accession of the Georges. To quote a rather popular authority, who is, however, sufficiently reliable here, "If a man injured Westminster Bridge, he was hanged. If he appeared disguised

upon a public road he was hanged. If he cut down young trees; if he shot at rabbits; if he stole property valued at five shillings; if he stole anything at all from a bleach-field; if he wrote a threatening letter to extort money; if he returned prematurely from transportation,—for any of these offenses he was immediately hanged.” It would be a truer statement of the case to say that the law required him to be hanged, and that the officers of justice were ready enough to hang him, but that juries sometimes asserted themselves with true Anglo-Saxon hard-headedness and obstinacy. Sir Samuel Romilly, whose noble efforts finally resulted in a mitigation of the code, tells of one case in which a woman confessed to the theft of five pounds from a house. Although it was money, nothing could persuade the jury that it was more than thirty-nine shillings; an amount sufficiently low to warrant a mitigation of punishment. The whole policy of government appeared to be that criminals and persons of criminal tendency must be put to death or got rid of by transportation.

If we cross the Atlantic in the expectation of finding a better state of affairs, we discover a comparatively new community whose statute-books were of course free from such disfigurement as we have just witnessed, but whose administration of justice was still sufficiently illogical and wrongheaded. The laws with reference to debtors made it possible for “one indiscreet compact to doom a wretch to a lifelong confinement” (Bancroft), and, as late as 1829, it was estimated that no less than three thousand persons were confined for debt in the prisons of Massachusetts alone, while the numbers given on good authority for the other States are so incredibly large that one is reluctant to quote them without opportunity for more searching scrutiny.

There was a practical admission, too, on both sides of the Atlantic, that there were classes in society who, as

classes, might be properly exploited for the advantage of other classes. Of course, France under the old *régime* worked out this theory to conclusions that seem almost inconceivably bitter to-day. But in both England and America there was little enough respect for the manhood and womanhood of the less fortunate strata in society. There was almost no feeling of public responsibility for those who were unable to care for themselves. Slavery was regarded in England as one of the foundation-stones of colonial prosperity, and in America as a great vested right of the South. It was not until 1807 that the slave-trade was abolished, and even then the abolition of slavery itself seemed almost hopelessly distant. But with the self-denying labors of John Howard in the latter half of last century, there promised to be an awakening of a public conscience with reference to the treatment of the dependent and the criminal classes. Howard himself was summoned to the bar of the House of Commons, and formally thanked for his examination of the state of the British prisons and the information which he had afforded the public. The Quakers on both sides of the sea had long been protesting nobly against the iniquities of slavery; and as Howard laid down his life and his work together, Wilberforce, Clarkson, and Granville Sharpe were beginning to push, in and out of Parliament, the agitation which issued in the abolition of the slave-trade; while to their success in this endeavor succeeded the patient agitation of Sir Samuel Romilly for the amelioration of the criminal code—a task at which he was still toiling when he died.

These facts are so well known that it may seem scarce worth while to mention them. But it is done because they were more than mere isolated and factitious outbursts of humanitarian sentiment. They are significant of a new social spirit animating the body politic. The world was coming to realize that in the social and industrial realms

humanity's solidarity must be recognized. A new idea of the Kingdom of God was making its way into some very hard heads. An irresistible feeling that men had a right to their religious convictions issued in the emancipation of the Catholics from their political disabilities, and paved the way for the emancipation of the Jews. Men began to see that the time had come when a wider extension of the privilege and responsibility of suffrage was imperatively demanded. It is true that the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 was partially due to selfish ambition and fear, but still the thing that made it a necessity was the growing sense that men had a right to say how they should be governed, and who should make their laws; and that, because they were men, and not because they were rich or educated men. So, rationally enough, there followed close on this reform a larger sense of responsibility for the dependent, and for those who, though partially able to care for themselves, were yet so situated as to be at almost hopeless disadvantage in the disposal of their scanty abilities and powers.

In illustration, it is sufficient to cite the changed conditions that began to surround the treatment of the insane. The old theory seems to have been that if the body of the insane person were not indeed the home of a demon, it might as well be treated as though it were, and made as undesirable a tenement as possible. Thus harshness, not to say brutality, became almost the rule. Even King George III., though his insanity was of a mild and inoffensive type, is said to have been put in the strait-waistcoat, and to have been struck by at least one attendant. If any of you have an appetite for horrors, I would suggest the reading of Sydney Smith's essay on the treatment of the insane, which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* soon after the Parliamentary inquiry of 1815. It may be thought that things were better in America; but it is well to remember that at

the beginning of the century there was "no reformatory; no asylum for the blind; for the deaf and dumb, or for the insane," upon our side of the ocean (McMaster); and the superintendent of one of the Massachusetts State hospitals has recently told me that, as a boy, he could remember homes in New Hampshire provided with a cage where an insane member of the family was kept. It was not until 1839, indeed, that John Conolly—a name ever to be held in honor—became resident physician to the asylum at Hanwell, and did away forever with the old *régime* of physical restraint and abuse.

It is interesting to note how, in all this advance, very imperfect and faulty ideals of 'righteousness, peace, and joy' were yet effective in bringing great influence for good to bear. When the Reform Bill passed, Lord Ashley was a young man just entering Parliament; a Tory too, who conscientiously believed that Reform meant revolution and the undermining of the foundations of society. But wrong as we think him; fancying, as he seemed to do, that the Kingdom of God could only be wrought out upon earth either under the administration of the established church as it then existed, or else by a second coming of the Lord to make all things new by force of his visible presence, he did not hesitate to cast all the influence of his personality and his position into the struggle for humane legislation in behalf of the outcast, neglected, and overwrought classes. Scarce any one man of this century has succeeded in embodying more of the beneficent spirit that must animate the builder of the Kingdom of God than Anthony Ashley Cooper, seventh earl of Shaftesbury. There was something that was narrow, something that was suggestive of unloveliness, about his life; and yet the Kingdom of God came the nearer because he lived, and the Idea of the Kingdom made itself felt as a power in the century's history because he yielded

himself to its sway. Contrast for a moment the England he found with the England which he left some twelve years since.

In 1833, to quote a sentence or two from his biographer, "The amusements of the people were a fair index of their general condition. There was universal rioting and carousal at Easter and Whitsuntide. Fairs and wakes were the popular resorts; drunkenness was the prevailing vice; unchastity was fearfully prevalent; and low-class dancing-saloons and still lower-class theaters were largely frequented.

"The opportunities for improving their mental and moral condition were very limited. The factory system . . . was cruel in its oppression. Mines and collieries were worked in great measure by women and children. Bakers, sailors, and chimney-sweeps were left unprotected by legislation. Friendly societies, many of them rotten to the core, were the only legalized methods of self-help. Sanitary science was practically unknown. Education was not a right. Ragged schools, reformatory and industrial schools, mechanics' institutes, and workmen's clubs had not begun to exist. Taxation was oppressive and unjust. Limited liability, enabling working-men to contribute their small capital to the increase of the productive power of the country, was not so much as thought of. The poor laws were pauperizing and degrading. . . . The Compensation for Accidents Act did not exist. The cheap literature of the day reflected the violent passions which raged on every side."¹

To relate what the ideal of a more perfect social life ordered in accordance with Christ's law of love, wrought through the instrumentality of this one man, would be to tell the story of the social reforms of nearly three-quarters of a century. There is not space to recount how he pro-

¹ Hodder's *Shaftesbury*, i. 132.

moted what has been called the Magna Charta of the liberties of the insane; how he freed the chimney-sweeps from their practical slavery; how he rescued the little children from their overwork in the mills; how he stopped, in great degree, the awful underground labor of women and of children under thirteen who had done so much of the work in English mines; nor how he succeeded, through a life of utmost devotion and strenuous toil, in giving efficiency to the benevolent instincts of a multitude of people who dimly saw a better way, but who failed to walk in it, for lack of leadership.

It would be wrong to leave this portion of our theme without passing reference to two other great advances of the century along lines suggested by an ideal of the Kingdom. Most men would smile if any one attempted to bring the Repeal of the Corn Laws under this category; for, if there be one thing above another that has ministered to the material advance of England, it has been her conviction that she had no right to hamper trade. We fancy that this has been a mere commercial conviction. But we forget the story of the repeal. Cobden's ideal has been thought to be that of a great commercial community merely. But the thing that made Cobden one of the prophets of the century was his outspoken conviction that the corn-laws, exploiting as they did one class, and that a humble class, for the benefit of another, were unsocial, and so in the large sense unchristian and immoral. And it was this conviction which underlay the political necessity that, in face of the distress of 1845, converted Sir Robert Peel, and brought Tories like Lord Shaftesbury to his support, even at cost of great political sacrifice.

The other reform, which is mentioned here the more briefly because it is so well known to all, was, of course, the long agitation for the abolition of American slavery. It is entirely true that there is much in the story of it to

convict the Christian church of sin. It was but slowly that she opened her eyes to her great responsibility and opportunity. But none the less it was an Idea of the Kingdom of God, sometimes very imperfectly conceived and yet more imperfectly expressed, that sustained the unconquerable spirit of the abolitionists. And it ought always to be added that the Idea of the Kingdom arose primarily from the teaching of the church herself. The word of her Lord that she had uttered carried with it implications which, though clearly enough discerned by many of those to whom she spoke, she herself was somewhat slow to recognize, and to which she was quite too slow to conform her practice.

Having thus said something of the Idea of the Kingdom as a power working for the reformation of the social and industrial life of the Anglo-Saxon world during this century, brief mention must be made of the same beneficent agency as it has influenced Politics and Statecraft on the one hand, and as it has modified certain of our Intellectual and Ethical conceptions upon the other. But it will be impossible to do more than indicate the lines along which such a discussion might profitably be carried on.

It requires but the most superficial acquaintance with the political history of the last one hundred and fifty years to discern manifestations of a larger spirit at work among statesmen and a deeper sense of responsibility to the commonwealth. We think that we live in an age of corrupt politics. So we do. But when, in the middle of last century, William Pitt, afterward Lord Chatham, became Paymaster-General, it was thought a marvelous thing that he should refuse to put into his own pocket the interest accruing from the vast sums that lay in the bank subject to his official draft. Henry Fox and Rigby took these gigantic perquisites as a matter of course, laying thereby the foundations of great fortunes, and the world seemed to think but little the worse of them for it. So when a subsidy to a for-

eign power was voted during Pitt's administration as Secretary of State, and he refused to receive the customary commission on the transaction, the bewildered prince who was subsidized scarce knew what steps to take in face of such unheard-of disinterestedness. To-day a Minister in England or a Cabinet officer in America who should be detected in lining his own pocket as it was expected he would line it then, would be discredited forever. All this is said without forgetting the present lamentable state of public and especially of civic ideals. But the very fact that their low estate concerns us, and is thought fit subject for agitation, is a sign that the Idea of Service instead of Profit is slowly moulding the public conception of office. "To the victors belong the spoils" is, as a maxim, discredited even in its birthplace to-day, and to have discredited a maxim is to have done much. So it was very well observed the other day by Mr. Godkin, that the gigantic armaments of the modern nations are supported nominally in the interests of peace, or at most in those of self-defense, and that none dares avouch a scheme of conquest.

There has been, too, through the century a constant growth in the sentiment of responsibility for dependent races. It can be truthfully said that at last we are honestly desirous, as a nation, of doing our best for the Indian and the Negro, though it is by no means easy to discover what that best is. And he is a very prejudiced student indeed who shuts his eyes to the mighty advance which India and Egypt have made under British rule along those lines that promise security and decency of life. No Anglo-Saxon people is ever entirely disinterested in its treatment of those who are its subjects. But the day is past when public opinion will permit a subject people to be exploited for the master's gain, as though they owed duties, but had no rights.

We find ourselves at present in the midst of a struggle

for larger comity between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race. What does it mean? I am little enough disposed to go into raptures over the dim prospect of perpetual peace; but, underneath this present agitation for whose consummation every Christian must devoutly pray, there is a subtle though mighty force at work, convincing men that the old notion that what one nation gained, must always be gained at the expense of another, is anarchistic and utterly opposed to the larger interests of society. We are coming, too, under the persistent pressure of the Idea of the Kingdom of God, to recast our notions of patriotism, and to make it a holier thing; to see that even the *nation* is not to be the ultimate object of the Christian citizen's service, although it may be and may remain the more immediate object. Patriotism, from the beginning, has always been animated in its attitude toward the world at large by something of that cruelty of fear which, in those moments when it gains the upper hand, always mocks at the moral sense. The moral sense, held in abeyance to selfishness too long, is coming to assert itself unmistakably in national affairs, and it is in the light of this fact that our present effort after international arbitration assumes its deepest significance; and however shrilly the mere Jingo may vociferate the message of his father, the Devil, he must learn at last that in the awakened moral sense of Christendom he will eventually find a master.

It might easily be shown that it is an ethical consideration which underlies much that is most powerful, and all that will prove permanent in modern socialism. The world at large only dimly perceives how our intellectual and ethical notions are being subtly but deeply wrought upon by the Idea of the Kingdom of righteousness, peace, and joy. It is telling upon our ideals of manhood. Renan thought a Christian society would necessarily be "*so weak*" —*si faible*. But the world resents any such notion of

Christianity as that to-day, and has lifted up higher than ever St. Paul's exhortation, "Quit you like men; be strong!" There is arising a new sense of the responsibilities of wealth and the obligation to acquire an economic understanding of its expenditure. And last of all, within the passing decade, even the so-called scientific spirit has come to recognize, at least in some slight measure, that humility and charitableness are necessary conditions of the truest knowledge. Surely "this great drama of Providence which we call History" is worth our reverent study as we face the immediate and troublesome problems of to-day.

In what has gone before no attempt has been made to picture the marvelous material progress of the last hundred years. Whether the riches we have gathered and the energy we have developed prove a blessing or a curse to later generations must depend upon the Idea to which these things are subject. I believe that the idea of the Kingdom of God—that is, the Idea of a Society whose life shall be spiritually and ethically as well as materially complete—has, even when very meagerly and imperfectly grasped, proved itself a power of vast significance in the world's progress, and I have striven to indicate roughly the place of this Idea in the life of the century now drawing to a close. It has expressed itself under such common forms sometimes that in looking back we miss it altogether. We think we see it in the turmoil of some great religious revival. But its real coming is just as often without observation. When such a very material thing as the first big Plimsoll mark was painted on the hull of a steamship, it was a sign, to those who could read, that the Idea of the Kingdom was at work upon the lot of those who go down to the sea in ships; and that one great commercial nation had put itself on record as decreeing that men's lives should not be bought for gold.

Nothing is more deplorable than the shallow optimism that pictures this world as sailing over summer seas to blessed isles, if only men would believe it to be so. Our true progress does not come in that way. It is rather a steadfast and courageous beating up against tempestuous winds and rugged seas, now to this side and now to that of the straight line we fain would follow; sometimes losing on this tack, sometimes only holding our own upon the other, but gaining on the whole; not able to see it always, except as day after day observation of our relation to the steadfast things above shows it to us. Thus it is that the story of men's toilsome advance, as all unwillingly and timidly and partially they have consented to become dwelling-places of the Holy Ghost,—that story that some count dull and others call profane,—is really the most ineffably sacred of records. One does not need to have commission to bring things new and old out of the treasure-house where this record is kept, and present them to his fellows. It is sufficient to remind them that the treasure-house is there, and that the door will open to him who knocks with reverent hand.

ARTICLE VIII.

EVOLUTION THEORIES AND CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE.¹

BY THE REV. W. DOUGLAS MACKENZIE, D.D.

THE word "evolution" has been popular for little more than a generation. In that time it has awakened the enthusiasm or the dread of large numbers of people who knew little or nothing of its previous history or inner meaning. It has been clothed by some with regal authority over all other ideas and theories that ever occupied the attention or guided the research of the human mind; and by them has been treated as the key to all mysteries, the one method of explanation to which all events and facts in the history of the universe must submit and by which their innermost secrets shall be laid bare. By others this word has been feared during these thirty years, aye, and hated too, just in proportion to the mystic delight which it conferred on the former class. Men have feared lest to believe in evolution necessitated a denial of the providence of God or of the reality of his self-revelation; lest some would be forced by holding this theory to give up their faith in Christianity with all the hopes of a future which are identified with that faith.

I.

We must not yield to the idea that evolution is an isolated dream of our generation, that Darwin launched it upon the world on his own authority for the first time. The

¹ An address delivered before the Class of 1897 at Oberlin Theological Seminary, on the occasion of its graduation, May 6, 1897.

idea is one which had occurred to many of the master minds both in ancient and modern times. Towards the end of last century it began to attract and dominate the thought of men who were working in very different fields of investigation. On the one hand, the great metaphysical schools of Germany were full of the conception of development or evolution: to see all things as related to one another, and to read the inner secret of those relations, was their ambition and effort; to see a concrete universe unfolding logically step by step before his eyes was the lofty ambition of every true follower of Hegel. On the other hand, the students of science were working towards it in their strenuous efforts to understand the relations of the different classes of plants and animals to one another. The great work of classification had proceeded on certain generally accepted principles; but enormous difficulties attended the attempts of the most acute minds to state the principles of classification in a final form. No form could be found that was final. Exceptions to every rule abounded on every hand. Gradually there appeared one investigator after another who dared to suggest that, perhaps, species had not been separately and directly created, but that the later forms of plant and animal life could be traced back through intermediate stages to the earliest. That suggestion was in the air during the first half of the century. It assumed an impressive and authoritative form only when the great work of Charles Darwin appeared. The reason for his great success was that Darwin propounded the Theory of Natural Selection as that which could account for most, if not all, of the problems involved in the hypothesis that all animal species came originally from one source. As a further indication of the extent to which the minds of men were devoted to this problem and its solution, we may name these two facts: (1) that the great Philosopher of Evolution, Mr. Herbert Spencer, had begun to develop

his system several years before Darwin's book appeared; and (2) that the publication of Darwin's work was hurried on by his astonishing discovery that another investigator, Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace, had worked out the theory of Natural Selection on lines almost identical with his own.

In yet another direction the middle of our century saw another great scientific triumph which is of equal significance, perhaps of superior practical value, when compared with the theory of evolution. This was the discovery of the correlation of physical forces. By this discovery it was made plain, once for all, that the various physical forces which hitherto had been supposed to be separate creations are very closely related to, and even dependent on, one another. Heat and light and electricity are all commensurable with one another, and ultimately explicable as forms of motion of the molecules of various substances. The word "evolution" may be, as yet, quite inapplicable in this sphere. But I name it here in order to make clear the fact that, behind the specific scientific theories which reign in different spheres of investigation in our day, there is one ideal which gave them all their being. This is the principle of continuity.

According to this principle or ideal of reason, our mind refuses to think of any one fact or event as existing in isolation, apart from the rest of the universe. If Nature is one, then all her parts must be conceived as in some degree and fashion related to one another. Nothing is alone; nothing is for itself only; but each object of experience has some definite relation, some meaning or value, for every other object of experience. It is only on this assumption that we can think. To present the mind with a certain object in Nature, and say that this one object has been separately created by the absolute power of God is of course to stop any further investigation into its origin. Thought cannot master or surmount the fiat of creation.

That is an ultimate wall against which the eager student traveler rattles his staff and henceforth feels himself a prisoner. For example, if a man believes that the various species of animals were all directly created by the absolute power of God, he must believe that this is true of the thirty different species of crow which are found in various parts of the world. He may henceforth observe their habits, investigate their anatomy, if he will; but he cannot ask, Why are they so like one another, and yet so different? There is only one answer possible to him. They are so just because they were made so, and you cannot from them find out any other reason, why they are made so. That could only be known by a direct revelation of his reasons which might be given by their Creator. But consider these thirty species of crow as having taken their place in the history of Nature, as forming part of that history, as explicable in the matter of their habits, colors, organs, etc., by means of that history, and at once a limitless field of investigation and an alluring hope is held out to the student of Nature. By placing them in a relation of continuity with the facts of Nature which preceded and accompanied their appearance upon the scene of life, you make that appearance a subject of possible investigation and at least partial explanation. This is the task of every biologist in our day. I do not know the name of one man who is working upon the problems of plant or animal life who does not deliberately aim at thus following out the ideal of the Principle of Continuity.

Now Evolution is the name given in the world of science to the theory that all forms of life are thus *historically* related to one another. They have evolved. They have reached their present forms throughout the world through a long series of transformations from that first form which was assumed by living matter, whatever it was, and however it came to be. Evolution, as a strict scientific term,

says nothing as to whether there has been progress or not. As a matter of fact, what is called "degeneration" from a higher to a lower is as truly evolution as development from a lower to a higher form of life. All that science, strictly so called, is concerned with is the relation of continuity which subsists between each successive stage of Nature's history and its predecessors.

Now the chief reason why the doctrine of evolution has awakened so much dislike and dread is that, if this principle is consistently carried out, then man must be included in the process of evolution. His animal nature must stand in a relation of continuity with the animal world. It is for this reason chiefly that some people to this very hour contest the theory of evolution ; it is for this reason that others come forth to assert that, because it is true, we must forthwith recast our whole theology ; it is for this reason that yet others say, they cannot see their way to accept any theology whatsoever.

Now, in order to proceed carefully in this matter, it is necessary to say, *first*, that the evidence appears to be overwhelming, that man's physical nature does stand in a relation of historical continuity with the animal world. No amount of protests about man's powers as a rational being, or about his ethical or religious capacities, no amount of humorous or defiant inquiries regarding the missing link, no amount of appeals to the account of creation in Genesis, which is a religious document, can possibly overthrow the force of this ever-accumulating evidence, that man is thus, on the side of his physical nature, related by natural descent to the rest of the animal creation. The evidence, which can be scanned in any book that deals professedly with the subject, is positive and abundant. Those who oppose the idea of any historical connection whatever between man and the animals cannot do so on general principles. That is to court, and perhaps to confess, defeat. They

must meet that mass of evidence by presenting some other explanation of the phenomena adduced therein which shall satisfy man's reason more fully than this theory. Until that is done, it must be held that some form of evolution has taken place in which the human body was gradually formed out of preceding stages of animal existence.

In the *second* place, no one theory of evolution has yet been developed which can be said finally and fully to explain the causes, stages, and manner of the growth of species from species. Darwin began by laying almost exclusive emphasis upon Natural Selection, and later added certain significant modifications, including that of sexual selection. But at present the scientific world is full of most powerful disputants regarding the fundamental elements of the evolutionary process and their relation to one another. There are those who, like Weismann and Alfred Russel Wallace, stoutly maintain that the theory of Natural Selection is sufficient of itself to account for practically all the problems of the evolution of species. But they are met by an apparently increasing number of men who, while giving Natural Selection a position of great importance, would add to it the operation of other forces or principles, and some of whom would very profoundly modify the essential features of Natural Selection itself. The three main elements in the process of Natural Selection are: (1) the tendency of all offspring to vary from their parents in more or less minute and numerous characteristics; (2) the tendency of such to transmit their variations to their own offspring; and (3) the action of the surrounding forces which encircle the life of each generation of animals. These forces tend to destroy, prior to maturity, all such offspring as have variations which are less adequately related to their environment.

Now the real nature and influence of each of these factors in Natural Selection is, as I have said, at present a

matter of earnest investigation and much dispute. To Darwin these factors presented themselves in a comparatively naïve fashion. He was indeed troubled about the causes of variation, and did argue with some critics regarding the influence of environment on organisms which reach maturity. But he died when the real battle over these factors of his famous theory was yet in its earliest stages. No layman like myself can as yet dare to say how the campaign is moving. Suffice it to say, that it looks as if, on the whole, the tendency is very strong to emphasize what the late Dr. James Croll called the determination of forces, and not mere forces, as the cause of evolution. This determination of forces may lead to the idea that chance has not played that godlike function in the process of building up nature which, alas, Darwin himself so constantly emphasized; for if the real origin of evolution is not the mere forces, but their arrangement or determination, the idea becomes almost irresistible, that there must be a determiner behind them, whose plan is being realized.

But now, in the *third* place, it must not be supposed that a theory of evolution must necessarily mean that the higher forms of existence are wholly derived from the lower. No doubt this is the hasty conclusion to which some have run. Hæckel may insist, almost vauntingly, on the notion that now it is scientifically established, that all forms of animal life and rational existence can be traced back, step by step, till at last all their elements are found to have originated only in some primeval matter and motion. But of course that is not a necessary deduction from the theory of evolution, nor from the principle of continuity. I am afraid that here it is my duty to criticise the definition of evolution which has been given by Professor Le Conte, and which is being championed by Dr. Lyman Abbott, as if it were the final and unexceptionable form in which the doctrine of evolution is to be defined. According to that def-

inition, evolution is "continuous and progressive change by means of resident forces." Now that phrase "by means of resident forces" is one to which exception of the most serious kind must be taken. I am aware, of course, that both Professor Le Conte and Dr. Lyman Abbott are earnest and true defenders of faith in Jesus Christ. They both are Theists, and teach that all force ultimately has its source in God. Indeed Dr. Abbott speaks in the most absolute terms of God as the only Force. But in that definition of evolution no man of science would understand by the phrase "by means of resident forces," this, that God is continually pouring the energies of his Divine will into created forms and carrying them forward to their further development. Any man of science would understand that definition to mean, that the evolution of any form of life takes place wholly by means of the forces already resident in the forms of existence which had been realized in the preceding stages of history. ✓ That is a phrase which Hæckel or any other vigorous materialist would employ. It must mean, on a complete survey of the whole evolutionary position, that the various stages have been carried through by means of forces which were resident in the first stage of all. Away back at the beginning of time, God, the one Force, did somehow bring into being the earliest forms of matter with resident forces. The interaction of the various portions of this primeval matter did, by continuous and progressive changes, result in the production of all later forms of existence, including life and consciousness, reason and conscience. That is a theory of evolution which I believe to be false, and which would be repudiated by some of the leading physicists and naturalists of our day. Doubtless the motive for the use of those words "by means of resident forces" has been, the desire to preserve the principle of continuity. It has been feared by Professor Le Conte that, unless we can suppose that in the later stages

of history no forces are manifested in addition to those which constituted the visible universe in its earlier stages, then our scientific ideal is unrealized, the principle of continuity is broken, and evolution is not seriously accepted.

Now on this point let me appeal to three men whose scientific instincts and powers have given them a prominent place in our generation. Professors Stewart and Tait, in their little work entitled "The Unseen Universe," say: "Continuity, in fine, does not preclude the occurrence of strange, abrupt, unforeseen events in the history of the universe, but only of such events as must finally and forever put to confusion the intelligent beings who regard them."¹ And again: "We believe that an extension of purely scientific logic drives us to receive as quite certain the occurrence of two events which are as incomprehensible as any miracle; these are: the introduction of visible matter and its energy, and of visible living things into the universe."² A still more powerful opponent of this theory of "resident forces" will be found in the great co-discoverer with Darwin of the principle of Natural Selection, and one of its most consistent expounders and defenders, viz., Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace. He maintains that "there are at least three stages in the development of the organic world when some new cause or power must necessarily have come into action." Observe, he does not say "existence," but "action." The three stages of history on which Mr. Wallace concentrates attention are, "the change from inorganic to organic, when the earliest vegetable cell, or the living protoplasm out of which it arose, first appeared." The next stage he calls "still more marvelous. It is the introduction of sensation or consciousness, constituting the fundamental distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms." "The third stage is the existence in man of a number of his most characteristic and noblest faculties,

¹ *The Unseen Universe* (Ed. of 1886), p. 88. ² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

those which raise him furthest above the brutes, and open up possibilities of almost indefinite advancement." Now Mr. Wallace maintains that "this involves no necessary infraction of the law of continuity in physical or mental evolution; whence it follows that any difficulty we may find in discriminating the inorganic from the organic, the lower vegetable from the lower animal organisms, or the higher animals from the lowest types of man, has no bearing at all upon the question. This is to be decided by showing that a change in essential nature (due, probably, to causes of a higher order than those of the material universe) took place at the several stages of progress."¹

It is not, then, in the interests first of all of theology, that one condemns the use of the phrase "by means of resident forces," in the definition before us. Criticism of it must be primarily based upon the simple fact, that science has done absolutely nothing to throw a bridge across those mysteries by proving that life arose from the non-living, and the sentient from the vegetable world, without the action of what Mr. Wallace calls "a new cause." It is the most authoritative dicta of the philosophy and science of our own day which make that phrase impossible for those who would be careful as well as courageous in their thinking, and who shrink in a matter of such moment as the definition of evolution, from overstepping the actual attainments of actual investigation. It ought to be made clear, that the defense of that definition can be carried out only by an appeal, not to scientific results, but to philosophical principles. Indeed, one of the great difficulties encountered by serious thinkers on this subject at present is the tendency manifested in various directions to erect a philosophy of the universe under the term "evolutionary," and to defend it on the ground that it is demanded by science. But we must be all the more careful to discriminate be-

¹ *Darwinism* (1889), pp. 474-476.

tween, *first*, the actual results of scientific investigation; *second*, the general hypotheses regarding nature which underlie scientific processes; and, *third*, the theories of philosophy regarding the ultimate nature and principles of experience and reality as such. There are various definitions and theories promulgated to-day under the name "Evolution," including the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer and the definition of Professor Le Conte, as if they were established by the results or demanded by the hypotheses of science, which are at bottom examples of metaphysical philosophy, pure and simple, and are to be discussed and judged as such.

There are two other remarks which, at the risk of being tedious, I should like to make upon this point. *First*, the principle of continuity does not of itself demand that no new cause shall be conceived as having entered into the history of the universe. That is an assumption which inductive science dare not make. It does not assert, for example, that in a world of physical forces either no new force like life shall appear; or if it does appear, it must be wholly caused and explained by the forces which already exist. That appears to be the conception of continuity present to the minds of the defenders of that definition. Now the principle of continuity will be abundantly satisfied if it is shown, that when new causes appear, each takes up and uses as its material or basis of operation the forces already existent, modifying their action only so far as may be necessary in giving them new uses. Thus does life stand to inorganic matter; thus does animal consciousness stand to organism; thus does conscience and reason stand to the animal consciousness. It is in each case, to use Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace's illustration, like "the change that takes place in the curve in which a body is moving when the application of some new force causes the curve to be slightly altered" (p. 476). There is, therefore, a continuity

both real and majestic, which connects the earliest movements of whatever forms of matter began the universe, even with the use which our most recent poet or preacher has made of his brain in the fashioning of lofty ideals or the stimulation of redemptive labors.

But this leads to the *second* observation. The theory of evolution, which is that each event or fact in Nature is related continuously with all preceding events or facts, is, as a theory of science, limited to historical events or concrete phenomena. It is not directly concerned with what I may call the ultimate elements of the phenomenal world. The investigation of the nature or relations of physical forces is the work of evolutionary science, but the problem as to what force is, belongs to metaphysics: the investigation of living things is the work of evolutionary science, but the problem as to what life is, will probably remain in the sphere of metaphysics: the investigation of the thoughts, emotions, and experiences of the human mind belongs to evolutionary science, but the problem as to what constitutes knowledge or experience in general is the fundamental work of metaphysics.

It is, I hope, evident from what I have said thus far, that, while evolution, in the domain of biology, has made vast strides in proving that the history of all organic forms is a continuous history, and that man's physical nature is involved in it, yet that there is much disagreement of opinion, even among the leaders of science, as to the principle under which this evolution has taken place. Further we have seen how dangerous it is to erect a scientific theory, which does its work in a prescribed system of concrete existence, into a philosophy which covers all spheres with an identical formula. The fact is that many, even competent theologians, are confused by the fact that Darwin and Spencer both use the word "evolution." They forget that, while Darwin uses it for the most part as a term of natural

science, Spencer uses it as a term of philosophy; while the one uses it to explain the development of individual forms of existence in Nature, the other uses it to explain also our very consciousness of existence, and makes it the keystone of reality. It is possible to be an evolutionist such as Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace, and yet not an evolutionist such as Mr. Herbert Spencer,—possible to believe that Natural Selection accounts for the various species of plant and animal life and yet to deny that we are bound to accept the philosophical theory, that all things have come to be as they are from some primeval condition of matter by means of “resident forces.”

II.

It may be assumed that the general acceptance of a theory of evolution will exert a more or less extensive influence upon Christian doctrine. For Christian theology is not an abstract theory of an abstract world; it also is the explanation of experience; it also is, in part, an attempt scientifically to investigate certain ranges of history and to state their significance in regard to man's nature, relations, and destiny. Hence any alteration in our view of the meaning of history as a whole, or of the historical relations of man to nature, may be expected to alter or modify our conceptions of the meaning of man's history. And truly the air has been filled for five and twenty years with the voices of those who have attained certainty in this regard. The tumult has not yet subsided. The hosts of the assured are still at war with one another, and I much hesitate to risk the intoxication of battle. But certain things do begin to grow somewhat clear, and these it may be useful to state.

In the first place, the spirit of the evolution theory has produced an enormous effect in the region of religious historical investigation. Many results which have been at-

tained there are now beyond dispute. The world of theology has been penetrated and illumined by what is called the historical spirit or method. It recognizes now with the utmost frankness, that all religion, including the religion of revelation, has had a history; that that history has been continuous, and that its successive forms must be investigated in their mutual relations. Hence it is that we now have the science of Comparative Religion. This science has made it plain that the religions of the world, even in their poorest and darkest forms, are no longer to be looked upon as the wholly false and disgraceful and useless facts which they appeared to former generations to be. They have had some function in history, some power over man. This function, this power, must be studied and described, that we may understand both man in his attitude towards God, and God in his relations to the heathen world. The whole method and spirit in which evangelical scholars work at this matter of man's religious history and its significance is the fruit of that general attitude of mind indicated by the word "evolutionary."

Within the Christian religion it is now recognized that there has been a continuous history both of doctrine and of institutions. The religion of revelation has its place in history, which means that it has had stages, development, evolution. Abraham did not see Christ's day in the same sense and degree in which John and Peter saw it, or you and I see it to-day. But he saw the first rays of its dawn, and from Abraham's day to John and Peter and Paul the religion of revelation had a prolonged and continuous growth. The history of this growth will describe its movements, its varieties of degree and method, its positive relations to man's nature and the general history of the race. How and when revelation took its place in history, and how from that moment of its first beginning it has molded the fortunes of men and the character of human experience,

according to its own inherent character and tendency, is all a matter of historical investigation. That investigation has undoubtedly been made more intelligent, more thorough, more fruitful, during the past two generations, than in any earlier period: and this triumphant work has been the result of that historical spirit or method which is part of the "sphere of influence" of the idea of evolution. The religion of revelation did not end with the Apostles, it then passed into a new form, resulting in the establishment of the Christian church. That too has had a history. The doctrines and institutions of Christendom have in a very real sense evolved. You can trace them from the seed to the seedling, thence to the fullgrown tree, and to the fruit which ripens thereon for weal or woe to man. There are to-day hundreds of highly trained specialists who are at work upon this piece of evolution with the same patience, skill, and spirit which are manifested by the biologist or the physicist.

Manifestly this kind and extent of work cannot be done without producing considerable effects upon our understanding and formulation of specific Christian doctrines. These doctrines have always been described and stated in the light of their history and of their actual influence upon the men who lived in the presence of revelation; and hence the restatement of their history may be expected to lead to a restatement of their nature. This is being attempted all around us to-day, and the result is bizarre and bewildering. Clearness will no doubt gradually come out of the present confusion. But no thinker seems yet to have attained that standpoint from which he can speak with convincing power. Much of the confusion seems to me to be due to the ignoring of three facts which are of fundamental importance.

In the first place, a survey of the evolutionary process shows us that in no case can the lower of the three or four

great stages into which it is divided make any prophecy regarding the higher stages which succeed it. The laws of the physical forces contain no hint of the laws of life. The history of a plant contains not the slightest suggestion regarding the nature and laws of sensation. Mere consciousness of sensation does not bear the remotest resemblance to the laws of conscience or experience of a moral being. Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy is an attempt to find a formula which shall cover the universe and bridge these gulfs; but his philosophy is summed up in a formula which, after all, is but an empty abstraction, with no inward movement, or life, or grip of reality; but which enables him at each of these transitions, not to speak of other points in the total process, to elude the real problem, without even stating its true nature and difficulty.¹ From this fact it must follow that no study of animal life, as such, or of the conditions under which man's animal and mental nature have been developed, can finally lead us to any certainty regarding man's moral and religious nature or his positive relations to God.

In the second place, it must ever be remembered that you do not explain the nature of a fact by describing its historical origin or dawn. For example, you cannot reach a true understanding or definition of life by the study of protoplasm. Not even Mr. Herbert Spencer's definition of

¹ An example of this is Mr. Spencer's well-known definition of "life" which Mr. John Fiske calls "the most profound and complete definition of Life that has ever been framed." Mr. Spencer says: "Life is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences." Mr. Fiske in his paraphrase (*Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. ii. p. 67) more naively says "within the organism." And of course there the whole mystery lies. The definition perpetrates the logical fallacy of containing the thing to be defined. For "life" is in that word "within." We do not speak of "within a stone" in defining it. What is that which has a "within" and a "without"? It is Life. Hence you do not define it by merely describing the relations of the "within" and the "without."

life could have been made possible by a summation of the observed facts of so poor a specimen of living things. On the contrary, you can understand the significance of protoplasm only by placing it in the light of a much larger fact. Similarly you cannot explain an oak-tree by the study of its seed; on the contrary, it is the life history of the whole tree which explains the seed. So with any statement of any portion of the relations of man to God, no adequate justice can be done to them by treating the first moment of their revelation or of their experience by man as containing the whole truth.

In the third place, if the faith of the Christian church be grounded in fact, then that which constitutes the subject-matter of theological science is, *the personal relations of God and man and their historical manifestation or realization*. The fact that they are personal relations must be kept strenuously in the forefront. To treat sin as the struggle between the animal and spiritual nature, in man; or revelation, as the history of man's consciousness of God; or the incarnation, as the attainment of the divine fullness by one human life, may be useful enough. But these are only half or quarter views of the whole fact. The real subject-matter of doctrinal investigation remains to be explored even after so much has been said of sin, or revelation, or incarnation. The personal relations of God to man, and of man to God, in the light of each of these great facts, remain to be grasped and expounded. Each thinker who keeps this principle patiently before his mind will find that the evolution theory is going to influence his statement of doctrine very really indeed, but not so directly and superficially as is sometimes imagined.

Let me briefly, and in conclusion, illustrate these principles in relation to two doctrines to which evolution is supposed to have much to say directly.

First, there is the Doctrine of Revelation. It is possible

to put this matter in what is supposed to be a scientific or evolutionary spirit by saying that revelation is ever proceeding, that God is ever making himself known to the human consciousness from the moment in creation when that consciousness develops the capacity for apprehending him. Hence the history of revelation is the history of man's ever-growing consciousness of God. Now that is all true, but it is not all the truth. To answer that question, we must not abide humbly at the feet of our general definition of evolution. We must in the true scientific spirit go to history. Now when we go to the history of the religion in which revelation has reached its climax, we find that from beginning to end it records acts which are described as specific acts, personal acts of God in relation to specific persons. The phenomena of prophetism in Israel cannot be brought under the general formula of an evolving consciousness of God. The consciousness of God did then undoubtedly develop, but through specific and personal acts of God towards individual persons. "The word of Jehovah" came to a prophet in such a fashion as it did not come to any other man in Israel except through him. It is impossible to deny that there was involved in the covenant with Israel and the inspiration of prophets a personal act of the divine will without denying to God any specific purpose of will concerning any specific portion of his universe and its history. But if that is so, then the doctrine of revelation is much more than the history of the development of man's consciousness of God,—as much more as it ever was. We may be in an indefinitely better position to investigate its meaning and methods; and we are. We may have gained enormously by the new emphasis which is placed upon the history of the human consciousness in this relation; and we have. We may be in a better position to understand the Divine acts as historically connected after a wider fashion than was possible three generations

ago; and we are. But the actual nature of revelation, as constituted by those acts of God in relation to individual men, from Abraham to Paul, which have a supreme significance and a divine authority for all human consciences for ever after, remains, as it ever has been, the free manifestation by a living person of his character and his purposes unto sinful men.

Second, there is the Doctrine of Sin. It is generally assumed, on the one hand, that the Doctrine of Evolution leads necessarily not only to a restatement, but to a *certain* restatement, of the meaning and nature of sin. The idea of a fall must, it is said, be abandoned. Man never fell except upwards. He did not begin in a state of innocence and break a known law of God deliberately, and so contract the racial guilt. Man, it is argued, must have awakened gradually from the sleep of sense in which the animal world slumbers. As, out of the control of appetite and the confusions of passion, the higher light of Reason began to shine, he became aware of a deep contradiction between his animal and spiritual self. The law of the animal life was, on the whole, "grasp-all"; the law of reason is "give-all." Man's struggle, man's long story of toil and bitterness, of wild self-abandonment and miserable self-contempt, is due to that inward war of the past animal life and its remainders with the new rational soul and its prophetic claims. This may of course be very largely true, but again it is not the whole truth. For instance, who knows yet what were the conditions amid which man first emerged from the animal to the human condition? No mere dogmatism from general principles can be allowed to rule our thought at this stage. We must strive to know something of the dawn of conscience and of the knowledge of God ere we can define man's earliest sense of sin. For, be it observed, the position which I have described is dogmatism pure and simple, since it is an attempt to deduce the form and na-

ture of an event from an abstract theory. Ere it can be considered valid or legitimate it must reckon alike with Anthropology and History. The fact is, we know nothing from evolutionary science, absolutely nothing, about man's earliest consciousness of personal relations with God; and until we have historical or other evidence, we are at least as warranted in holding that, when man first stood forth as man, rational and religious, he found sin to consist in his deliberate disobedience to the known will of God, as in holding any other theory. The degree of crudeness with which at the birth of his reason and freedom he conceived of God or law or disobedience, has nothing to do with the determination of the essential nature of sin.

But this leads to another point. In the light of the three principles enunciated above, it is obviously right to insist that we shall not make our doctrine of sin to depend on our theory as to its origin. That is one great mistake in which the older orthodox and some evolutionary theologies alike share. The nature of sin is not fully revealed nor a Christian doctrine of sin made possible, either by the story of the Fall downwards or of the Fall upwards. To understand sin we need to trace the relations of men to God through the whole course of his self-revelation. The Old Testament, in the prophetic writings including the prophetic histories, in the Psalms, in the development of the sacrificial ritual, presents us with a gradually deepening view of the nature of sin, both profound and humbling. The New Testament presents us with the most clear and unmistakable revelation of the nature of sin in the character and experience of Jesus Christ, as also in that form of religious consciousness which he awakened in the apostles after his resurrection, and which formed the real climax of the work of redemption and revelation. We need to look at the ripe fruit of man's history as he puts Jesus to death, defying Jehovah; we need to look at the ripe fruit of God's

grace as he offers his Son on the cross, if we would know what sin really is. The Christian doctrine of sin must come not from the study of the seed, but of the whole tree of revelation. And when it is seen that throughout the course of that unique history the personal nature and relations of both God and man were progressively unfolded, it will be seen, first, that the doctrine of sin can be adequately stated only when those natures and relations are adequately appreciated; and, second, that any account of the historical beginnings of sin will not carry any thinker far in that task.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTES.

JOHN ELIOT, THE APOSTLE TO THE INDIANS.

SPECIAL attention has been called to the life and work of the Apostle Eliot, by the observance last October of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of his first preaching to the Indians. Some new facts have been brought to light by recent investigations. It is possible to form a more intelligent idea of his missions, and of their results, than it was a few years ago.

He was one of the first generation of the Puritan ministers in New England. Born in Widford, a small parish, twenty-five miles north from London, in 1604; the third child in a Nonconformist family of seven, brought up in Nasing, Essex County, from which so many of the Colonists of Massachusetts came; educated at Jesus College, Cambridge, where he received the degree of A.B. in 1623; employed as a teacher in the Grammar School at Little Baddow, under Thomas Hooker,—he was abundantly prepared for his work in New England. He sailed from England in the "ninth month," 1631, in the good ship *Lyon*, and was landed in Boston, November 3d of that year. He was at once employed to preach in the First Church in Boston, in the absence of their pastor, Mr. Wilson, in England. He was married the next year to that "beautiful Puritan maiden," Hannah Mumford, and was settled as pastor in Roxbury, November 5, 1632. His ministry, of almost sixty years, in that church, was much like that of the other Puritan pastors of the Colony. He was a very able and a well-read man, a careful student of the Bible and of the theology of the Reformers. He was an earnest and faithful preacher. He had a special interest in young people. His conversation was "sprinkled with wit." "His manner," we are told, "was commonly gentle and winning; but when sin was to be rebuked, his voice swelled into solemn and powerful energy. On such occasions there were as many thunderbolts as words."

Why was it that this earnest pastor of the church in Roxbury became the missionary to the Indians? Because the Pilgrims and the Puritans had crossed the sea as missionary colonies. Governor Bradford says that one reason for coming to New England was the "great hope and inward zeal of laying some foundation for propagating the kingdom of Christ in the remote ends of the earth." The Massachusetts charter states that the

principal end of the plantation was to "winn and incite the natives of the country to the knowledge of the true God and the Saviour of mankinde." The seal of the Colony had the figure of an Indian, with the words, "Come over and help us."

In the earlier years they were not able to carry out their missionary plans in any systematic way. The struggle for a bare subsistence absorbed their energies. But they cherished friendly relations with the Indians who came every day into their settlements. They were an imitative race, and susceptible to acts of kindness from their Christian neighbors. Some of them in the early years gained a knowledge of the Christian religion. A few became members of the churches. As early as 1632, Roger Williams began to study their language with a view to preaching to them. In 1636 the Plymouth Colony provided by law for the regular preaching of the gospel among the Indians. Eight years later, the younger colony of Massachusetts Bay requested the ministers to report what means could be used for the more systematic instruction of the Indians; and in 1646 the General Court directed the ministers to select each year two of their number to preach to the Indians. This was a signal for definite and systematic work. The idea of missions was in the air. The ministers were studying the language of their dusky neighbors, and the people were praying for their conversion. It is not surprising that a number of the Puritan ministers, at about the same time, began to preach to them.

John Eliot was among the first of these missionaries, and he was in some respects the most eminent. He says: "God first put into my heart a compassion over their poor souls, and a desire to teach them to know Jesus Christ, and to bring them into His Kingdome. Then presently I found out a pregnant-witted young man, a servant in an English family, who pretty well understood our language, and well understood his own. Him I made my interpreter."

Mr. Eliot's first effort to preach to the Indians was not successful. They gave "no heed to his word, but were weary, and despised what he said." The next effort was at Nonantum (now Newton), October 28, 1648. It was only four or five miles from his own house. He went in company with three of his friends. The Indians had come together, in the great wigwam of Waban, to meet him, and to hear his message. He preached to them for an hour and a quarter from the vision of the dry bones in the thirty-seventh chapter of Ezekiel. But he knew better than to follow his text. He began with the ten commandments, explaining the meaning of each one, and showing to the Indians in what ways they were every day breaking the law of God. He told them that God was angry with them every day for their sins. Then he told them of the Saviour whom God had sent to save lost Indians; and that if they would put away their sins, and ask God to forgive them, his anger would turn away, and he would love them as his dear children.

This was the beginning. He went again by invitation two weeks later.

The Indians at Neponset asked him to preach to them, and for some months he went once a week to Nonantum, and once a week to Neponset. He catechised the children. He gave the Indians opportunity to ask questions, and the most useful part of these services was their inquiries, and the replies of the missionary. He was invited to preach in a number of other Indian villages in Eastern Massachusetts, and he went as frequently as he was able, to tell the "old, old story."

All the accounts that have come down to us indicate that there was a genuine religious work among the Indians at that time. They left their old religion and worship, and began to pray, not only by themselves, but in their families, and to return thanks at meals. They taught their children, as far as they were able, and asked for teachers and for schools. They began to keep the Lord's day, and to meet by themselves, when Mr. Eliot could not be present, to pray, and to speak of the things they had learned. Waban, the most intelligent of them, took the lead in teaching his people, and in the devotional services.

A few months later, the Cambridge Synod met for its second session, and Mr. Eliot was permitted to assemble the praying Indians from the neighboring villages, and to preach to them in their own language in the presence of the Synod. He catechised the children, and the Puritan ministers were delighted not only by the attention of the people to the word, but especially by "the readiness of divers poor naked children to answer openly the chief questions that had been taught them." From that time, this work had a large place in the sympathies and the prayers of good people, not only in New England, but in Great Britain, where narratives of these events were published and read by great numbers of the people.

It was a cardinal principle with Mr. Eliot that civilization must go with religion. The savage must form habits of industry before he could have strength of character to live an honest and virtuous life. He thought it necessary to separate the praying Indians from their tribe and gather them into villages by themselves, where they would learn the ways of the English, and be under English laws. He established the first Indian Community at Nonantum, where the General Court "purchased land for the Indians to make a Towne." He furnished them with tools such as the English used, and promised to pay sixpence a rod for all the stone wall they would build. In the course of two or three years it was found that this reservation was too small, as the number of praying Indians was increasing rapidly. It was also too near the English settlements. In 1650 he secured a larger grant of land at Natick, on Charles River, eighteen miles southwest from Boston. A town was laid out with three streets, one on one side of the river, and two on the other, with a foot-bridge, built by the Indians, across the river. A house-lot was assigned to each family. They built a large frame-house for the common use,—the first story of which was used for a school on week-days, and for a church on

the Lord's day,—the upper story as a store-room for their furs and other articles. They also built a fort for defense against hostile Indians. They cultivated a large tract of land, and became a prosperous agricultural community, regulating their own local affairs, while submitting to the laws of the Colony in matters of general interest. Natick was the model for a number of Indian communities which were organized within the next twenty-five years by Mr. Eliot. Each of them had its reservation secured to the community by the General Court. Each of these reservations included from four to seven thousand acres of land. In 1674 there were fourteen of these communities of praying Indians, each with its native preacher and its schoolmaster. Mr. Eliot trained twenty-four Indian preachers, some of whom he "set over their churches," in true apostolic fashion, while he employed others to preach among the pagan Indians. These communities included eleven hundred persons at that date. Many of them had been baptized, and were living Christian lives. A smaller number had been gathered into Indian churches.

The funds for this extended missionary work came from Great Britain. When Mr. Eliot began to preach to the Indians there was not a Protestant missionary society in the world. Very careful accounts of the work among the Indians were printed and sent to England, such as the *Day Breaking*, the *Clear Sunshine*, etc. These excited so much interest, that a corporation was established by act of Parliament, with the aid of Cromwell, then Lord Protector, with the title: "The President and Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England." Several thousand pounds sterling were sent to New England by this society, within the next thirty years. With this money they paid the salaries of missionaries, built the Indian college at Cambridge, educated native preachers, printed the two editions of the Indian Bible, and assisted the Indians in procuring tools and other things for their farms.

The translation of the Bible into the language of the Massachusetts Indians was regarded by Mr. Eliot as the great work of his life. For almost forty years he was preparing for this translation, and carrying it forward. The language had never been reduced to writing. It was especially poor in words to express spiritual truth. Mr. Eliot had no companions in his work except such Indian interpreters as he had taught to read and to write. He had the care of his church at Roxbury, through all those years, the care also of the Indian churches and communities. He made frequent missionary journeys into the wilderness, to establish new missions. It is very wonderful that the translation was finished at last. The first edition of fifteen hundred copies was printed in Cambridge in 1661-63. This lasted about twenty years, and it was the cherished household book in hundreds of Indian cabins. The second edition of two thousand copies was printed in 1680-85. The expense of the two editions was about two thousand pounds.

In these three ways,—by preaching to the Indians, and gathering them

into communities and churches; by forming the first Missionary Society in England, the pioneer of so many other Protestant missionary societies; and by his translation of the Bible,—Mr. Eliot was laying a broad foundation for missionary work among them. He confidently expected that the Indian race would become Christian within a generation or two.

But the Indians in New England were comparatively few. Some authorities place the number, in 1675, at thirty thousand. The highest estimate I have seen is fifty thousand—a number less than the population of a city of moderate size. They had been decreasing for some years before the English came. The tribes of the great Algonquin family were jealous of each other, and often at war.

The missionary work was limited to the smaller tribes, such as the Wampanoags and the Massachusetts. Mr. Eliot tried in vain to get a hearing for the gospel among the more powerful tribes, such as the Mohegans and the Narragansetts. It may be that the segregation of the praying Indians into communities tended to hinder the work. Modern missions have been conducted on a different plan. Certainly the pagan Indians were jealous of the Indians who had become Christian and were hostile to them. Still the work was pushed vigorously by Mr. Eliot and his collaborators, and it continued to extend up to the time of King Philip's war. It is very likely that if peace had continued the Narragansetts, at least, would have become Christians. In 1675 there were about thirty-six hundred praying Indians in the whole of New England, with at least six organized churches.

The great war interrupted the work, and swept away the larger number of the Christian Indians. Philip was a vigorous and crafty leader of the hostile tribes. There was a reign of terror for about three years. The burning of villages, the massacre of women and children, the infernal torture of prisoners, roused the Colonists to a vigorous and, in the end, a successful war. The praying Indians were crushed between the two forces. They were not trusted by either party. As a class, they were loyal to the English. Several hundred of them enlisted in the army, and did good service. Many of them lost their lives in the course of the struggle. When the war was over, the survivors came back to their old settlements. But they were few, and disheartened. They found their homes in ruins. The war had almost exterminated the Indians of the Eastern Colonies. After that time, they no longer appeared as an important element in the population.

Mr. Eliot resumed his work as soon as the war was over. He endeavored to gather the survivors into their old villages, but they were never the same people again. They faded away year by year. The Indian race lacked iron in the blood,—vigor of purpose,—power to resist temptations to intemperance and other vices.

Mr. Eliot's last years were busy years. He went regularly among the villages. At the age of eighty-three he was still preaching to the Indians

once in two months. In 1684 he wrote that the villages of praying Indians were reduced to four. "There is a cloud," he said, in his old age, "a dark cloud upon the work of the gospel among the poor Indians. The Lord revive and prosper the work, and grant that it may live when I am dead."

His prayer has been answered. His shining example as the pioneer American missionary has helped to keep alive the interest in missions. It was a hundred and twenty years from John Eliot to the American Board. Many of its most successful missions were among the Indians. Thousands of the red men are reading the Word of God in their own languages. John Eliot did not live in vain.

EZRA HOYT BYINGTON.

NEWTON, MASS.

SCIENCE AND THE SUPERNATURAL.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA :

DEAR SIR :—In the *Tribune* of Sunday the 14th appeared an article entitled "Religion and Science," in which I find the following expressions : "In the opinion of many clear-minded Christian thinkers a point will soon be reached—if indeed it has not been reached already—when no compromise with science will be possible. Christianity cannot throw supernaturalism overboard without ceasing to be Christianity. But can it retain its belief in the supernatural and at the same time accept the methods and conclusions of science? . . .

"They believe that ultimately religion must fight science, and that therefore all attempts to temporize with it are not merely useless but harmful."

I desire to express most emphatically, both as a man of science and a professor of religion, my dissent from the views expressed and implied in the above quotation.

In the first place, as a man of science, I would protest against the suggestion that the methods and conclusions of science are in any way inconsistent with the acceptance of the supernatural.

What is the supernatural, in the view of science, except that for which nothing that we know or have deduced in the way of law or the observable succession of phenomena will account? In other words, any inexplicable phenomenon, until an explanation is discovered, is supernatural, i.e., beyond the application of what we call natural law.

The rainbow was a supernatural phenomenon prior to its explanation ; and in my opinion the hatching of a chicken from an egg is just as much beyond the reach of our present scientific knowledge as to its cause and origin as is the restoration of vitality to a dead body.

Unless, then, the man of science is assumed to believe his knowledge to be final and complete (which I am confident all men of science will disavow), it is not reasonable to assert that to him anything claimed by

enlightened believers in historic religion as the foundation of their belief is inconsistent with a strict adherence to the methods and results of scientific study. In other words, the man of science studies the phenomena which are within the ever-enlarging range of his powers of perception and deduction, and he would be simply abandoning the methods of his own subject if he went beyond this range to deny the existence of that which is outside of his present horizon.

To make my meaning plain I had best take a concrete case. The man of true science, as I understand him, is not, and certainly need not be, an atheist. Without pretending to know *how* the universe came into existence, he does not believe that it is eternal or created itself. He is therefore entirely at liberty to assume, as the only remaining hypothesis, a creator, who must certainly be supernatural.

Again, the man of science finds himself surrounded on all sides by forces, the origin of not one of which, from gravitation to thought, has he made the least progress in explaining. We know no more to-day than did the first man, by what means the sun reaches out through millions of miles of space and holds the planets to their orbits, and the same is true of every other form of force. We only know that, judging from their effects, these forces are omnipresent throughout the universe; omnipotent, as controlling everything; and omniscient, as adapting their influences to the ever-changing configurations of the bodies on which they act. What is more, the man of science sees that these forces in the past have acted in the direction of an evolution from the lower to the higher, —physically, intellectually, morally.

In view of all this, what more consistent with the methods of sound scientific induction than the foundation of an hypothesis that the supernatural creator of the universe was and is the supernatural but immanent source of the past and present forces of the universe?

The man of science of course will not claim that he knows this in the way that he knows that an unsupported weight will fall to the ground; but he can accept this hypothesis as freely as he does that of the luminiferous ether, and proceed with his investigations of phenomena and their relations as freely, in the presence of this supernatural final cause, as he can proceed in his investigations of the phenomena of light in the presence of the hardly less transcendental hypothesis of the luminiferous ether with its supermaterial properties.

The conflict between Science and Religion only arises when one party or the other transcends his own limitations and assumes a knowledge which he does not possess.

Thus, when theology claimed that facts of science were taught by the Bible, and denounced those who said that the earth's motion, and not the sun's, caused day and night, because the Bible taught the contrary, a conflict resulted whose consequences were most disastrous. So again, when certain men of science assumed that because they could not find in

the range of scientific research evidence of a future existence, none such was possible; they likewise went beyond their controlling limits in placing ignorance as a foundation for conclusion, and another conflict was developed.

In the words, however, of John Fiske, in that admirable little book "The Destiny of Man," "The materialistic assumption that there is no such state of things" (a future life), "and that the life of the soul accordingly ends with the life of the body, is perhaps the most colossal instance of baseless assumption that is known to the history of philosophy."¹

The past conflicts of Science and Religion have been fought over errors, on one side or the other, arising from dogmatism on each side as to matters outside of its own range of knowledge; and in my opinion, in place of an inevitable conflict in the future, we have reason to look for a gradually developed and perfect agreement as each comes nearer the truth by extension of knowledge. In the eloquent words with which Mr. Fiske concludes the book above referred to, "The future is lighted for us with the radiant colors of hope. Strife and sorrow shall disappear. Peace and love shall rest supreme. The dream of poets, the lesson of priest and prophet, the inspiration of the great musician, is confirmed in the light of modern knowledge; and as we gird ourselves up for the work of life, we may look forward to the time when in the truest sense the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever, King of kings and Lord of lords."

HENRY MORTON.

STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY.

March 24, 1897.

EDITORIAL NOTE ON GENESIS AND GEOLOGY.

APPROPOS of President Morton's note on page 468, it is but fair for me to say that "the general views" in which we are represented to be in accord do not include our critical opinions concerning the origin of the Pentateuch, for I have not yet been convinced of the soundness of the arguments adduced for a late date of that literature, and my experience in attempting to verify the conclusions of Professor Driver and the class of critics to which he belongs has not given me unquestioning confidence in their methods of reasoning. I may add, also, that prolonged attention to the subject has increased my respect for those who have sought a positive harmony between the geological history and the system unfolded in the first chapter of Genesis. It has seemed to me that the opponents of all attempts at positive harmonization have too generally failed to appreciate the peculiarities of popular literature as distinguished from scientific, and have assumed that the freer handling of language, appropriate

¹ Twenty-second edition, p. 110.

to popular presentation, is incapable of giving any expression to general truths. In this respect it has seemed to me that Gladstone has a great advantage over Huxley. The principles of interpretation of Genesis upon which Huxley has insisted would totally fail of attaining the truth when applied to general literature.

Viewed in this light, the obscurities in the first chapter of Genesis seem of slight importance when compared with the numerous clear coincidences. Still I do not object to being held in the main to the brief statements made in "Studies in Science and Religion" in 1882, and in "The Divine Authority of the Bible" in 1884, portions of which are appended:—

"In seeking to draw out a close parallelism between the progressive stages of geological and paleontological development and the six days of creation described in Genesis, the error is twofold. First, there is no such sharp distinction between geological periods as was formerly supposed. The gaps in the geological record are so many and so great that the apparent evidence of sudden changes is probably delusive. Changes in the fossils of succeeding strata, which were formerly considered the results of *convulsions*, are now accounted for on the supposition of *migrations*. Geologists are more ready than formerly to reckon the realm of their ignorance as greater than that of their knowledge.

"In the second place, it was not modern science with which the sacred writers wished to be reconciled, but polytheism which they wished to cut up root and branch, which gave rhetorical shape to the first chapter of Genesis. Followed by the traditions of polytheistic ancestors, tainted by the polytheistic conceptions of the Egyptian people from whom they had escaped, and surrounded by the civilized worshipers of Baal and Ashtaroth, the children of Israel needed to have the unity of God emphasized. Historically it can be shown that the first chapter of Genesis has had more influence in disseminating correct views of the divine unity and personality than all other literature put together. Now what does it say? Why, it denies the plurality of gods. It denies it both in general and in detail. It affirms, in general, that God—the God of Israel—created the heavens and the earth. The writer then descends to particulars, and affirms (1) that it was this same one and true God who created the light which some ignorantly adored as itself divine; (2) it was also the same God that ruled both the sky and the earth. (3) The fruitfulness of the earth, which some worship as the manifestation of a particular divinity, is also the gift of Israel's God. (4) The sun and moon are not to be worshiped; God created them. (5) Why worship the sacred bulls and cats of Egypt, when it was God who created every living thing—the beast of the field as well as the fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea? (6) Finally, God created man, and set him over all the things he had made. Why should the lord of creation bow down to stocks and stones?

"Such, to the contemporary of Moses, was the purport of this most remarkable 'proem' to God's revelation of man's condition and ground of hope. It should be remembered that the first chapter of Genesis had the same editorial supervision with the ten commandments. When thus we consider it as a protest against polytheism, and an enforcement of the first two commandments, it seems an impertinence to endeavor to find all modern science in the document, however easy it may be for science to find shelter under the drapery of its rhetoric."¹

"Another view, however, has been entertained in recent times by many eminent scientific men. This view regards the six days of creation mentioned by Moses as six great periods or cosmogonic days, which are supposed to have marked the progress of the earth's creation up to the advent of man; and it certainly is a most remarkable occurrence that centuries before the Christian era an orderly account of creation should have been written into which it is so easy to adjust all the facts of modern science. Even the theories of evolution, so far as they are capable of proof, find little to oppose them in this remarkable composition. As Professor Guyot has pointed out, the language of Genesis would necessitate only three distinct periods of creation, leaving the rest to proceed by natural processes."

"Thus, according to our author, 'the question of evolution within each of these great systems—of matter into various forms of matter, of life into the various forms of life, and of mankind in all its varieties—remains still open.'

"On either of these theories of the interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, it certainly is a marvelous result that a cosmogony should have been presented at that early day in language that can be easily interpreted so as to avoid conflict with the science of the present day. No other religious system has a cosmogony with which the men of science can by any possibility be at peace."²

G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

NOVEL BIBLE HISTORY.

[The April number of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA contained an article by ex-President S. C. Bartlett, cited from the *Advance*, in refutation of an editorial statement of a religious journal, that the law of Moses authorized the Jew to sell diseased meat to the foreigner. He furnishes also the following note along the same line.—EDS.]

In the previous note, an editorial statement of a prominent journal, that the law of Moses permitted the Jew to sell diseased meat to the foreigner was shown to be baseless and unjustifiable. Other equally inconsiderate editorial declarations appeared in the same number of the paper,

¹ Studies in Science and Religion, pp. 365-367.

² The Divine Authority of the Bible, pp. 197-199.

or not long before and after. Coming from other sources they would not require attention, but when such things appear in a religious and denominational journal, they should not pass unchallenged.

The article referred to also declared, "Moses, David, Elijah, Jeremiah, Peter—indeed all the apostles—made mistakes while they were attempting to interpret to men the will of God." Understanding that there is no intentional ambiguity in using the word "while" instead of the accurate word *in*,—which would reduce the remark to the truism that all men make mistakes,—we ask for proof of this sweeping assertion, or even of a part of it. Errors and sins in their personal character and conduct are obvious and unconcealed. But that when they claimed to interpret God's will to men they made mistakes, remains to be shown. Elijah fled in despondency, but when he interpreted God's will, whether to Ahab or to the prophets of Baal, where was the mistake? Peter failed in conduct at the Corinthian church; but his teaching had been the same as Paul's (Acts x.), and he had simply failed to conform to his own express teachings, and for that "he was to be blamed." What particular teaching of his first (and undisputed) Epistle would our editorial friend reckon among his mistakes? And when he so easily expands the remark to include "all the apostles," will he please to inform us what particular information he has of the mistakes of Bartholomew and Lebbeus and Simon Zelotes and Philip, for instance, in attempting "to interpret to men the mind of God"?

In the same article and in the same strain we read, "Christ often in his teaching corrected the ethical positions of his apostles." Certainly, while they were in training, and doubtless afterwards, if by "correcting their ethical positions" is meant disapproving their *conduct* in some instances, rather than withdrawing their apostolical authority—which is a very different thing. Surely the writer cannot have forgotten that Christ did not pronounce them fully equipped for their work as apostles till they had, after his death, tarried at Jerusalem, been "endued with power from on high," had "the Holy Ghost come upon" them, and then been definitely appointed "witnesses unto me unto the uttermost part of the earth" (Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 2-8). After this complete qualification, which of the attempts to interpret the mind of God contained in the writings of John, James, Peter, Paul, will he point out as the "mistakes"? Our editor indeed recognizes the promise, for he adds in the next sentence, "He [Christ] promised them that the Holy Spirit should guide them into all the truth"; but the very next words bring them down again to the common level,—“and that promise is as truly for us as for them.” If this ambiguous phrase “as truly” means *as fully*, that is, with the same inspired authority, then Christians generally will prefer the teachings of Paul and John to those of “us.” To which of the editorial “we” has the Saviour said, “Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven”?

Equally emphatic and more distinct is the statement just before: "Our appeal to holy men of old is never to what is final authority, independently of the Holy Spirit illuminating our own minds." This is a very novel discovery that the final authority of the apostles or of Christ—or any "final authority," human or divine—depends for its reality on the degree of "illumination" in the subject of it. Was the decalogue not an authority, and a "final authority," when the Jew had "a wicked *mind*," and "the imaginations of an evil heart"? Are not Christ's declarations concerning the new birth, and the necessity of faith on himself, final authority, and "independently" of our illumination?

Not to fail of being understood, the writer adds, in the next sentence but one, "The exhaustive word concerning the character of God and his will has not been spoken yet." Who is to speak it? A greater than Jesus Christ? We pause for a reply.

In the same article we read that "Christ forbade the hatred of foreigners which breathed in prayers of the Old Testament saints." Where are the prayers of those saints which breathed hatred of foreigners *as such*? All that has been claimed by the most unfriendly critics is hatred of foreigners *as foes*. Here is, of course, the old story about the imprecatory psalms. The subject has its difficulties to many minds. But an intelligent editor should be aware that a large portion of the Christian church have not accepted the view that these utterances were the expression of vindictive feeling against the personal enemies of the psalmist, but of righteous indignation against incorrigible wrong-doers, the enemies of God, of God's kingdom and God's friends. Is he not aware that men so eminently respectable as Albert Barnes, Bela B. Edwards, Professor Park, Tholuck, Perowne, and the like, have expressed this view, some of them very distinctly and strongly? Why not candidly recognize the fact that this aspect of the case, though often implied rather than definitely stated, is frequently given in express form? Thus in Ps. cxxxix. 21, 22, "Do not I hate them that hate thee, O Lord? Am I not grieved with them that rise up against thee? I hate them with perfect hatred, I count them mine enemies." So in other Psalms more or less explicitly. Intense as are the expressions, we are not to forget that they are but the open, frank utterance of what was involved in the prayers offered in every loyal pulpit during the war of the Rebellion. Every prayer for the triumph of lawful authority, it is sad to say, meant havoc and death to its armed foes, and, alas, it involved widows and orphans too. The terrible sufferings that accompanied the answer to those prayers equaled and far surpassed anything expressed in those psalms. It is a fact not to be ignored; and cavils at those psalms were hushed during the war. Professor Park then felicitously said, "That one phrase, 'They are *confederate* against thee' (Ps. lxxxiii. 5), has suggested to many American Christians the crime of those States that are now 'confederate' against our Union." And the late Dr. A. P. Peabody said to me in Cambridge, in

the midst of the war, "I have come to your view of those psalms." Professor Moulton, in his "Literary Study of the Bible," speaking of the imprecatory psalms, well states the case thus: "We in modern times are quite accustomed to feel enthusiasm for the abstract thing we call 'a cause'; with the ancient world it was necessary for the cause to be embodied in a concrete party, if it was to win devotion or the reverse. . . . When the psalmist's hatred of evil men has once been translated into the form of hatred against evil, it will be felt that the passages cannot be too strongly worded." Such well-considered views, from such sources, cannot be disposed of by a sweeping condemnation, much less by a misrepresentation.

A month later the readers were informed by the editor, without qualification, that "the prophets bitterly contended with one another." This broad statement, unrestricted even as to time, would be true of some particular times, *provided* always that we disregard all distinction between prophets as true or false, a distinction definitely stated in Deut. xiii. 1-5; that is, provided we cover with one term the prophet Elijah and the prophets of Baal, or Ahab's four hundred prophets who said to him, "Go up," and "the prophet of the Lord," Micaiah, who told him the truth. If we may confound opposites after this manner, then we have here genuine Bible history.

The statement is not improved in its bearing by the next sentence: "Even those whose sayings we now most cherish did not command any more confidence from the people than ministers now receive who claim to present messages from God." This remark may—or may not—be true in the letter, but it is not true in its meaning, if it is intended to imply, as it appears, that they were *entitled* to no more confidence than modern preachers. That such is the intent of the statement appears from the immediate sequel: "They [the prophets] were influenced in their convictions, as we are, by fear and hope, by passions of ambition and patriotism, by anger against those who opposed them, and admiration of those who agreed with them, as well as by indignation against sin and approval of righteousness." Here at length the prophets are brought completely down to the common level,—"*influenced as we are*" by the evil "*passions of ambition*" and "*anger*," and that too "*in their convictions*." There is an earlier statement that they were influenced or "*moved by the Holy Ghost*," which some of us still prefer.

We were told also, somewhat earlier, that "it is a great principle of divine teaching, that truth from God can become a revelation only when interpreted by human experience." Now this may mean one of two things: either that a truth cannot become a matter of experience till it is experienced; or, that a truth cannot be a truth till it has become a matter of "human experience." In the former meaning, it is no "great principle," but a truism, and indeed a tautology. In the latter signification it is neither truism nor truth. There is no such "principle," hu-

man or divine. To take a human instance, Cannot a physician reveal to his patient the "truth" that he has a mortal disease, and is it no revelation till the patient is dead? And to take a divine instance, Is it not an actual revelation that God will save men by faith on Jesus Christ, whether any given man chooses to experience it or not?

It is much to be regretted that such ill-considered utterances, confused and confusing, should proceed from sources otherwise respectable and respected.

S. C. BARTLETT.

HANOVER, N. H.

ARTICLE X.

SEMITIC NOTE.

A JEW ON THE MISSION OF JUDAISM.

IN the *Fortnightly Review* for October, 1896, Dr. Oswald John Simon has a very interesting article on the "Mission of Judaism," which is striking not merely for the point of view of Judaism itself, but also as evidence of what is taking place in the minds of a certain class of Jews in the effort to become assimilated to the rest of the world in character, habits, and thought. That there should be any extensive desire to become thus amalgamated with the remaining faiths of the world in the practical aspects of religion is itself a suggestive circumstance.

In this connection there is a fact important to the understanding of the New Testament, especially the Pauline letters, which, though not new, may with wisdom be frequently emphasized. It is this : Christianity had, according to the New Testament writers, especially Paul, its greatest antithesis not in heathenism, but in Judaism. And the larger part of Paul's literary activity was spent in demonstrating this truth. Christianity in its universal aspect seemed to Paul, and the rest, to stand diametrically opposed to the fundamental idea of Israel, namely, an exclusive people with a peculiar history, revelation and a peculiar destiny. Not that they ever thoroughly freed themselves from the nomenclature of exclusive Judaism, but that, when they really reached the heights of Christianity, they saw a world-wide and human faith contrasted with an exclusive and national one.

Dr. Simon, after calling attention to the need for sympathy with Judaism and its religion, as necessary for its best interpretation, a statement undeniably a true one, proceeds to combat the idea that Judaism is in any sense an exclusive faith. Israel's very nationality is, he says, suspended, and the Jew is of every nation in the world ; while, by intermarriage, he has lost himself as an exclusive being in many cases. Still he says, that the Jew everywhere must still be conscious of the *Covenant of Israel*, and from this he will never be free. If it be alleged that the Jews had a peculiar history, laws, and had a kind of separateness as their distinctive feature of national growth and expansion, he says simply that this is a mistaken idea. The Ten Commandments were given to the Jews, but they were simply publishers for the world. So also of other great and fundamental truths of the belief. Jewish nationality, he affirms,

is merely a spiritual matter, and in that sense calculated to become the broadest basis for a world-wide spiritual nationality into which all men may come. The genius of the Jewish religion, according to this writer, is, strangely enough, *universality*. And in this universality lies its [Judaism's] conception of the Supreme Being. All other theistic conceptions are mere secessions from this one, universal conception which is said to be "*inherent*" in Judaism.

The writer does not stop with this singular point of view, for a "believing Jew." He even offers a line of practical approach, beginning with an assimilation with Unitarianism, and the elimination from the Jewish liturgy of relics of exclusive nationalism, and the adoption even of the Christian Lord's day, for uniformity of worship, and the leaving of many matters of ritual and personal government to the liberty of the individual. A full and comprehensive plan for an all-inclusive Judaism is thus offered. Christianity, he says, has superseded Paganism, but Judaism has never been superseded, and survives in the Christian belief.

Nor do the person of Christ and the reading and study of the New Testament offer insurmountable barriers. Christ as a Jewish teacher can be read and his words pondered and honored, of course with very different interpretations than those common, and much of the Old Testament may wisely be set aside for portions of the New, which are more profitable. He recalls having heard the Vedas read with approval in Westminster Abbey, and thinks a Judaistic congregation might with equal equanimity hear the words of Christ and Paul. Judaism is the sole impersonal, and therefore truly unselfish, religion; and such an one alone can be universal, and to this standard all the world can with satisfaction come.

This is a strange program from a Jew surely. But one wonders what becomes of the *Covenant of Israel* if the revelation to the Jews was not a peculiar one, nor they the custodians of the faith destined, in its fulfillment through Christ, to become the redemption of mankind. Judaism has not been superseded, this is true,—it has been fulfilled; and that is precisely the point. Christianity loses its rationale entirely on the theory of a world-wide Judaism. Christ himself becomes an uninterpretable being on such a theory of the mission of the Jews. Paul's great argument was that Jesus was the Messiah, and that the fulfillment of the prophetic hope was the dissolution of Judaism and its transformation into Christianity. It was not destruction truly, it was completion and expansion; and this is the very point upon which the disciples one after another had to break with Judaism. Under some theories of Christ's work and the New Testament, that universalizing process has not yet been comprehended; but an intelligible universal Christianity, which is the good tidings of great joy to all people, must be this, or merely another link in the narrow national faith of Jews.

The Jews as "publishers" is itself an interesting figure. The most conspicuous of the internal trials of the newly-founded Christian church

arose over just the matter as to whether the Jews were to publish their truths. So far as we are able to judge, the Jew was the most rigorous disciplinarian imaginable for the proselytes who accepted his faith ; and, from his point of view, he was right. He was Jehovah's special care and concern ; and it was this consciousness that made his nation so incomprehensibly great, in the world history, when his numbers and resources are considered. It is a never ceasing miracle of history that, out of so obscure a nation as the Jews, through Christ, there could arise such tremendous social and religious revolutions as Christianity has wrought. It was his exclusiveness that did it. It was the fact that he was separate ; that he did not court world-wide influence and expansion. It was the preservation of Israel's national and religious solidarity that made Christianity itself a logical possibility from such a source.

All this need not, however, be discussed again here. The main fact about the article quoted is the readiness to yield the last citadels of Judaism, namely, nationality and peculiarity, together with rites, symbols, holy days, liturgy, and all, to become a part of the world-wide movement of assimilation and religious unity. It is an interesting phenomenon. Such tolerance of Christ and the New Testament may well foreshadow a wider acceptance and a fuller mastery of the Pauline Christology, with the ultimate result of still wider acceptance of the gospel of Christ in its simple and apostolic sense. It will indeed be a universal Judaism which, when it reads the splendid prefigurations of the Messiah, will in the same breath lift up triumphant shouts of allegiance to Christ, and sing aloud on the heights, Hosanna to the Son of David ! This is He ! Blessed is he that cometh in Jehovah's name !

ARTICLE XI.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

BISHOP POTTER AND MACHINERY.

It sounds strange to hear one who is occupying so eminent a position as Bishop Potter of New York ascribe to machinery and labor-saving inventions the cause of modern industrial unrest and misery. The consumption of iron per capita is so clearly an index of civilization, no less than good roads and school-houses, and machinery and industry follow this so intimately that the argument need only be stated to be understood. Instead of degrading men to the level of the machine, machinery exalts idle and useless men to the dignity of producers and mechanics, and the sphere of the monotonous mechanic is a step upward in the scale of progress,—not a step backward or downward. The meager amount of ability required to do one thing might seem to the casual observer to degrade and demoralize a man of superior intelligence; but, in general, it raises because it makes useful the man who otherwise would be idle and dependent. The three economic graces are invention, machinery, industry; and they are the indexes of a high civilization, not of a barbarous or savage condition like that of India, China, Mexico. As Japan awakes to civilization it becomes a manufacturing nation. If Bishop Potter could visit Japan, he might lament that so many immortals were degraded by factory service; but, upon mature thought, it might occur to him to ask their condition before the machinery came along to become man's valuable partner in production. The evolution of the factory and its place in the modern economic world deserves judicious and not sentimental treatment. When industry ceases to be a blessing, the factory and the machine man may go; but, until then, the truest philanthropist will still remain the employer, and not the labor agitator, and much less the elaborate theorist.

The greatest philanthropist the world could produce to-day would send to India's millions of starving people some modern machinery, and let them become producers for the world's markets. It is idle and superficial to invite civilized nations to return to a savage or barbarous condition, where the consumption of iron per capita is an unknown quantity, instead of a ton to each person, as in the United States and England. Bishop Potter at least should know better.

PUBLIC OPINION VS. TRUSTS.

THERE seems to be a general uprising of the people against trusts and monopolies. The gas trust of Chicago, of which the only son of Abraham Lincoln is President, one of the most iniquitous and conscienceless of all trusts in existence, has received a careful overhauling in the report of the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics. The sugar trust may own some of the Senators in Washington, but the President is awake to its influence, and Broker Chapman is doing time for contempt. The steel-rail trust has gone to pieces, the iron-beam trust is broken, and New York is beginning action against the coal combine. Organized wealth and organized labor seem to have taken the people by the throat too long for the people's comfort or for their own safety, and it may be the new century will see the beginning of the end.

THE TELEPHONE MONOPOLY.

THE United States Supreme Court has decided that no fraud has been shown in the delay of thirteen years in issuing a patent to Emile Berliner for a telephone transmitter. Justice Harlan dissents, as it might be known he would; for he is of the people, by the people, and for the people. The real merit of the patent is not decided, and it never will be, for that outrageous monopoly, the Bell Telephone Company, will never bring suit on it except as a *casus belli* for purposes of a scare. Fifty millions of dollars are now invested in independent telephone plants, and the price of service is usually one-half of the monopoly prices. The idea that a patent can be made to protect a monopoly for thirty years, by delay in issuing, is absurd.

DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY.

THE daily newspaper is supposed to be a snap-shot at passing events. It is a kodak view of the forces that are at play in moving society and molding social conditions. If so, the Chicago press reveals the paramount influence of perverted truths. For the freedom of the press, libel has assumed sway; for right of contract, avarice has taken the place of the desire to acquire, and the result is trusts and monopolies that grind the poor and threaten the peace of our nation; for the rights of labor, the right to kill and wound non-union men stalks the streets in broad daylight.

In view of these facts, Chicago needs a Savonarola to call it back to sober truth and reason; to hew to the line and let the chips fall where they may. Churches are not dying because people move away. They are dying because they are not alive to the evils of our wicked city, or are afraid to tell the plain truth about it. Dr. Hillis has startled Chicago

by a sermon from his platform that is in the right direction, and it has received unqualified praise from all true friends of genuine reform, for it is founded on a plain statement of facts.

SOME RECENT LABOR LITERATURE.

OF the books before us on various phases of the social or labor question, the most valuable are the two by Mr. Stimson, of Boston, possibly the chief authority on American statute law.¹ His smaller work gives in a more popular form part of what is presented in more legal and yet clear phraseology in the later and larger work. These two books contain the best and practically the only readable condensation of the legislation and legal decisions of the various states and the national government on factory legislation, trades-unions, strikes, boycotts, blacklists, conspiracies, company stores, labor contracts, injunctions, etc.

Mr. Stimson believes that a mistake has been made in the recent injunction cases and the laws on which they were based, and urges a law requiring trial by jury in such cases. His words may be quoted in part. In his smaller book, "Labor in its Relations to Law," he writes: "As we now stand, any laborer, or class of laborers, though he has received no notice of suit in court, may find, any day, that an ordinary trespass or neglect of duty made by him will subject him to a criminal punishment without indictment, jury trial, or certain laws defining the extent of the punishment; he may possibly find himself in jail without a trial, though he himself has committed no overt act, but merely by being a member of a trades-union or combination, some of whom have committed an overt act of trespass, or, perhaps, even solely because the purpose of such combination or union has been, by a strike or boycott, directly or indirectly to interfere with transportation. . . . This receivership process, with the Interstate Commerce and the Anti-Trust laws, are the principal causes of this immense extension of the function of the Federal courts in the last few years, so that they have practically found themselves part of the executive of the government; and here, I think, is the greatest danger of all. Physically and morally our courts ought not to be required to stand such a strain. In fact, their power in so doing is far greater than that of the executive itself, for the reason that the executive is subject to the *habeas corpus* act and the ordinary restrictions of criminal process, but the equity courts, although the punishment, of course, is never extreme, are not. They, or their appellate courts, must themselves judge the propriety of their acts.

¹Labor in its Relations to Law. By F. J. Stimson. Pp. 146. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1895. 75 cents.

Handbook of the Labor Law of the United States. By F. J. Stimson. Pp. xxii, 286. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$1.50.

"We all want order maintained throughout the country, and most of us, doubtless, commended Mr. Cleveland for his prompt and forcible action in the Chicago strike; but, if such action had been expressly based upon the ground that the transportation of the mails was being interfered with, that riots and crimes were being committed which made, practically a state of insurrection, so that the republican form of government in certain localities was being threatened, rather than upon the ground so much less impressive to the public mind that certain equity processes of Federal courts were not being executed; and then, if all the offenders, whether arrested by troops or deputy-marshals, had been brought before the Federal grand jury, indicted and tried by a jury in the ordinary way, I cannot but think that the lesson to the people would have been better given and certain great dangers in the future avoided; for the government, and especially the judicial branch of the government, must not even appear to take sides in this labor question."

"The Evolution of Industry," by Henry Dyer,¹ who holds a prominent position in a technical college in Scotland, does not present a connected history of the evolution of industry, although throwing some side-lights upon it. The work is chiefly speculative, and neither very new nor informing. It has sensible views on trades-unions and coöperation, and is a good illustration of how the more moderate socialist school, to which the writer evidently belongs, only believes in collective activity so far as its successive stages, when gradually introduced, prove helpful to liberty and individuality. He agrees with Professor Foxwell and Rev. Washington Gladden, that what we most need is to "socialize the individual." He also well adds: "No society can ever rise above the average intelligence and conscience of the people. The present duty of all social reformers is, therefore, to educate public opinion in the direction of their ideals. At the same time they must not press their ideals too fast, for, as Herbert Spencer has reminded us, 'the policy of compromise, alike in institutions, in actions, and in beliefs, which especially characterizes English life, is a policy essential to a society going through the transitions caused by continual growth and development. . . . For the carrying on of social life, the old must continue so long as the new is not ready.'"

The work of Professor Nicholson² is disappointing to those who have been led to expect great things from the author of "Money and Monetary Problems," yet his doubts of the recent developments of trades-unionism and the demands for a living wage and old-age pensions merit consideration. When, however, he holds that the only justification for

¹The Evolution of Industry. By Henry Dyer. Pp. xi, 307. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1895. \$1.50.

²Strikes and Social Problems. By J. Shield Nicholson, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Edinburgh. Pp. viii, 238. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1896. \$1.25.

collective bargaining on the part of employes is the frequent combination, either tacit or open, of the "masters," he ignores the need for combination growing out of the ignorance, poverty, and other features which make the single laborer a poor bargainer, to the ultimate injury of all society.

In order to prove that the masses have most of the wealth, he asks us to note how large a proportion of the yearly product of industry is in the form of goods evidently destined, from their quality, etc., for the consumption of the many. He then naïvely assumes that we may fairly judge of this proportion by seeing what it may be in the case of food products! This assumption that as great a proportion of the value of personal services, furniture and furnishings, for example, goes to the wage-earner as of wheat or salt is a remarkable slip for so eminent an economist.

Most of the chapters are reprints of addresses, which always prevents any continuous treatment, but often adds a freshness to the style. In the address on the Relation of Political Economy to Journalism, he suggests that the reviewer of economic books now appearing in such increasing quantities "might find it worth while to get up the subject simply for this purpose. He then would be able to lay on the praise with less uniform thickness, or, in the converse case, to expose errors and plagiarisms in a way that would interest the general reader. Simple flattery or abuse in general terms is apt to become wearisome. It might even be contended with some appearance of plausibility that it is the duty of a reviewer to know something of a subject with which he has to deal!"

The author's chapter on a trip around Africa is the best in the book, illustrating, as it does, simple yet easily overlooked economic laws by the phenomena of an undeveloped country.

In the well-written and elegantly-printed work of Hake and Wesslau¹ we have the greatest exhibition of poor reasoning and unconscious humor issued by the English press for many a day. That men should write long chapters to try to show that we should have no restrictions on foreign trade, the issue of bank-notes, the sale of obscene literature and drink, the prize-fight or the bull-fight, and that we should not inspect the milk that is sold, or allow the municipality to contract any loans except those to be paid by the individuals voting therefor, is about as ridiculous a waste of time, though fortunately about as harmless, as well could be imagined. When the "printers to Her Majesty" can calmly issue such a book, we should, however, be careful how we attack the respectability of the anarchist!

Nothing could be more easily disproved than the authors' fundamental postulate, at least in the way they interpret it, "No man can benefit him-

¹ *The Coming Individualism.* By A. Egmont Hake and O. E. Wesslau. Pp. xii, 347. Westminster, England: Archibald, Constable & Co. 1895. \$4.00.

self, except by benefiting all men, and no man can injure others without injuring himself." The assumption is that these benefits and injuries are to be felt in this present life in a material shape, and that men will act according to this perfect realization of their economic interests. But men can only see, and that often imperfectly, even their immediate interests, which are very often in conflict with their remote industrial interests, and more often in conflict with those of society.

The absurd claim is made that the wealthy men of Great Britain, alarmed at the growth of social control, "can, despite any law that may be enacted to the contrary, at a moment's notice, transfer all their working capital to other countries." Yet, in other places, these writers claim matters are as bad elsewhere.

The cheering prospect is held out that, if collectivist control continues, a scare is likely to arise, which will lead the capitalists to send "urgent telegrams to all foreign ports, ordering the retention of all cargoes of food intended for these islands." Then would follow "an appalling famine in the country, and then a wolfish struggle for sheer existence, involving all the horrors recorded of beleaguered cities and shipwrecked crews." If this does not scare the London County Council, the case would seem hopeless—for the writers, though, happily, not for the people.

On pages 93-94 occurs the most startling yet apparently unconscious exposure of the ethics of modern business that we have seen for many a day. An act was passed in England, it seems, requiring that all goods made abroad should have that fact stamped on the goods. Criticising this, the authors say, "Before the passing of the Act, British merchants sold at home and abroad British and foreign goods indiscriminately, after stamping them *all with their own brands*. [The italics are ours.] In this way, British commerce all over the world swelled beyond Britain's power of production." Now the German manufacturer supplies the cheap goods directly to foreign countries. "If he cannot make the good qualities as well and as cheaply as they are made in Great Britain, he orders these from us *on the condition that his own name and German address shall be affixed, and there is hardly any manufacturer, who, pressed by competition, would not consent to this*. . . . Anxious to thrust aside British trade in all parts of the world, *the German manufacturer stamps all his inferior qualities with English marks* and never allows the cheap rubbish he may buy in Great Britain to be stamped with his name and mark."

From considerable evidence at hand it is greatly to be feared that business morals are no better in America.

E. W. B.

ARTICLE XII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

G. B. WINER'S GRAMMATIK DES NEUTESTAMENTLICHEN SPRACHIDIOMS. Achte Auflage, neu bearbeitet von Dr. PAUL W. SCHMIEDEL, ord. Professor der Theologie an der Universität Zürich. II Theil: Syntax. Erstes Heft. Göttingen. 1897.

An idea of the labor expended by Professor Schmiedel upon this new edition of Winer may be formed from the fact that, although the First Part of the book appeared in 1894, we receive now, after the lapse of nearly three years, an instalment of the Syntax covering but sixty-four pages. But examination will silence complaint. The Grammar is Winer's in little more than name. Substantially it is a new work. The completeness of its reconstruction may be indicated by the statement that on a single page (p. 149) the marginal references to the pages of the original amount to eight within the compass of seventeen lines. Professor Schmiedel has wisely relegated to the bottom of the page the philological references with which Winer encumbered his text and distracted the student's attention. He has sifted and supplemented them with infinite pains. By their variety and completeness they must command the respect of the professional philologist, even if they do not often render him welcome help in his researches.

But the book, in its present as in its original form, is designed primarily for theologians. And it admirably meets their needs. Professor Schmiedel has carefully sought out the exegetical problems of the New Testament, and made his book in effect a grammatical commentary on the more difficult or debated passages. Seldom will an inquirer leave it with his grammatical questions unanswered. Its compact fullness can be exhibited only by an array of details for which this is not the place; but passing mention may be made of a few particulars taken almost at random. Dr. Schmiedel devotes more than two fine-print pages to a discussion of the use of *ῥῆμος* in the Epistles of Paul, and "it must be admitted (says Middleton, ed. Rose, p. 303) that there is scarcely any greater difficulty in the whole New Testament." He reaches the conclusion that the reference of the word to the Mosaic "law" is not determined by the presence or the absence of the article with it. Similarly he disagrees with those who would decide by the use or the omission of the article with *πρεβυα* (*δύω*) whether the term denotes a *person* or an *influence*.

In Acts xx. 28 he expresses his preference for the reading *τοῦ κυρίου*; and in Titus ii. 13; 2 Peter i. 1, he leaves (with Winer § 19, Remark 1) the settlement of the translation to considerations other than grammatical. He dissents from the conclusions drawn by Professor Ramsay (in the *Expositor* for July, 1895, pp. 29 ff.) from the use of a single article in classifications in the book of Acts; and he adopts in Hebrews xii. 17 the first of the renderings preferred by the American Revisers.

All biblical students will be glad to learn that there is a well-founded prospect that the work will reach its completion by the end of the present year.

J. HENRY THAYER.

HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL.

DIE PAULINISCHEN BRIEFE im berichtigten Text, mit kurzer Erläuterung zum Handgebrauch bei der Schriftlektüre, D. BERNHARD WEISS. Pp. 682. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1896. M.12.50.

Dr. Weiss has long been known as a New Testament exegete. His "Life of Jesus," "New Testament Introduction," "Biblical Theology of the New Testament," and the last editions of Meyer's Commentary which have come so largely from his hand, have probably been more widely read than the works of any other German New-Testament scholar now living. The last great work of his long and richly productive life is in the department of textual criticism. He has undertaken the task of making a text of the New Testament in three parts. The first part contains Acts, the Catholic Epistles, and the Apocalypse. The second part is the present volume, the Pauline Epistles, including Hebrews. The third part will contain the Gospels. The present volume gives the new text together with a brief running commentary designed primarily to justify exegetically Dr. Weiss's textual views. The commentary will be of great value, considered apart from its textual bearing, for it expresses in compact form the author's exegetical views upon some portions of the New Testament which he has not elsewhere treated exegetically. In the case of Romans, Hebrews, and the Pastoral Epistles, this commentary is an abridgment of his work upon these Epistles in Meyer.

The present volume does not give and discuss the various readings in view of which the text has been formed. It presents simply the completed text. To discover the process by which the text was formed, the reader must go to Gebhardt and Harnack's "Texte und Untersuchungen," xiv. 3. But there only the process and the result in each individual passage are given; so that one needs both that volume and the present one, if he would see both process and completed text.

The fact that Dr. Weiss approaches the work of textual criticism from the standpoint of exegesis, is to his advantage. His exegetical studies have brought him into such close sympathy with the thought of the writers, and have made him so familiar with their style, that passages

may be intelligible to him which one less familiar with thought and style might think it necessary to emend. The author takes a wisely conservative view of the duties of a textual critic, keeping closely by manuscript authority and being loath to suggest emendations of the text. Much of the irregularity and roughness of style which one is tempted to remove by textual emendations, Dr. Weiss considers to be fully explained by the fact that Paul dictated his correspondence, and by the farther fact that he was never equal to a facile use of the Greek language.

One disadvantage under which an exegete labors who, late in life, undertakes textual criticism, is the temptation to make the text sustain his preconceived exegetical views. One is relieved to find that Dr. Weiss does not labor under this disadvantage, for he has really been a textual critic for many years, and has reached his exegetical conclusions in connection with careful textual study. He represents himself as having long been dissatisfied with the current judgment of exegetes regarding the value of the various manuscripts, and even with the judgments of textual experts regarding variant readings in many important passages. It has therefore long been his habit (according to the statement in the preface to *Texte und Untersuchungen*, xiv. 3) to make his own text, and the present textual discussions, except in the case of the Gospels, are based upon the notes gathered during many years of textual study. The distinguishing feature of his work seems to be the importance which he attaches to a study of the distinctive errors and of the peculiar character of the variant readings found in a given manuscript. The application of this principle results in assigning a high place to B. This high estimate of B brings him into accord with Westcott and Hort, and his results are not widely different from theirs.

E. I. BOSWORTH.

A PRACTICAL METHOD IN THE MODERN GREEK LANGUAGE. By EUGENE RIZO-RANGABE. Pp. vii, 249. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1896.

This little book endeavors, by a series of easy conversational lessons, to introduce the traveler, whether a classical scholar or not, to the modern Greek language. It aims to give not simply the forms of polite speech as they occur in literature and public address, but also the forms of the popular, unwritten language, of which there are very many. It contains an English-Greek vocabulary that will be useful to the traveler. The increasing number of books introductory to modern Greek is a hopeful sign. The time will come when the ability to speak modern Greek will be considered as essential to the equipment of a professor of Greek as is the ability to speak German in the case of the professor of the German language and literature. Especially is an acquaintance with modern Greek of value to the New Testament student, for he finds certain tendencies in New Testament Greek, which he might not otherwise understand, explained by their full development in the modern language.

LECTURES ON PROPHECY: An Exposition of Certain Scriptures with Reference to the History and End of the Papacy; the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine, their Repentance and Enlargement under the Reign of the Son of David; and the New State in the Millennium. By Rev. BENJAMIN H. CHARLES, D.D. Pp. 320. Chicago, New York, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.50.

This volume is a typical illustration of current defenses and applications of the premillennial theory of the second coming of Christ. The author does not believe that "the world will grow gradually better and better till all shall become righteous" (p. 302), but that when Christ comes to usher in the millennium "he will find the whole earth, save a small flock, in rebellion against him" (p. 303). This event he expects to take place as soon as the gospel "has been preached as a witness to all nations" (p. 304); but the thousand years he believes to be prophetic years in which a day stands for a year; so that the whole length of the millennium will be three hundred and sixty thousand years.

LIFE AFTER DEATH, and the Future of the Kingdom of God. By Bishop LARS NIELSEN DAHLE, Knight of St. Olaf. Translated from the Norse by the Rev. JOHN BEVERIDGE, M.A., B.D. Pp. xii, 456. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.50.

In this volume the eminent missionary bishop, Dahle, has given the world one of the most elaborated and carefully thought out treatises which have appeared upon the subject of life after death considered from a purely biblical point of view. In preparation for the work, the author combines deep piety, wide and successful experience in missionary work, extensive and minute knowledge of the literature of the subject, profound philosophical attainments, and the ability to express his thought in clear and simple language; and he has produced, in consequence, a volume of superior worth. The point of view from which it was written is that of the orthodoxy of the conservative wing of the Lutheran Church. His reverence for the Bible is refreshing, while his painstaking interpretation of it is always instructive, even when it leads to questionable conclusions, which is very seldom.

It will be sufficient to note the author's opinion upon one or two controverted questions. The section upon the Intermediate State occupies one hundred and fifty pages. In this he maintains that we may barely cherish a hope that the offers of the gospel are made after death to such impenitent persons as have not had it presented to them in this life. He interprets First Peter ii. 18-22 as referring to a personal preaching by Christ between his resurrection and his ascension, but is very cautious in the inferences which he draws from the fact. "An after-death preaching of the gospel to the heathen only turns upon a hope, a possibility, and is nowhere absolutely set forth as certain" (p. 209). "We may entertain a hope that God will provide for them an opportunity for salvation without our coöperation, but yet that is only a hope and a possibility. . . . That hope must not be a pillow to our indolence, but only a

consolation against the despair which is apt to possess us when we think of the many who will pass away without knowledge of salvation. . . . That others may come and save them is an uncertain possibility" (p. 210).

Upon the subjects of the Millennium, the Lord's Appearing, the Resurrection, and the Judgment, the discussion is equally full and judicious, holding closely to the interpretation of biblical passages, and maintaining that both Gentiles and Jews are to be converted before the coming of the end, and that the millennial reign of Christ after the first resurrection is not to be on earth, but in heaven; while the binding of Satan will allow the church which remains on earth to have freer scope and more phenomenal success in working out everywhere the peaceable fruits of righteousness.

FORETOKENS OF IMMORTALITY. By NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS. Pp. 75. Chicago, New York, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 75 cents.

This latest work of Dr. Hillis' is a poem in prose. The subject gives wide scope for the reason and the imagination, and Dr. Hillis is gifted in both. His genius lies in seizing upon a vast array of facts and then clothing them in most attractive garb. We have all wandered through the Socratic argument, and reassured our minds that our hopes in immortality are well founded; for we must think that God is perfect, and that perfection is the end of all creation. But Dr. Hillis brings the subject so startlingly fresh before the mind, and has such a charming way of putting it, that we find no place or wish to differ from him, but move on in sympathy with his argument until we are pleased to be convinced.

A belief in the resurrection is the child of faith, and in the soul's immortality is the child of hope. Now abideth faith and hope. Faith rises above the mere canons of historical criticism as easily as hope transcends the processes of the reason. As poetry, music, and art spring full-orbed from the soul, and ask no sanction from logic, nor are amenable to the intellectual domain, so the deepest love of the heart clings to the fact of the resurrection and to the hope of immortality. The love of philosophy could not compare with the earnest solicitude for the eternal to-morrow of Socrates, when Phædo and the loving disciples watched him drink the fatal hemlock. The law of opposites was of little importance, except as it might furnish a ground for belief that the longing of their hearts for a continuation of their friendship and intercourse with their departing friend must find its answer in the future life.

That Christ rose from the dead is believed by all in whose hearts Christ has risen, and is doubted by all who find no hunger of soul for it to satisfy. The intellect reflects the sunlight of the spiritual nature or gropes in the darkness of spiritual death. It is the servant, not the master, of our hopes and of our faith. Spiritual instincts transcend the reason, though not contra-rational. The soul hath its hungering and thirsting after growth and perfection, and the corollary is immortality. The mind

believes it because the heart demands it. Hence Dr. Hillis halts not at the gateway to convince the doubting and the skeptical that harmony is divine law, and the harp is a mere incident; that the soul is the reality, and the body the accident. Beecher said that the preacher must not swing on the gate, but open it to pass through into the garden. This Dr. Hillis always does; for he fills the soul full of new music, the mind full of new thought, the heart full of new hopes, and the will full of new purpose. The authority with which he speaks is that of principles no less than of a strong personality. He says, Come; never, Go. The processes of logic are hidden from view in the torrent of argument, the wealth of illustration, the fold and drapery of his thought so rich in metaphor and simile. No one can read his book without believing and hoping that death does not end all, and, what is best, renewing the effort for a crowning mastery while in the body.

Z. S. H.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. (Library of Biblical and Theological Literature.) By JOHN FLETCHER HURST. Volume I. Pp. xxvi, 950. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Curts & Jennings. \$5.00.

Among the many valuable church histories which the present century has produced, this of Bishop Hurst must long take a prominent place. The subject-matter was originally gathered for use with classes of theological students, and was repeated to them annually during a period of ten years. But nearly twenty years more of labor have been required to prepare it for publication. Every page bears marks of this long-continued labor, both in the carefully considered sentences of the narrative and in the abundant footnotes, which contain a well-nigh exhaustive body of references to the literature of the subject. The use of the volume is greatly facilitated, also, by an indented analysis of the subject-matter, which readily catches the eye, and calls attention to the specific points under discussion in almost every paragraph. The work is also accompanied by several original maps which illustrate in colors the development of Christianity at various stages of its progress; while fourteen pages are required for the bibliography of the subject. In short, the whole conception of the work is as nearly perfect as it can be, insuring for it a favorable reception by all who are interested in church history.

Nor will the reader be disappointed in the execution of the plan. The style is clear and straightforward, the references are remarkably accurate as well as varied, and the point of view from which the various subjects are approached is both judicial and evangelical. Indeed, the work is not the product of a theoretical historian with a lopsided hypothesis to maintain, but of one who has a generous appreciation of all the spiritual forces which have entered into the progress of Christian history. For instance, in his discussion of Montanism, our author recognizes, with Schaff and others, the analogy between it and the numerous modern forms of protest against various evils of the church; such as, Anabaptism, Puritanism, Quakerism, and Second-Adventism. It is specially instructive to note

the quickness with which John Wesley's insight recognized its real character. Upon this our author well remarks:—

“One of the chief reasons for the zeal of the bishops against Montanism was its earnest insistence on the priesthood of all believers, and its opposition to all hierarchical assumptions. In this it anticipated Puritanism and Methodism, with both of which it had many points in common. Wesley was one of the first moderns to speak a strong word for Montanism. He says: ‘By the best information we can procure at this distance of time it seems that Montanus was not only a truly good man, but one of the best men then upon earth; and that his real crime was the severely reproving those who professed themselves Christians while they neither had the mind that was in Christ nor walked as Christ walked, but were conformable, both in their temper and practice, to the present evil world.’ Here, as well as elsewhere, Wesley anticipates the verdict of the most recent historians, like Harnack and McGiffert, who have completely reversed the judgment of the old writers” (pp. 239–240).

The style and character of Bishop Hurst's work is well illustrated in his presentation of the relation of tradition to the written word in the early history of the church. He easily and clearly exposes the fallacy of those who maintain that in the early part of the second century the history of Christ and of the apostles was in a fluid state dependent about as much upon tradition as upon written documents. Thus he well remarks:—

“Tradition, therefore, in this first period of the church was simply that unwritten construction of doctrine which afterward assumed fixed form in the great symbols of the church. It was the beginning of the formularization of doctrine, and was never regarded as a substitute for the inspired and written word of God. Its later perversion took place in the Western church, the Eastern never finding a hierarchical motive strong enough to elevate it into equality with the written word. As Rome found reason to clothe its episcopacy with all possible functions tradition came in for its share of honor. What Tertullian had said, in the earlier and purer days, was easily forgotten, ‘Truth is older than all things’; and Cyprian had strongly declared, ‘Custom without truth is the old age of error.’ But these great teachers of the West were silenced amid the strife for building up Rome into a great ecclesiastical center, which, in due time, held its long mastery over the whole of Western Christendom” (p. 278).

If the succeeding volumes of the series are carried out in spirit and ability equal to that displayed in the present volume, there can be little hesitancy in recommending to those who are likely to depend upon a single author for their knowledge of church history, this above all other works of its kind; while its literary references will be invaluable to those who are making a thoroughgoing study of the subject.

NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. By GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ. Together with an Appendix consisting of some of his Shorter Pieces. Translated from the Original Latin, French, and German, with Notes. By ALFRED GIDEON LANGLEY. Pp. xx, 862. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$3.25.

In this carefully translated and elegantly printed volume we have brought within the reach of the English public a great mass of important new material from one of the greatest philosophers of the world. The Index itself occupies eighty pages. As Professor Morris has well said, "It suggests no favorable comment on the philosophic interest of the countrymen of Locke" that Leibnitz's reply to Locke was not long ago translated into English. The present volume, with its abundant footnotes, will therefore be of great value to English students; for, in many respects, Leibnitz is the best antidote for Locke. The translation of the Essays proper occupies about six hundred pages, and traverses Locke's ground in detail respecting Innate Ideas, Ideas in General, Words as expressing Ideas, and the Nature and Extent of Human Knowledge; while the Appendix contains several most important essays concerning Dynamics and the Nature of Matter. It is illustrative of Leibnitz's great penetration of mind that the modern doctrine of the conservation of energy was clearly stated by him, since he perceived that when the motion of two moving bodies is arrested by their coming into collision with each other, the motion still exists in the greater activity of the molecules, which shows itself in a rise of the temperature of the bodies. This Leibnitz compared to the breaking up of a large coin into smaller pieces of change in which the sum of value remains constant.

The student of philosophy, and indeed the general reader, will find this volume of great value in getting at the central ideas of philosophy which have occupied the thoughts of men from Plato down, and in whose discussions the late writers do not have any material advantage over the earlier.

THE MYCENÆAN AGE: A Study of the Monuments and Culture of Pre-Homeric Greece. By Dr. CHRESTOS TSOUNTAS, Ephor of Antiquities and Director of Excavations at Mycenæ, and J. IRVING MANATT, Ph. D., LL.D., Professor of Greek Literature and History in Brown University. With an Introduction by Dr. DÖRPFELD. Pp. 417. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1897. \$6.00.

This book is finely illustrated and intensely interesting, containing as it does the latest results of exploration in Mycenæan fields, besides including a rapid sketch of former discoveries and of monuments known in classical times, a statement of opinions formerly held, a careful and conservative study of the bearing of the Homeric poems upon the subject, and a discussion of the problems connected with Mycenæan chronology and the identity of the race whose remarkable works have been revealed by the spade. The fortress-city of the Heroic Age, the palace,

the private house, the tombs or dwellings of the dead, the domestic life of the people, their dress and ornaments, their arms and methods of warfare, their works of art, and even their religion are all made to pass before the reader with no diminution of interest in a single particular. The eminent fitness of Professor Manatt for the task is not the only thing revealed by the harmonious whole which has resulted from his combining the *Μυκήναι καὶ Μυκηναῖος Πολιτισμοὶ*, published at Athens by Dr. Tsountas in 1893, with the results of another three years of exploration in that and kindred fields; for it is clear throughout the entire volume that his own personal interest in the subject has been of the highest order.

In the introduction, Dr. Dörpfeld has brought out the points in which he, as an architect, differs from the conclusions arrived at in the main work; but to the layman it is not always plain that the weight of the evidence is not with the view presented in the book, although in some cases it seems clear that he is right; as, for example, in the matter of the filling in of the entrance to the great beehive tombs. Many of these matters have not yet passed out of the stage where the judgment of experts, which is sure to differ, is all that we have to depend upon; but even in places where there is room for an honest difference of opinion, the position taken in the text is so candid and so clearly stated that it disarms any but the most friendly criticism.

Not the least interesting thing in the volume is Appendix A: The Mycænæan Troy. Dr. Dörpfeld has now shown that the Troy of Homer was not the second city on Hissarlik, as has been supposed since Dr. Schliemann made his remarkable discoveries; but the sixth, chronologically speaking, or the third below the Roman Ilium; for the spot seems to have had nine successive cities built upon it before the year 500 A.D. The details of the new discoveries and the conclusions drawn from them in these matters make up the substance of this appendix. But the book is fortunate in another particular; it has an excellent index, the work of Dr. Barker Newhall, who is himself a careful and accurate scholar, and this adds not a little to its usefulness and to the appreciation which it is bound to have at the hands of scholars.

H. W. MAGOUN.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS selected from *The Guardian*, *The Times*, and *The Saturday Review*, 1846-1890. By the late R. W. CHURCH, M.A., D.C.L., some time Rector of Whatley, Dean of St. Paul's, Honorary Fellow of Oriel College. In two Volumes. Pp. xiv, 416; viii, 492. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$3.00.

Dean Church was one of the best representatives of the conservative members of the English clergymen of the present century. In addition to his regular duties he was a weekly contributor for a long period to the *Guardian*, and a frequent contributor to the *Saturday Review* and the *London Times*. To the *Guardian* he contributed no less than a thousand reviews and articles. Indeed, his writings may be said to have given character to that influential paper more than those of any other one per-

son. While belonging to the Evangelical party, he was by no means illiberal in his attitude towards scientific subjects, being a close friend and correspondent of Professor Asa Gray. The sympathy of the two men with each other appears in Gray's "Life and Letters," where we learn that during his trip up the Nile Dean Church's sermons were regularly read at the Sunday services.

The present volumes give a well-selected collection of the author's writings upon a large number of questions of permanent interest. In them the reader will find a thorough analysis and estimate of Dean Stanley's writings, of Gladstone's attitude towards the English Church, of Mozley's lectures on miracles, of Renan's various works, of the writings of Maurice, of Cardinal Newman, and various other subjects, amounting in all to more than fifty. They represent the high scholarship and the earnest thought of the best element in the Church of England.

THE CHURCH AND MODERN SOCIETY. Lectures and Addresses. By JOHN IRELAND, Archbishop of St. Paul. Second Edition. Pp. vi, 416. Chicago and New York: D. H. McBride & Co.

Archbishop Ireland presents the case of the Catholic Church in its relations to American civilization in its most attractive form. Doubtless there is much misapprehension concerning the adaptability of this church to modern society in its varied new developments. We welcome the influence of the liberalizing elements which Archbishop Ireland represents. The addresses upon the subject of temperance are specially significant and helpful, and, in general, the volume is a noble protest against the materialistic tendencies of the age.

CHOSEN OF GOD. By Rev. HERBERT W. LATHE. Pp. 306. Chicago, New York, and Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25.

This volume of discourses combines in a remarkable degree keen intellectual insight into the spiritual forces of Christianity, deep spirituality, and simple, elegant literary diction. Its keynote is, "Hope thou in God." The basis for hope presented is the love of God for us. It presents the truths of the Calvinistic idea in its most helpful and attractive form. The truths here emphasized are much needed in this restless age.

THE ETHICS OF GAMBLING. By W. DOUGLAS MACKENZIE, M.A. Pp. 64. Philadelphia: Henry Altemus.

Professor Mackenzie's discussion was prepared for the English reading public, which evidently looks upon horseracing and betting with more favor than is done in America; but there are many indications that in this country we are not wholly past the danger from this and other forms of the gambling mania. This able discussion of the subject is, therefore, both timely and most welcome. Gambling, that is, disposing of property by chance, is shown to be an act in which "a man deliberately and as completely as possible forsakes his manhood, and resolves to deal with

his own property and that of his neighbor on a non-human principle. It is his wish to get as far as he can away from reason into a region that is to him irrational, where the laws of love and labor, knowledge and skill, do not follow" (p. 27). The act of thus disregarding the high prerogatives of human reason in regulating our affairs is, like drunkenness, not incidentally, but fundamentally wrong.

CHAMPIONS OF CHRISTIANITY. By SILAS FARMER, author of "History of Detroit and Michigan," "The Royal Railroad," etc. Pp. 140. New York: Hunt & Eaton; Cincinnati: Curts & Jennings. 60 cents.

A convenient collection of facts revealing the attitude of a large number of men eminent in every branch of human endeavor who are at the same time devout followers of Christ.

JULIAN M. STURTEVANT. Edited by J. M. STURTEVANT. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25.

In this excellently edited volume we are furnished with a most important addition to the materials out of which the history of our country is to be written. President Sturtevant's career is typical among the builders of our nation, and in this "Autobiography" he has given the story with telling effect. Born in Connecticut in the first decade of the century, he was driven westward with his parents by the economical changes occasioned by the War of 1812. Having prepared for college in one of the first academies opened amid the forests of Ohio, he went back to Connecticut to graduate from Yale. Soon after he responded to a call for the establishment of an educational institution on the prairies of Illinois, where for more than a generation his influence was not only predominant in local educational affairs, but became national in reputation. Illinois College at Jacksonville is a monument to his self-denial; while through his books and pupils he profoundly affected the destinies of the whole country. Lincoln was one of his associates, and Yates, the great war governor of Illinois, one of his admiring pupils. President Sturtevant was one of the distinguished men encouraged to go abroad by the Government during the Civil War to assist in molding the public sentiment of England in favor of the North. No man can understand the growth and the history of the United States unless he has read the biography of such men as Julian Sturtevant.

ADONIRAM JUDSON GORDON. A Biography, with Letters and Illustrative Extracts from Unpublished or Uncollected Sermons and Addresses. By his Son ERNEST B. GORDON. Pp. 386. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.50.

To the wide circle of Dr. Gordon's personal acquaintances, this biography, with its lifelike portrait, will be specially welcome; while it deserves in every respect a wide circulation, and will interest every one who reads it. The story of Dr. Gordon's early days, conversion, and college life, and of his long and remarkably successful career of labor in Boston,

is well told by his son. Few lives have been more fruitful than his, and few personalities more symmetrical, lovable, and strong. The chapter on Dr. Gordon's humor reveals a side of his life that few of his public admirers would suspect, but which is exceedingly interesting. Theological students and young ministers will find this volume most helpful, and everybody will find it most interesting; while the student of history will find it essential to a proper understanding of New England society and the forces out of which it has developed.

THE RECOLLECTIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. Edited by the COMTE DE TOCQUEVILLE, and now first translated into English by ALEXANDER TEIXEIRA DE MATOS. With a Portrait in Heliogravure. Pp. xiv, 410. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$4.50.

The distinguished author of the great work on "American Democracy" which appeared in 1835 became a conspicuous actor in the French Revolution of 1848. In this volume he gives an extended account of his experiences from the beginning of the Revolution to the 30th of October, 1849, together with a comprehensive discussion of its causes and results. It is an indispensable document for the proper understanding of that eventful period.

LIFE AND TIMES OF GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA. By Professor PASQUALE VILLARI. Translated by LINDA VILLARI. Pp. 792. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

This book is old wine in new bottles. The standard life of Savonarola has been, and will continue to be, Villari's. This popular edition is in compact form, on good paper, and has good print. It will therefore be welcome to all students, for the world will no more lose its interest in the Dominican monk who attempted such practical and heroic reforms than it will in the Augustinian monk who posted his theses and reformed the theology of his times.

All the world loves a lover, said Emerson; and it is even more true that all the world loves a reformer. There is not likely to be any new biographies of Savonarola that can add to our knowledge of the man or his times; for even George Eliot in her "Romola" has made no particular contribution to the literature on the subject. Ranke's "History of the Popes" and the "Biographie Universelle" together with Villari cover the entire subject.

BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES. A Study of the Conditions of the Production and Distribution of Literature from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the Close of the Seventeenth Century. By GEO. HAVEN PUTNAM, A.M. Two Volumes. Vol. I.—A.D. 476-1600. Vol. II.—A.D. 1500-1709 (the date of the first copyright statute). New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Sold separately. 8vo, gilt tops, each \$2.50.

These two volumes are a tribute to the remarkable state of perfection to which printing and bookmaking has been brought in this day by such lead-

ers in the art as the Knickerbocker Press, but they are a higher tribute to the knowledge of books and of the history of bookmaking that the head of that great publishing-house possesses. It has seldom come to our notice to review books so mechanically perfect as these are. The paper, the binding, the typography, is beyond criticism, and, considering the price of the volumes, is worthy of especial notice and commendation.

The amount of information contained in the two volumes is a library in itself, and reveals scholarly research, perfect familiarity with the art of bookmaking from the earliest times, the most painstaking habits of thought, and the close discrimination of a careful thinker. Volume I. treats of books in manuscript, and Volume II. of the earlier printed books. In the first, the ground covered is the making of books in the monasteries; the libraries of the manuscript period; the making of books in the early universities, and the book-trade in the manuscript period. Volume II. treats of the printer-publishers of France; Caxton and the introduction of printing into England; the Kobergers of Nuremberg; Erasmus and his books; Luther as an author; the Elzevirs of Leyden and Amsterdam, besides a careful review of privileges, censorship, and legislation in Italy, Germany, France, and England.

No library is complete without these volumes. They are a monument to the honored chief of one of the finest publishing-houses in the world.

THEORETICAL ETHICS. By MILTON VALENTINE, D.D., LL.D., Ex-President of Pennsylvania College, and Professor of Theology in the Lutheran Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa., author of *Natural Theology, or Rational Theism*. Pp. 232. Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co 1897.

One who has read Dr. Valentine's "*Natural Theology*," takes up this little volume with the expectation of finding clear and vigorous thinking and luminous writing; and he is not altogether disappointed. It is refreshing to find a treatment of the psychology of the moral agent, the being we know as man, without beginning with the oyster or the earth-worm, and being left at last in doubt whether the human soul differs in kind or degree from the insignificant embodiment of nervous susceptibility with which we began. Dr. Valentine takes man as he finds him, endowed with rational intellect, sensibility, and free will, and leaves the evolutionary biologist to amuse himself with the problem how he came to be what he is. What he is, is all that essentially concerns the ethical philosopher.

The author finds in the constitution of the moral being a rational perception which he designates conscience, by which he perceives the right which exists as the moral quality in act or conduct in connection with which perception there arises the emotion or feeling of obligation. The right comes first in sight as an objective fact in the presence of contemplated action, and the obligation arises with the attendant feeling. The

primary fact is the moral quality inherent in the action. The perception and the feeling which follow impose the obligation. I ought to love my neighbor because conscience perceives the quality of rightness in the act, which belongs to it in its essential nature, and the accompanying emotion enforces it as obligation and duty. The rightness of the act is an ultimate fact, back of which we do not need to look—a part of the moral order of the universe existing in the righteous nature of God and expressed in the work of his hands. It is not the result of his will, not a creation, but it exists eternally in his being. Such a conception may transcend our thought, but it is among the mysteries involved in the conception of God.

This moral quality belonging to action is perceived by men with different degrees of clearness and the sense of obligation varies with the varying distinctness of perception; hence conscience is not infallible, but it is the authoritative moral guide for every man, and his moral conduct and character must be as imperfect as his perception. We cannot fall back upon the comforting thought that it is the purpose or intention of the agent to do right, even if he fails to perceive it. Intending to do right is very important, but it cannot be accepted in conduct or character for the doing. Acting thus under mistake, "we have maintained our own personal moral integrity, in maintaining that which is the fundamental and essential element of all morality, the right intention and effort. This is the prime and the grandest element of all moral character, and is itself more than four-fifths of conduct." It seems a pity that since the right intention can count for so much, it could not be accepted for the small fraction of obligation which remains and set the agent right at the bar of duty. But this is asking more than the author feels able to grant. In his view the moral element extends beyond intention and purpose through all the activities of thought and feeling and volition, and exists even in the constitutional or hereditary predispositions and impulses which lie back of all these activities, and we reach at length the puerile declaration that "no amount of good intention can make blasphemy or murder right or virtuous." Of course; for the bad intention is involved in the words "blasphemy" and "murder." Murder is not the mere killing of a man, but the killing of a man with an evil purpose. To kill a man in self-defense or by pure accident as an executor of a law is not murder. When these discriminations are made, the author's statement becomes a mere truism, like saying that no amount of good intention can make a bad intention right. It is vain to look for light out of such confusion.

How much simpler and clearer and more satisfying is the view which finds all obligation arising in the presence of well-being, and directed toward that absolute good. The value of this good is the reason for every duty. I am bound to love my neighbor, that is, to stand ready to promote his good, because that good is valuable in itself, and the persistent

purpose of fidelity to this good is the sum and substance of righteous character. While this remains, it governs all the conduct, and all obligation is met. There may be misjudgments and mistakes, but the man stands approved of God and of all moral beings. That righteous purpose toward well-being is the love which fulfills the law. This benevolence the author characterizes as Utilitarianism, but there is no excuse for applying this term opprobriously since Jonathan Edwards wrote his immortal treatise on "The Nature of Virtue," or even since Paul wrote the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians.

J. H. FAIRCHILD.

AGNOSTICISM AND RELIGION. By JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN, President of Cornell University. Pp. 182. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. \$1.00.

Dr. Schurman's analysis of Professor Huxley is exceedingly acute and on the whole satisfactory. As a philosopher, he clearly and easily uncovers the weakness of the narrow-minded devotees of physical science. One of the most striking passages in the volume is that which contrasts Charles Darwin with Abraham Lincoln, showing how much better equipped, in all the essential knowledge of human nature, the man of action was than the mere devotee of physical science was. Lincoln, from the very exigencies of his situation, became a profound believer in God; illustrating the truth of Gladstone's remark, "that the description of persons who are engaged in political employment, or who are in any way habitually conversant with human nature, conduct, and concerns, are very much less borne down by skepticism than specialists of various kinds and those whose pursuits have associated them with the study, history, and framework of inanimate nature. How can this latter class be expected to tell us anything about that of which they have had no experience? The oracle to consult in matters of religion is the man of faith and action, not the man of skepticism and science" (p. 71).

EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS OF ST. PAUL'S FIRST EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.

By H. P. LIDDON. Pp. 93. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1897.

This book, as its title indicates, is not a commentary. It does not discuss the questions connected with Introduction, and does not give detailed comments. It is an analysis in which each phrase of the text is carefully numbered and labeled. A series of fine-print "observations" to some extent takes the place of exegetical comments, and contains valuable material. The method of arrangement is the same as that in the author's "Explanatory Analysis of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans." The analysis of Timothy was drawn up by Dr. Liddon for the use of his classes in connection with his lectures as Ireland Professor of Exegesis, and was first privately printed in 1877. The fact that it is only a syllabus accounts for its seeming somewhat mechanical at times. Although there is no discussion of authenticity and date, the Pauline authorship is assumed throughout.

CHRISTIAN LIFE IN GERMANY as seen in the State and the Church. By EDWARD F. WILLIAMS, D.D., Western Editor of *The Congregationalist*. Pp. 320. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1896. \$1.50.

The sociological student will find in this book of Dr. Williams a fund of information worthy of careful perusal and study. It is an appreciative and discriminating study of social conditions in Germany, and presents a vast array of facts on such important subjects as "Care of Defectives and the Sick," "Prostitution," "Social and Industrial Movements," "Intellectual Training," "Drunkenness." Dr. Williams is a most careful observer, a factual chronicler, and a painstaking student, in whose conclusions confidence may be reposed. There is not the remotest attempt at the startling or the sensational, but a study, thoroughly inductive, of German life and of the forces that are just now most powerful in shaping the future of that nation. It is as interesting as a novel from beginning to end, and should be in every library, for it has a permanent, not a passing value.

Z. S. H.

BAPTISM AS TAUGHT IN THE SCRIPTURES. By RHYS R. LLOYD, A.M., Professor of New Testament Greek and Exegesis in the Pacific Theological Seminary. Pp. 102. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society.

The author of this little volume has made an independent study of the mode of baptism, and comes to conclusions which in his mind support the views of Pedobaptists. He maintains that in heathen Greek literature the word *baptizein* is never used to describe the performance of a religious rite by immersion of men by man, and that the New Testament teaches, "that affusion, or more probably sprinkling, was the Johannine and apostolic method of baptizing" (p. 100). This he argues from the use of the verb in the Septuagint and the New Testament, from the ritualism of the Old Testament, and the bathing customs of antiquity, and from the use of the prepositions connected with the verb. The reader will find here the argument against immersion presented in its strongest form.

THE GOSPEL IN BRIEF. By Count LYOF N. TOLSTOI. Translated from the Russian Original embodying the Author's Last Alterations and Revisions. Pp. 222. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. \$1.25.

In a lively paraphrase, which displays the literary genius of the author, Count Tolstoi has constructed a harmony of the Gospels which will be of great value in giving vividness to the literary form through which the great themes of our religion were first presented. The book is as good as a commentary, and yet adheres very closely to the simple story of Christ's ministry. A single illustration will be sufficient: "The kingdom of heaven grows and spreads in the soul out of nothing, providing everything. It is like a birch seed, the very smallest of seeds, which, when it grows up, becomes greater than all other trees, and the birds of heaven build their nests in it" (p. 48).

THE NEW OBEDIENCE: A Plea for Social Submission to Christ. By WILLIAM BAYARD HALE, Mission Priest of the Church of our Saviour, Middleboro, Mass. Pp. x, 192. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1897.

This little book is unnecessarily depressing in its tone, arising perhaps from its being a series of Lenten discourses. But the author imposes upon the commands of Christ a strictness of interpretation which no literature can endure, and which leaves out of sight the boldness of Christ's rhetorical language, in which paradoxes are frequent, and are left with the common-sense of men for interpretation. Still, by taking the same freedom of interpretation with the author which we are compelled to ask for the Gospels, and making due allowance for the circumstances under which the addresses were given, the volume may be made very useful.

THE TRUTH-SEEKER.

THE REV. A. A. BERLE, D.D., of Boston, is publishing in tract form the sermons as preached in his church. They are issued weekly, and the price is one dollar per year. The subjects are, thus far: "The Sight that Sees Truly"; "Power in Believing"; "The Saving of a City"; "Christ the Interpreter of Life"; "Jesus, the Patriot-Reformer"; "Faith's Corner-Stone"; "The Resurrection of Christ"; "Again the Macedonian Cry"; "God is Law"; "Industry and Morality"; "The Trumpet of Warning." The subscription has already reached one thousand. In this way Dr. Berle reaches a large audience, and already his little pamphlet goes into seventeen States, is read every Sunday in four congregations where they have no minister, and a copy is put every week into the hands of every car conductor and motorman in his district. Dr. Berle's style of writing in sermons is much like the late Professor Drummond's. It is simple, conversational, and yet philosophic and fundamental.

Z. S. H.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON, New York.

FOUR BIBLE STUDIES: Shamelessness, Revenge, Prayer, Fidelity. By JOHN H. OSBORNE. Pp. 90.

AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY, Philadelphia.

AMERICAN BAPTIST YEAR-BOOK, 1897. LANSING BURROWS, D.D., Editor. Pp. 268. 25 cents;—**CHRISTIANITY AND PROPERTY: An Interpretation.** By Rev. ALBERT E. WAFFLE. Pp. 106. Paper, 25 cents; cloth, 50 cents;—**THE CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLE IN OUR LITERATURE.** By WILLIAM R. WILLIAMS, D.D. Pp. 91. Paper, 25 cents; cloth, 50 cents;—**DOLLY FRENCH'S HOUSEHOLD.** By JENNIE M. DRINKWATER. Pp. 308. \$1.25;—**RUTH THE GLEANER.** By MAY FIELD MCKEAN. Pp. 60. 25 cents.

FLEMING H. REVELL CO., Chicago.

ST. PAUL: His Life and Times. (Men of the Bible.) By JAMES IVERACH, M.A., Professor of Apologetics and Exegesis of the Gospels, Free Church College, Aberdeen; author of "Is God Knowable?" etc. Pp. 216. 75 cents.

SILVER, BURDETT & CO., Boston.

HEAVEN: Six Sermons. By Rev. RICHARD MONTAGUE, D.D. With Memorials by Rev. GEORGE E. MERRILL, D.D., and Rev. ALVAH HOVEY, D.D., LL.D. Pp. 192.

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
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THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

A Religious and Sociological Quarterly

CONDUCTED BY

G. FREDERICK WRIGHT
Z. SWIFT HOLBROOK

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ARTICLE I.

EARLY RELIGION OF THE HINDUS.

BY H. W. MAGOUN, PH.D.


FIRST PAPER.¹

THE religion of any people is not a thing to be easily mastered. The early religion of a heathen people is a matter which may well require careful and painstaking study if it is to be understood in any but the most superficial manner. The best that can be done, as a rule, in conducting an investigation of this kind, is to study all the objects of a religious nature that have come down to us; but, especially, to examine the religious literature, where such exists, and endeavor to comprehend what it meant to the people who used it.

This in itself is no easy task; for it means the shutting out of all extraneous ideas and the confining of the text

¹ SYMBOLS USED IN THE FOOTNOTES.

- A. Edwin Arnold, *Indian Idylls*. Boston, 1889.
 - AJP. *American Journal of Philology*. Baltimore.
 - B. A. Barth, *The Religions of India*. Authorized Translation by J. Wood. Boston, 1882.
 - CB. Chr. Bartholomae, *Handbuch der Altiranischen Dialekte*. Leipzig, 1883.
 - EB. *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Ninth Edition. New York.
- VOL. LIV. No. 261 I



strictly within its original bounds, so far as it is possible to do so. In other words, the investigator must put himself in the place of the heathen whose religion he wishes to become acquainted with, and must, for the time being, empty himself of all his modern ideas and standards; lest, in the course of his study, he read into the original that of which its authors and users never dreamed; for it must be remembered that there is a perspective in religion and in morals just as truly as in art.

To ignore in the slightest detail the laws of perspective may mar or even spoil an otherwise beautiful picture, and in a similar way the failure to perceive the true position in intellectual or moral space, so to speak, of any given fact may vitiate results which might otherwise be considered admirable. It is therefore evident that a mere knowledge of the religious literature of a people is not of itself sufficient; indeed, every possible means must be used at the very beginning to obtain a faithful picture of the people themselves, and even of their history and environment; for

- H. The Hindoos. Library of Entertaining Knowledge. London, 1834.
- EH. E. W. Hopkins, The Religions of India. Boston, 1895.
- J. F. B. Jevons, Introduction to the History of Religion. London, 1896.
- JAOS. Journal of the American Oriental Society. New Haven.
- K. Adolf Kaegi, The Rigveda. Translated by R. Arrowsmith. Boston, 1886.
- L. C. R. Lanman, A Sanskrit Reader. Boston, 1884.
- M. J. Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts. London, 1872-74.
- MM. F. Max Müller, India: What Can It Teach Us? New York, 1883.
- PAOS. Proceedings of the American Oriental Society. New Haven.
- SBE. Sacred Books of the East. Edited by F. Max Müller. Oxford.
- S&J. Schrader and Jevons, Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples. London, 1890.
- T. C. P. Tiele, Outlines of the History of Religion. Translated by J. E. Carpenter. Fifth Edition. London, 1892.
- TAPA. Transactions of the American Philological Association. Boston.
- W. W. D. Whitney, A Sanskrit Grammar. Boston, 1891.

nothing which may enter as a factor into the final result can afford to be ignored.

In the case of the Hindus, the student has an unusually favorable field. The literature of the people, religious and otherwise, is enormous and reaches back indefinitely into the past: some have even placed parts of the sacred writings as early as 3500 B.C. In all of the literature, which has a distinct individuality of its own, the marvelous holds an important place: in fact, the *Arabian Nights* is so strikingly Indian in its construction and general character that many students of the Aryan tongues would not be surprised if a manuscript should some day be found in India which would go to show that the Arabian tale was simply an extension and adaptation of a Hindu story.¹ The grounds offered for such a belief are, briefly, that no other book of like construction appears to have originated in Arabia, while the general plan of a tale within a tale is the prevailing characteristic not only of the Sanskrit epic but also of other Hindu books intended for entertainment or instruction.

Such were the *Hitopadeṣa* and its predecessor the *Pañcatantra*; each intended to teach, by means of the fable, the best practical wisdom of the time in which the author or compiler lived. A *śloka*,² or distich, containing some

¹The Arabic system of notation came from India, and the best of the tales of the *Arabian Nights* are reported to be found in the Sanskrit *Bṛhatkathā*. See H., Vol. ii. p. 316. It accordingly seems likely, unless they were transferred to Arabia by oral tradition, that they may have been borrowed from that source directly; but the materials of the literature have been so often worked over that they may possibly have been so treated in this case, and the result may then have been used, with Persian additions or possibly in a Persian form, by the Arabian compiler. Cf. F. D. Chester, in *JAOS.*, Vol. xvi., 1896, p. 264.

²It is customary to cite the stem or root (verb) form of Sanskrit or Zend words, unless there is special reason for using some other form. It is hoped that such technicalities as could not well be avoided have been made clear to the general reader.

choice bit of wisdom, in each instance precedes the fable, which is then told to explain its meaning; but these books belong to the later period.

Not so with the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa; for both epics are supposed to have been handed down by tradition long before they were committed to writing. These two books, then, may be supposed to mirror more or less accurately the character and condition of the people of early Indian times, or at least to shed some light upon their manners and customs, their modes of thought and mental characteristics, and their religious practices and beliefs; although, in this last regard particularly, they undoubtedly show in their present form the influence of later times. A brief description of each may not be amiss in attempting to give an intelligible picture of what the old Vedic religion was; for our real knowledge on this point comes from the literature, since the sacred objects, numerous as they are, that have come down to us belong to the later period.

In various places in the Sanskrit, Viṣṇu, later regarded by his adherents as the chief of the three great Hindu gods, the so-called Hindu trinity,—it is rather a triad,—is represented as manifesting himself or ‘descending’¹ in bodily form to relieve gods or men from extreme peril or from some great moral evil; for the *deus ex machina* is very much at home on Hindu soil. He appears as a fish, a tortoise, a man-lion, man, etc.; and these manifestations are commonly called incarnations, a word apt to be misunderstood by the layman. The Hindu conception is this,—Viṣṇu sends a small part of his essence into a child that is to be born of earthly parents, or causes it to take the shape of some wonderful being, as in the case of the man-lion sent

¹ It is a familiar truism, that it is, for the most part, impossible to exactly reproduce in any given language even a single word of any other language; and it has come to be the fashion, in recognition of this fact, to use the single quotation marks for translations.

to slay the demon Hiranyakaśipu whom no created thing was able to kill; for he had obtained this boon for himself from Brahmā by practicing severe austerities. This minute portion of the essence of Viṣṇu, when manifested in human form, fairly outdoes the labors of Hercules himself. It is such a manifestation that is described in the Rāmāyaṇa, which is nearly twice as long as the Iliad and Odyssey combined. It is the younger of the two epics.

The story relates how King Daśaratha, 'Possessing-ten-wagons, (Man)-with-ten-wagons,' having performed the horse sacrifice to obtain sons, is presented, by a supernatural being, with a divine drink containing the essence of Viṣṇu. His wives drink the beverage, as directed. In time, Rāma is born of her who received the larger portion, and it is his destiny to slay the monster Rāvaṇa, 'Howl-maker.' Other sons are born of the other wives to be his helpers. The monster is possessed of ten heads and twenty arms and,—having obtained by austerities a promise from Brahmā, chief deity of the universe, that neither gods nor demons should be able to take his life,—is oppressing the entire universe and threatening the very existence of the world and even of the gods themselves. Rāma performs many marvels, such as breaking the bow of Śiva, bending that of Viṣṇu, destroying the worlds of a rival, etc.; but is banished to the forest for fourteen years in consequence of a rash promise made by his father. Here he destroys many demons, his wife is stolen by Rāvaṇa, who thus invites his fate, and extensive preparations are made for her recovery. At last, with the help of many wonderful animals divinely prepared to assist him, he crosses over to the abode of the monster, whose death follows, and Rāma receives his wife again unharmed.

The other epic, almost five times as long as the one just described, or about eight times the length of the Iliad and Odyssey combined, tells of the struggles of the Pāṇḍu

princes, models of virtue, with their cousins who cheat them out of their kingdom and are in every way bad. Only about a fifth of the poem is occupied with the main story. The rest is made up of episodes, added probably in large measure by succeeding generations of poets. One of the best, oldest, and least affected by the later influence of Vishnuism, is the story of Nala.

The chief of the Pāṇḍavas, Yudhiṣṭhira, 'Firm-in-battle,' bewails his lot as the most unfortunate of men, and the sage Brhadaçva, 'Possessing-great-horses, (Man)-with-strong-horses,' tells him of one yet more unfortunate. Nala was a prince, and Damayantī a lovely princess. They hear of each other, and golden geese, met by Nala in the forest, go and advise her to marry him. She thereupon becomes sad, pale, and much given to sighing. Her father, therefore, invites all the kings and princes to her *svayamvara*, 'self-choice,' and the great gods, Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, and Yama, decide to go also. They see Nala on his way, win a promise that he will go at once and press their suit, and make him invisible to the guards. Damayantī asks his name, refuses to accept any of the gods, and declares that she will destroy herself if Nala himself refuses her. In the meantime the kings and princes have assembled with their troops, wagons, and elephants. On the day set, all gather in the appointed place; but five Nalas appear. The princess looks in vain for the distinguishing marks of the gods which have been told her by old men. She turns to the gods for refuge, assumes a posture of reverence, does obeisance with voice and mind, begs them to point out the gods to her, and prays the great 'Earth-lords' to assume each his proper form. She now sees that four of the Nalas have fixed eyes, are free from sweat, have garlands that are unwithered and free from dust, and do not touch the earth; while the real Nala casts a shadow, has withered garlands, is covered with dust and sweat, stands on the ground, and

winks. She hastily chooses the fifth to the consternation of the kings and the delight of the gods, who give Nala miraculous gifts. But the demon Kali, coming too late, is filled with wrath because she chose a mortal, and vowing vengeance bides his time.

After twelve years, Nala forgets to wash his feet and goes impure to his devotions. This is Kali's chance, and he forthwith enters Nala's body, who, thus influenced, loses his kingdom in games with the dice and is compelled to leave home with his wife. Her he would not stake; but in his misery he deserts her in the forest. She ultimately reaches her father's home in safety, however; for he sends in search of her. Nala sees a fire in the woods and rescues an enchanted serpent from it, at his request. He is told to count as he walks and at the word *daça*, 'ten' (it means also 'bite'), the snake bites him and becomes a man. Nala shrinks into a dwarf with a withered arm; but is assured that it is for his good and is given a means of resuming his proper form. He enters the service of a prince as charioteer and cook, and Damayanti at last gets tidings of him by reason of her great sagacity in sending out her messengers. The rajah whom Nala serves is led to think that he may be able to obtain the hand of Damayanti if he can reach her father's capital in a single day. She knows that Nala alone can drive the distance, about five hundred miles, in that time. He does it for the rajah and teaches him the training of horses in return for perfect skill with dice. Then Kali appears beside him. It was he that the serpent had really bitten and, now that Nala knew the dice, he could no longer escape expulsion.

The rajah is received with due ceremony and Damayanti sets a watch on the charioteer, especially while he cooks for his master. Fire comes at the will of the dwarf and water gushes up in the pot, the lintel of a low doorway rises to let him pass, and he weeps over his children saved.

Then Damayanti, i.e., 'Victoria,' knows that it is Nala. She receives him back, he assumes his true form, wins back his kingdom, and lives happy ever after.

This tale greatly pleases Yudhiṣṭhira. In due time the princes go to war with their hundred cousins, the Kurus, and, after much fighting, win back their kingdom. Yudhiṣṭhira is crowned king; and the chief of the Kurus, though mortally wounded, instructs him, for about twenty thousand distichs, on the duties of kings, etc., and then dies. Finally the five Pāṇḍus renounce the kingdom and ascend to heaven with their common wife Drāupadi.

It must be clear, from even so hasty¹ a glance at the great Hindu epics, that the people possessed a comparatively high degree of civilization even in early times, and the evidence of the Vedas on this point is conclusive. Nomadic life had given way to the fixed dwelling,—a simple hut to be sure, but a house,—and village life had begun. The wealth of the people still consisted of flocks and herds; but the soil was cultivated with rude plows and harrows, mattocks and hoes; and the fields were watered, when necessary, by artificial canals. Crops, especially barley, were raised twice a year; and grain was threshed on the floor, winnowed, ground in the mill, and made into bread. Hunting with bow and arrow, snare and trap, was still continued; but it had lost its importance as a means of livelihood. Bread of a simple sort, cakes of flour and butter, milk in various forms, vegetables, and fruits of many kinds formed the chief articles of diet; while meat, cooked on spits or in pots, was little used. The question of food, however, was of small importance in comparison with drink. The praises of water were sung, to be sure; but they drank *surā* and *soma*, both intoxicating, and in

¹ For fuller accounts, see encyclopedias, articles; "Vishnu," "Mahabharata" (cf. L., pp. 297-300), "Sanskrit Literature," etc. For the Nala Episode, see A., pp. 53-211.

fact worshiped the latter as a god. Wood-workers, metal-workers, tanners, and potters plied their craft with considerable skill; the women knew how to plait mats, weave, and sew; and golden ornaments and jewelry were worn. The cow was the unit of value for barter; the family was the foundation of the state; and the father was the head of the family, the wife being next in importance. Children married in the order of their age, and the mother assisted at the match-making. If the father gave his consent, the bride was purchased from him with rich gifts. Monogamy seems to have been the rule and the union was a close one. The government was monarchical, but not absolute, and caste had not yet developed. The unchangeableness of all law was asserted, and it was believed that wrongdoing, even though unconscious, must be atoned for. Gaming with dice was a favorite sport, as was also the chariot race, while battle was a source of delight. Of sciences there were practically none, though a slight beginning had been made in arithmetic and astronomy. Of the arts, with a single exception, the same can be said. They had distinguished a few diseases which were treated, for the most part, with charms; but writing was still unknown. These were the conditions, in the main, which prevailed in Vedic times.¹ The one art which had long flourished was poetry, and that seems to have had its beginnings in the very cradle of the race.²

A second point, brought out by the two epics, is that they were a highly imaginative people, a trait in perfect keeping with the fact that poetry had such a hold upon them; and it is also clear that in some directions they were equally simple minded. They belong in the childhood³

¹ K., pp. 11-20.

² I.e., among the Indo-Europeans, whose history must reach back for centuries before their appearance in the world's drama.

³ In these matters terms are relative: the time may come when we shall be regarded as belonging in the period of the world's youth. It is for

period of the world; and this must never be lost sight of, if a correct view is to be obtained of their religion.

Two other leading characteristics, which also appear in the poems, were ingenuity and a love of truth. Only the worst of creatures ever break a promise once given; but a modern criminal lawyer is not more ingenious in getting around a point in law than Braman is in surmounting the difficulty of keeping his promise, while helping to accomplish the thing prohibited by it; for it is by his advice that Viṣṇu is induced to make his 'descent' as Rāma, since Rāvaṇa had forgotten to include men in the agreement.

One other fact showing that they were a people of great capacity, in some directions at least, may be mentioned. After writing was introduced and the alphabet had been perfected, it contained fifty characters (one is Vedic), representing with great care all the sounds of the language, and a system of phonetics was developed which has been the wonder of modern scholars. R and l were recognized as vowels in certain connections (cf. Eng. *mantle* and *burrow*) and, in addition to nasalized vowels, four distinct n's were used, three of which (n, ñ, and ṇ) we have in the English words in, inch, and ink.¹ This indicates a wonderful

this reason that the word "primitive" has such a broad signification: in the absolute sense it takes us into the field of pure hypothesis.

¹These n's are respectively dental, palatal, and guttural. The other is a lingual, or cerebral, formed between the dental and palatal positions. In transliterating Sanskrit letters (Whitney's method), linguals are represented by placing a dot below the English letters which they most resemble in sound. They are commonly pronounced like those letters; but *ṣ*, like palatal *s* (written *ç*), is pronounced as *sh*. *H*, after a preceding surd or sonant (such a combination is written as a single letter in Sanskrit), is always sounded in connection with it. *C* is pronounced like *ch*. Vowels have their continental value, while *ṛ* and *ḷ* (dental in this one instance), because they possess the syllable-carrying quality, are added to the list.

The transliteration of Zend shows quite as much diversity as that of Sanskrit and it presents fully as many difficulties. As far as possible, the same plan has been followed for both, where Zend words occur. San-

delicacy of ear, if nothing else, and it does not seem out of keeping with their poetic temperament, which in turn is not incompatible with an utter lack of the scientific faculty as applied to natural phenomena.

That they were thus deficient is testified on every side; indeed, the modern Hindus are sufficient evidence on that point. That consistency also was not, to them, a jewel, and that the people were not troubled by little difficulties of that kind, may be clearly seen when the Vedic poet sings in one of the later hymns:—

‘What poets, pray, of those that lived before us,
Have reached in fact the end of all thy greatness?
Who both thy mother and thy father also
From thine own body caused to spring together.’¹

To the prosaic minds of our practical age, this seems a trifle strong: to the Hindu mind, it was only what might have been expected. The true relation of cause and effect, to such an intellect, must of necessity be a *terra incognita*, and it is not surprising that many a Hindu saw in the red rag, which some enemy had placed above his door, a cause of misfortune or death; much as the negroes of our own “Black Belt” often feel a severe attack of rheumatism coming on if some one has sprinkled black sand on the door step. In fact, there is much in the illiterate plantation “darkey” which is a help in understanding the peculiarities of the Hindus, though it must be borne in mind that the latter, as they appear in the Rig-Veda at least, were of an intellectual and metaphysical temperament. It was only on the practical side that they were weak and helpless. There are not wanting, even among the cultured and re-

skrit *e* (made up of *a+i*: see W., § 28) frequently appears in Zend as *ae* (there are four *e*'s in Zend), representing the original sounds. It is certainly objectionable to transliterate the second letter as though it alone was equivalent to Sanskrit *e*; and *ē* has therefore been used. The corresponding long *e* may stand for Sanskrit *e*, as may also *oi*. See CB., §§ 25, 41.

¹ Said of Indra, Rig-Veda, x. 54, 3.

finer of our own day, those who delight in soaring platitudes which soothe all thought to rest and leave the mind a blank ; and it is not to be wondered at that in India a type of mind should be developed which found its chief delight in esoteric doctrines.

Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Theosophy are natural growths in such a soil ; but the earliest period shows little trace of such teachings, and the various stages in the development are plainly shown in the literature. The farther back this is traced, the simpler it becomes, until philosophic speculations disappear and only hymns are left. If a cause is sought for this gradual change, it must be looked for in the environment of the people.

What the original home of the Aryans was, is still a matter of conjecture.¹ It is perfectly well established, however, that Hindus² and Persians, Greeks and Romans, Teutons and Slavs, Celts and Lithuanians, all came from a common race, which, though scattered abroad before the dawn of history, has left many traces of itself in the language of its descendants.³ In the general dispersion, one branch of

¹ See S&J., pp. 80-106 ; but see also the final chapter, pp. 426-443, which contains the most satisfactory attempt at a final solution yet offered.

² In the narrow sense; for the word has been extended so as to include all the inhabitants of modern India, only about six per cent of whom are pure Aryans. About as many more are direct descendants of the earlier races whom they conquered. The rest are a mixture of the two.

³ Even the familiar Celtic word *Erin* appears in Old Bactrian (East Iranian or Zend) in the form *airyana*, i. e., '(Land?)-of-the-Aryans,' (the Iranians called their traditional fatherland, *Airyana Vaējah*, 'Aryan Might'), and in New Persian as *Irān* (formerly *Erān*), the official name of the country. The word *airyana* is an adjective from *airya*, Old Persian (West Iranian) *ariya*, Sanskrit *aryá*, 'good, true, noble,' which in the masculine form, though with change of accent in Sanskrit, was used to mean a member of their own race, as distinguished from the evil (foreign) tribes about them. In Sanskrit the derivative *ārya*, 'belonging to the faithful, one of the faithful,' is commonly used to designate members of the tribe and it is from this word that the term *Aryan* comes. See K., note 37; and cf. EH., p. 25, footnote. The circumflex (*ā*) indicates an accented long vowel.

the family became the Hindu-Persians, or the Aryans, in the narrow sense of the word; for it is sometimes used as synonymous with Indo-European; and this branch in turn, finding its way through the passes of the Hindu Kush into the eastern part of what is now Afghanistan, divided after a time into two others. Of these, one became the Iranians, or Persians; while the other, retaining possession of the valley of the river Kābul—for this is probably the Vedic Kubhā—became the Hindus. At first, both spread to the south and east into the extreme northwest of what is now India; and, encountering a broad river, they called it the Sindhu, 'Stream', i.e., the Indus (Iranian, Hindu). Finding fertile land to the east, the Hindus gradually pushed their way to the Satlaj, the last tributary in that direction. They gave it the name of Çutudrī, later changed into Çatadru, 'Hundred-course.'¹

It was not until near the end of the early, or Rig-Veda, period that the Aryans reached the upper Ganges, and the conquest of the peninsula came long afterwards. It is supposed that the conquest of the Deccan, 'South,' is portrayed in the story of Rāma; for the monster whom he was born to slay was the king of Ceylon. As it is fair to suppose that the Epic demi-gods were simply ancient heroes, it is also fair to infer that the monsters and demons of the forest were the dark-skinned tribes whose only means of escaping slavery was to retire before the oncoming invaders. Here again the strong imagination of the people is apparent. That the Mongolian faces of the Dravidians, Kolarians, and Tibeto-Burmans, whom they found in the land, were especially hateful to them, is sufficiently clear²; and the rest follows naturally. It is also plain that they looked with scorn and contempt upon the customs and beliefs of the Dāsya vas, 'Fiends,' as they were pleased to call their

¹ Cf. EH., pp. 31-36.

² See EB., article, "India," section, "History."

foes; and little or no influence upon early religious beliefs is to be looked for in that quarter.

What the religion of these despised races was, is not certainly known. In two passages of the Rig-Veda (vii. 21, 5, and x. 99, 3) they may(?) be referred to by the word *çiç-nádevās* (pl.), whose accent requires it to mean, 'having-a-çiçna-as-god,' i.e., phallus-worshippers.¹ In the course of centuries, whatever their religion, contact with these tribes and their presence as slaves among the people must have had its effect upon the Aryan immigrants. It may have been one of the factors which led to the enormous exaggeration of the importance of the priestly office and of the sacrificial rites, together with that peculiar caste system which has been the curse of India. Among the newcomers, there were three divisions of the people: *Brahmāṇas*, '(Professional)-prayers, Priests'; *Kṣatṛiyās*, 'Rulers, Princes,' the military classes; and *Vāiçyās*, 'Settlers,' the mass of the people, the middle classes.² These all felt themselves infinitely superior to the native population, especially in their religion, and began to call themselves *dvi-já*, 'twice-born,' because invested with the sacramental cord; while the *Çūdrās*, or lower classes, enjoyed no such privilege. Investiture was the placing of a cord over the left shoulder and under the right arm of a boy when taken to a teacher to learn the sacred knowledge. It seems to have sprung up with the formal ritual, and the care with which both it and the sacred knowledge were kept from the lower classes must have favored the development of a rigid caste system.

In the early days prince and priest alike officiated at the tribal sacrifice; but, as the bulk of the religious hymns

¹ Cf. the conjectural origin of dancing girls in the temple service (H., ii. p. 96), and the worship of Çiva as a generative power. But see EB., article, "Brahmanism" (p. 207); B., pp. 261-262; and EH., p. 471.

² See EH., pp. 27-29.

and rites increased, princes began to employ priests to perform the sacrifice for them, and in time the Brahmans claimed the office as their own. The sultry heat of their new home had relaxed the sturdy fiber of the Aryans, and constant warfare with the hostile natives left little time to keep up with the growing ritual. This the Brahmans as a whole did, and gradually obtained, because of their superior knowledge of the Vedas, that wonderful ascendancy which they still maintain. One of the most powerful factors which led to this result is possibly to be found in the diseases which are incidental to a tropical climate. To the Aryan, disease was a punishment for some wrongdoing, which must be expiated by the doer. The knowledge of such matters was in the hands of some Brahman: what more natural, then, than that the importance of the Brahman should be greatly increased? Anything done to cure the disease would be useless without the proper formulas pronounced over the remedies: and here the Brahman was all-important, even if he did not practice medicine himself; as he was forbidden to do so, in later times at least, unless driven to it by necessity. He had the knowledge and was the ultimate authority on prayers and rites, which were the things of greatest importance.

This knowledge which gradually came to be the special possession of the priestly classes constituted the Vedas. Oldest and of greatest importance is the *R̥g v e d á*,¹ 'Praise-knowledge,' from which, in a sense, selections best adapted to be sung or chanted, with some modifications and a few additions, grew into the *Sāma v e d á*, 'Chant-knowledge.'²

¹The true spelling; but *Rig-Veda* (*Rigveda*) is the established form in English. See W., §§ 23-26.

²Both Vedas probably drew from a common source (see W. D. Whitney, in *PAOS.*, October, 1883, p. xx.), and some even maintain that the *Sāman* has the older form. See K., note 9. The *Atharva-Veda* and parts of the tenth book of the *Rik* (*Rig-Veda*) probably also drew from a common source. *More Mantra* ('Thought, Text,' the ordinary name of

These seem to have been used in the early days as the impulse of the individual 'twice-born' directed; but when a fixed ritual had been established and the priests were in charge of the sacrifice, formulas of various kinds, such as blessings, explanations, etc., with admixtures from the Rik, were developed and out of these grew several different forms of a Yajurvedá, 'Worship-knowledge,' i.e., the knowledge of the sacrificial formulas. Two of these, distinguished by the names White and Black, are known, and there are three recensions of the latter and two of the former. In the meantime, a large body of charms and incantations had arisen, apparently among the people. In the course of time, these also came into the possession of the Brahmans, accepted possibly as a help in the struggle which they had long waged with the princely class for the supremacy; and out of these grew the Atharvaveda, 'Atharvan-knowledge,' i.e., the knowledge of the 'fire-priests,' the supposed descendants of the first legendary priest who obtained fire from heaven and instituted the sacrifice; for the advocates of the fourth Veda sought to make it chief of all.¹ This Veda also contains material found in the Rik, especially in its late hymns, amounting to perhaps a sixth of the stanzas which in this last recension became a part of the 'sacred-knowledge.'

With the lapse of time, changes gradually took place in the language itself, so that the meaning of the hymns and formulas was no longer plain. To meet the resulting need, commentaries on the sacred text were made by learned priests, and each received the name of Brāhmaṇa,² 'Relating-to-devotion.' These in turn were added to the 'sa-

the Vedic hymns and formulas) was in existence than was ever committed to writing, as is shown by occasional citations from hymns now lost.

¹ Cf. SBE., xlii., Introduction, pp. lxi.-lxxi.

² The word commentary only faintly expresses the nature of these works. No one word can do them justice. They contain Mythology,

cred-knowledge' and became a part of the Vedas, which at length grew to such proportions that brief rules for the proper observance of the rites were a necessity; and certain formulas, composed to supply the want (each was called a *Sûtra*, 'Thread'), came to be regarded as the third and last division of the Vedas.¹ In later times the *Sûtras* were spoken of as *smṛti*, 'remembrance, tradition,' while the hymns, formulas, and their commentaries were known as *ṣrúti*,² 'hearing, revelation.'

These changes which took place in the language have an important bearing on the whole Vedic question. If the classical Sanskrit, the language of the epics, be compared to that of Lysias, the *Brāhmaṇas*, roughly speaking, may be said to correspond in a similar way to Herodotus; the *Atharva-Veda*, to the *Odyssey*; and the *Rig-Veda*, to the *Iliad*, though the difference in the last instance is much more marked in the Sanskrit than in the Greek. But the *Rig-Veda* itself exhibits marked linguistic differences, and the composition of its hymns, exclusive of late additions, is supposed to have covered a period of about five hundred years. On this point, however, opinions differ.³ Professor Whitney, whose view is looked upon with most favor, placed the time of their composition during the first half of the second thousand years before our era (2000–1500 B. C.); but the question will always remain a difficult one, and probability seems to be all that can be hoped for.

Philosophy, Legend, Etymology, Exegesis, etc., most of which is worthless, except as a curiosity or as a means of studying the curious phases of priestly superstition.

¹ There were still only four Vedas; but the *Rig-Veda*, for example, came to include its *Brāhmaṇas* and *Sûtras*. As ordinarily used, it means the hymns only.

² The later extensions of the *Brāhmaṇas*—the *Āraṇyaka* and *Upaniṣad* treatises—were not *ṣrúti*; but they do not concern this paper. See K., p. 5. For these treatises, see K., note 16; W. D. Whitney, in *AJP.*, April, 1886, Vol. vii. pp. 1–2; B., pp. 64–86; *EH.*, pp. 178 and 216–241; and *SBE.*, i. and xv.

³ See K., note 38; also *EH.*, pp. 4–7.

It has already been mentioned that the epics are supposed to have been in existence long before the art of writing was known. That the Vedas were in the same manner handed down by tradition can no longer be questioned; indeed, "at the present moment, if every MS. of the Rig-Veda were lost, we should be able to recover the whole of it—from the memory of the *Srotriyas*¹ in India."² Mantra, Brāhmaṇa, and Sūtra, for each of the four Vedas, were thus preserved for centuries; and, when at last, only a few hundred years before the Christian era, the introduction of an alphabet made it possible to commit the hymns to writing, the meaning had been so long obscure that, in many instances, the ancient authors of the Brāhmaṇas themselves had been at a loss to know how to interpret the Mantras, and, in their perplexity in one case, had even gone so far as to evolve out of a refrain beginning, *kásṁāi devāya*, 'to what god,' a special highest unknown god *Ka*, 'Who.' This alone is sufficient to show that the real meaning of the hymns cannot be looked for with certainty in the native interpretation.³ Indeed, one of their own Vedic scholars is even said to have gone so far as to declare that it was useless to attempt to explain the words of the text, since the hymns themselves had no meaning.

How this obscurity came about can be easily surmised. Among the early Aryans, when a man of greater than average intellectual power, fired by some unusual event or pressed by some urgent need, composed a prayer or hymn of praise, it became the property of the family, or clan, to

¹ Brahmins who know the Vedas. ² MM., Lecture vii., p. 227.

³ The value of the native commentaries varies in proportion to their approach to an unbroken continuity of tradition. There is no such continuity in the main, as is made clear by the marked difference in the language used; but there are degrees of difference; and the native documents in the case of the Atharva-Veda, for example, are more likely to be reliable sources of information than in that of the Rik. But here again opinions differ. See EH., pp. 12-23.

which the poet belonged, and was sacredly cherished. Such hymns were passed down from father to son with little or no change for generations. From time to time, other members of the clan, similarly affected, composed new hymns which in turn were added to the general family collection. For hundreds of years the process went on; but the original form of each of the hymns was carefully preserved as a sacred inheritance and the meaning thus became more or less obscure.

The hymns themselves for this very reason, however, grew in sanctity, until at length Brahmans possessing the requisite knowledge made definite collections of the oldest and best of them; and in time, presumably about a thousand years before our era, these collections were united into one. In this way arose the Mantra of the Rig-Veda, or the *Ṛgveda-Saṁhitā*, i.e., the collection of hymns which forms the basis of this Veda in the broad sense of the term; and it is probable that the history of the Sāma-Veda is not materially different. In a similar way, sacrificial formulas which had come into use in different communities formed the basis for the Yajur-Vedas; while the Atharva-Veda, resembling more closely the Rik, is connected by tradition with two mythical priestly families. But variations and additions began to creep into the different Saṁhitās and thus, in connection with each of the Vedas, here and there a *cāraṇa*, 'school,' arose which had its own *çākḥā*, 'branch, recension.' While the other Vedas have been more fortunate, but one recension of the Rik has survived; yet this was committed to writing in so many different ways, made possible by the peculiar laws of Sanskrit word combination, that no possibility of change except by interpolation remained; and, in this way, it has been preserved.

The Rig-Veda is divided artificially into 'eighths'; but its historical division is into books. Of these, the first consists of fifteen (some authorities say fourteen, some six-

teen) minor groups, each referred to a single source; the following seven (ii.-viii.) are each ascribed to a separate clan, from which they get the name "Family-books," and are considered on linguistic grounds to be the oldest; the ninth consists of hymns to the drink Soma, treated as a divinity; while the tenth and last, like the first, is attributed to different poet-sages, or, as the Hindus put it, to different 'seers' (a 'seer' is an Ṛṣi), i.e., men who saw the hymns the last time they were revealed; for the true Hindu believes that they have always existed somewhere. The first and last books are said to be the youngest as a whole.¹ The age of the hymn, as will be readily seen, is an important matter in every case. It is determined chiefly by the linguistic form; but metre, arrangement, and subject-matter are also considered.

The Brāhmaṇas, although they have their beginning in some of the prose portions of the Black Yajur-Veda, are shown by their language to be later than the Mantras, and they may safely be said to mark the development of the influence and power of the Brahmins,² which took place in the Madhyadeśa, 'Mid-land,' the region of the Jumna and the upper Ganges; while Buddhism³ arose later on, in the

¹ Books ii.-vii. are commonly grouped together as the "Family-books," because of the similarity in their arrangement. Book viii. is peculiar in its meters and, like ix., is called one of the chief sources of the Sāma-Veda. Book x. resembles the Atharva-Veda in language, etc., and is the book from which that Veda has the appearance of drawing most largely. For this reason it is regarded by many as the youngest of the books, though it contains material which is evidently old. The chronological order usually given is iv., vi., vii., v., iii., ii., then parts of i., viii., ix., x., and lastly parts of i., viii., ix. But see K., note 73; EB., article, "Sanskrit Literature"; E. W. Hopkins, in JAOS., Vols. xvi., 1896, pp. 275 ff., and xvii., 1896, pp. 23 ff; and E. V. Arnold, in JAOS., xviii., 1897, pp. 204-236 and 352-353.

² Cf. T., pp. 117-118. Also L., pp. 356-357, §§ 90-93.

³ Important for the study of both religions are SBE. The canonical books of Buddhism are contained in Vol. x., The Dhammapada. Others are: xi., Buddhist Suttas; xiii., xvii., and xx., Vinaya Texts; xxi.,

fifth century B.C., in the region of the lower Ganges. The various stages in the development may be made clear, if it is borne in mind that Buddhism is related to Brahmanism somewhat as Christianity is related to Judaism, while Brahmanism is in turn related to the earlier Vedic beliefs somewhat as Catholicism is related to the Apostolic Church.

It must now be clear that it is with the formative period, the days of the poet-sages; that the present paper has most to do, and it must also be evident that the early religion of these Aryan settlers in the Pañjāb, 'Five-rivers,' was not Brahmanism, but something which Brahmanism adapted to its own uses and made to serve its ends. With this position agrees the fact that the Rig-Veda knows nothing of the doctrine of metempsychosis, which has had a wide acceptance in the world, but which nowhere else attained to such proportions in the daily life of the people as in India. It follows that the theosophic speculations of the Brahmins must be excluded, although it will be allowable to consider the material upon which they were based, so far at least as it appears in the Mantras, and it will also be necessary to shut out the religious teachings of the epics, except such as plainly coincide with the doctrines of the Rik and are therefore survivals from the early Vedic period.

Beyond the hymns themselves, then, provided the prevailing view is the correct one, nothing upon which to rest remains except what can be shown to have belonged to the entire family before its dispersion, together with such side-

The Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka; and xlix., Buddhist Mahāyāna Texts. Most important for Brahmanism, are Vols. xii., xxvi., xli., xliii., and xlv., The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa. Others are: i. and xv., The Upanishads; ii. and xiv., The Sacred Laws of the Āryas; vii., The Institutes of Viṣṇu; viii., The Bhagavadgītā; xxv., The Laws of Manu; xxix. and xxx., The Gṛīya-Sūtras; and xxxiv. and xxxviii., The Vedānta-Sūtras. It should be noted that vii. and viii. are the products of sects. See AJP., ii., 323-341; iii., 391-410; vii., 1-26; and x., 91-94. Valuable material is also to be found in M., which has not been available for reference.

lights as can be obtained from other religions and the conditions existing in the periods following most closely after the one in question; unless it appears that there were influences either from without or from within which affected the popular beliefs. From without, nothing really tangible appears until a much later period; for Brahmanism was well established centuries before the Greek invasion, and the same is true of the introduction of the alphabet from Semitic sources, which was brought into general use by the Buddhists. There may have been an occasional borrowing from some foreign source, and yet an eminent authority says: "I think I may say that there really is no trace whatever of any foreign influence in the language, the religion, or the ceremonial of the ancient Vedic literature of India."¹ Influences from within there must have been, and they appear to have come from the environment of the people.

It is a commonly accepted doctrine that nature religions—as opposed to ethical—are based on superstition. The word, however, is an unfortunate one for several reasons: it now almost universally carries with it a certain amount of opprobrium; the supposed original meaning, which seems to be the one intended, is still open to question and is almost never thought of even by scholars; and all men are prone to class all religions save their own as superstitions. The two undoubtedly are closely related; but so are courage and rashness, self-love and selfishness, reverence and fear, faith and credulity, firmness and obstinacy, caution and cowardice, and that too in the same way. Moreover, in these cases without exception it is clearly easier for the good quality to degenerate into the corresponding evil one than for the reverse to take place. Why not so in the matter of religion and superstition? Is not the latter closely allied to fear on the one side and the for-

¹ MM., Lecture iv., p. 159.

mer to reverence on the other? That the two are commonly mixed is nothing strange; for it is the same with all things human; the dross is always present, if not in evidence. It does not necessarily follow that all heathen nations have developed a religion first and then relapsed into superstition in most cases later on; but rather that some heathen nations may never have really developed a religion at all in any true sense of the word, precisely as some men have never risen above the possession of the bad quality in the list given. A beginning must have been made, however, even in these cases, since no savage tribe has ever been found in which there were no germs of religious belief; but the classification must depend, as in every other matter affecting the human will, on what has been the ruling motive. Where the religious element is weak, degeneration soon sets in and progress ends.¹

The truth seems to be that non-ethical religions develop out of a natural desire for the help of some protecting power in the struggle for existence, coupled with the mixed feelings of fear and reverential awe with which primitive peoples view all objects and phenomena too complex for their comprehension. In other words, whatever amazes the savage or causes him to feel his own weakness, arouses in him a sense of the supernatural and either draws to itself or to its supposed cause the worship and trust which grow out of the universal longing of the human heart for something above itself upon which to lean, or drives him in terror to seek protection elsewhere in something more familiar or previously chosen from similar causes.² The practical result, from our standpoint, is superstition. The heathen, however, often make a sharp distinction where we fail to detect a difference, and the Hindus will place one act under the head of religion and another under that of witchcraft (a form of superstition), when we would

¹ Cf. J., p. 5. ² Cf. J., pp. 17-26.

promptly classify both as magic. Where it seems to be clear that reverence or gratitude have led to faith and worship, it may be safe to place the result under the head of religion; while obeisance and credulity growing out of fear are plainly the characteristics of superstition. Heathen practices, as a rule, so combine and confuse the two that either word seems applicable and neither satisfactory¹; but it may be safe to say, on the basis now laid down, that the hymns of the Rig-Veda, taken as a whole, are the product of a religion²—a religion somewhat primitive and childish to be sure, but still a religion.

The Atharva-Veda, on the other hand, which as a whole probably represents the belief of the less intellectual classes, is clearly in the main the outgrowth of superstition.³ For some centuries it seems to have had no currency among the more intelligent of the people, and it never gained so complete an ascendancy over the thinking classes of the whole country as the other Vedas did. In linguistic form, it belongs between the Rik and the Brāhmaṇas; but it contains material which in substance seems to have gone back to the earliest times, since some of its spells in both purpose and content (partly also in form) are said to resemble old Germanic ones so closely that the two may well have come from a single source.⁴ This does not, however, go to show that the Atharva-Veda contains material that is older than that in the Rik; but rather that parts of both

¹ A good illustration of what is meant is to be found in Paul's sermon to the Athenians, Acts xvii. 22,—old reading, "too superstitious": new, "somewhat superstitious"; margin, "religious"; appendix, "very religious." English lacks a word for the middle ground (Greek *θεοειδαιμονία*) and superstition is made to do double duty with the inevitable loss of clearness common in such cases. If it could stop at Samaria instead of being made to reach from Dan to Beersheba, a real gain might be realized.

² Cf. L., p. 352, § 72. ³ Cf. L., p. 355, § 85.

⁴ Cf. K., note 12. But see also SBE., xlii., pp. 313-314, 321, 386, 388, and 567.

reach back in substance to the Indo-European period. Religion is either progressive or retrogressive,¹ while superstition tends to perpetuate itself unchanged.² For this reason there may be more that is of a primitive nature in the former than in the latter; but if there is, it in no way weakens the main argument. It rather tends to strengthen it on the whole; for the evidence seems to show that old religious beliefs were giving place to new ones, when the earliest hymns were composed, as will presently appear.³

That the Vedic religion should have the slightest resemblance to our own is not to be expected. The Hindus had no revelation in our sense of the word, and in comparison with men trained in the schools of modern religious

¹ Cf. J., p. 139.

² This fact does not seem to have been given the prominence which is its due. The religious elements in a system of heathen beliefs may disappear entirely and the superstitious ones may still persist for centuries. This is perhaps the chief reason why magic still holds such sway in the world. Cf. J., pp. 39-40.

³ It may be confidently asserted that some simple form of religious belief existed among the Aryans quite as early as any form of superstition. Cf. J., pp. 7-10, and see below. It seems clear that the religiously inclined have ever been the leaders in formulating tribal rites (cf. J., pp. 101, 105-107) and especially in setting up the "blood-covenant" with the "god," which appears to have been the earliest form of sacrifice (cf. J., p. 147, and E. Riess, in TAPA., Vol. xxvii., 1896, p. 15); but the two tendencies must have been in man from the beginning, and just as one man is courageous and another rash, one is cautious and another timid; so, in the same community with the same tribal rites, the nobler and more intelligent tended to the religious, and the baser and less intelligent to the superstitious side, with the result that the stronger won the day, causing progress in a few cases but degeneracy in the many. This agrees in part with the assumption that prayer and "charm-song" both go back to a "common source" (Riess, *L. c.*, p. 17); for the "charm-song" may well be "a survival of an earlier stage of intercourse with the divine power" (*ibid.*) and would thus bear "out the definition of superstition as religion become *stark*" (*ibid.*); but, if magic of any sort copied the earliest religious forms, it could hardly fail to copy later ones (cf. J., pp. 42, 178-179), and it appears to have also originated in part in "savage science" (*ibid.*, pp. 31-38).

thought were but children. It would be quite as reasonable to expect an illiterate day laborer to understand as much by the word "sun" as is conveyed by that term to the mind of the specialist who spends his days with spectroscope and camera photographing and analyzing the wonderful lines of the solar spectrum, as to imagine that a nature religion in primitive times can be held to the standards prevailing among ourselves just before the twentieth century so soon to dawn. The important question is the attitude of mind. If it shows worship and faith, the rest is simply a question of knowledge, or light. Modern standards may indeed make it clear that the faith shown has no reasonable ground and that the object of worship is unworthy of reverence: on practical grounds we may perhaps call it superstition, in the broad or general sense of the word: but, from the worshiper's standpoint, it is still a form of religion; inasmuch as, with our light, its followers might put us to shame. In the case of some of the early Vedic worshipers at least, this statement is certainly not too strong.

It should be borne in mind, however, that nothing regarding the nature of the Vedic deities is to be inferred from what has been said thus far. To understand just what was suggested to the Hindu mind by such words as Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, and the rest, is an extremely difficult and delicate task; not from any lack of material descriptive of them and of their deeds, nor yet altogether from the complexity of the concepts; but rather from the vagueness of the latter and the inevitable desire of the modern mind with its analytical and scientific tendencies to bring down to a definite fixed system what was never intended to be so treated. It is the difficulty of the grown man trying to think the thoughts of the child. To illustrate.

One of the commonest words in the Rig-Veda is *devás*, which we render 'god'; yet it is an adjective in reality and

appears to mean 'belonging-to-the-sky' (div); i.e., it seems to have been used originally to describe something observed in the sky which was spoken of as belonging there or having to do with the sky; but the concept was not sufficiently lofty to prevent the term from being applied in later times to such terrestrial things as priests and princes,¹ somewhat as the corresponding Latin word *deus* was used of distinguished or highly honored persons.² This does not go to show that the devâs of the Rig-Veda were not objects of reverence; but rather that the general character of the word lacked sufficient definiteness to prevent it from coming to be applied to men exalted above their fellows, or possessing unusual authority. To the poet-sages, a *deva* was something manifesting powers which excited the wonder and admiration of the beholder and led him to believe that blessings could be and were obtained by propitiating the object exciting his adoration. Early *deus* may perhaps define the word; but classical *deus* has become too much like *θεός*. *Θεός* will not do, because the *θεοί* were essentially "men writ large"; while, in the Vedic hymns, *deva* means something above and beyond the human in its fundamental conception,³ and implies a certain "vagueness which likeness to the human does not satisfy. To be sure, a *deva* may show human traits, good or bad; but that is nothing strange: the savage thinks that even stones may have life and intelligence,⁴ and the civilized man does not

¹ The word is even said to have been used of fools and idiots; but it has never been cited in this sense in the literature. It may have been so used, somewhat as our own ancestors applied the term 'happy' (A.-S. *sælig*, Eng. silly) to the same class of persons.

² On the contrary, Lat. *dominus*, Gr. *κύριος*, and Eng. lord, all started from the definite human side, though in widely different ways, and came at last to be used of the supreme being.

³ Cf. Herodotus (I., § 131) on the gods of the Persians. The same idea comes out in the later philosophical writings. Cf. also MM., Lect. v., p. 179.

⁴ Cf. J., pp. 11, 21-22, 28, 99, etc. This animism must not be taken to

always easily rid himself of the notion when he suddenly stubs his toe against a projecting rock. A deva may even make use of language like a man and be subject to human conditions: the human side is all the poet knows and his language must of necessity take the form of human experience; but, for all that, a deva is a deva still and the human elements are simply the outgrowth of the effort to grasp the nature and character of the divine (sky) power which has impressed itself upon the poet's heart.

But allowance must be made for two things. Attention has already been called to the difference in the age of the hymns and to the changes and additions in them made by the Brahmans. The evidence of this Brahmanical tampering is clear, even in the present state of Vedic knowledge, and in the latest additions, possibly younger by a thousand years¹ than the oldest hymns, it must be expected that the

mean that primitive man consciously thinks his own characteristics into certain objects animate and inanimate, as we are obliged to do to think his thoughts after him; but rather that he simply takes these things for granted. It does not occur to him that anything that affects him can be different from himself in the matter of intelligence and will; for he has no idea of what intelligence and will really are. He supposes that whatever moves, makes a noise, or seems to have power to benefit or injure him, must of necessity know and do, as he knows and does; he then likens such things more and more to himself, as he begins to think, until his reasoning finally breaks down and doubt becomes possible. Knowing nothing of the nature of logic, his reasoning is often but the association of ideas and the strange and sometimes apparently contradictory notions which result are a sore puzzle at times to the scholar. The untangling of the web of associated ideas, a thing which the original thinkers were incapable of doing, is the problem which such matters present for solution. Cf. E. Riess, *L. c.*, p. 14.

¹ Cf. K., p. 25. But see also M. Bloomfield, in *JAOS.*, Vol. xvii., 1896, p. 175, footnote ||. In the case of the Atharva-Veda, it seems likely that much that is late in form is early in substance, and the same may be true of portions of the Rik. For some reason,—either because they were not regarded as especially sacred or because they were in such common use, probably as charms,—the original form of certain hymns appears not to have been preserved but to have suffered a change corresponding to the shifting which took place in the language, at least this seems to be the

content of words has greatly changed; while the intermediate stages may be expected to appear in the original hymns. Such is, apparently, the fact: mere animistic personification has steadily grown into an abstraction until a deva has come to be more of an actual definite personality than was possible in the early days. To cover this growth from a somewhat vague sky power into a distinct heavenly being by a single word is manifestly impossible, unless the content of the word is made to vary consciously with the varying needs. Even in English no two persons mean exactly the same by the words they use, and in this far-away time, so many centuries before the art of definition, it is only fair to allow the greatest latitude to the singers not only in hymns far apart in point of time, but even in those of approximately the same age; for here and there a poet-sage will outstrip his generation and appear to see with a clearness of vision belonging to a later day: in short, the deities of the Rik are in the process of becoming anthropomorphic; but, with a possible exception or two, they have not yet actually become so. That belongs to the age of the Brāhmaṇas and still more clearly to the Epic period; and yet the single word "god" is made to cover all these varying conceptions.

A late stanza summons to the sacrifice, 'the eleven gods in the sky, the eleven on the earth, and the eleven dwell-

most natural explanation of the differences in the dialect used and it may possibly account for the fact that certain hymns and especially certain stanzas seem to have suffered a change of use in the ritual. This shifting may perhaps have continued in some cases until the form of the hymn was finally fixed by its adoption into one of the priestly collections. The existence of this and similar possibilities complicates the question of the distinction between early and late. The "new school" holds that these terms refer to dialect rather than to chronology, i.e., hymns of widely different form may belong to approximately the same age. That there is a possible factor of this kind in the question is only beginning to be recognized, and it is impossible at present to tell exactly what effect it may have on Vedic exegesis.

ing-in-the-waters,' i.e., the clouds, i. 139, 11.¹ Later the gods were said to rule over the three 'regions,' or 'worlds,' i.e., earth, air, and sky; and they are accordingly classed as terrestrial, aerial, and celestial. There were, however, poets whose imagination was not satisfied with so limited a company, and one late hymn concludes with the remarkable stanza:—

'Three times eleven hundred gods did Agni,
With yet thrice ten and nine gods more, great honor,
In that they melted butter gave for increase;
With sacred straw installed they him as hot r.' x. 52, 6.²

But these passages are doubtless the work of the Brahmins. When an established ritual had been set up and the Mantra-material of the Yajur-Vedas was beginning to take shape, Brahmanism may be said to have been born. It was of slow growth, however, and there can hardly be any question that some of the late hymns of the Rik were composed subsequent to that period,³ since many additions are supposed to have been made at the time of the final compilation, or even later.⁴ It is more than likely that the hymns quoted belong in this number; for the Rik as a whole knows little of thirty-three gods.⁵ The original number of gods in this Veda has been put at ten,⁶ or, by Brahmins, as low as three, to which, however, different

¹ All numbers inserted in the text or footnotes refer to the Rig-Veda, unless otherwise specified.

² Also iii. 9, 9; but there, probably an interpolation, as is shown by the metre. There are a number of metres in the Vedas (metrical translations follow them as far as possible and seek to preserve the general character of the original), all depending on the fixed quantity of the last three or four syllables in a certain number of feet. They are supposed to have developed from a sort of poetry based on syllable counting in Indo-European times which has survived in the Zend-Avesta. See K., note 85.

³ See T., pp. 118 and 122.

⁴ See L., p. 354, § 80; EB., article, "Sanskrit Literature," section, "Rigveda"; and K., pp. 21-22.

⁵ See Hopkins, in JAOS., xvi., p. 280. ⁶ *Ibid.*

names were applied.¹ Three may have been a sacred number even in Indo-European times,² and three and seven (their product also) were sacred in the younger Vedic hymns.³ Three thousand three hundred and thirty-nine is a multiple of all three numbers and may possibly have been consciously so used to express the utmost reach of the poet's imagination concerning the honor paid to Agni. That the stanza as a whole belongs to incipient Brahmanism rather than to the early Vedic beliefs might also seem to be shown by the fact that Agni is made *hotṛ*, or priest; for it has been held that the classification of the gods, on human models or otherwise, was one of the minor changes produced by the evolution of Brahmanism,⁴ the essential feature of which was the sacrificial service.⁵ The difficulty about that position, however, is the fact that Agni is constantly referred to as *hotṛ* throughout the *Rik* and is also spoken of in such a way as to make it probable that the idea that he was installed in the office was an early one.⁶ However this may be, it is quite unnecessary to comment further upon such passages; for they are of little consequence in comparison with the great mass of the *Veda* and the points that remain can barely be touched upon in the limits of the paper which is to follow.

¹ MM., Lecture v., p. 167. ² Cf. K., note 117.

³ See Hopkins, *L. c.*, pp. 276-279. ⁴ See T., p. 124.

⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 122, and B., pp. 47-60.

⁶ Cf. R-V., ii. 2, 1; iii. 6, 3; iv. 15, 1; v. 3, 4; and vii. 16, 12.

ARTICLE II.

A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK
OF ZECHARIAH.

BY WALTER R. BETTERIDGE.

THE unity of the book of Zechariah was first questioned, about the middle of the seventeenth century, by the English scholar Joseph Mede (d. 1638). From that date to this, these prophecies have been one of the most interesting subjects of criticism; and the history of these investigations forms one of the most instructive chapters in the history of biblical criticism.

The quotation of Zech. xi. 13 by Matthew (xxvii. 9, 10) as from Jeremiah seems to have called Mede's attention to the authorship of the last six chapters of the book of Zechariah. The doubt as to the unity of the book raised by this quotation was strengthened, rather than removed, by an examination of the character of the chapters in question. He says: "Certainly, if a man weighs the contents of some of them [chaps. ix.-xiv.], they should in likelihood be of an elder date than the time of Zachary; namely, before the Captivity: for the subjects of some of them were scarce in being after that time. . . . There is no scripture saith they are Zachary's; but there is scripture saith they are Jeremy's, as this of the Evangelist."¹ Mede's opinions found some recognition in England, for they were advocated during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Hammond, Kidder, and Whiston. Their arguments were essentially the same as Mede's, and all of them supported

¹Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, Art. "Zechariah."

their conclusions chiefly upon Matthew's statement. These authors were opposed by Carpzov,¹ who devoted himself to defending the unity of the book, noticing especially the arguments of Whiston. The quotation in Matthew he disposed of by asserting that Matthew simply quoted from the order of the prophets, which order he designated by the name of the first prophet in the list, a position which, according to the oldest Jewish authorities, was occupied by Jeremiah. The reference was thus parallel to the citation of the order of the Hagiographa as the Psalms (Luke xxiv. 44).

But Mede, Hammond, Kidder, Whiston, and Carpzov were only the heralds of the coming conflict. With the appearance of an anonymous work on Zechariah in Germany in 1784 from the pen of Flügge, archdeacon of Hamburg, and the book of Bishop Newcome in England in 1785, the real critical battle began,—a battle which has been waged unceasingly, and with varying fortunes, from that day to this. Both Newcome and Flügge advocated the preëxilic authorship of Zech. ix.—xiv.; and Newcome was the first to divide the six chapters between two preëxilic authors. "I conclude," he says, "from internal marks in chapters ix., x., xi., that these three chapters were written much earlier than the time of Jeremiah, and before the captivity of the tribes. They seem to suit Hosea's age and manner. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth chapters form a distinct prophecy, and were written after the death of Josiah; but, whether before or after the captivity, and by what prophets, is uncertain, though I incline to think that the author lived before the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians."²

With certain modifications this opinion of Newcome became the prevailing critical view for almost a century.

¹ *Critica Sacra* (2d ed., 1748), p. 856.

² *Dictionary of the Bible*, p. 3603.

Although there was a great diversity in details as to the exact date of the two writers, there was still a general agreement that chapters ix.-xi. were written by a prophet belonging either to the Northern Kingdom or to the Southern Kingdom, but active, like Amos, chiefly in the Northern Kingdom, and a contemporary of Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah. Chapters xii.-xiv., on the other hand, were written after the death of Josiah, but before the Exile. Rosenmüller and Hitzig were almost the only scholars among the advocates of the preëxilic authorship who did not adopt this theory. Rosenmüller, who at first defended the unity of the entire book in the first edition of his "*Scholia in Vetus Testamentum*,"¹ in the second edition² yielded this position, and advocated the preëxilic authorship of chapters ix.-xiv., though he maintained that these six chapters were a unity, and came from a prophet who lived in the time of Uzziah. This was also the view of Hitzig in an article published in *Studien und Kritiken*.³ In his commentary,⁴ while he still defended the unity of authorship of the chapters in question, he had yet so modified his original opinion as to acknowledge that chapters ix.-xi. belong to a period about fourteen years earlier than xii.-xiv. In the later editions of his commentary, however, he gave up the unity of authorship of these six chapters, and assigned ix.-xi. to the period of anarchy in the Northern Kingdom following upon the death of Jeroboam, while he assigned xii.-xiv. to the time of Manasseh.⁵

With this exception, the theory of the preëxilic authorship of these chapters in the form already outlined was regarded, by a large number of the most eminent Old Testament scholars of the century, as proved. The list of their names is a long one, and I can mention here only some of

¹ 1816, vii. 4, pp. 233-236. ² 1828. ³ 1830, pp. 25-45.

⁴ *Die Zwölf Kleinen Propheten* (1838), pp. 129-132.

⁵ 3d ed., 1863, pp. 351-391.

the most prominent. To this list belong the names of Bertholdt,¹ who was the first to suggest that the author of chapters ix.-xi. was Zechariah the son of Jeberechiah, who is mentioned in Isa. viii. 2; Gesenius,² Knobel,³ and Ewald.⁴ To Ewald is due the suggestion which has found much favor with more recent critics, that verses 7-9 of chapter xiii. have been removed from their original connection, and that they should be placed at the close of chapter xi. Other supporters of this view are Bleek,⁵ Nöldeke,⁶ Diestel,⁷ Bunsen,⁸ Schrader,⁹ Duhm,¹⁰ Orelli,¹¹ Steiner,¹² Riehm,¹³ Schultz,¹⁴ and Farrar.¹⁵ In the most recent times, Strack¹⁶ has supported this theory, and König¹⁷ has defended it at considerable length and with great vigor.

Although this division of chapters ix.-xiv. among two preëxilic authors¹⁸ was regarded as one of the most certain as well as one of the most brilliant results of scientific criticism, so that Hitzig¹⁹ declared that a refusal to accept the

¹ Historisch-kritisch Einleitung, 1812, and ff. 4ter Theil, pp. 1712-1728.

² Commentar über den Jesaia, 1821, p. 327.

³ Prophetismus der Hebräer, 1837, 2ter Theil, pp. 166-176, 280-290.

⁴ Propheten des Alten Bundes (1840), Vol. i. pp. 308-324, 389-398.

⁵ Studien und Kritiken, 1852, pp. 247-332; Introduction to the Old Testament (Eng. Trans. 1869), Vol. ii. pp. 161-175.

⁶ Die Alttestamentliche Literatur (1868), p. 214.

⁷ Art. "Sacharja" in Schenkel's Bibel Lexikon, Vol. v. pp. 126-134.

⁸ Bibelurkunden, 2te Abtheilung, 2ter Theil, pp. 272-274, 370-371.

⁹ De Wette-Schrader Lehrbuch der hist.-krit. Einleitung (8th ed. 1869), pp. 477-483.

¹⁰ Theologie der Propheten, 1875, pp. 141-149; 222, 225-228.

¹¹ Old Testament Prophecy, E. T., 1885, pp. 244-253, 345-360; The Twelve Minor Prophets, E. T., 1893, pp. 304-311.

¹² Hitzig-Steiner, Die Zwölf Kleinen Propheten, 4th ed., 1881, pp. 367-374.

¹³ Einleitung in das Alte Testament (1890), Vol. ii. pp. 150-160.

¹⁴ Old Testament Theology, E. T., 1892, pp. 416-418.

¹⁵ Minor Prophets, pp. 208-222.

¹⁶ Einleitung in das Alte Testament, 4th ed., 1895, pp. 109-111.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1893, pp. 364-376.

¹⁸ Cf. Bunsen, *ut supra*, p. 272.

¹⁹ Die Kleinen Propheten, 1838, p. 129.

conclusion was equivalent to a denial of the rights of criticism, yet there was no lack of competent defenders of the unity of the entire book of Zechariah. So Eichhorn¹ and Jahn.² Jahn's discussion is notable from the fact that, instead of maintaining, as has usually been done by the advocates of the unity of the entire book, that chapters i.-viii. contain the record of Zechariah's prophetic activity immediately after his call to be a prophet, while chapters ix.-xiv. embody the messages of his later years, he suggested that Zechariah first composed and published chapters ix.-xiv., but that these oracles were not received by his contemporaries, because, dealing as they did with the remote future, they were unintelligible to them. Later, in order to find an audience among his fellow-men, he proclaimed the prophecies contained in chapters i.-viii., prophecies dealing with the immediate future. Rosenmüller followed Jahn, and maintained the unity of the book. His adoption of the preëxilic theory in the second edition of his "Scholia" has already been noticed. De Wette's change of attitude in regard to this question is also noteworthy. In the first three editions of his "*Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung*" he had adopted the preëxilic theory of the authorship of these chapters. In the fourth to seventh editions, however, he abandoned this position, and came out for the unity of the entire book.³ Among other advocates of the unity of the entire book should be mentioned Hengstenberg,⁴ Hävernicks,⁵ Stähelin,⁶

¹ *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 1st ed., 1780-1783, 3ter Theil, pp. 414-426.

² *Einleitung in die göttlichen Bücher des Alten Bundes*, 1803, Vol. ii. pp. 675-685.

³ E.g., 6th ed., 1845, pp. 372-376.

⁴ *Dissertation on the Genuineness of Daniel and the Integrity of Zechariah*, E. T., 1847, pp. 293-315.

⁵ *Handbuch der hist.-krit. Einleitung in das A. T.*, 1837, Vol. ii. pp. 411-426.

⁶ *Messianische Weissagungen*, 1847, pp. 125-135, 173-175.

Keil,¹ Pusey,² Henderson,³ Köhler,⁴ Ayre,⁵ Harman,⁶ Chambers,⁷ C. H. H. Wright,⁸ Lowe,⁹ T. T. Perowne,¹⁰ and Dods.¹¹ Bishop Perowne¹² evidently favors the unity of authorship, but he concludes that "it is not easy to say which way the weight of evidence preponderates" (p. 3608). Drake in the Bible Commentary is equally undecided.

Side by side with these two theories, a third theory has from the first had its supporters; viz. that chapters ix.-xiv. are from a different author than chapters i.-viii., and belong either to the late Persian or to the Greek-Maccabean period. Eichhorn, who in the first edition of his "Einleitung" had defended the unity of authorship, preserved in the second and third editions,¹³ in the body of the text, the discussion of the first edition; while he suggested, in quite an elaborate note, that many points in chapters ix.-xiv. could be best explained after the time of Alexander the Great, a view which he finally adopted positively in the fourth edition.¹⁴ Paulus¹⁵ argued for a date as late as

¹ Introduction to the Old Testament, E. T., 1871, pp. 425-430, and Commentary on the Minor Prophets, E. T., 1868, Vol. ii. pp. 217-233.

² Minor Prophets, 1866, pp. 503-512.

³ *Ibid.*, 1868, pp. 354-357.

⁴ Die Weissagungen Sacharjas, 1861, 1863, and article "Sacharja" in P. R. E., 2d ed., Vol. xiii. pp. 179-187.

⁵ Horne's Introduction to the Holy Scriptures, 14th ed., 1877, pp. 882-885.

⁶ Introduction to the Study of the Holy Scriptures, 1879, pp. 407-411.

⁷ Schaff-Lange Commentary, Minor Prophets, p. 874, and article "Zechariah" in Schaff-Herzog, Vol. iii. p. 2568.

⁸ Zechariah and his Prophecies, Bampton Lectures for 1878, especially pp. xxii-xlii, and Introduction to the Old Testament, 1891, pp. 222-224.

⁹ Commentary on Zechariah, 1882, pp. ix-xx, and in Ellicott's Old Testament Commentary, for English Readers, Vol. v.

¹⁰ Haggai and Zechariah in The Cambridge Bible, 1888.

¹¹ The Post-Exilic Prophets, in Handbooks for Bible Classes.

¹² Article "Zechariah" in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, Am. ed., Vol. iv. pp. 3598-3610. ¹³ 1787 and 1803.

¹⁴ 1824. ¹⁵ Exeg. Handbuch über die drei ersten Evangelien (1832, iii. 1, pp. 117-142).

John Hyrcanus. Vatke¹ maintained that these chapters could not have been written earlier than the first half or middle of the fifth century. Geiger² asserted that these chapters ix.-xiv. were the work of a later poet; and Böttcher³ assigned Zech. ix.-xiv. to a date after 330 B.C. Wellhausen⁴ regarded the last six chapters as the work of an anonymous contemporary of Zechariah. But even with such advocates, this theory attracted but little notice, and indeed, in many discussions of the critical questions regarding the book of Zechariah, was not even mentioned, so thoroughly convinced were the majority of critics that the question at issue was simply whether the last six chapters were preëxilic or from the hand of Zechariah himself.

The year 1881, however, marks an epoch in the history of the criticism of our prophecy. In this and the following years, Stade published his elaborate article on Deutero-Zacharia,⁵ in which he sought to prove, by a consideration of the relation of the contents of chapters ix.-xiv. to the rest of Old Testament prophecy, and of the indications as to date to be drawn both from the internal history of Judaism and from external history, that the chapters in question could not have been written earlier than the first ten or fifteen years of the third century B.C., i.e. 300-278. Stade also held that the entire section came from the hand of one man. With considerable difference of opinion as to date and other details, particularly in regard to the question of the unity of authorship of the last six chapters, these chapters have been assigned to a date subsequent to Zechariah by most of the leading critics of the past fifteen years.

¹ *Die Religion des A. T.*, 1835, pp. 553-554.

² *Urschrift und Übersetzungen*, 1857, pp. 58-59.

³ *Lehrgebäude der Hebräischen Sprache*, 1866, 1868, Vol. i. p. 23.

⁴ *Geschichte Israels*, 1878, Vol. i. p. 420; *Prolegomena*, E. T., 1885, p. 404.

⁵ *Zeitschrift für die A. T. Wissenschaft*, Vol. i. pp. 1-96; ii. pp. 151-172, 275-309.

So Wellhausen,¹ Cheyne,² Cornill,³ Delitzsch,⁴ Kirkpatrick,⁵ Eckhardt,⁶ Marti,⁷ Wildeboer,⁸ Kautzsch,⁹ and with some hesitation Elmslie.¹⁰ Worthy of special mention are the views of Kuenen, Driver, Briggs, and Halévy. Kuenen, who in the first edition of his "*Onderzoek*" had been an advocate of the preëxilic theory, has in the second edition adopted a modified form of the post-exilic theory.¹¹ He acknowledges that chapters ix.-xiv. as we now have them are later than Zechariah, but still the author has made use of preëxilic material, particularly in chapters ix.-xi. In this way he accounts for the supposed preëxilic references in these chapters. Driver's view¹² is essentially that of Kuenen. Briggs¹³ divides these chapters between two authors,—one, the author of ix.-xi., belonging to the time of Hezekiah; while the author of xii.-xiv. belongs to an age later than Zechariah. Halévy¹⁴ combats the opinions of Wellhausen and Stade and asserts that the chapters in question belong to the early Persian period. He does not express himself positively on the question of authorship, but he seeks to assume the non-Zecharian authorship.

Just as half a century ago the preëxilic theory was dominant, so now it is undoubtedly true that the theory of a date later than Zechariah is in possession of the field. This

¹ Article "Zechariah" in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*, Heft V., 1892.

² *Jewish Quarterly Review*, Vol. i. pp. 76-83.

³ *Einleitung in das A. T.*, 1892, pp. 195-201.

⁴ *Messianische Weissagungen*, 1890, pp. 149 ff.

⁵ *Doctrine of the Prophets*, 1892.

⁶ *Z. A. T. W.*, Vol. xiii. pp. 76-109.

⁷ *Kayser-Marti Theologie des A. T.*, p. 191.

⁸ *De Letterkunde des Ouden Verbonds*, 1893, pp. 408-416.

⁹ *Die Heilige Schrift des A. T. übersetzt.*, 1894, Beilagen, pp. 203 ff.

¹⁰ *Book by Book*, 1892, pp. 331-337.

¹¹ Cf. *Onderzoek*, 2d ed., Vol. ii. pp. 408-425.

¹² *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, 1891, pp. 324-333.

¹³ *Messianic Prophecy*, 1886, pp. 183-184, 462 ff.

¹⁴ *Revue Sémitique*, Avril, 1844, pp. 101-109.

bewildering change in critical opinion might well lead one to expect that the next movement would be a return to the traditional view of the unity of the entire book. In fact the appearance, in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*¹ of an able article from the pen of George Livingstone Robinson, Ph. D., entitled, "The Prophecies of Zechariah, with special Reference to the Origin and Date of Chapters ix.-xiv.," is not unlikely to mark the beginning of the new critical movement. The article is, as we are informed by a footnote, a Dissertation presented to the Philosophical Faculty of Leipzig, for the purpose of obtaining the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Dr. Robinson, who is now a professor in Knox College, Toronto, has made a valuable addition to the literature on the prophecy of Zechariah, and in the main his conclusions seem to the present writer perfectly satisfactory. After a very complete bibliography, the author gives a brief sketch of the history of critical opinion, followed by an analysis of the contents of the book. He then proceeds to examine the preëxilic hypothesis, discussing successively: (1) the Argument from Historical Allusion; (2) the Argument from Messianic Prophecy; and (3) the Argument from Parallelism in Thought and Language between Zech. ix.-xiv. and the other prophets. Each one of these arguments is subjected to a searching analysis, and it is difficult to understand how an unprejudiced mind can follow this process and not conclude, with Professor Robinson, that "there are good critical grounds for assigning these disputed prophecies to a post-exilic date."

Having thus disposed of the preëxilic theories, the author proceeds to examine the post-Zecharian hypothesis. He insists rightly upon making a sharp distinction between the grounds advanced in favor of a post-exilic date and those which argue a post-Zecharian date. He considers two

¹ Vol. xii. pp. 1-92.

arguments,—the linguistic and the historical. In his discussion of the linguistic argument he investigates particularly that of Eckhardt, who went over this ground in the *Zeitschrift für die A. T. Wissenschaft*, and concluded, on the basis of the linguistic argument alone, that these chapters could have been written "only in Grecian times." This conclusion Professor Robinson, after a thorough examination of the various linguistic criteria of late authorship, declines to accept, and asserts that the linguistic evidences lead rather to a date before the Greek period. Nor do the passages which have been said to furnish historical arguments in favor of the Greek-Maccabean period stand the test of criticism. On the contrary, some of them, such as Zech. xiv. 9; xii. 2, are utterly inconclusive, while others really favor the Persian period. One of these is the mention of the houses of David and Levi; that is, of the political and ecclesiastical authorities in xii. 12-14. So far as we know, such a coördination was natural only in the early Persian period, for even as early as the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, the house of David seems to have lost the prestige which it unquestionably had in the time of Zerubbabel. The other is the mention of the sons of Greece in chapter ix. 13. This reference is the strongest argument in favor of the post-Zecharian date. Stade indeed goes so far as to assert,¹ that the mention of the sons of Greece alone is an imperative reason for the placing of these chapters in the Greek period. But Robinson maintains, and as we think rightly, that the nature of the reference to the Greeks is too vague and indefinite, in short too apocalyptic in its character, to necessitate a date after Alexander. All that it requires is that the Greeks should have already appeared as a formidable power on the plane of history, and it is a well-known fact that the Ionians had been threatening the Persian empire several years before the battle of Marathon.

¹ *Zeitschrift für die A. T. Wissenschaft*, Vol. ii. p. 290.

Our author concludes that this reference to the Greeks leads to a date before 516 B.C., a conclusion which he seeks to support by other arguments. He maintains that these chapters indicate that the temple is still in process of construction. But here we must part company with him, for his arguments appear to us entirely inconclusive. We are too little acquainted with the period from the completion of the temple in 516 to the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, to be able to draw definite conclusions from the allusions in these chapters. But that they must have been written before the time of Malachi seems certain. Professor Robinson examines next the arguments against the integrity of these chapters, and concludes that they are from one hand; and, lastly, he decides that they were probably composed by Zechariah himself.

As a whole, this dissertation of Professor Robinson's meets with our most hearty approval. In the main we agree with his conclusions, although, as we have indicated above, we do not think the historical references will justify us in fixing upon so definite a date, i.e., between 518 and 516, for the origin of these prophecies.

The author has undoubtedly made a mistake when he names Cornill among those who argue that ix. 13 is either a post-exilic interpolation or a corrupt text. Cornill has, on the contrary, argued most positively against Kuenen's position, and in favor of that of Stade. He also errs in saying that Hitzig in the first edition of his Commentary (1838) gave up the unity of chapters ix.-xiv. Hitzig's successive changes of view have already been described. We would suggest, also, that the author add to the list of the defenders of the preëxilic hypothesis the name of König.¹ König's attempt to explain the כִּי יִנֶּה of ix. 13 as a textual corruption, which arose before the employment of final letters, so that כִּי יִנֶּה might be equal to כִּי יִנֶּה, i.e.

"the sons of Nineveh," is interesting and might well be mentioned in such an historical survey as Professor Robinson has given.

But, at the most, these are only trifles, and do not seriously affect the merit of the article. We are glad to acknowledge that a careful study of it in connection with the history of the criticism of the book of Zechariah, has strengthened our conviction that there is no really decisive argument against the unity of the entire book.

ARTICLE III.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE
PLATONISTS.

BY THE REV. F. J. POWICKE, D. D.

ENGLAND was never more intensely alive than in the middle of the seventeenth century. Englishmen have always been politicians; but then they were politicians and theologians as well. Moreover, it was their theology which shaped their politics. It was the conviction that the king had a divine right to rule in church and state which engaged the Royalists for what is now seen to have been an unjust cause. It was the conviction that God's will must be done; that God's will meant the welfare of the people, and in a special sense the welfare of their souls; that God's will could not be done so long as any man, even though a king, stood in the way, claiming to interpret but often perverting its dictates,—it was this conviction which kindled in the Puritans so stern a passion of resistance. God was the supreme element. At that time, if at any time in our history, God seemed to men a living God. We need not say, as Carlyle would seem to say, that he was a living God only to the Puritans. A faith in God which craved to know what it was right to believe about him, and in what way it was right to worship him; a faith which charged all actions of the present life with momentous issues for the life to come,—was not confined to Puritans. It was a possession diffused, more or less, through all parties and ranks. It was as real in Falkland as in Cromwell, in Laud as in Owen, in George Herbert as in Colonel Huteson.

Here, in fact, is the truest key to the multiplicity of sects and the fierceness of their conflict. Men do not become zealous for things about which they feel no great concern. When there sprang up swarms of "Antiscripturists, Familists, Antinomians, Antitrinitarians, Arians, Anabaptists," it might be natural for Puritan and Prelatist alike to ban them as "the very dregs and spawn of old accursed heresies which had been already condemned, dead, buried, and rotten in their graves long ago." Nevertheless, the sudden uprising, the rapid growth, the fervent zeal of such sects bear sure witness to the dominant interest of the age. They tell of the universal craving for acquaintance with God and God's will as the secret of satisfaction and peace. In this view, the tumult and contention which to men like Baxter appeared so utterly deplorable, may be seen to deserve something more than denunciation. We are to God not what we seem, but what we mean. And there was scarcely a sect in those earnest days which did not mean or intend the truth.

Still, even as the contrast between the strife and chatter of the agora and the seclusion of the Academic grove where Plato walked and talked, so seems to our imagination the contrast between the tumult of the outside ecclesiastical world and that little circle of choice spirits at Cambridge who "studied to propagate better thoughts, to take men off from being in parties, or from narrow notions, from superstitious conceits and a fierceness about opinions." What impresses one at once in these men is not so much the articles of their creed—whether political or theological—as their temper. It is the temper of the Christian philosopher met with unexpectedly, and so the more welcome. They are not recluses. They are men of affairs. They are men who give free and large expression to their thoughts in speech and writing. They can give and take in controversy. Their views are definite, are deeply rooted

in principle, are never lightly changed or abandoned. But, withal, their temper—as represented especially by Whichcote, Smith, Cudworth, and More—is the perfection of “sweet reasonableness.” Bitter personalities and animosities—the generally accredited weapons of theological combatants—were abhorrent to them.

“Universal charity is a thing final in religion;”¹ “the truly zealous serve religion in a religious temper; in zeal there is nothing tending to provocation or exasperation. Zeal for God and truth appears to others in fair persuasion and strength of argument,”²—these are words descriptive of religion as they both conceived and practised it.

It did actually affect their whole manhood. “In the understanding it was knowledge; in the life it was obedience; in the affections it was delight in God; in their carriage and behavior it was modesty, calmness, gentleness, quietness, candour, ingenuity; in their dealings it was uprightness, integrity, correspondence with the rule of righteousness.”³ One who values spiritual culture cannot but be drawn to the study of men like these—even though, as is certainly not the case, they could do little for the intellect. They were remarkable for learning even in that learned age. They abound in passages of “that glorious eloquence, so rich in varied and majestic harmonies,” of which Milton and Hooker are the greatest masters. They contain numberless examples of noble thought, so clearly and tersely expressed as to make their writings a rich mine of aphoristic wisdom. But their chief claim to live, and their chief use, lies in the fact that the reader who puts himself under their influence soon comes to feel, as Plato said, that the soul is a winged creature whose proper home is not the flats and mists of earth, but the pure and open heavens; is not the perishable things of

¹ Whichcote's Aphorisms, No. 679. ² *Ibid.*, 425. ³ *Ibid.*, 956.

sense, but the eternal truths, the unfading hopes and ideals and possessions of a divinely nurtured life.

The purpose of this paper is to describe general characteristics of the Cambridge men. Biographical details, therefore, need not be given. These can be found in Principal Tulloch's admirable work "*Rational Theology in England in the Seventeenth Century.*" Yet it is necessary to say so much about the men as will suffice for historical background.

Whichcote (1610-1683), son of an old Shropshire family, entered Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in 1626, at the age of sixteen. Emmanuel College had the reputation of being Puritan—which in this connection means, not Calvinist, but opposed more or less to the ritual and articles of the established church.

In the sense of Calvinist all the colleges were professedly Puritan. Thus, Mr. Joseph Mede—who on some accounts might almost be called the day-star of the Cambridge movement—wrote to a friend on the 6th of July, 1622, in a tone of amazement, that "on Sunday, in the face of the whole 'commencement assembled,' Mr. Lucie," lately made a B.D., "preached a sermon totally for Arminianism. . . . "Yesterday," he goes on, "a combination gathered in the town, and went to the vice-chancellor to have him censured." But by some backstairs influence he escaped.¹

Emmanuel, then, was Calvinist in common with the rest of the University: it was only singular in being Puritan, i.e., in favoring a further reformation of the church. Hence Whichcote might afterwards, as he did, retain office under Parliament and Cromwell without departing from his early principles. He was always for the church, but he was also for the movement which aimed at purging away gross errors and simplifying forms of worship, i.e., for the

¹ See his letter in *Cambridge Transactions*, Vol. ii. p. 309.

early Puritan ideal, if not for the whole Puritan performance. In his undergraduate days his tutor noted him as "studious and pious"; "in 1636 he was ordained both deacon and priest by Williams, Bishop of Lincoln. During the eventful years which followed, he appears to have employed himself with pupils at the University till 1643," when he removed to the college living of North Cadbury, Somersetshire. The next year he is back at the University as provost in King's College, and there remained till the Restoration.

Whichcote was a preacher. Preaching came natural to him. He was never so happy as in the pulpit. He wrote nothing for publication. All his literary remains are four volumes of sermons compiled from notes taken mostly by admiring hearers; and a Book of Aphorisms mostly culled from the sermons. But they are quite enough, when added to the rare beauty of his character, to explain how he became the founder of a new school. Maurice¹ is reluctant to call the movement which started with Whichcote a school. And certainly Whichcote did not seek to found a school in the sense of getting a man to adopt and echo his opinions. But, like Maurice himself, his influence was magnetic. From the time he set up his afternoon lectureship—1644—he became, like Maurice, a center of attraction or repulsion. To stern and unbending Calvinists such as his former tutor Tuckney, he was a source of mental perplexity and sorrow of heart. To the young Masters of Arts, on the other hand, he was a fountain of "new light and "heart's ease."

One of these latter was John Smith (1616–1652), a farmer's son from Achurch, Northamptonshire; poor in purse, but rich in genius; so remarkable a scholar that, though he died at the age of thirty-six, he was considered 'a living library' and 'a walking study'; so clear a thinker that

¹ *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, Vol. ii. p. 349.

his "learning lay not as idle notions in his head," but all "concocted" for use; so sweet a personality, that the friends who "had a more inward converse" with him knew him to be one of those "of whom the world is not worthy," one of the "excellent ones of the earth"; so eloquent that "his mouth could drop finished sentences as easily as an ordinary man's could speak sense." He was one of Whichcote's favorite pupils. Whichcote eased him of care, in his straitened circumstances, with money freely and delicately given. Smith on his part did ever express not merely "a great and singular regard" for his tutor, but used to say that mentally and spiritually he "lived on Dr. Whichcote." None more certain to be among the Trinity Chapel audience than he; none more diligent in taking notes; none more quick to see and assimilate the preacher's thought; none better able to reflect it, exalted and enlarged, in "Select Discourses" of his own—discourses which, for richness of style, depth and breadth of grasp, and elevation of feeling, are second to none in the English language.

Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), too—another student of Emmanuel, son of a clergyman at Aller in Somerset; who graduated M.A. at the age of twenty-two "with great applause"; who distinguished himself later as tutor of his college and Master of Christ's, and still more as author of an "Intellectual System of the Universe," which is at least a miracle of learning—also followed Whichcote, not slavishly, but yet with a fullness of sympathy which made him receptive of his leader's most characteristic thoughts and aims.

A third adherent was Henry More (1614–1687), son of a squire at Grantham, in Lincolnshire; a student not of Emmanuel, but of Christ Church; one who almost equals Cudworth in the vastness and variety of his learning; one who deserved to be called, if any man ever did, a "spiritual

splendor"—"the most Platonical of the Platonic sect, and at the same time the most genial, natural, and perfect man of them all."

These were the men with whom the Cambridge movement began. And when we consider what they were in position, in attainments, in ability, and in character, it is not surprising that the youth of the University should have been at once attracted to them, and that in a few years the numbers inoculated with their principles should have so increased as to create a wide-spread anxiety among the orthodox, and to put their "name in every man's mouth."

We may now raise the question, what mainly the men of the New School would learn from its leaders. There can be no doubt as to the answer; for the word oftenest on the lips of Whichcote was "reason." His free and bold use of it was the special fault charged against him by Tuckney and others. These wished "faith to have been advanced, rather than reason cried up: which is yet so frequently done that it proves nauseous."¹ Whichcote of course did not begin the use of the term. It had already become a sort of watchword among men inside and outside the universities who claimed to be men of light and leading. But he imparted to it a significance and sacredness which soon made it a distinguishing badge. Locke in his essay opens the chapter on Reason with the remark, that "the word Reason in the English language has different significations; sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles; sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles; and sometimes for the cause and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a faculty in man." So with the Cambridge men, reason—though they not seldom employ

¹ Second letter of Dr. Antony Tuckney to Whichcote, written in 1641.

it in one or the other of the senses mentioned by Locke—is a faculty. As such, their conception of it was Platonic.

According to Plato, there is nothing higher in man than reason; because it answers to what is highest in God. The Divine Reason, or *νοῦς*, is conversant with ideas only, i. e., with the pure truth of things, the essential “forms” which shape and sustain all phenomena of sense and spirit. Human reason is capable of doing the same. Man’s grandest privilege and most serious duty is to escape the mere shows of life; is to rise by means of discriminating intellectual effort and purifying moral discipline, from the confused to the clear, from that which seems to that which *is*. *Truth* is that which *is*; is a *κόσμος*—a steady, steadfast system of ideas and their relations. To know the truth in all fullness belongs to God. To know it in some measure—a measure which may be ever growing in range and distinctness—was God’s gift to man, when by communicating reason he communicated to him the most genuine token of his own image. So taught Plato.

And the interpretation which the Cambridge men put on the words they were so fond of quoting is of itself proof enough that they agreed with Plato. To them the “candle of the Lord” was not so much the *light* as the eye of the soul, an organ of intellectual apprehension, derived from God, and godlike. The light was the truth, evidenced to the eye of reason, as the sun’s light to the eye of the body, by its very nature. Their love for that particular phrase may have arisen, certainly not from the feeling that it was their only scriptural support, but from the humility which always led them to confess that the glory of knowing the truth is coupled with the fact that man’s knowledge, and power to know, do not, at least on earth, amount to very much; is comparatively a feeble light, a mere beam in the darkness. All the same, its divine origin and character confer upon it a divine au-

thority, so far as it goes. "A man has as much right to use his own understanding in judging of truth as he has a right to use his own eyes to see his way."¹ "To go against reason is to go against God; it is the self-same to do that which the reason of the case doth require, and that which God himself doth appoint. Reason is the Divine Governor of man's life; it is the very voice of God."² In fact the distinction and the offense of the Cambridge men was, not that they exercised or even commended reason more than others, but only that they made it the ultimate authority.

It has often been said that a result of scholasticism was utterly to suppress and eclipse reason. In a sense, no doubt, the statement is correct—in the sense, viz., that when once doctrines were established they were forced upon the mind's acceptance without option of criticism. But it should be remembered that the process which led up to the formulating of a doctrine was a strict exercise of reason, and such an exercise as trained it to a subtilty and power that have never been surpassed. Reason was indeed the handmaid of faith—faith supplied its premises—to expound and confirm these was its assigned and only legitimate task. But in doing this it disciplined itself—"Men learned in reasoning freely to reason well." At the same time they learned, gradually, to doubt and question—to question the assumptions imposed upon them by Aristotle and the church—to doubt whether it was really the sin it was declared to be to put these authorities to the test. Thus by the use of reason came at length the emancipation of reason. Amid the debates—theological, political, philosophical—which fill the closing years of the sixteenth and the opening years of the seventeenth century, reason developed, more and more, a habit of self-reliance. In the case of the Cambridge men it not simply claimed to be

¹ *Aphorisms*, No. 40.² *Ibid.*, 76.

free: it boldly exhibited the credentials of freedom. It ought to be free because it is divine, is "the first participation from God," is the medium, though not the source, of all the light of truth. On this broad ground—ground truly philosophical—they thought and acted consistently.

They held out a welcome hand to the new philosophy, as it became the fashion to style the Cartesian and Baconian method. Bacon's appeal to the plain facts of sensible experience from the abstractions which, in Aristotle's name, had long stood for explanations of physical phenomena, was an entirely reasonable principle; so, too, was Descartes's principle that the universe might be accounted for mechanically, as the result of the necessary interplay of matter and the circular motion "impressed by the Supreme Agent on the particles of extended substance."¹ How far the first awakening of Whichcote to the independent rights of reason may have been due to Bacon and Descartes it is hard to say. Certainly what we are told of their precursor, Joseph Mede, that he was an enthusiastic botanist and practical anatomist, and that he turned from the "troublesome labyrinths of metaphysical inquiry to physics as a reassuring study," shows that the influence of the new philosophy was in the air. Anyhow, they were among the first to hear and heed its summons to clear the mind of idols, and look facts in the face. The one "distinct" thing which an Oxford man who wrote to a Cambridge friend for light on the new Cambridge sect could "meet with," was that they are "Followers for the most part of the New Philosophy wherewith they have so poisoned that Fountain [i.e., Cambridge], that there are like to issue out very unwholesome streams throughout the whole kingdom." This is true, replies his Cambridge friend. "Aristotle and the Schoolmen are indeed out of request with them." The former's "*ipse dixit*" is an argu-

¹ Berkeley's Lives, § 232.

ment much out of fashion." "They embrace a method of Philosophy which they think was as much ancients than Aristotle as you conceive Oxford was before Cambridge." This philosophy is new and free; and proves itself true by actually discovering to them the way to use and control the great "clock" of the universe. If therefore the church is wise she will heartily encourage it, since "true Philosophy can never hurt sound Divinity."¹

Yet, while Whichcote and his sympathizers were sure to be on the side of a philosophy whose method was frankly reasonable, their main interest did not lie in the physical, but in the theological sphere, and here it was that their reason found most congenial exercise. Into this sphere the new philosophy, as represented at least by Bacon, did not penetrate. Bacon honored theology as the Jews honored the Holy of holies. He thought it too sacred to enter. On this point he is a Protestant scholastic. When the Articles of Religion have been 'posited,' reason may then be allowed to draw inferences—"as to play a game of chess according to the rules; but the 'placets' of God are removed from question." We may sail with philosophy round the world of the sciences, but theology is not a science. Coming to it, we must "step out of the barque of human Reason, and enter into the ship of the Church, which is only able by the divine compass to direct its course. Neither will the Stars of Philosophy, which have hitherto so nobly shone upon us, any longer supply their light; so that on this theme silence is golden." "Sacred Theology ought to be derived from the oracles of God, and not from the light of nature." "Therefore, attend his will as Himself openeth it, and give unto Faith that which unto Faith belongeth." It has sometimes been said that Descartes divorced theology and philosophy in a similar way.

¹ Brief account of the new sect of Latitude-men in 'Phoenix' Tracts, Vol. i.

But this is more than doubtful. He did, indeed, make his bow to the church on all occasions,—professing readiness to accept her ruling in matters of divinity. But his construction of philosophy *ab initio* took up, and was bound to take up, theology on the way. “I have always thought,” he says in the dedication of his “Meditations” to the Sorbonne, “that the two questions of the existence of God and the nature of the soul were the chief of those which ought to be demonstrated rather by Philosophy than by Theology.” Faith on the dictate of the church may suffice for the faithful, but faith on the distinct evidence of natural reason is necessary for the inquirer, and was to himself, whatever he might seem to think, the only faith worth much.

The Cambridge men could not fail to differ from Bacon and agree with Descartes. Their very conception of reason as a “partial likeness of the Eternal Reason,” a faculty in man akin to God’s own power of apprehending truth, committed them to a philosophical treatment of theology. There could be for them no question of any necessary disharmony between reason and faith. These could not even belong to different provinces. They dwelt on the same ground—they had reference to the same objects. Faith was the mind’s assent to the evidence, intuitional or inferential, which reason brought forward. Such assent, when the object was intellectual, might be hindered by prejudice, or, when it was moral, might be hindered by a reluctance of the will. But the yielding it was a purely voluntary act, as much so as the admission of light by the eye or of sound by the ear. To speak of blind faith, therefore, could only mean a faith which had nothing to say for itself. And this, so far from being meritorious, was neither more nor less than self-betrayal. We can see then how justly their position entitles the Cambridge men to the name of philosophical divines. Philosophers simply—in

the sense of mere searchers after truth in general—they were not. Their chief concern was the highest truth, truth religious and moral; and *that* was not a mere *quæsitum*—it was something given, something already within reach. But they were philosophic divines above any who had gone before them, or any of their own time, inasmuch as they maintained that religious truth can never contradict other truth, can never contradict itself—can, in short, never be other than rational in its source, its nature, its relations, its results. We have here the key to their whole theory and practice.

(1) It accounts for their view of the 'natural' and the 'revealed.' What the regnant theology made of this distinction is well known. By the Fall, it said, man ceased to be in any living relation to God. God withdrew himself. Man was left to his own devices. Darkness and corruption became his natural element, unrelieved by any power of self-redemption or self-enlightenment. Whatever fragment of spiritual truth he possessed was traditional—fading gleams of the glory which was his in Paradise. His intellect might converse with words and things; might extract from them a use and meaning; might frame arts and sciences; might lead him on to wealth and power and civilization. But he was without God, and so without hope in the world. How utterly this was supposed to be the case is apparent from the strenuous endeavors of orthodoxy to prove, that, if men like Plato and Aristotle did not get the truth in their writings from Adam, then it must have come to them somehow from the Hebrew Scriptures. Theophilus Gale, e.g., a rather famous Puritan and Independent of the seventeenth century,¹ was really attracted by Plato: his Puritan soul was often thrilled with admiration and delight by the noble heathen's truth and love of truth. He would fain have owned some direct operation of God

¹ 1628-1678.

in Plato, some inspiration of the Spirit. But his theology stepped in. Plato was not a Jew; therefore, outside the sphere of God's personal action: so there was nothing for it but to show that he must have 'borrowed' from that sphere by roundabout ways: which Gale tried to do in two bulky volumes¹ whereon he spent the best years of his life.

There was, then, according to the current belief, no such thing as 'natural' light, i.e., truth communicated to man through the medium of his natural faculties of reason or conscience. Revelation was the only source of light, and revelation was another name for the Scriptures. The Scriptures did not contain the Word of God: they *were* the Word of God: genuine, authoritative, true in every jot and tittle. All Scripture, said the Calvinist, was written under the direct dictation of the Holy Spirit, and was to be read by the church as a living voice from heaven. So given to men, it could not possibly contain discrepancy or contradiction: to question its genuineness was simple rebellion against God. It was the one and sole rule of faith. Reason might be employed to make clear the sense—to fit text to text and deduce doctrines; but must not presume to speak or judge in its own right. Some things in Scripture—in the Old Testament particularly—might inflict a shock on the reader's sense of the right and true. This, however, did not matter. Things in Scripture were right and true, not so far as approved by reason and conscience, but simply by being there.

Now the Cambridge men differed from this entirely. They believed in 'natural light,' because they believed that God had not cast men off; that the vital links between him and them had never been quite severed. True, the Fall had drawn down reason with it. It was now "but an old MS. with some broken periods, some letters worn out; it was a picture which had lost its gloss and beauty, the

¹ His Commentary of the Gentiles.

oriciency of its colors, the elegancy of its lineaments, the comeliness of its proportions—it was like Leah, blear-eyed.” But though the ‘eye of reason is weakened,’ it is not destroyed. It can still see the light; and God on his part has given light to every man in the measure of his receptiveness. God is the ocean of light wherein all human spirits move and live. He shines in all. He shines in all continually. So far, therefore, as they *can* see him and his truth, they *may* see. Moreover, there are some truths to which reason has borne witness always, and in every man. If a man has failed to exercise his reason, or has gathered around it a “dark, filthy mist” of sin, these truths have been dark to him. But in nobler men like Plato they have been marvelously clear, and have filled “the whole horizon of the soul with a mild and gentle light.” These are the truths, which Whichcote led the way in calling “the truths of first inscription.” They are what a due reverence for the rule “Know thyself” must bring first and most plainly to view. They are the common, i.e., universal, notions of God and virtue,—that God is; that he is, like our own souls, intelligent and spiritual; that he is all-wise, all-good, all-holy; that we are bound to revere, and serve, and submit to him; that “we are under obligations to good self-government”; that “in our converse one with another we ought to maintain brotherly love, and to act with all calmness and gentleness, to do according to the measures and rules of right and equity.” These notions God has folded up in the soul of man. They are the Master light of all his seeing, “the foundation of all religion,” the sure guide to God and heaven. He who knows them, though a heathen, is truly wise; he who knows and follows them will never miss the goal. “If,” says Henry More, “thou wilt be faithful to thine inward guide, and deal uprightly in the Holy Covenant, thou wilt want no monitor—thy way shall be made so plain before thee that

thou shalt not err, nor stumble, but arrive at last to the desired scope of all thy travels and endeavors." There might be saints, then, as well as sages among the heathen—ancient and modern. Plato was one, and many others. Their Teacher and Redeemer was not Moses, but the living Father of Spirits. Moses may have been their original in some matters of fact relating to the history of man and the world; but in matters of spiritual life and truth the 'inspiration of the Almighty had given them understanding.'

But such being the doctrine of the Cambridge school as to so-called "natural light," what was its doctrine as to Scripture? Not certainly that the latter is more divine than the former; for God, the Father of lights, is equally the Fountain of both. But what Scripture does is (*a*) to confirm natural truth. "The written word of God," says Whichcote, "is not the first or only discovery of the duty of man. It doth gather and repeat and reinforce and charge upon us the scattered principles of God's creation." "Therefore, these things have a double sanction from God. They are the principles of his creation discoverable and knowable by natural light. They are again declared and included in the terms of the covenant of grace." (*b*) Next, it clears, and makes sure, things which philosophy could do no more than anticipate. Thus Plato argued about the soul's immortality, about judgment to come, about heaven and hell, about the nature of God, but could reach no definite certainty. On these and other mysteries Christ lifts the veil. (*c*) Scripture reveals the surpassing love of God. "It gives a man assurance that God is placable and reconcilable; and also declares to us in what way, and upon what terms, we may be confident that God will pardon sin and receive a sinner to mercy, viz., upon his repentance and faith and returning to God."¹

¹ Sermons, Vol. i. p. 389.

Here Scripture opens up a region of truth fairer than man's best dreams; the fuller light of nature is here lost in a splendor such as "eye had not seen, nor ear heard, nor heart of man conceived." Whichcote and his followers, as we have seen, did full justice to those who in their day were called "mere naturalists." But they were far from being 'mere naturalists' themselves. They would not blame these—they would admit that some of them "will be the condemning of many Christians at the day of Judgment." Still their own glory was in the grace of God in Christ. They preached about nothing so much: they preached about nothing so eloquently. They loved to show how perfectly it accorded with the worthiest conception of God: how fully it meets the deepest and sorest needs of man. To use Whichcote's phrase, all their thoughts of God were steeped in "the perfume of the angel of the Covenant."

But it should be carefully noted that they ever insisted on the end to which even the grace of God is a means. Christ was the efficient means to the final end of restoring man to a state of moral integrity. "The Grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world." This was one of Whichcote's favorite texts: he called it a summary of all necessary divinity. A saved state, he says, is a morally sound state. All that Christ did for us is with a view to implanting a new life within us which shall bear fruit in the good works for which we were created. "The great design and plot of the gospel," says Smith, "is to open and unfold to us the true way of recourse to God; a contrivance for uniting the souls of men to him, and deriving a participation of God to man, to bring in everlasting righteousness." "The great mystery of the gospel," says Cudworth, "doth not lie only in Christ without us

(though we must know also what he hath done for us), but the very pith and kernel of it consists in Christ inwardly formed in our hearts. Nothing is truly ours, but what lives in our spirits. Salvation itself cannot save us so long as it is only without us; no more than health can cure us and make us sound when it is not within us, but somewhere at a distance from us."

Accordingly, for the Cambridge men, the moral element in Scripture was supreme. On no plea could that element be justly set aside or lowered. However texts might be quoted and examples adduced, from the Old Testament especially, in support of some morally questionable doctrine, or practice, they were of no account. Clear principles of truth and right—affirmed by the natural reason and confirmed by the law and purpose of the gospel—were above all particular examples and texts of Scripture. "The *moral* part of religion never alters. Moral Laws are Laws of *themselves* without sanction by will; and the necessity of them arises from the things themselves. All other things in Religion are in order to these. The moral part of religion does sanctify the soul; and is Final both to what is Instrumental and Instituted."¹ One can see how practical in its bearing this view was at a time when Joshua's extermination of the Canaanites, and Jael's treachery, and David's cruel treatment of enemies were accepted and acted upon as divine precedents. The Cambridge men knew nothing of historic criticism. In theory they held the common faith that the Rule of Faith embraced the whole of Scripture, and that every part of it was available for the construction of doctrine or the conduct of life. But in practice they acted as if they stood where *we* stand, and saw the books of the Bible along a line of true historical perspective. It has needed generations to persuade men that in Scripture the true Word of God is Christ; and that

¹ Aphorisms, No. 221.

other voices there are only true so far as they blend harmoniously with his: nay, with many the process of persuasion has yet to do its work. But the Cambridge men may be said to have advanced instinctively to this position—mainly as the result of their unswerving fidelity to that “candle of the Lord,” that natural light, which was, and is, indeed, the word within; and, therefore, could not fail to lead them past all lesser lights to close and rest in the teachings of the “Word made flesh.”

Two other consequences of their application of reason to religion are even more obvious. One is the antagonism it aroused in them toward one of the dogmas of Calvinism—predestination: *decretum absolutum*. Calvinism was, as already remarked, the ruling creed in Cambridge. Arminius had a few open advocates and possibly a few secret sympathizers. But they were not popular. They were classed with Socinians as enemies of the faith; and it was a thrust which hurt Whichcote keenly when his friend Tuckney charged him with being “too well versed in Socinian and Arminian works”—particularly in the Remonstrant’s “Apologie.”¹ He hastened to deny the charge almost angrily, and to declare that, as to the “Apologie,” he had “never even seen or heard of the Book before, much less read a tittle of it.” His views were Arminian, in their general character, nevertheless. There is not one of the ‘five points’ in which he does not agree with Arminius more nearly than with Calvin. No doubt this was why John Goodwin dedicated, chiefly to him, his “Redemption Redeemed.” The arch-Arminian saw, if Whichcote himself did not see, the whereabouts of his theological position and tendencies. But still Whichcote’s Arminianism—and that too of his followers—was come to independently. Assenting as they did to the sacredness of reason and conscience, they could not come to anything else. The sheet-

¹ Letters, p. 27.

anchor of the *decretum absolutum*, e.g., was the supposed teaching of Scripture. Given that teaching, then it *must* be true, and its supposed effect in darkening the divine character must be endured. On the contrary, to the Cambridge men the absolute goodness of God was to their faith as the 'apple of their eye.' Plato had said that God and the good were identical; that Eternal Goodness, delighting to communicate its own perfections, was the author of creation; that the same goodness has spread its beams upon all things great and small, and has focused its radiance in the soul of man. They had learnt from the gospel that Plato was right, that God is light,—in whom is no darkness at all,—and that Christ in his fullness of grace and truth is the mirror of God. The divine goodness—that God "must needs be good as good can be"; "that all the amiable qualities that we see in good men are but so many emanations from those that are in God"; "that he is that unstained beauty and supreme good to which our wills are perpetually aspiring, and wheresoever we find true beauty, love, and goodness, we may say, here or there is God"; "that the only glory he seeks through man is to behold him perfectly fashioned after his own likeness,"—this was to them an axiom of faith. To force upon them a doctrine which virtually denied it was a staggering insult to their spiritual reason. It seemed to them not simply *absolutum*, but *horribile decretum*. They resented and rejected and denounced it with their whole soul and strength. It might have been said of them, as it was said of the 'most judicious and pious Mr. Joseph Mede,' that, "if at any time his spirit was stirred in him, it was when he observed some to contend with an immeasurable confidence and bitter zeal for the Black doctrine of absolute Reprobation." In their case, too, as in his, the sentiment of holy indignation was intensified by the evidently pernicious effects of the doctrine on many of its adherents. For, as

John Smith says, its effect might be to make men's "brains swim with a strong conceit of God's eternal love" to them; to fill them with 'strong dreams' of being in favor with heaven, of their names being enrolled in the book of life, of the debt-books of heaven being closed, of Christ being theirs—while at the same time the "foul and filthy stains" of sin were still "deeply sunk in their souls."¹ This of course is not a necessary effect of the Calvinistic belief. The conception of an eternal will which begins, continues, and completes the work of salvation in a human soul—the central conception of Calvinism—has nothing to do with Antinomianism so long as 'salvation' is felt to be salvation from sin as the indispensable condition of eternal life. There is indeed a spring of mighty moral energy—to which the Cambridge men did scant justice—in realizing that God is *the* Initiating Agent from first to last in the process of salvation, and that the human part is merely receptive, is an unstinted readiness to let God work. Examples of this were before their eyes even in Cambridge. But what mainly struck them was the prominence given to the negative, rather than the positive, side of Calvinism: to 'reprobation' rather than to election, i.e., to just that side which was most dishonoring to God and at the same time demoralizing to its advocates. Hence their protest in the name of reason and conscience was the more severe and strong!

(2) It was due to their exaltation of reason in religion that they were stigmatized not only as Arminians, but as Latitudinarians,—a name designed to be still more reproachful. "I can come into no company of late but I find the chief discourse to be about a certain new sect, of the men called Latitude men"—so writes the Oxford man who signs himself G. B. to a friend at Cambridge who signs himself S. P. The date is 1662; and S. P. in his

¹ Discourse on Legal and Evangelical Righteousness.

reply tells him how the name (or rather nickname) first came into vogue some years before, how it was "pointed at" certain of "learning and good manners" in the University—meaning Whichcote, etc.; and how it was designed to insinuate a charge of indifference, or laxity, in religious and political faith; how, as matter of fact, the only warrant for it was their opposition to that "hidebound, strait-laced spirit that did then prevail."

Certainly the Cambridge men were not lax in the sense of putting self-interest in the first place and fidelity to principle in the second. They had clear convictions of what seemed to them the truth—as to things theological, ecclesiastical, and political. Nor did they ever, so far as I know, do or say anything inconsistent with those convictions. But what they really did was to respect the convictions of others; to teach that within the husk of every error there was a kernel of truth worth searching for, to plead for "moderation and persuasion toward all opponents." "God applies to our faculties, and deals with us, by reason and argument. Let us learn of God to deal with one another in meekness, calmness, and reason, and so represent God."¹ "Let him that is assured he errs in nothing, take upon him to condemn every man that errs in anything."²

Their preference, e.g., on grounds rational and æsthetic, was for Episcopacy. S. P. tells his Oxford friend that most of them had been "ordained by bishops"—a fact which had been a certain bar to their referment if any of them came before the Committee of Triers; that they highly approved the "liturgy, the ceremonies, the government and doctrine of the church." As to the last particularly there is not "any article or doctrine held forth by the church which they can justly be accused to depart from, unless absolute reprobation be one, which they do not think themselves bound to believe." "Nor," he adds, "is

¹ *Aphorisms*, No. 572. ² *Ibid.*, 570.

it credible they should hold any other doctrine than the church, since they derive it from the same fountains, viz., from the sacred writings of the apostles and evangelists, in interpreting whereof they carefully attend to the sense of the ancient church, by which they conceive the modern ought to be guided." In the mind of Laud this preference for the church narrowed itself into a fanaticism. The church, with its liturgy, ceremonies, government, and doctrines, was divine throughout. Unity meant uniformity; schism meant any degree of departure from the one heavenly pattern. On the other hand, most Puritans were just as fanatical about their particular form of a church. Hence each side in its day of power was no less eager than the other to press the state into its service against the nonconformist.

Whichcote and his friends had not the least sympathy with this disposition. Questions touching the constitution of a church could not seem to them of primary importance. If not unimportant, they were secondary. The church was a means, not an end. Its purpose was to make men better Christians, and thereby to carry on more effectually the work of Christ. For themselves, this end seemed best achieved in a church of which the government was Episcopal. But if others held the end best served in a church of another form, why refuse to them the hand of fellowship and communion? Accordingly, when Parliament set up the Presbyterian model at Cambridge, it touched nothing in their beliefs so vital as to compel dissent, although they did dissent, "with the whole force of their intellects and energies, against the narrow, persecuting spirit of Puritanism," when this came to its "highest ascendancy." So, too, although they conformed "with a general readiness" to the ecclesiastical "commands and injunctions" which followed on the "happy restitution of the church" to the pattern they professed; yet they were equally earnest and

energetic against "the narrow, persecuting spirit" which, after 1662, took possession of the bishops and clergy. They were most anxious the church doors should be set wide open, "that mercy and indulgence should be shown towards those whose consciences would not permit them to comply with the will of their governors in some things disputable."

Their attitude in relation to differences of religious belief was similar. Amongst all parties alike there was a strong tendency—though it was strongest amongst the Puritans—to lay the chief stress on doctrine. Doctrine, or materials for the construction of doctrine, was apt to be the main thing sought for in a study of the Scriptures. Especially attractive were points of doctrine which verged on the mysterious, or had to do with subjects appealing to "implicit faith"; and especially keen was the zeal of the men who propounded, or propagated, such points against those who doubted or opposed them. Now the Cambridge men were not disposed to deny the truth of doctrines simply because they were mysterious. "Suppose there be a place of Scripture," said Whichcote, "about some notion that doth transcend the reach of human reason, and which is knowable only by divine revelation; and divine revelation is comprehended in a form of words that I cannot fully comprehend; in this case I refer myself to God, and believe that that is true which God intended in those words. This I call an implicit faith." In this his followers were agreed with him. But they deprecated insistence on 'obscure doctrine' as in any degree essential to life or practice. The essentials of religion, said they, are few; are clearly intelligible to all capacities; are such as any honest mind can apprehend; are, indeed, such as all true Christians unite in accepting. To think otherwise would be dishonoring to God himself. "We cannot put a greater abuse upon God than to say he is obscure; that he

expresses himself darkly in that which concerns every man's duty towards him, or happiness by him; so that the man is at a great loss whether he understands God's meaning by his written word or not."¹ Let us then, said they, come together in that which is universally clear; in that which shows itself to be sufficient because it results in a state of faith and love toward God, and in goodness of life. Let the mysteries of Scripture be expressed in the words of Scripture without seeking to explicate them into terms and systems which are sure to evoke controversy. For "determinations beyond Scripture have indeed enlarged faith, but lessened charity, and multiplied divisions."² In case of plain, or probable, error, "let a fair allowance of patience be given to those who mean well; be ready to show them, since there is ground of expectation that in a little time they will come out of their error." For "nothing is desperate in the condition of good men: they will not live and die in any dangerous error."³ Above all, let it be remembered that Christ was "Magister vitæ," not "scholæ," and he is "the best Christian whose heart beats with the truest pulse towards heaven; not he whose head spinneth out the finest cobwebs. He that endeavors really to mortifie his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life which his conscience is convinced of, is neerer the Christian though he never heard of Christ, than he that believes all the vulgar articles of the Christian faith and plainly denyeth Christ in his life."

If this was the 'Latitude' of the Cambridge men, there is less need to wonder at the resentment it encountered—considering the fierce dogmatism of the times—than at the nobleness and elevation of the spirit which prompted it, and also at the comparatively limited range of its growth and action in the church after the lapse of two hundred years.

¹ Aphorisms, No. 37. ² *Ibid.*, 981.

³ Whichcote, Discourses, Vol. ii. p. 20.

(3) Lastly, it was supposed to be an effect of their reverence for reason and the inner light, that they became pre-eminently "moral preachers." Evelyn in his "Memoirs,"¹ bemoaning the neglect of moral exhortation in the Presbyterian pulpit during the Commonwealth period, says, "There was now nothing practical preached or that pressed reformation of life, but high and speculative points, and strains that few understood—which left people very ignorant and of no steady principles." Indeed, systematic instruction in the practice of "Christian virtue, obedience, purity, temperance, uprightness, and holiness of will and deed" grated discordantly upon the ear of the ultra-Pauline and Augustinian claimant of irreversible election and faith irrespective of works; and was utterly denounced by the Antinomian of whatever shade as a savor of "mere morality," a "stinted" and legal spirit, Arminianism and "heathenry." That this tendency to slight—or at least this failure to press home—the claims of the moral law came to its nemesis in the scandalous license of the next generation is well known; and it should stand to the honor of the Cambridge divines that, though they never preached "mere morality," they did proclaim with a courage and persistence which have seldom been surpassed that "faith without works is dead." "The righteousness of faith is that powerful attractive which, by a strong and divine sympathy, draws down the virtues of heaven into the souls of men; which strongly and forcibly moves the souls of good men into a conjunction with that divine goodness by which it lives and grows."²

One splendid illustration of their teaching in this respect is presented by Cudworth's sermon on the text, "Hereby know we that we know him, if we keep his commandments. He that saith, I know Him, and keepeth not his

¹ November 2, 1656.

² Smith, Discourse on Legal and Evangelical Righteousness.

commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him." He preached it before the House of Commons on March 31, 1647. That year, it will be remembered, witnessed the climax of Presbyterian influence in Parliament. It was the year when the Westminster Assembly of Divines brought its five years' session to an end; when Presbyterianism had been raised at least to a nominal supremacy throughout the land; when the four ordinances were passed, one of which enjoined the covenant on all the officers of the army, etc.; when, in short, the lights of sound doctrine were at their brightest. And this was the year when Cudworth seized occasion to deliver a discourse of which the scope was, not to contend for this or that opinion, but only to persuade men to the life of Christ as "the pith and kernel of religion." Open it at any place, and only variations of the same pure strain are in your ears. Thus: "If any of you say that you know Christ, and have an interest in him, and yet (as I fear too many do) still nourish ambition, pride, vainglory, within your breasts; harbour malice, revengefulness, and cruell hatred to your neighbours in your hearts; eagerly scramble after this worldly pelfe, and make the strength of your parts and endeavours serve that blind mammon, the god of this world; . . . deceive not yourselves, you have neither seen Christ nor known Him. . . . Let us really declare that we know Christ . . . by our keeping of his commandments; and, amongst the rest, that Commandment especially which our Saviour Christ himself commandeth to His disciples in a peculiar manner: 'This is my Commandment that ye love one another as I have loved you.' . . . Let us endeavour to promote the Gospel of Peace, the dove like Gospel with a dove like spirit. . . . Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and His Gospel which is nothing else but our own temptations and stormy passion. True zeal is a sweet, heavenly, and gentle flame which maketh

us active for God, but always within the sphere of love.

Here, again, are some words on what he means by holiness and the law: "I do not mean by holiness the mere performance of outward duties of religion, coldly acted over as a task, nor our habituall prayings, hearings, fastings, multiplied one upon another (though these be all good, as subservient to a higher end), but I mean an inward soul and principle of Divine life that spiriteth all these; that enliveneth and quickeneth the dead carcasse of all our outward performances whatsoever. . . . I do not urge the law written upon tables of stone without us (though there is still a good use of that too), but the law of holiness written within upon the fleshy tables of our hearts. The first, though it work us into some outward conformity to God's commandments, and so have a good effect upon the world; yet we are all this while but like dead instruments of musick, that sound sweetly and harmoniously when they are only struck and played upon from without by the musician's hand, who hath the theory and law of music living within himself. But the second, the living law of the Gospel, the law of the Spirit of life within us, is as if the soul of musick should incorporate itself with the instrument and live in the strings and make them of their own accord—without any touch or impulse from without—dance up and down and warble out their harmonies."

So much, from just one of them, in answer to the reproach that they were moral preachers. The reproach was their glory. For its only warrant lay in the fact that they realized with extraordinary vividness that the supreme value and test of religious truth is its power to awaken in men the vision, and to quicken them with the energies, of a divine life. And let it be noted, in conclusion, that they linked life and truth in another way. It was part of their most emphatic teaching not only that truth must react on

life, but also that life is the path of truth. Reason, to some extent owing to their influence, became more than ever a watchword after their time. It led to great changes for the better.

We can agree with Mr. Lecky, that "the triumphs won by emancipated reason whether we look to the political, the social, the industrial or the theological sphere, have been conspicuous and conspicuously beneficent." We can agree with him further, that one of the things to be most desired is "a love of truth which seriously resolves to spare no prejudice and accord no favour, which prides itself on basing every conclusion on reason or conscience," and in "rejecting every illegitimate influence"¹: including the influence of "early education." For "the fable of the ancients is still true. The woman even now sits at the portal of life, presenting a cup to all who enter in which diffuses through every vein a poison that will cling to them for ever. The judgment may pierce the clouds of prejudice. In the moment of her strength she may even rejoice and triumph in her liberty, yet the conceptions of childhood will long remain latent in the mind, to reappear in every hour of weakness, when the tension of the reason is relaxed, and the power of old associations is supreme."²

This is true: is, at any rate, one side of the truth. But still one feels that there must be some sound justification for the suspicion of reason entertained by so many who have been neither unenlightened nor illiberal. And is it not this? that reason has been identified so often with a private judgment which fancied itself free from prejudice, but was really ensnared by the fatal prejudice of its own intrinsic ability to be an adequate measure of all things? One recalls the Deists of the eighteenth century. Reason was their idol of the cave. Reason could comprehend, demonstrate, or destroy, everything. Mysteries in religion

¹ *Rationalism in Europe*, Vol. ii. p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

were an absurdity; and mysteries were whatever did not yield to the first touch of logical analysis. The result for religion was a dearth, and even death, of spiritual belief and enthusiasm. The result for the Deists themselves has been that, "if we except these two [Hume and Gibbon], it would be difficult to conceive a more complete eclipse than the English Deists have undergone." "The shadow of the tomb rests upon them all; a deep unbroken silence, the chill of death surrounds them."¹

The lesson is not that religion can ever dispense with reason, but that reason is more than the logical understanding; that it includes conscience; that the insight of conscience is the medium of the highest truth; and that such insight is directly and continuously dependent upon the culture of the highest religious life. To the Cambridge teachers this fact was cardinal and central. Thus Whichcote: "Nothing is *the true improvement* of our rational faculties, but the exercise of the several virtues of sobriety, modesty, gentleness, humility, obedience to God, and charity to men."

Thus John Smith: "Divine Truth is better understood as it unfolds itself in the purity of men's hearts and lives, than in all those subtle niceties into which curious wits may lay it forth, . . . and therefore our Saviour's main scope was to promote a holy life, as the best and most compendious way to a right belief. He hangs all true acquaintance with divinity upon the doing God's will."

Thus Cudworth: "If we did but heartily comply with the commandments and purge our hearts from all gross and sensual affections, we should not then look about for truth wholly without ourselves and enslave ourselves to the dictates of this and that teacher, and hang upon the lips of men; but we should find the great Eternal God inwardly

¹ Rationalism in Europe, Vol. i. pp. 191-192.

teaching our souls, and continually instructing us more and more in the mysteries of his will."

As to Henry More, it were a small thing to say that he believed the same. Rather, this spiritual side of reason became the keynote of all his teaching. When he went to Cambridge he was at first possessed with a "mighty and almost immoderate thirst after knowledge—he immersed himself 'over head and ears in the study of philosophy.'" The result was a sort of skepticism from which he escaped only when he was led to see "that the knowledge of things—especially the deepest cause of things—was to be acquired not by such an eagerness and intentness in the reading of authors," but rather "by the purgation of the mind from all vices whatsoever." Henceforth his motto was, "*Amor Dei lux animæ.*" Reason, he would say—Reason, "the oracle of God, is not to be heard but in his holy temple—that is to say, in a good and holy man, thoroughly sanctified in spirit, soul, and body."

Here the mystic element of the Cambridge men comes into view, and is seen to be not opposed to reason, but the outcome—fruit and flower—of its noblest activity. "Spiritual things are spiritually discerned," i.e., are discerned by the spiritualized reason for whose normal and efficient development there is needed both logic and life—keen logic, if you will, but also a pure and true life. If thou beest it, thou seest it, said More. In the last resort—was Plato's teaching—being and knowledge are identical. At any rate the remark of a Hibbert Lecturer, suggested by the system of Socinius, is true: "As a system of avowed Rationalism, Socinianism was born prematurely. . . . Rationalism could not have its perfect work till biblical, following in the track of all other literary criticism, had accumulated such a store of indisputable facts as would warrant settled inferences. But even when the knowledge is accumulated, and the inferences are drawn, the rationalists will still have to go to the mystics, if they would learn the whole secret of Christianity."¹

¹ Beard's *Reformation of the Sixteenth Century*, p. 281.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CHURCH FATHERS ON THE NATURE OF PROPERTY.

BY HENRY HUNTINGTON SWAIN, PH. D.

THE fathers of the early church were not economists. They could not even be said to be, in the modern sense of the term, social philosophers. They sought to reform society, but it was rather through the leavening influence of moral principles than by means either of elaborate "programs" or scientific study of the elements of social organization. Thus few of them have declared themselves unequivocally on the nature of property, and their views can be inferred only from their acts or pieced together from fragmentary allusions sparsely scattered through their writings.

With reference, first, to their acts, we have no evidence that any of them set about establishing any movement toward a change in the institution of private property. It may, perhaps, be alleged that certain heretical sects included community of property among their tenets. Such sects were freely denounced by the fathers, however. Indeed, we are dependent mainly on the testimony of their enemies for our knowledge of communistic tendencies among the heretics, and in some instances where independent evidence is available, the charge is found to be false. We must not therefore give too much weight to these reports, and the very fact that charges of communism are so freely hurled at heretical sects, is good evidence that those who made the charges were themselves opponents of communism.

Augustine, it is true, at one time formed, with some of his associates, a plan for a select communistic family of ten men; but, before the plan had very far matured, it was abandoned, on account of the wives which some had and others (including Augustine himself) "hoped to have"¹ It would be utterly unwarranted to assume that this fanciful dream of an hour, devised apparently to enable a coterie of well-to-do friends to enjoy each other's society and escape the irksomeness of industrial exertion by living on the aggregate accumulations of former years, had its origin in any scruples about the institution of private property.

Nor is there evidence that the fathers themselves were disposed to disregard the "sacredness" of property rights. Augustine, after his conversion, reproaches himself bitterly for having, as a boy, committed a wanton but very petty act of thievery.² In fact, this trifling lapse which, from the vividness with which it impressed itself upon his memory, must have been a rare if not a solitary instance, seems to have caused the saint much keener remorse than some of his early practices which, judged by modern standards of morality, seem flagrant.

In laying down a rule for convents, Augustine says: "Call not anything the property of one, but let all things be common property."³ And the establishment of monasteries is often taken as the chief indication of communism in the early church. It must be observed, however, that the monastic life is never urged as a general plan of life for mankind at large. It was never expected that any but a small fraction of society should belong to these communities. The monastic life was not more a renunciation of private property than of all wealth beyond what was essential to the barest subsistence. The monastery was not so much a community of wealth as a community of poverty. Further, even for the bare pittance deemed necessary, the

¹ Confessions, vi. 14.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 4.

³ Letter ccxi. 5.

stitution of private property. While aiming to withdraw so far as possible from contact with the world, the monastery was not primarily an industrial organization, but, by reason of the vows of poverty and celibacy, depended, both for economic support and for recruiting its numbers, on the successful maintenance of a wholly different system in the world at large.

But even in the earliest times complete community of property was not the inflexible rule of the convent. Jerome relates an instance of a monk leaving at his death a hundred pieces of money which he had earned by weaving linen.¹ And though Jerome tells with approval of the burying of the money with its owner, there is no indication that the monk's error was in treating the money as private property, but in having regard for wealth at all. If the case had been otherwise, the money would have been turned over to the monastery instead of being destroyed. "Thy money perish with thee," he quotes, and tells how, in Egypt, it is a crime to *leave after one* a single shilling.

The frequent warnings of the fathers against riches, and their appeals to renunciation of wealth, cannot be taken as evidence of any peculiar views on the nature of property. Nowhere is it intimated in these quotations that the institution of private property is an injustice. It is always the notion that wealth is demoralizing to the owner, never that by holding it one wrongs his fellow-beings. "Let us therefore, brethren," says Augustine, "abstain from the possession of private property; or from the love of it, if we may not from its possession."²

Many precepts of the fathers distinctly look to the holding of private property, and are meaningless without it. The following quotation from Rogers' "Catholic Doctrine of the Church of England," in reference to the biblical

¹ Letter xxii., To Eustochium.

² On Psalm cxxxii.

writers, is no less applicable to the fathers: "Against community of goods and riches be all those places (which are infinite) of Holy Scripture, that either condemn the unlawful getting, keeping, or desiring of riches, which, by covetousness, thievery, extortion, and the like wicked means, many do attain; or do commend liberality, frugality, free and friendly lending, honest labor, and lawful vocations to live and thrive. All which do show that Christians are to have goods of their own, and that riches ought not to be common."

Augustine himself so understands the Scriptures: "Why," he says, "do you reproach us by saying that men renewed in baptism ought no longer to beget children, or to possess fields and houses and money? Paul allows it."¹

One of the most striking passages in the writings of the early fathers which seem to oppose the institution of private property, is the following from Chrysostom: "Is not this an evil that you alone should have the Lord's property, that you alone should enjoy what is common? Is not the 'earth God's and the fullness thereof'? If then our possessions belong to one common Lord, they belong also to our fellow-servants. The possessions of one Lord are all common. . . . Mark the wise dispensation of God. That he might put mankind to shame, he hath made certain things common, as the sun, air, earth, and water, the heaven, the sea, the light, the stars; whose benefits are dispensed equally to all as brethren. . . . Other things then he hath made common, as baths, cities, market-places, walks. And observe, concerning things that are common there is no contention, but all is peaceable. But when one attempts to possess himself of anything to make it his own, then contention is introduced, as if nature herself were indignant that when God brings us together in every way, we are eager to divide and separate ourselves by appropri-

¹ *De Moribus Ecclesiæ Catholicæ*, xxxv.

ating things, and by using those cold words 'mine and thine.' Then there is contention and uneasiness. But where this is not, no strife or contention is bred. This state therefore is rather our inheritance, and more agreeable to nature. Why is it that there is never a dispute about a market-place? Is it not because it is common to all? But about a house and about property men are always disputing. Things necessary are set before us in common; but even in the least things we do not observe a community. Yet those greater things he hath opened freely to all, that we might thence be instructed to have these inferior things in common. Yet for all this we are not instructed."¹

The only other quotations in the writings of the fathers that seem distinctly to sanction community of property as a general practice are those which comment upon the conduct of the earliest converts at Jerusalem at the day of Pentecost as narrated in the Acts. Chrysostom, for example, says of this: "If the same were done now, we should convert the whole world even without miracles."² And John Cassian attributes the abandonment of the pentecostal practice to the weakness of the newly-born faith of the Gentiles and cooling of the early fervor.³

Now preliminary to any consideration of this matter, it is to be noted that the fathers very commonly held the notion of two distinct standards of the Christian life,—one practicable standard for all, and a higher ideal for which only a very few could be expected to strive. So, for instance, Jerome, constantly quoting "One thing thou lackest," urges the renunciation of property (though more mildly in his later letters), but emphasizes "*If* thou wilt be *perfect*." That these men seriously concerned themselves about any general change in the institution of private prop-

¹ Homily xii., On Timothy.

² Homily vi., On First Corinthians.

³ Conferences, xviii. 5.

erty, we have already seen to be an untenable position. Yet even ideals which are not considered practicable, may be a good indication of the real verdict of the reason and conscience on existing institutions. Consequently it is worth while to determine just what this pentecostal practice was which Chrysostom calls "an angelic life."¹

It is quite common to assume that the church at Jerusalem was communistic, but careful reading of the very scant information which we have on the subject shows that the evidence to be adduced in favor of this hypothesis is very meager indeed.

Now what were the circumstances under which it is said that the disciples had all things common? Here was a great multitude assembled from all parts of the Roman world. They had come up to Jerusalem to attend the feast of the Passover, and had made some provision for that occasion, but they had already remained far beyond the time expected. Their resources were temporarily exhausted. Many of them, being at a great distance from their homes, were of course unable to earn the means of replenishing their stock of supplies. A great emergency was at hand. Heroic measures were necessary to meet it. And so we read, that "all that believed were together, and had all things common; and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all, as every man had need."² That is, those who lived at Jerusalem and had property, sacrificed it to feed their unexpected guests, and if any among the strangers present had come provided with anything more than sufficed for their immediate needs, they likewise contributed. We have no need to assume that these contributions were used otherwise than to provide for the strangers and perhaps for some of the very poor who lived at Jerusalem. That the persons who contributed so liberally became thereby dependent on a common store for their own

¹ Homily vi., On First Corinthians.

² Acts ii. 44, 45.

verse precludes us from supposing that these generous souls sacrificed the whole of their property, for we find them "breaking bread from *house to house*"¹ of the believers.

Now what expressions are used that are not equally applicable to the common practice in our own day in connection with great religious conventions where those in attendance are entertained by the residents? Is it any straining of language to say of such gatherings that they have all things common? Is not the delegate brought into the home and made to feel that, so long as he stays, everything the house affords is to be held in common? Are there not gatherings day by day where all meet together to enjoy the bounty of the local church, and no one says aught of the things which he possesses is his own, but they have all things common? Indeed are not all the conveniences and accommodations which the city affords placed at the free disposal of the guests?

The circumstances at Jerusalem were peculiar in two respects: (1) the multitude was overwhelming, in view of the limited numbers and resources of the resident Christians; (2) the occasion had not been anticipated, and therefore no systematic plans had been possible; consequently extreme measures were necessary. So, "as many as were possessors of lands or houses² sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, and laid them down at the apostles' feet: and distribution was made to every man, according as he had need."³ But this benevolence is seen to have been purely voluntary,⁴ and apparently brought in-

¹ Acts ii. 46.

² See Acts xii. 13 for evidence that this refers only to possessions in excess of personal needs, and that private homes were still retained by the disciples.

³ Acts iv. 34, 35.

⁴ Acts v. 4.

to prominent notice the comparatively few who made considerable contributions.¹ Now it is noticeable that all these contributions were of "consumption goods" to relieve immediate wants. Not a single reference can possibly be twisted into an intimation that an industrial organization was established whereby all the members continued to obtain their living. There is no reason to doubt that those who had made these contributions continued to gain their livelihood as they had done before, namely, by individual exertions in connection with the general industrial system of the times. Nor is there the least evidence that their later acquisitions were ever turned into a common store. The occasion of Pentecost seems to have been a solitary experience, never repeated, so far as we have reason to believe, in the history of the Jerusalem church.

If the Jerusalem church were so radically different from the other churches (for the other apostolic churches are not alleged to have been communistic), it seems almost incredible that such a fact should receive no further notice in the Acts, and not the slightest allusion in any of the Epistles, although frequent mention is made of this church.

In commending the Jerusalem Christians at Pentecost, therefore, the early fathers do but stamp with their approval the same view of property implied in the teachings of Christ, the social theory of property, private property a social trust. As Latimer says: "They [goods] be ours upon the condition that we shall spend them to the honor of God and the relieving of our neighbors."² "Things are not so common that another man may take my goods from me, for this is theft; but they are so common that we ought to distribute them unto the poor, to help them and to comfort them with it."³ "The rich man cannot say, 'This is mine alone, God hath given it unto me for mine own use.'

¹ Acts iv. 36; v. 1.

² Sixth Sermon on the Lord's Prayer.

³ Fifth Sermon on the Lord's Prayer.

. . . For the rich man is but God's officer, God's treasurer. . . . And remember that thy riches be not thine own, but thou art but a steward over them."

Nor is there lack of passages in the writings of the earlier fathers expressly sanctioning this view. The Ante-Nicene Archelaus: "The centurion, a man exceedingly wealthy and well-dowered in worldly influence, possessed a faith surpassing that of all Israel; so that, even if there was any one who had forsaken all, that man was surpassed in faith by this centurion. But some one may now reason with us thus: It is not a good thing, consequently, to give up riches. Well, I reply that it is a good thing for those who are capable of it; but, at the same time, to employ riches for the work of righteousness and mercy is a thing as acceptable as though one were to give up the whole at once."¹

And Jerome, writing to Paulinus, says: "Your possessions are no longer your own, but a stewardship is entrusted to you."² And Chrysostom says: "This wealth is not a possession, it is not property, it is a loan for use."³

Chrysostom has left on record some notions in regard to special forms of property which may be worth a little notice. One of these illustrates the common prejudice of early times against wealth acquired through trade, and particularly gold and silver, the special instruments of the trader. "What then," he says, "did Abraham hold unrighteous wealth; and Job, that blameless, righteous, and faithful man, who 'feared God and eschewed evil'? Theirs was a wealth that consisted not in gold and silver, nor in houses, but in cattle. . . . The riches of Abraham, too, were his domestics. What then? Did he not buy them? No, for to this very point the Scripture says, that the three hundred and eighteen were born in his house. He had al-

¹ Disputation with Manes, 42. ² Letter lviii.

³ Homily xi., On Timothy.

so sheep and oxen. Whence then did he send gold to Rebekah? From the gifts which he received from Egypt without violence or wrong."¹ And yet the same Chrysostom says: "Is gold good? Yes, it is good for almsgiving, for the relief of the poor; it is good, not for unprofitable use, to be hoarded up or buried in the earth. . . . It was discovered for this end that it should loose captives."²

Private property in land seems to the worthy Chrysostom to involve some injustice, though he does not propose any radical change: "Tell me, then, whence art thou rich? From whom didst thou receive it? and from whom he who transmitted it to thee? From his father and his grandfather. But canst thou, ascending through many generations, show the acquisition just? It cannot be. The root and origin of it must have been injustice. Why? Because God in the beginning made not one man rich, and another poor. Nor did he afterwards take and show to one treasures of gold, and deny to the other the right of searching for it; but he left the earth free to all alike. Why, then, if it is common, have you so many acres of land, while your neighbor has not a portion of it? It was transmitted to me by my father. And by whom to him? By his forefathers. But you must go back and find the original owner."³

Notwithstanding this past injustice, Chrysostom realizes that an attempt to upset existing tenures might aggravate the evil, and he hints pretty clearly at the doctrine of prescription, for he immediately adds: "But I will not urge this argument too closely. Let your riches be justly gained, and without rapine. For you are not responsible for the covetous acts of your father. Your wealth may be derived from rapine, but you were not the plunderer."⁴

¹ Homily xii., On Timothy.

² Homily viii., On Timothy.

³ Homily xii., On Timothy.

⁴ *Ibid.*

The grounds upon which the right of private property rests, do not seem to have claimed much attention from the fathers. But it is interesting to find that Augustine, in dealing with this matter, does not have recourse either to a "social contract" or to "natural and inalienable rights," but sees in property a creation of society, maintained for the good of society by its organized forces in government, and subject therefore to such modifications as the interests of society may demand. He says: "By what right does every man possess what he possesseth? Is it not by human right? For by divine right 'the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof.' . . . By human right, however, one says, 'This estate is mine, this house is mine, this servant is mine. By human right, therefore, is by right of emperors. . . . It is by right from him that thou possessest the land. Or take away rights created by emperors, and then who will dare say, 'That estate is mine, or that slave is mine, or this house is mine?'"¹

¹ Tractate vi., On the Gospel of St. John, 25.

ARTICLE V.

KNÖTEL'S HOMER.

BY EX-PRESIDENT SAMUEL COLCORD BARTLETT, D.D., LL.D.

THE appearance of Knötel's two volumes on "Homer the Blind Man of Chios"¹ both presents a valuable lesson in the historical investigation of a literary question, and apparently marks a new epoch in the assured recognition of Homer's personality and work. For a century Friedrich August Wolf and his followers have claimed to dominate the literary world with the theory that the Homeric poems were a compilation of what he termed rhapsodies composed by various unknown authors, and not the work of any one person bearing the name Homer.

It is to demolish this skillfully elaborated and widely current theory that Knötel has written these two scholarly volumes. He fully recognizes the tenacity with which the theory has been held by its advocates, and the impossibility of dealing with it on the ground of mere literary criticism without some historic basis on which the discussion shall rest. For, as he remarks, the attempt to rebut critique with counter critique proceeding from within outward, is hopeless, and we can never thus reach a clear, tangible, and conclusive result. He earnestly asserts and reiterates that the Homeric question is no grammatico-critical or purely literary question, but by all odds a historical one, which cannot be settled by acute conjectures or critical keenness of scent, but by well-proved facts. This

¹ *Homeros der Blinde von Chios und seine Werke*, von A. F. R. Knötel. Leipzig. Erster Theil, 1894, s. 378; Zweiter Theil, 1895, s. 396.

matter-of-fact aspect, he maintains, has been wholly lost sight of, and "thus we have fallen into a literary quagmire, where no sure step or firm foothold further is possible."

To find a firm historic starting-point he turns to the great historian Thucydides and the Homeric hymns. Thucydides, besides twice referring elsewhere to Homer, in chapter iii. 104 makes two quotations from the hymn to the Delian Apollo, not only distinctly ascribing them to Homer, but also affirming that in the second of these passages Homer alludes to himself. The historian, after describing the nature of the great festival held in very early times at Delos by the Ionians and the neighboring islanders, proceeds thus (as rendered by Jowett): "The character of the festival is attested by Homer in the following verses which are taken from the hymn to Apollo:—

'At other times, Phœbus, Delos is dearest to thine heart,
Where are gathered together the Ionians in flowing robes,
With their wives and children, in thy street ;
There do they delight thee with boxing, dancing, and song,
Making mention of thy name at the meeting of the assembly.'

And that there were musical contests which attracted competitors is implied in the following words of the same hymn. After commemorating the Delian dance of women, Homer ends their praises with these lines in which he alludes to himself:—

'And now may Apollo and Artemis be gracious,
And to all of you maidens I say farewell ;
Yet remember me when I am gone,
And if some toiling pilgrim of the sons of men
Comes hither and asks : O maidens,
Who is the sweetest minstrel of all who wander hither,
And in whom do you delight the most ?
Make answer with one voice, in gentle words,
The blind old man of Chios' rocky isle.' "

The four following lines of the hymn, not quoted by Thucydides but cited by Knötel, may be rendered thus:—

"His songs shall hereafter prove triumphant,
Your fame, wherever on the earth we turn,
To densely peopled states we'll bear along,
And they will hear ; for it is very truth."

This hymn which, with the other Homeric hymns, is summarily dismissed by Wolf as "farrago," attested as it is by the great historian, and bearing in its allusions the distinct marks of the author's personality, and the hymn to the Pythian Apollo, immediately following and commonly having its lines numbered consecutively with it, are made the starting-point of the discussion. Taking together this attestation of the historian and the statements of the poet thus attested, Knötel finds at once the following matters of fact from which to proceed further, with additional confirmations as he proceeds:—

1. The great antiquity of the Delian hymn appears from the fact of its composition at a time when the Ionic colonies in Asia were in a highly flourishing condition, yet still so closely connected with the Attic mother country as to celebrate at Delos a union festival in common with the Athenians.

2. The author of the hymn had attended this festival, and he names himself a toil-worn or suffering pilgrim, a blind man from the island of Chios, the author of many songs, which he believes after his death will gain the highest estimation.

3. He himself sings, is highly skilled in music, and does not journey alone, but with a company of minstrels through the lands.

4. The second hymn shows the Odyssey to be in existence. The voyage of the Cretans to Krissa names on the west coast of the Peloponnesus the same stations in the same words as that of Telemachus from Pylos to Ithaca. An entire passage (verses 452-456) is borrowed literally from the Odyssey, and another strikingly corresponds to a passage in the Iliad.

3. It rests, moreover, on good and sufficient information that Chios was the last place where the wandering old man found a home with his son-in-law Creophilus, and where he founded the minstrel company of the Homeridæ which for a century professionally carried on the chanting of the Iliad and the Odyssey. At Chios Homer had a shrine (Heiligthum) and a hero-worship.

6. No other renowned poet of Chios can be found to contest the claim, and thus the blind man of Chios is no other than Homer, in accordance with the general belief of the Greeks that Homer was blind.

7. It can also be shown on valid grounds that other hymns, longer or shorter, as well as epigrams, which cast many glimpses in upon the life of a poor man followed by an adverse destiny, proceed from the same author that composed the hymns to Apollo, that is from Homer. From Epigram iv. it appears that the poet, who by his "two daughters of Zeus, noble children" (Iliad and Odyssey), would confer the renown of the song upon his fatherland, was born at Smyrna when that city still belonged to the Æolians; and from the hymn to Artemis (ix.) that its conquest by the Ionians of Colophon took place in his time,—an important fact for determining the time of his birth and life.

This group of historic circumstances, stated mostly in Knötel's own words, forms the point of departure for the further discussion. But with German breadth of method, on account of the necessary historic relations of the poet and his environments, the author proceeds to a wide range of historic investigations, quietly informing his readers that it will take quite a long time to reach Homer himself and his history, inasmuch as it involves the earliest traceable history of Greece. Among the points to be elucidated he specifies the rise of Hellenism, the origin and spread of the Apollo cultus, that of the Muses, the minstrel's calling,

the art, of writing, the work and reign of Cadmus, and other things, including an examination of "Wolf's sophistries."

Accordingly he devotes at once one hundred and fifty pages to such historic questions as the early history of Delos, the Phœnicians in the Archipelago, the career of Cadmus in detail, the relation of Artemis and Apollo to Delos, the Hyperboreans and their land, the connection of Delos with inner Asia, Ogyges in Attica and Beotia, the Scythian worship of Apollo, the feast of Leto, and the festal gatherings of the Ionians. These and other related and subordinate topics are considered in detail, and by the aid of allusions and hints scattered through the whole circle of Grecian literature. Returning at length to Delos, a sketch of its great Pan-Ionic festival with its sacred rites, its music, dancing, and sports, introduces us to the blind old singer about 900 B.C., there present with a great company of minstrels, male and female, bringing his hymn to the Delian Apollo, previously composed and now made a thank-offering. A brief analysis of the poem follows.

This recurrence to Delos and its hymn leads to a further investigation founded on the statements, allusions, and implications of the Homeric hymns and epigrams, together with the concurrence of certain passages with passages of the Iliad and the Odyssey, and hints and suggestions gathered from the two great poems. These discussions run in two different yet partially coincident lines: the further elucidation of early Grecian history and worship on the one hand, and the personal history and relations of the poet on the other. The poet is found thus to be a welcome and honored friend of the priestesses of Delos, as well as at Samos and Delphi, a blind old man, once possessing sight, a "much-suffering" man (*τάλαπείριος*), traveling with a company of rhapsodists from land to land, already distinguished, but aspiring to still higher renown. He was an

then an Æolian and not an Ionian city. For a time he lived among the Ionians, but later resumed his Æolian relationship, went as a needy man to Neon Teichos, then to Cyme (Cumæ), probably next to Phocæa, then to Erythræa, and soon to Chios,—all these places lying not far from each other, and constituting the proper home of the poet. The epigrams show that he made other journeys. He had been in Troas and at the iron mines in Ida and Phrygia, apparently at the Ceramicus in Athens, and in Arabia. He sometimes journeyed in winter. He sang in the houses of nobles before distinguished people, lamented the stupidity of towns where he had hoped for applause, longs to find men of genial spirit and good taste, and he relates some trying experiences. He composes for pay, and the pay cheers him to good humor and sportiveness. He can indulge in pleasant raillery with choice women as at Samos and Delos, and in that connection describes himself as a gray-headed but vivacious and aspiring man. To him was dedicated the ditty which the children sang at Chios, when they went from house to house with a swallow announcing spring, as with us (Germans) the children do with their Mayflowers, singing in like manner a song and expecting some small present.

The author elaborately unfolds the environments of these journeys, and traces him in later years at the home of his son-in-law Creophilus at Chios, about the decade 890–880, till his death, while on a journey, at the island of Ios, between Paros and Naxos, attended by his faithful servant Skindapsos, and his burial by the seashore.

A chapter is devoted to the refutation of Wolf's assertion that writing was unknown in Greece in the time of Homer, and a showing—scarcely needed now—of the antiquity of the art in Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, and Greece alike. The first volume concludes with a chapter headed

"Homer could write," and referring to the allusions to writing in the sixth and seventh books of the Iliad and one or two other passages, as requiring no defense from the charge of anachronisms.

In his second volume the author, proceeding from the vantage-ground thus gained, which we have imperfectly indicated, does not hesitate boldly to pronounce judgment: "Thus for us again Homer is the great incomparable poet, as by the Greeks and Romans, in all antiquity and even to modern times, he was known and honored. . . . The old Greeks were right, and not Wolf, Lachmann, Dissen, Bernhardt, and the whole host of those that carp and peck¹ at his incomparable masterpieces." He calls attention to the striking fact that so little is known of the youth and manhood of the poet, and accounts for it by the fact that the Greeks chose to know nothing of that portion of his life, since then they must have owned that Homer was by residence not a Pan-Hellenic but rather a Trojan poet. "For the Iliad was not written at a Grecian royal court, but, as Schwegeler had partly recognized and as may be shown, at Skepsis in Ida (of the Trojan realm), at the court of the Æneides and Hectorides, whose *attaché* he must long have been. Hence his manifest exaltation of this line of ancestry."

In further elucidation of Homer's history, Knötel thinks it clear that he had no legitimate and acknowledged father, inasmuch as (for one reason) the established Greek usage of designating the person as the son of such a one is wholly wanting in his case. He supposes the mother's name to be Critheis, and that in the free lives of the minstrel bands Homer was born outside of wedlock. This obscure origin was in one light the great misfortune of his life, and in the other its great good fortune. While it

¹ Das ganze Heer der an diesen unvergleichlichen Meisterwerken mäkkelnden, schnitzenden und pützelnden kritikbefissenden.

checked all other hopes of recognition and brought no little humiliation, it also threw him on his own resources, upon that varied experience, and those efforts of genius which have made him world-renowned. Yet, as indicated in his hymns and epigrams, it was felt to be a hard lot. His vast range of knowledge of nature, and of affairs in common and in higher life, is to be explained not alone by his wandering career, but by his residence at court, and that the Trojan court in the highlands of Ida. Hence the apparent inclination towards Hector and the Hektoridæ. The remarkable variety and vividness in his descriptions of armed conflicts is reasonably thought to indicate some direct and personal knowledge of the warfare of those times.

In tracing the relation of the poet to the poems and to the events which they commemorate, Knötel enters on an exhaustive account of the historic facts and tendencies which lay behind the Trojan war. The ultimate cause is found in the hereditary enmity existing between the race of Pelops, who gave name to the Peloponnesos, and that of Ilos, perpetuated in the name of Ilion, which was roused into activity by such a sensational event as the abduction of Helen. The Trojan kingdom, though for a time powerful and extensive, was but short-lived, enduring from about 1350 to 1050 B.C., its capture and destruction being assigned by Knötel to the year 1049. The *Iliad*, says our author, is but a romance narrated in verse, according to the taste of the times. It mingles all Olympus and its inhabitants with these human affairs in the one grand unity, which is a tragedy, the more sad and comfortless because the high powers bring no light or relief. It sings the wrath of Achilles which dominates the whole poem, yet with such sympathy for the Trojan cause that it celebrates the intractable strength and valor of Achilles to show how much greater and nobler is the bravery of Hector, the last guardian and defender of his unfortunate fatherland; and

Hector's tragic end is ennobled as the death sacrifice for his country hastening to its downfall. This striking thought is followed out in a careful examination and analysis of the plot in its several stages, or acts, as he terms them, ending with the fifth, wherein the author endeavors to show the unity and consistency of the whole and its parts, as well as its steady progress to the consummation, and that too, as he thinks, without any diversion that can properly be termed an episode. This analysis and interpretation is carried out with an acuteness and enthusiasm highly attractive and impressive, whether fully assented to or not. Thus—to take a single instance—the *Iliad* closes tragically with two burials and dirges, that of Patroclus and that of Hector; the one grand, brilliant, and loaded with all the honors that could be paid to a fallen hero, the other burdened with depression and with the sad outlook into the near future which carries in its womb the downfall of the state. Achilles likewise learns at the height of his power that death is determined for him; his mother tells him so, as does the horse Xanthus, the dying Hector, and Patroclus who appears to him in his dreams. And so there comes to view a third burial and lamentation, greater and lordlier than that of Patroclus; it is narrated noticeably in the last book of the *Odyssey*, where Agamemnon in Hades relates to Achilles how the Achæians shed hot tears around his bier, the sea-nymphs came over the waves lamenting bitterly and wrapping him in ambrosial robes, the nine muses bewailed him responsively, and Thetis his mother brought a golden vase, the gift of Bacchus and the work of Vulcan, to receive his ashes, for which the army built a magnificent tomb on a cape of the broad Hellespont—funeral rites surpassing all that Agamemnon had ever seen.

The last eighty pages of the second volume are occupied with a briefer account of the contents of the *Odyssey*, with

somewhat special reference to its geographical environments. The later poem he finds, of course, to be less marked by youthful fire. The work closes with a thoughtful estimate of Homer's genius. The two volumes cover far too wide a range to admit of a complete review in these pages. Our object is simply to call attention to the work and indicate its scope.

Knötel gives all due credit to Wolf for his great learning and his critical labors on the text, at the same time that he recognizes his lack of important literary qualities, and points out the weakness of his entire argument. He sums up virtually the fundamental mistakes that form the basis of Wolf's whole theory of the origin of the *Iliad* in three:—

1. The assumption that the art of writing was not then known in Greece, and consequently all composition must have been carried on in the head and preserved in the memory—a feat which he regarded as impossible in the case of poems of the length of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*,—this, too, notwithstanding some allusions to writing in the *Iliad*, which again he regarded as anachronisms and proof of later composition.

2. The vast range and variety of knowledge displayed, which Wolf determined to be too much for one brain; an objection of no weight in the case of such an extraordinary genius who, on the one hand as a wandering minstrel was brought in contact with all characters and scenes both in private and in the great gatherings and contests which it was his professional duty to attend, and on the other hand was the welcome guest of the great, and there made conversant with all that belonged to and could be learned from that aspect of life and affairs.

3. Alleged contradictions; of which, though in a work of such compass, two only are Wolf's main support. In

regard to one,¹ Knötel remarks that Wolf simply did not understand the passage, and in regard to the other² that the passage is clearly defective, disturbing the connection. In reference to a third, adduced by some later writer,³ he shows that by the slightest rectification of the text, namely, the introduction of *oŭ* to correspond with the same word in the next line, the alleged contradiction becomes an actual reminiscence of the earlier passage.

It is the steady aim and claim of these volumes to proceed from a strictly historic basis. Such is the starting-point, and so far as personal traits and career are inferred from allusions in the longer poems themselves, it is only as related to the historic foundation. Thus, for example, in view of all the abundant and exact local references contained in the *Iliad*, the author finds it evident that Homer had known and visited the ruins of Ilion that had lain waste a hundred years, and that here, standing upon the dismantled castle of Pergamos, in sight of Gargaron and other peaks of Ida, he surveyed the whole territory which by his portraiture he was to ennoble for all time. Here to the north and northwest he had before him the locality of the Dardanian and Scæan gates, and looked out beyond over the plain watered by the Scamander and the Simois, to the Hellespont, the mountain range of Sigeum, Rhœtium, and the southern peaks of the Chersonesus. There had been the camp of the Greeks, and there along the shore had lain their numerous ships. On the way thither, not far before the town had stood the oak to which before the outbreak of the strife in the Grecian camp the Trojans had been driven. Farther still and on the side of the plain was the high abrupt hill where Hector reviewed the Trojan nations, the hill Batiea, called the monument of Myrina. Beyond were the tombs of Ilos and Æsyetes, and the

¹ Il. xviii. 356-358. ² Od. iv. 621-625.

³ Il. xiii. 658; comp. v. 576.

Trojan observation post over against the camp. Close by was the ford over the Scamander. Westward was the Eri-neos, the hill of wild figs, where the town on its uneven site was most accessible, then the watch-tower and the Trojan women's washing-place at the two sources of the Scamander, the hot and the cold, and on one edge of the river valley the fair hill Callicolone. Over these relics and ruins, not merely of a city but of a kingdom, where the mighty shades of kings and heroes dwelt and came forth in vision from their graves, the incomparable genius of the poet was enlivened, and conceived the great thought to celebrate in song the death struggle of the unhappy state.

This outlook, which we have quoted almost exactly in the words of the author, illustrates the realizing—not "realistic"—method in which he has dealt with the great poems of Homer. The discussion is a vigorous historic protest against the "higher critics" of Homer, and is understood to have been received in Germany itself as a refutation of their results. It is a significant phenomenon, as coming from the land of speculations, and may not unsuitably be considered as perhaps heralding (with Klostermann and others) a revolt from similar unsound proceedings and unwarranted results in the line of biblical discussion.

ARTICLE VI.

AN EXAMINATION OF ROYCE'S "RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF PHILOSOPHY."¹

BY THE REV. EDWIN STUTELY CARR, A.M., D.D.

THIS work was published several years since, and was somewhat extensively discussed at the time. The importance and abiding interest of the subject, and the unusually clear and thorough exposition of certain philosophical doctrines which are now considered new and fruitful, are my justification for the present article. Professor Royce's graceful and popular style, clear without superficiality, enriched by the results of wide and varied reading, has placed him in the front rank of American writers in his department. His "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," embodying the same general principles as the work we are to discuss, is used as a text-book in several courses in Harvard University. It is gratifying to the student of philosophy, wearied by the endless recounting of what other men have thought,—the stock in trade of the average philosophy-professor of to-day,—to find a man who has the courage to construct a system. An examination of the book will inform us whether the courage of the author or the prudence of his colleagues is the more commendable.

Part I. is concerned with "The Search for a Moral Ideal." The mutually destructive warfare of all existing ethical standards leads to the adoption of a moral maxim which bears the ordinary marks of a compromise,—so far as it is

¹ Public attention has been recently drawn to Professor Royce's view of theism by his appointment as Gifford lecturer in the University of Aberdeen.

clear, unsatisfactory to all parties; and so far as it is vague and ambiguous, the source of future strife. It is, "Act always in the light of the completest insight into all the aims that thy act is to affect." "The ideal means the will to direct my acts toward the attainment of universal harmony" (p. 141). The wished-for state of harmony suggests an Universal Will, obedience to which brings in the harmonious condition. When the man fell among thieves on the Jericho road, if the Samaritan, before relieving his necessities, had seated himself comfortably and begun to consider what influence his act would have in harmonizing the moral ideals of the Jew and the Samaritan, Greek, Roman, Persian, etc., history would probably never have recorded the case of this man as an example of successful charity. It is encouraging, however, to learn that there is an Universal Will, for a will may be expected to have some purpose and to do something, and there is sad need that something be done in the dreadful world unveiled to us in the second part.

Part II. is on "The Search for a Religious Truth." All historical and existing systems of thought fall before the author's critical onslaught, and a space as wide as the universe is speedily cleared for the erection of the treasure-house of humanity's future truth and hope. Materialistic and monistic theories are untenable, and all theistic systems, which make the Deity a first cause, are involved in an infinity of contradictions, and finally impaled on one or the other of the horns of the old dilemma, "In this bad world the Creator is either not omnipotent or not good."

We are to be delivered from the world of universal doubt by a monistic idealism. From the postulates underlying Berkeley's hypothesis a world is constructed in which there is no reality, external to the mind and causally related to it, but only finite spirits whose consciousness corresponds to the mental states of a World-Consciousness. Causation

in general is denied or made very secondary. This idealistic conception of the world is first presented merely as an hypothesis, in order to overcome the prejudice of common-sense realism, and secure for the theory a fair hearing by showing that it satisfies the conditions of the problem better than any of the common conceptions,—realistic, monistic, etc. The author is not satisfied, however, to present his system as a simple hypothesis. It is to be infallibly and irresistibly demonstrated. This is accomplished by means of the argument from the possibility of error,—which the author presents as the original element in his system. A thorough discussion of this argument is not in place here, but it is not difficult to show that the argument is unsound,—the fallacy consisting in identifying total relativity, which is equivalent to solipsism, with skepticism. Reserving this argument for discussion elsewhere, for the purposes of this article I assume the author's monistic idealism as an unproven hypothesis which any man is at liberty to accept or reject according as it seems to him to furnish a satisfactory theory of things.

Assuming this system, then, as an hypothesis of the nature of things, how does it satisfy as a theory of knowledge? The assumption of ordinary common-sense is that the object affects causally the senses of the knowing subject. But the author denies causality, and the missing link between subject and object is to be supplied by a World-Consciousness including both. Subject and object are both embraced in an all-inclusive Consciousness, which knows the idea in the finite mind and its correspondence or lack of correspondence with the object; and the finite mind knows, more or less clearly, the ideas of the World-Consciousness, for the finite mind is a "part" of this Consciousness.

As to this theory in its general outlines. This type of idealistic theory is credited with having destroyed the

common-sense, "carpenter," theory of the universe,—which assumed God, a material world, and finite minds. It is objected to the carpenter theory that it is crudely anthropomorphic. This difficulty is greatly exaggerated, because proper weight is not given to the fact, that, when correctly stated, the theory insists on the immanence as well as the transcendence of God. The former doctrine allows God to work his will in the world largely by an immanent causality, while the latter doctrine preserves his personality,—always imperiled by an idealistic theory. It must of course be admitted however, that the carpenter theory is anthropomorphic; but the idealistic theory is equally so. How do I know that the universe is constructed on the plan of my mind, any more than that God made the world as I make a house? It is true that we regard thought as nobler than a physical activity, and it is doubtless proper to use the highest analogy we know in accounting for the universe; but we must not forget that it remains a mere analogy, exposed to the objection of subjective anthropomorphism. And further the activities of the mind are utter mysteries. Idealists of the school of Professor Royce explain even the most ordinary and fundamental operations of the mind by an appeal to the Deity; as, memory is possible because the past and present mental states are brought together in the timeless life of God. Here is the manifest circle of using God to explain the mind, and then using the mind to explain God in his relation to the finite.

The problems of psychology are recognized, and always have been, as the most difficult and complicated in the whole realm of science; and the idealistic position, in itself, is an admission of this fact, for the idealist has tried to simplify the problem somewhat, by eliminating the troublesome factor of external reality. And now we find this center of all mystery, the human mind, taken as the analogy for the structure of the universe, and all is explained! The

unknown is said to be like the mysterious, and lo! the light of all truth bursts upon us!

If this monistic idealism be accepted as the theory of the universe, it is not the end but the beginning, not the goal but the starting-point, of philosophy. All the puzzling problems remain. The sphere of the unknown, on the common-sense view, becomes the sphere of the unconscious, and the problem of knowledge (not to raise the question how knowledge originally got into the mind) takes the form of the rising of truth in consciousness,—as mysterious a process as knowing external reality. And in fact when it is assumed that the finite mind and known object are both included as thoughts in the Absolute Consciousness, the problem of knowledge seems to remain practically unaltered; except by the introduction of an additional complication in the relation of mind and object to the Absolute Consciousness. For the finite mind and the object must somehow preserve their identity, otherwise they disappear in the blank unit of the Absolute, and all knowledge is at an end. If, however, they preserve their identity, they are as far separated within as without the Absolute Thought.

This theory of monistic idealism, therefore, if generally accepted, would be merely the statement, not the solution, of the philosophic problem. The psychology of the divine mind or of the Absolute Thought would be the problem. Philosophy surely could not content itself merely by suggesting the analogy of the human mind. For in addition to the fact that the unknown activities of the mind deepen the shadows rather than clear up the obscurity which envelops the ultimate philosophical questions, the analogy is very imperfect. Our thoughts do not assume *quasi*-independence in our minds, capable of knowing each other and of mutual interaction. It may be questioned whether the problem might not be more satisfactorily stated by

dropping the analogy of the human mind entirely, as confusing and misleading.

This World-Consciousness is now made out by our author to be the Infinite Universal, Absolute and All-embracing Thought, the essence of all finite persons and things which are simply thoughts of the World-Spirit. In ourselves and apart from God, we are unable, not only to know any object, but to remember any past event. The theory, held in strictness, would of course deny to the finite subject, who is a "part" of God, power to imitate or complete the most insignificant mental act; though the author represents the wicked man as possessing and exercising the will to do evil. But the author particularizes about memory, asserting, as I have suggested above, that one can have a mental experience, and remember that he had a similar experience previously, only because his two mental states are brought together in the timeless life of God. What is this but the breakdown and suicide of philosophy, or its metamorphosis into mythology? It is the psychology of Homer come again, with a goddess of memory, of love, fear, anger, etc. It would require the combined activities of all the gods of Olympus to keep such a mind in efficient operation. One would naturally assume that the author's monotheistic Absolute is an improvement on polytheism; but whether this pantheistic extreme is preferable to the ancient conception may fairly be questioned.

But though the World-Consciousness does not seem to help us much philosophically, it may have something good for our souls. We are in doubt and discouragement because of the dark world pictured in the first chapter of Part II., which forbade us to believe or even to hope there could be a good God. The author hails the advent of the Absolute Thought with a sense of joy and freedom which promises much. What sort of a religion does the Absolute Thought bring us?

"The Infinite Thought must, knowing all truth, include also a knowledge of all wills and of their conflict. In him then we have the Judge of our ideals and of our conduct. He must know the exact value of the Good Will which for him, like all possible truths, must be an actually realized fact. And so we cannot pause with a simply theoretical idealism. Our doctrine is practical, too. We have found not only an infinite Seer of physical facts, but an infinite Seer of the Good as well as of the Evil. In looking for goodness we are in no wise looking for what the world does not contain" (p. 434). Our author makes a loyal effort, by the use of capitals and complimentary adjectives, to show that the Infinite Thought is a satisfactory God; and he even goes so far as to capitalize Evil and Good, probably because both enter into the thought-substance of the Deity. There is an important new element introduced, unostentatiously, in the passage just quoted. The whole argument thus far, if admitted, establishes only the Infinite as Thought. Is the Infinite also good, or has he any moral character? One might expect to find him so, as he is the Judge; but as Thought he merely knows the good as realized fact. He is not said to *be* good, and to exert himself for the realization of the good, for he is to possess no causal power lest he become responsible for this bad world. Can we make clear to ourselves the mental life of this deity? It is an infinite succession of mental states, and these thoughts are the realized persons and things of our world. Has the deity any power over this train of ideas, as to its composition or order? One would expect so, for he "realizes the Moral Insight and the Universal Will of our ethical discussion" (p. 442). "God's life is the infinite rest, not apart from but in the endless strife, as Heraclitus taught" (p. 459). But no; the deity has no power over the train of ideas, for by controlling the ideas he would create the world and be responsible for the evil.

What then is the function of this deity? He is the Seer and Judge; he sits a helpless spectator of the infinite train of ideas, and "never ceases to think of us and of all things, never changes, never mistakes" (p. 440). As a Seer he has no conceivable use or significance; as a moral ideal he is an Universal Will which cannot will, and which is utterly indifferent to evil and good; and he cannot be made serviceable as a Judge, for no sensible man would regard in the least the good or ill opinion of such a nonentity. We may then simply drop all names and all ideas about the Infinite Thought which tend to give it a deceptive appearance of personality, and consider it simply as a train of ideas,—causeless, passionless, purposeless,—hanging in the air or moving in shadowy procession through the clouds—if it cares to think for itself an atmosphere or a cloud to hang in. An orthodox Hegelian can readily understand the existence of a thought without a mind to think it, or of a group of qualities apart from any substance, for he lives in a Wonderland where nothing is more common than Alice's experience of seeing a grin without a cat. Would it not be better for the Seer and Judge, rather than to turn into a pale abstraction and vanish, to become in fact the Universal Will, even if he is obliged to assume responsibility for the world? Especially, as the surprising discovery is now made that the world is absolutely good. Of this I will speak later.

In short, the Absolute cannot be said to be Thought, unless feeling and volition are also ascribed to him. We know thought only in our own consciousness, and there we always find it intensified by feeling and to some extent controlled by will. These three phases or aspects of our mental life are inseparably connected in our inner experience, and to speak of an Infinite Thought, as a separate objective existence apart from a person who also feels and wills, is meaningless to the human intellect and can lead only to

endless confusion. If it is intended that the Infinite is *like* thought, the reader has a right to know in what respects it is like thought, and probably some other word could be more safely used. Such an ambiguous expression as Infinite Thought is confusing to the student, and tempts the writer to increase or diminish the content of the term according to the exigencies of his system. This appears when we are told that the moral aim is the "realization of the eternal life of an infinite spirit." "Life" and "spirit" mean more than Thought.

The reply to this criticism will doubtless be made, that the Infinite is in the "intelligible" world, where causality, substance, and other categories of the understanding do not hold good. Kant may be pardoned for employing the notion of an intelligible world, for he did it in ignorance of the fantastic extremes to which it would be carried by his successors. And in fact, what human insight could have enabled Kant to forecast the future course of philosophy? The "Critique of Pure Reason" draws the sharpest line of distinction between the world of experience, which only is knowable by us, and a transcendental world, unknowable because in no conformity to the laws of our thought. The main use of this latter world is to furnish the theologian a wide field where he may amuse himself by the erection of speculative air-castles, which can do no harm in future, for all sensible men know they are baseless fancies. No one was more astonished than Kant to find his successors annihilating the *Ding an Sich*, abandoning the *terra firma* of the *Verstand*, and soaring on the wings of the *Vernunft* into the uttermost regions of the infinite. The subtle irony of Kant has been often noted, where he says he preserves the treasures of faith by elevating its objects above either attack or defense, and the philosophers have amused themselves at the simplicity of the theologians who have taken the words seriously. But is the philosopher now gravely

to inform us that his Infinite Thought, his World-Consciousness, etc., cannot be disproven, because they are in a transcendental world, where the laws of our experience are not valid? It may be said in this connection, that my criticism above on the author's theory of knowledge is faulty, because I assume that the subject and the object must either retain or lose their identity,—identity being a notion applicable to the mind and the object only when conceived materially as abiding substances. Such lines of defense are the ones commonly adopted by the idealist, and always of course with triumphant success, if his premises are once admitted. He prefers to fight in the air, remote from fact and common-sense; in a land of enchantment, where nothing can be done except by spells known only to the initiated. The transcendental objects of the Hegelian faith must be spiritually discerned.

The Infinite Thought not only maintains a strange and inscrutable character in his natural habitat in the regions of the transcendental, but his advent on earth is attended by various miraculous manifestations. The most remarkable of these is the transformation of the dreadfully bad world of the beginning of Part II. into an absolutely good world at the close of this section. It is the same world, the world of our daily experience, in both cases; and how the supposition of the Infinite Thought can work such a revolution of opinion in the author's mind is a mystery, which the page of dialectic about the Infinite as the perfect being does not solve. Natural evils,—imperfection, death, etc.,—may be blessings in disguise; and moral evil is constantly overcome by the virtuous wills of men, and therefore the good is constantly being exalted as victorious. Here the disciplinary power of temptation, the conflict with sin as necessary to virtue, which were powerless to save the gods of Chapter VIII. from annihilation, are sufficient to stop the mouths of all who would scoff at the absolutely

good world of the Infinite Thought; while we are left to draw our own inferences from the case of the wicked man, whose life is a victory not of good but of evil.

As to the moral ideal in the system, it is to aid in the "progressive realization of the eternal life of an Infinite Spirit" (p. 441). This religion "cannot be expected to furnish us an *a priori* knowledge of any fact of experience, of any particular law of Nature, of the destiny of any one finite being. All that remains just as dark as it was before" (p. 437). Immortality for a finite being is inconceivable, and the expectation of it is immoral, because selfish. "You love the ideal for its own sake. It is not your triumph you seek, but the triumph of the Highest" (p. 447). We find here what Lotze has somewhere characterized as the Quixotry of virtue which feels disgraced if rewarded. And yet the system allows a certain reward to virtue in the approval of the Judge. Possibly the criticism above on the Judge-notion may serve to remove from the system this last trace of what Kant calls "*Götzendienst*," and introduce a thoroughly disinterested benevolence such as flourished in New England a century ago, when good souls professed themselves willing to be damned for the glory of God.

I cannot regard this system as the final utterance of speculative thought. It is to me the breakdown and suicide of philosophy, and the vanishing-point of religion. Yet this book may be useful in showing us where we are philosophically, as the author says Schopenhauer has benefited philosophy,¹ and for much the same reason. The book makes impossible an unreflecting optimism as to the future philosophical development, unless a radical reform is instituted.

The world of philosophical and ethical thought to-day is chaos and night come again. We have Spencer with his absurd Unknowable, offset in part by his sane attempt to

¹ Modern Philosophy, p. 230.

live and think in a real world. We have the monist, who begs the question of the ages by assuming a principle both physical and spiritual. We have the scattered remnant of the Hegelian school, more than any other the characteristic philosophy of the time, as it is the logical outcome of the speculative development of the past century. This system has proven a success, however, neither as a philosophy nor as a religion. Religious souls were at first deceived by the pious humbug about a wondrous union with God to be brought about by the Hegelian Holy Spirit; but now all the world knows that the God is a conscienceless and passionless pantheistic principle, the union is the absorption and annihilation of the human personality, and that the system in general can no more meet the intellectual and moral needs of living men than the ideas of beefsteak and potatoes can nourish the physical body. We have Goethe raising an infinity of profound questions to which our age has no reply save the sneer of Mephistopheles. We have Carlyle, the Stoic. We have George Eliot, giving up the Christian God for the soulless and loveless Substance of Spinoza, and singing the praises of an immortality in the memory of future generations:—

"O may I join the choir invisible
Of those immortal dead who live again
In minds made better by their presence."

We have, in fiction and in life, men like Robert Elsmere, where the ice-bound peaks of a dreary pantheism are lit up into a deceptive warmth and beauty by the last fading beams of a Christian faith. And we have the shallow optimist, who says the world is growing better and we must be patient and cheerful until in some wondrous way the golden age of the future is ushered in by the destruction of all that humanity has trusted and loved and worked for in the past.

What then shall be done? Is not resignation the lesson

of the hour? We cannot call back the Pope or the Puritans, Eden or the age of Saturn, and we do not care to return to the fool's paradise of the ignorant past by clinging to illusions merely because it is pleasant to believe them. If the world is really such a wretched place, and humanity is necessarily compassed about with so many limitations, it is well to know it and prepare to make the best of it. Another question, however, may be raised concerning this, as every evil predicament in which men find themselves,—What is the cause of the existing state; the Creator, or our own folly? This question is pertinent here.

Modern science and philosophy are the children of the Renaissance. They have broken away from the leading-strings of their ancient mistress, theology, and set up for themselves. We see the outcome to-day; science has arrived at a blind and purposeless evolution of the Unknown, and philosophy has adopted the scholastic dialectic and dogmatic method of the old theology, without even winning thereby any object satisfying to reason or inspiring to moral effort. The bonds of the ancient union must be restored, if we are to gain a full-orbed and permanent truth. "Religion must be reorganized as one of the essential and fundamental facts of life. It is a fact that does not ask either of philosophy or science leave to be. . . . Religion represents the fullness of the nature; each system of philosophy represents only a part of the nature. Theology should still maintain her old position as queen of philosophy as well as of science."¹

It is apparent in Germany to-day that the race of giants is extinct—the intellectual Titans who had ideas, however erroneous, and personal force and courage to apply these ideas in constructing a theory of things. The German professor of philosophy to-day is a scribe, a commentator, an antiquarian. He will lead the student out over an in-

¹ Professor C. C. Everett, *Institute Essays*, 1879, p. 47.

the fragments of the metaphysical wrecks of all past time; but when at last he has traversed the long road from Thales to Hegel, and you think you may at length learn what it all amounts to, he hesitates and stammers and finally stops. He is rather an Hegelian, but not exactly; and he is going to wait until natural science explains matter and mind before he builds his system. The subjective-skeptical tendency of the transcendental period pervades German speculation as an influence hostile to creative thought on new and fruitful lines. German theology has become largely metamorphosed into philosophy, and, blind leading the blind, they are likely to fall into the ditch together.

I know of no country to-day so favorably situated as America for the development of a philosophy and a theology which shall meet the needs of our time. A great opportunity presents itself to the young students of America. In the God of our fathers, immanent in the world and yet in some sense transcendent, we have the loftiest and truest principle the world has yet known, whether as a regulative guide in thought or as an ideal for conduct. Profiting by the errors and one-sided extremes of the past, we may develop a theology which shall be rational, and a philosophy which shall be reverent. And in the interval we shall be living in a world where God and man, body and mind, the duties of the present and the hopes of the future life are each allowed a place,—a much more comfortable world to wait in than that of the Hegelian, old or new. For “the wide shoreless universe” shall be to us in some sense “a firm city, a dwelling which we know.”

ARTICLE VII.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND THE CHURCHES.

BY THE REV. HENRY DAVIES, PH.D.

I. THERE is nothing more assuring to our modern institutional religious life than the fact that we are hearing less and less from that class of critics whose special, pet aversion is an ecclesiastic or an ecclesiastical institution. To the scientific world the death of Tyndall and Huxley was sincerely lamented; and as true friends of science the religious leaders of the times looked not without sorrow on their demise. But it is equally true that there is no one to take up the task of prejudicial criticism which these and similar men have carried on for so long a time. The fact is, that to the vast majority of people religion is a serious affair; one which is somehow or other to play a dominant part in those developments which the times seem to be pointing out as the next step in the progress of the species. This fact is shown in the large number of laymen who write on the subject; in the equally large number of extra-ecclesiastical organizations which owe their initiation to men who cannot bear the idea of a religionless society, but who are equally averse to the creeds of the churches; and lastly in the practical way in which the phenomena of traditional church life form the topic of serious investigation on the part of interested outsiders. All that is done by these persons is not wise or charitable; yet we must acknowledge that this change of attitude towards the subjects involved in our religious life is a significant sign of the times and also one altogether welcomed.

It is with the view of winning more serious respect still to these much-maligned and often-misunderstood traditional churches, that this article was written. The writer feels that if the process of change which is obtaining in all other departments of social life were seen in relation to our churches; if those who turn against these churches as fossilized, unyielding institutions, incapable of making the necessary adjustments to our changed conditions; if we could see that this process is actually deeply affecting these churches,—we would not be so ready to turn away from these bodies, which have given life, literature, and law to our Western civilization. It is the belief of the writer, that if the change referred to could be considered in the light of those laws of scientific evolution which have been so influential in modifying other departments of our social organism, we should find a rapid reversal of judgment with reference to the place and influence of the church in our social evolution. One of the principal ways to do this is to show how that process is daily affecting these organizations; and with this theme this article will be mainly occupied.

By the phrase "the churches" I do not limit myself to those individual bodies which we comprise under the word "denominations." The words are used, with a generous elasticity, to denote all those organizations which are based upon the recognition of that historical faith which owes its origin to Christ. I exclude from consideration here only those purely subjective and arbitrary forms of religious thinking which have attempted to claim a lineage with this historic faith, or to assimilate its own content with that more universal outlook. We are not, therefore, concerned here with "orthodox" or "liberal," with "inspirational" or "institutional," churches. These terms, in a strict or a broad sense, have no value whatever in determining the essential nature of what we mean by the

church. They may be rightfully applied only to qualify some characteristic which that unchanging unity which we designate "the church of God" has assumed in the course of its historical manifestation. I refer, in speaking of "the churches," to those historical bodies, of whatever name or sign, which are built upon faith in Christ, without discriminating carefully between the different idiosyncrasies which they possess, or between the numerous subdivisions into which the process of disintegration is rapidly changing them to-day, as in the past.

That this process is going on is, perhaps, a truism with most of us; yet it is not equally certain that we are thoroughly convinced as to the reason, the extent, and the outcome of this change. Through a failure to grasp the full import of the evolutionary hypothesis, *as that hypothesis relates to religion*, we have much thinking which implies a certain settled conviction that evolution and religion are irreconcilable. Equally ignoble is the wholesale assumption that in the evolutionary hypothesis is the last word of the human mind on this subject. The writer is out of all sympathy with the first view, and he agrees with the latter to this extent at least, namely, that in the fundamental thesis of the philosophy of scientific evolution, the main incentive to a modification in our views is to be found.

Briefly stated, the doctrine of evolution—or development, if this word be preferred—is based on a twofold discovery. First, the process of life on our globe, and in fact wherever there is life, is *one* process. All "the manifold of experience," to use Kant's expressive and inclusive term for what transpires without the mind, and mental phenomena as well, are the manifestation of a single, persistent power of life, which has this twofold way of revelation. Thus all nature, all history, all science, under the law of action and reaction, are developments of this one source of energy. The phenomena of chemistry, their elementary classifica-

tion; the phenomena of astronomy, their discovery and systemization; the phenomena of physics, with their relation to the ultimate problems of matter and motion; the phenomena of biology, with the wonderful panorama of the processes of birth, death, and reproduction; the phenomena of mind, in their physical and psychological correlation; the phenomena of history and society, including religion,—all things stand in relation to this ultimate fact, which evolutionary science has established, namely, the presence and power of one single force, of which the manifold life of the world is the manifestation. The full import of this great discovery is very far from being grasped, especially with reference to religion; and this, because the whole of that class of phenomena called religious is embedded deep in all living and progressive developments.

The other great principle underlying the evolutionary mode of thought, is, that this process of life is a process from the more simple to the more complex. Nothing appears for the first time in an adult form. The tree begins as a seed and slowly attains its majority, passing through the stress and strain of growth forward to its normal goal. Even the somewhat incalculable history of states obeys this rule in the broad interpretation of it. Human society does not begin in a perfectly developed political and religious condition. According to the development hypothesis, the human species has passed from its simpler to more complex social arrangements. Politics, after being concerned with the most elementary needs of communities, has come to be the complex and absorbing pursuit it is to-day. That life-process, which to-day culminates in the conception, so alluring, so fatuous, of an ideal state of perfected persons living in perfect relations with one another and with the world, was at one time the inspiring ideal of one brain. It has gained its prominence only by submitting to the conditions of all development. Its formation and growth

could not constitute an exception to the law of action and reaction.

But evolution or development, as related to religious and ecclesiastical history, has not been seriously or commonly accepted. A commonplace circumstance will show this. The other day, whilst walking down one of the main streets of a New England city boasting a university and public library, I read on a placard outside the Y. M. C. A. building this anomalous notice: So and so will speak here on Sunday next; subject, "Revelation or Evolution: Which?" It is implied in that notice that the public must make a choice between the two, as though there existed a radical antagonism between that process of life of which the Bible is the record and that process which, up to the present, has of necessity been largely confined to physical science!

It is the failure, on the part of many, sympathetically to grasp the inevitable bearing of this doctrine of development on religion, which accounts in large measure for the surprise and alarm which in certain quarters accompanies the obvious disintegration of the churches. Now the rationale of this movement is simple enough, the fact being that the churches are disintegrating because they cannot help themselves. The real occasion for alarm and surprise would be if they did not disintegrate. For it is, in the light of these two principal positions of the evolutionary philosophy, an inherent necessity of all life and all institutions based upon living processes, that they change; and the indispensable conditions of change are, slow disintegration of part from part; the gradual decay and death, from disuse, of neglected or exhausted sources of life; the assimilation of new and more suitable ones; and the purposive selection of means for their effectuation. Without these conditions no progress could take place, and because this is so, we are called upon to witness the breaking-up of those religious

traditions which have nourished the life of mankind for so long a time in the past. All change is a sign of progress.

"Cast leaves and feathers rot in last year's nest,
The winged brood, flown thence, new dwellings plan;
The serf of his own Past is not a man;
To change and change is life, to move and never rest :—
Not what we are, but what we hope, is best."

II. Thus far we have seen the bearing of the theory of development upon the churches in its most general aspect. It remains, in this second part of my article, to mention three changes which have occurred in the process above referred to, and which are destined to shape the future of the churches to a very considerable extent.

I. The first is concerned with the idea of religion. It is a fact that the idea of religion is undergoing profound modification both from within and without. We are growing more and more familiar with the ethical conception. The old metaphysical, suprarational conception made of religion a something out of all connection with the working of our ordinary understanding; a something which needed official interpreters or sacramental mediation. Right life and religion were separated. You must "get religion," according to this view. Among thinking men this conception has largely been superseded.

In nothing, perhaps, is this change more clearly indicated than in the vital way theology has modified its systematic views of God. It will be agreed, by all reflective readers, that for religion nothing is so central as the idea of God. All religious tenets depend ultimately upon our deepest thought of God. It is as this thought is modified that the idea of religion changes. Now, the question comes, How has evolution modified our idea of God? By bringing to light new facts and relations, by which we gain broader views of the cosmical process. We can gain no higher synthesis than that which the facts at hand justify. Widen

the area of facts, and you necessarily heighten the synthesis. Now physical science, during the past half-century or so, has added very materially to our sum of knowledge. The growth has been extraordinary, and equally so has been the searching criticism to which this knowledge has been subjected at the hands of the critical philosophy. All this has tended so to modify our conceptions of religion and of God, the central fact of religion, that we can no longer conceive of him as the eighteenth century thinkers thought—justifying Huxley's jest at what was called by him "the carpenter theory." For just so long as he was conceived of as distant from the world, the idea of religion assumed fatalistic and non-moral features. There can be no reasonable doubt that this was the fact. The conception of God and his relations with the world held by many of the prominent post-Reformation thinkers, though ostensibly intended to aid in establishing a truly ethical religion, really involved the baldest fatalism. A perusal of the leading symbols of the post-Reformation churches will serve to explain, at least in great part, the vehemence of the protest which the modern spirit is making against their unethical implications. The controversy over Deism, which I apprehend is still unsettled, whilst agnosticism enjoys its unabated vitality, was only one feature of this general tendency.

Evolution, on the other hand, has brought the transcendent and the actual into such close proximity, that the mind easily makes the inference, clear and fruitful in theology, that God is *in* his world. If we reflect for a moment, we can see the immediate consequence of this modification. It elevates our thought of the world, making it more worthy of our admiration and esteem, and, if I judge correctly, this thought of the world underlies most of our reactionary philosophy. To us the world is not a means simply of material progress; it has æsthetical and even eth-

ical significance. God is filling things with ideal elements, showing thus that he is not unfriendly to the natural world. Every tree and flower, so runs much of the religio-poetical thought of our day, is a shekinah: "every bush is aflame with God." But we also gain, by this modification, in our idea of man. Man, it is true, is part of the complex unity called the Universe, but he receives special dignity in so far as he is made more nearly akin with the Author of this complex unity. This, evolution has really, though unconsciously, done. By tearing aside much of the metaphysical drapery from God, we have discovered more clearly the essential relationship between him and his creatures. Man participates in the divine nature; is, in fact, a divine being, and therefore a religious, i.e., devoted, consecrated person. Under the impulse of these ideas, we feel a strong desire for more knowledge of one who is so near us, whose awful presence is so dignifying and inspiring. Under this impelling desire, reflecting men have turned their eyes backwards, and cast a searching glance to the past, and found loyalty to this divine element in man a characteristic of all the great personalities of history. This is so much a habit of our thinking to-day that we take it for granted, although, like most of our mental habits, it has a history.

The results of these modifications, introduced by serious thinking, are obvious in almost every living pulpit which is in touch with the times. The idea of religion which is gaining increasing power is not the notion that it consists in belief of a creed; but in conduct, regulated by an ideal conception of God's nature and relations with the world. It is not going to church and worshipping once a week in a building "consecrated" for that purpose; but the life lived in the vivid consciousness and joyous fellowship of the Universal Father. It is not "otherworldliness," but the intensest devotion to the affairs of the present as preparing for a better state in this world and a probable next.

But what we specially desire to notice is, that these modifications would have been impossible, so far as we can see, without corresponding changes in our philosophical thinking, in our scientific views, and also in the realm of social achievement. They have come as a result of these changes. The higher synthesis of philosophical truth with the moral ideal could not fail to modify the idea of God, and therefore of religion. It is an ethico-philosophical conception of religion which appeals to the deepest life of the present time, and in this fact lies the substantial ground for believing that religion will remain with us, now as ever, the most significant factor of modern life.

2. The second sign of disintegration may be dismissed with greater brevity. There is a marked tendency, quite in harmony with the evolutionary mode of thought, to emphasize union in the essentials of religion.

It is not necessary to refer to statistics here; and, even if it were, they would not be a reliable source of knowledge. Statistics either prove too much or too little. Besides, we are dealing with those impalpable transformations which may be called "the tendencies of modern religious life." We shall therefore continue upon the lines already adopted, and try to show that, owing to the operation of the inevitable laws of change, the churches, so long separated, are now rapidly coming together upon terms of mutual agreement in those essentials of religion which, historically and philosophically, can be regarded as constituting the *raison d'être* of religion itself.

This disintegrating process, like that which has resulted in the ethicalizing of our idea of God, and therefore of religion, arises from the factors involved in the universal method of progress. Disintegration presupposes reintegration, and implies separation of part from part—not necessarily, it is true, integral parts—which results in revealing common features among those parts. In this way we

arrive at what we call "laws." For example, those periodical ways of acting which the study of the heavenly bodies manifests are called "the modes of their behavior," or, "the laws of the heavenly bodies"; but what we mean in reality is that in the critical process of our knowledge of an extra-mental world, we have noticed the regular processes which certain bodies, under the attraction of gravitation, possess. Similarly, what we call politics, and the "laws" of political economy (often, it must be confessed, anything but stable quantities), are nothing but our observations of the habitual functioning of certain well-considered and separated phenomena. In religious evolution it is coming to be admitted that the same is true. We are beginning to find that the churches have certain "ways of functioning" common to them all, and that these ways of functioning are essential to the existence of the churches; as distinguished from other matters up to the present considered important, but which do not belong to the "nature" of the elements under examination.

It is important to observe that it is not enough that certain common features in our religious life be thus made manifest; it is necessary that, for a complete case, these be the absolute ones, all others being regarded as introductory to these. This only a long process of conflict, criticism, and change, such as the last thousand years or so has witnessed, could thoroughly show. Now, not only is evolution as thus described, destroying unnecessary growths upon the substance of religion, thus revealing her true and beautiful lineaments; but, as part of the same critical process, we are beginning to grasp the fact, as never before, that these common features lead to a more "socialistic" construction of the point of view in religious matters. We are beginning to see that religion is not only a concern of the individual, but also a social force of the highest magnitude. The great inconsistency of religious faiths has al-

ways occurred at this point. For example, much time has been expended in the endeavor to determine which was first, the individual or society, in the conception of Jesus. The truth is that both are held in his thought in indissoluble simultaneity. His ethical ideal is, to put so much in brief: *realize yourself by sacrificing yourself to a social ideal, the kingdom of God.* Man is to find himself in society, not in isolation from it. Under this ethical impulse, we are forced in this age, in the contemplation of the social ideal, to approach nearer to one another, to acknowledge the unity which underlies our separated, corporate ways of acting, and to yearn for an acknowledgment of our common brotherhood in that which is highest. The point at which this process tends to culminate is the spectacle of society completely ethicalized under the highest idea of God, and local distinctions yielding to the feeling of a common unity in religion comprehending all mankind.

As this article is only intended to indicate tendencies, not to particularize results, I need not pause to mention the positive directions which this movement is taking among the churches. The great influence of the Parliament of Religions at Chicago will have lost much of its power and significance, if we do not learn that it is only by a patient and painstaking process of scientific thinking that we can reach a satisfactory statement of what the essential features of religion are. I say advisedly *scientific* thinking. For there is much thought and work expended on these subjects which is sheer waste of time. We cannot, by the strenuous necessities of our mental nature, anticipate the result, which some seem so anxious to consider already settled. Only as the ever-rolling stream of time slowly completes the disintegration, can the fellowship so happily inaugurated reach its final consummation. The human heart must suffer much yet, before it can feel, in all its freedom and freshness, the touch of that master heart which beat

in sympathy with all humanity, and which always bade us hope for the realization of the ideal brotherhood.

3. The last illustration of our topic which I shall permit myself to employ is of a more positive and practical, if not also personal, nature. It is this: the ethicalizing of the great test by which the churches are to be judged. Briefly expressed, that test is: deeds, not doctrines. The ethical idea of religion, which we have seen has resulted from the changed conception of God, brought about by the evolutionary philosophy, is also responsible for this third development. It was inevitable and natural, under the new impulse, that a church's claims and rights should be measured by its previous fulfillment of duties, since we have no conception of rights which do not so originate. This judgment has been accelerated immensely by the new school of ethical thinkers, chiefly prominent in Germany and among the younger professors in America. They are the teachers of a new ethical ideal of personality. That ideal is, that it is man's right and duty to strive after the completest possible development of his whole personality. So largely, however, has the church occupied itself with a single corner or section of man's complex life, that the disproportion between the results and this new ideal has only excited the daily criticism of all thinking and serious minds. Believing that religion is the profoundest element in man's life, the writer cannot but regard these criticisms with some concern. They show how natural and necessary this new step is, and also that, for the future at least, that church which asserts the religious, but does not equally acknowledge the intellectual and moral, dignity of man, is foredoomed to destruction in the evolutionary process. The supreme privilege of the churches to-day is that they have a "door of opportunity" open to them, whereby they may prove their right to respect, and that is by becoming the champion of the rights of "the whole man." As a matter

of fact, the judgment is on, and according as they are faithful or unfaithful to this ethical test—deeds not doctrines—will their permanence be settled, and not according to the vehemence of their protests against the advance of ideas with which they have no sympathy. The doom is set and will “go by forever” between “the bloom and blight,” “the darkness and light,” of its hearing or failing to hear this its knell of judgment by the world. In other words, the evolutionary process has brought to light the essential ethicality of that social ideal to realize which the churches stand pledged by their Founder. This, it is hoped will be seen, it has done at the vast expense of much that was considered of value to our fathers. For it was inevitable that society should cast aside its old clothes, and that new ones should be assumed. We cannot live “coffined in brick and stone” when “the unmapped prairie” can be our own.

Enough has been said to show the main lines according to which our religious life is working itself out. The direction which it is at present taking, we observe, is not only towards a greater comprehensiveness, but towards increased effectiveness. Perhaps the two go together. This is clear from the prominence which ethical considerations take in it at every point. Hence we need not be in doubt long as to the whither of scientific theology or as to the tendency which the churches must take, in obedience to the scientific teaching of religion. For it must ever be in the direction of greater freedom. The days of religious individualism, like those of economic individualism, are drawing to a close. Augustine and Calvin must yield to Justin Martyr and Origen. The reason of man, finding new areas in which to exercise itself, cannot but apply itself to the new problems thus opened up before it. These new problems are the result of that slow but certain work of change which the conditions of human existence inevitably involve.

As regards the future of the churches, to win greater respect to which this article was written, we can speak only tentatively. Great and radical changes have already been accomplished in these historic institutions. These are not of a superficial character, as our remarks show, but concern the very life of these ancient bodies; so that it is no longer possible for them to hold, in the way of the past, the attitude of suspended judgment in regard to those matters which were in doubt. Evolutionary philosophy and biological science necessitate unconditional surrender to their main thesis by all social forces whatsoever. Only, therefore, as the churches, in the person of their members and ministry, adjust themselves, with all haste consistent with decorum, to the changes already accomplished, can these churches take their position as the leading factors in the social regeneration we desire and expect. This it has already done to a considerable extent, though the results are ridiculously inadequate. Our greatest need to-day is, it seems to me, men who understand the situation. The pulpits need thinkers: men, to use Carlyle's words, "who can tell what o'clock it is in the universe." The future of the churches can be secured only as they are provided more and more by such men. Their power is increasing, however.

I claim for the churches a deeper respect on account of their good faith in the midst of our social and intellectual palingenesis. Evolution is always slow, and the church is the slowest, the most conservative, of our social agencies. It is not wise, it is not just, to break away from them, when we remember how inscrutable are those forces which are gradually forcing upon them and upon all of us the logic of events. Instead of ostracism by the cultured and enlightened, they merit the utmost consideration at the hands of this entire generation. For probably no establishment of modern society has more to contend with just now than

it, and certainly none has a harder task before it. Least of all should we ignore this factor in the social evolution of the world. For it is far from being proved yet, that the power of spiritual life which every age needs is not, in some way, immediately connected with the existence of these much-maligned and much-misunderstood historic channels of the world's blessing. Rivers always take the course of channels already formed.

One important lesson our churches need constantly to lay to heart is the constant need of adjustment to new conditions of thought and action. If they will unitedly make a corresponding effort at understanding the world to which they are to minister; if they will yield as gracefully as may be to the social forces which beset us, such as the intellectual renaissance herein described; if the attitude of its leading thinkers—Origen, Erasmus, Beecher, etc.—become the attitude of its rank and file,—much of the abuse and absurd prejudicial criticism which has been leveled at it would disappear. The church is an integral element in the problem of society. It is the highest source of inspiration and expresses ideally the highest life yet attained by the human species. To underestimate or ignore it is folly. This the church itself needs to bear in mind.

It is impossible for us to revert to any condition which has ceased to contain those living religious inspirations which have been blessings in the past. Try how we will, we can never revive in detail any primitive religion in our vast and complex civilization. Our hope lies in the combination of the scientific and religious forces at work among us; that is to say, in a deeper comprehension of the unity which underlies the whole circle of life. Philosophy has the deepest word to say here, and a wise philosophy will not deny that development must never so absorb our minds as to exclude the exercise of rational faith in the world and its reality and in love, which is the key to all its growing mysteries. After all, development is without meaning apart from the knowledge of God.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE INCARNATION AS A PROOF OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE KENOSIS.

BY THE REV. F. C. H. WENDEL, PH.D.

THE Incarnation as the all-important point for the earthly career of the Christ is also the all-important point for the doctrine of the Kenosis. If we are to build up a historical doctrine of the Christ upon the basis of the New Testament, our starting-point must be the Incarnation, as the first historically attested fact of his life on earth. The view we take of this important event will, to a great extent, determine our entire Christology. To give any historical sketch of the various views held with regard to this event, or even to enter fully into its Christological significance, would lie far outside the scope of my present purpose, which is merely to define the Incarnation from the standpoint of the Kenosis.

The New Testament accounts of the Incarnation may be arranged under five heads: 1. The miraculous Birth from the Virgin (Matthew and Luke); 2. The *πέμψις*, or Mission from the Father (Jesus, John, and Paul); 3. The *παρουσία*, or Coming, out of a preëxistent state of Glory, into the world (Jesus and John); 4. The Assumption of the Flesh, or the Incarnation proper (John and Paul); and 5. The Kenosis or self-emptying of the Logos in becoming Incarnate (Paul). Yet, while making this distinction, I am well aware that these classes of statement overlap; but I think that this arrangement has the recommendation, at least, of clearness and convenience.

1. The first class of passages records the Annunciation, the miraculous Conception, and the Birth (Matt. i. 18-24; Luke i. 26-38, the annunciation, and Luke ii. 1-10, the birth). There is really little, if anything, to add to the Bible narratives, which are straightforward accounts of a historical event. A great deal has been written on the manner both of the conception and the birth,—but to very little purpose. The Roman Catholic dogmata of auricular conception and of a birth *clauso utero* are sufficiently familiar to all to require more than a passing notice. Just how this conception and Virgin birth were possible, is beyond the scope of our knowledge. All we can say is that conception and birth are both alike miraculous. Nor can a purely human analogy help us much, though we shall have to return to this point later on. The analogy fails us just at the vital point, when we ask, How is any conception possible? So far as I have been able to ascertain, conception is the ultimate fact of human biology, which is unexplained and, probably, unexplainable. And, if we thus come—even in a matter of every-day occurrence, and of such apparent simplicity—to the limit of human knowledge, how can we explain the mysteries of a purely spiritual conception, brought about through revelation? When we examine the accounts of Matthew and Luke, we find very little upon which we could base a physiological inquiry. Matthew simply records (i. 18): "His mother, Mary, who was betrothed to Joseph, before they had any connection, was found to be pregnant of the Holy Spirit." Here is a simple statement of the historical fact that the apparently premature pregnancy of Mary, the betrothed wife of Joseph, was due to the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit, a statement that gives us no basis for physiological reasonings from human analogies. Turning to the Annunciation, recorded in the Gospel according to Luke, we seem to find help in verse 35 of chapter i., "Behold, thou

shalt conceive, and bear a son." And when Mary, in great perplexity, asks how this can come to pass, seeing that she had "known no man," the angel answers (i. 35): "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee." It is very plain that a pneumatophany is here implied. While under the influence of this pneumatophany, which represents the power of the Most High, the Virgin shall conceive. There seems to be, thus, a way out of our difficulty. But, unfortunately for our attempts at explanation, the pneumatophany is itself a miracle; and to attempt to explain one miracle by another would be like trying to solve an equation in algebra in which two unknown quantities and no known quantities are given. When, then, we turn to Luke's account of the birth (ii. 7), we find, simply, "And she bore her first-born son," which is a simple, straightforward statement of the historical fact, that gives absolutely no foundation for any physiological speculations. All we learn from these accounts of the Gospels is the fact, stated in words of simple beauty in the Apostles' Creed, that he was "conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary." What is important for us, from the standpoint of our doctrine, is the fact that he whom these two Gospels most evidently regard as the Son of the living God, was born of a woman.

This is implied, also, in Paul's statement (Gal. iv. 4): "When the fullness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman (*γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός*)," etc. The earthly, human birth of the Son of God is the first and, in some respects, the most important moment of his humiliation. That the Son of God, in becoming Son of man, in assuming human flesh, in entering upon a human mode of existence, should submit himself to the regular human method of coming into the world, rather than come in the burst of ineffable glory in which the Messianic hopes of his Jewish contemporaries pictured his coming, is one of

the most sublime proofs of his loving condescension to us, his brothers. By thus entering into a human family, and that one of the poorest in the land, he came into close, sympathetic touch with the flesh and blood of the race. Flesh of our flesh, and blood of our blood, we can claim him the Son of man, our Brother. Yet, one thing we must not forget, that this family, into which he was born, was, on both sides, of royal stock, both Joseph and Mary being descendants of King David. This was, so to say, a soteriological necessity, for the Messiah of prophecy was the descendant of David, born in the royal city of Bethlehem. The attendant circumstances of deep poverty serve but to emphasize the humiliation of our Saviour. Surely he who was rich, for our sakes became poor, for our sakes was born in the manger of that stable in Bethlehem, for our sakes descended to the deepest human poverty, short of actual beggary!

2. The second class of passages refers to the *πέμψις*, the Mission of the Son from and by the Father. Christ here represents his coming, not as an independent act, as we shall see him represent it presently, but as an act dependent upon the will of the "Father who sent him." Of course there is here no real contradiction. The *πέμψις* and the *παρουσία* are but different aspects of one and the same act of the eternal triune Godhead: the Father sends, the Son comes. And herein is expressed, at the same time, the temporal, economic submission of the Son to the will of the Father which is part and parcel of the humiliation of Jesus, the Christ. He himself viewed his coming into the world in this light, as is attested by numerous passages in the Gospel according to John (e.g., John iv. 34; v. 23; vi. 39, *et al.*). John iii. 16 presents this same aspect of his coming. The apostle Paul tells us (Gal. iv. 4) that, when the fullness of time was come, God sent forth his Son.

3. The third class of passages is that large one in which

Jesus refers to his "Coming." The *παρουσία* is a coming from heaven, from the Father, out of a preëxistent state of glory. The most important passages are, of course, those that report his own words. Among the most striking ones are: John v. 43: "I am come in the name of my Father"; vi. 33: "For the bread of God is he that cometh down from heaven"; viii. 42: "For I am come forth from God"; and especially xvii. 5: "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." In the prologue of his Gospel (i. 1-18), in verse 1, John distinctly affirms both the preëxistence and the divinity of the Logos: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was divine." This Divine Logos, who was with God, "became flesh, and dwelt among us." Leaving aside, for the nonce, the assumption of the flesh, which is really another aspect of the question, we are concerned more especially with the second clause of verse 14, "and dwelt among us." What is here distinctly stated is that the Divine Logos, who was in a preëxistent state with God, a state which, as we learned from John xvii. 5, was a state of glory, when he had assumed flesh, became as one of us, making this world his temporary abiding-place. Though the method of transition from the preëxistent state of glory into the state of dwelling among us is not directly stated, being involved in the *σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, yet this text teaches, as does also John xvii. 5, a coming out of this preëxistent state of glory, into the earthly life, with all that implies.

4. The fourth class of passages upon which we want to touch in this exegetical study of the incarnation, comprises those that refer to the Assumption of the Flesh. The most important of these is John i. 14: "The Logos became (was made) flesh." This text is nothing more or less than a theological statement of the fact of the human birth of Jesus, the Christ. While Matthew and Luke recorded

merely the historical fact of the birth, John, in his prologue, goes into the theology of that birth, and represents it as the incarnation of the preëxistent Logos. What in the accounts of Matthew and Luke appears as a simple, historical fact, is by John explained as a process within the eternal life of the Divine Logos. *How* the Logos became or was made flesh, we learn just as little as we learned from Matthew and Luke *how* the child Jesus was conceived and born. The two accounts give us the same account, only from different points of view. The two Synoptists view the event from the purely human standpoint, as a birth; John views it from the divine standpoint, as an incarnation, as an assumption of flesh on the part of divinity, as a becoming flesh of the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity. What is further involved in this statement we shall see as we proceed. We want now to add to this Johannine statement some statements of the apostle Paul which may serve to explain and to amplify it. Foremost among these is the celebrated passage Phil. ii. 5-8. This text teaches that Christ is both divine and human, is possessed both of the divine and the human essence; that, existing from all eternity in the essence of God, he took to himself, in addition, the essence of man. Thus we preclude, by comparison with this text, and with the texts in which Christ claims oneness with the Father (e.g., John x. 30), any explanation that might possibly posit an essential change in the eternal life of the Divine Logos. Paul teaches, moreover, that this flesh which the Logos assumed, was *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*, "sinful flesh," i.e., flesh which, like our flesh, is subject to the rule of sin. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, Paul quotes an old Christian hymn which speaks of Christ as manifested in the flesh (*Ὁς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σάρκι*).

5. The last class of statements noted comprises those passages of the Epistles of Paul in which the apostle expounds his conception of Christ's humiliation (Rom. viii. 3; 2 Cor.

v. 21; Gal. iii. 13, iv. 4, 5; 2 Cor. viii. 9; 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Rom. viii. 32; and Phil. ii. 5-8). The general teaching of Paul is that Christ, who knew not sin, was made sin for our sakes; that he was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh; that he redeemed us from the curse, by becoming a curse for our sakes, in our stead; that he was sent in the fullness of time of the Father, being made of a woman; that, though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor; that he was crucified through weakness, but liveth by the power of God; that God spared not his own Son; and that, though he existed from all eternity in the essence of God, yet considered it not a thing to be eagerly grasped, to be equal with God, but emptied himself of this, being equal with God, assuming the essence of a slave, and being made in the likeness of men. Thus we find that Paul conceives of the incarnation as implying both a self-emptying of equality with God, i.e., of the exercise of divine functions and prerogatives, and the assumption of the human nature.

We have, then, under these five heads, the New Testament doctrine of the incarnation. The Son of God, sent of the Father, came upon the earth and was born of a woman, in the regular course of nature (yet she was a virgin, and the conception was brought about by the instrumentality of the Holy Spirit); or, in theological language, the eternally preëxistent Divine Logos became flesh, i.e., assumed the human flesh, with all of its liability to sin, having first emptied himself of his equality with God;—and all this, without loss of divine essence. The resultant product of this process is Jesus Christ, the God-man, Son of God, and Son of man.

Thus far we have closely followed the guidance of Holy Scripture; but a number of speculative questions has arisen out of the fact of the incarnation, which have been discussed by theologians with a great deal of warmth. Just how far such questions are legitimate, it is not always pos-

tance, and must be met by every one who enters upon a discussion of the incarnation. In discussing these questions I shall strive to use the utmost candor and shall, so far as at all possible, be guided by just and logical deductions from Holy Scripture.

Of course, the leading question, from our point of view, is, What is the import of the incarnation for the earthly life of Jesus, the Christ? The answer is simple: It is the initial act of the Kenosis, or self-emptying, by which the Son of God becomes Son of man. Certain it is that the real beginning of the earthly life, the real incarnation, lay back of the birth, in the conception. The moment of the conception is the moment of contact between the divine and the human life processes; and, from this moment on, proceeds the clothing of the Logos with flesh. Here, in the conception, we have the moment of the self-emptying of the Logos, the moment of his resignation of the exercise of divine functions and prerogatives.

The great question of the Kenosis is as to how far this self-emptying of the Logos is carried. Kœnig taught that the Logos emptied himself of omniscience and omnipotence in assuming the human nature in its integrity, and so became a theanthropic personality. Thomasius conceives the Logos as emptying himself of the divine mode of existence, in order to the assumption of the human form of existence, which necessarily implies a surrender of the divine glory that he had from the beginning, with the Father. The incarnation is to Thomasius, as it is to me, the unity of the two moments of assumption (of human flesh) and self-limitation (surrender of divine mode of existence). Liebner regards the incarnation from a peculiar standpoint. Holding to an eternal kenosis, and an eternal submission of the Son to the Father, he finds that in "the actual incarnation" this eternal kenosis and subor-

a complete loss of divine consciousness and of independent life on the part of the Son in becoming man. The self-emptied Logos, reduced to mere potentiality, is transformed into a human soul. Ebrard teaches an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the eternal form of existence; but he teaches, also, that the Logos did not lay aside his omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, but retained them in an applied form. Martensen teaches, like Gess, a renunciation of divine self-consciousness on the part of the Logos. He bases this teaching on the words of the angel to Mary (Luke i. 35): "The holy thing which is born of thee [reading ἐκ σοῦ] shall be called the Son of God." But the proper translation, omitting ἐκ σοῦ, is: "That which shall be born shall be called Holy, Son of God." Martensen here lays undue stress, to my mind, upon the neuter τὸ γεννώμενον, as bearing out his view. He holds a peculiar theory of a double life of the God-man.

With all this discussion, there seems to be little clearness as to what it was that the Logos relinquished in the kenosis, at the moment of incarnation. While the older writers are agreed in making the Son of God empty himself of the μορφή Θεοῦ, yet when we come to inquire what they understand by this exegesis, we find them greatly at variance. While Thomasius prudently uses the most general terms, Gess and Martensen go so far as to deny to the self-emptied Logos a consciousness of his divinity and ascribe to it mere potentiality, Gaupp finds in it a subordinationary view of the Trinity, Liebner removes both kenosis and subordination into the eternal Trinitarian life-process, and Ebrard denies any real kenosis of divine attributes, so-called. I have already touched upon what I consider the true significance of the passage Phil. ii. 7, which has given rise to this entire discussion. It is important here to say that I do not believe that in this passage the apostle de-

sired to convey the impression that the Son of God emptied himself of the *μορφή Θεοῦ*, which signified to him "the essence of God." What he did empty himself of was *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*, referring to the exercise of divine functions and prerogatives, of Omniscience, Omnipresence, Omnipotence, etc., which are generally called "attributes of God," a term that might, in my humble judgment, be with great propriety replaced by the expression "modes of divine existence." I would be understood, then, to say that in becoming man, the Son of God laid aside these Modes of Divine existence in order to conform himself to the modes of human existence. To illustrate, the *Λόγος ἄσαρκος*, the pre-incarnate Son of God, was omnipresent, and infinite, in every place at one and the same time, and unlimited by any boundaries of space;—the *Λόγος ἐνσαρκος*, the historical Jesus Christ, could be only in one place at any given time, and was limited by well-defined spacial boundaries. The pre-incarnate Logos was all-wise: the historical Jesus Christ knew not the day or the hour of his second Coming (Matt. xxiv. 36). In these instances we find that the Incarnate One has given up some former divine privilege, in order to become like his brethren in all things. What the New Testament presents to us is not the picture of a monster in human form, reaching out to divine powers, not an unheard-of monstrosity, with his feet on the earth, and his head in heaven, but the picture of a man of flesh and blood, like ourselves, though, owing to his divine origin, more highly endowed and absolutely free from sin.

The most difficult question, the one in which we must cut loose most completely, from all Scripture guidance, is, in how far the kenosis has affected the divine self-consciousness of the Logos. The easiest way is, of course, to cut the Gordian knot, and to declare that this divine self-consciousness is lost in the incarnation, and reappears, after a time, as the human self-consciousness; or to assume

a separate development of a divine and of a human consciousness, in the child Jesus ; or, again, to assume a theanthropic development of the self-consciousness as well as of the life of Jesus Christ. All of these methods have been followed by theologians. The first of these views is that of Gess, the second is that of Martensen, and the third that of Thomasius and Liebner.

One thing that all writers who assume a renunciation of self-consciousness on the part of the Logos forget, is, that self-consciousness is an inseparable adjunct of personality. Psychologically, we cannot conceive of personality apart from self-consciousness. If, then, the Logos did divest himself of self-consciousness at the incarnation, he also divested himself of personality;—becoming unconscious, he became also, by necessary implication, unpersonal. Such a consideration would lead, logically, to the position taken by Gess, which seems altogether unwarranted on scriptural grounds. There is no definite statement in Holy Scripture by which such theories could be tested. But, perhaps, the analogy of the growth of human self-consciousness can help us a little here. There is a very definite point at which a human self-consciousness germ, if such an expression be permissible, is given in the foetus. The moment of conception, which consists in the union of the male and female life principles in the ovary, imparts to the embryo organism certain qualities, both essential and accidental, which belong to both parents. In the growth of the newly conceived organism these qualities are gradually developed. This is what is known as “heredity.” One of these germinal possessions is self-consciousness, which is developed gradually as the infant grows. Fully developed self-consciousness is not reached, ordinarily, before the third or fourth year of life; but it is an essential inherent fact of personality. From this human analogy we might conclude that, in the ovary of the Virgin, there was im-

consciousness. Just as, in the purely human conception, the germs are not from one parent or the other, but result from a coöperation of the male and the female life principles, so we may suppose that, in the process of germ formation in the ovary of the Virgin, there was an analogous coöperation between the divine and the human life forces. Thus the product came to partake both of the divine and human natures, i.e., from the very beginning, from the very moment of conception, the development was theanthropic. Furthermore the product of this coöperation between the divine and the human life forces was to be a personality. We may reasonably assume that, in the regular manner, there was implanted in this theanthropic embryo the germ of self-consciousness; and, as the personality was to be theanthropic, the self-consciousness, from the earliest germinal beginnings on, was theanthropic. Following the human analogy, then, I would assume a germinal union of the divine with the human nature at the conception, and that the embryo which resulted from this conception possessed the germs of the entire future development. To apply this still more fully to the incarnation, I would explain that act as the entrance of *Λόγος ἄσαρκος*, self-emptied of the divine modes of existence, but not of the divine essence, which includes the divine self-consciousness, as the divine life germ, into intimate union with the human life germ, taken from the Virgin Mary, so that the resultant product was the God-man; the human ovum is fructified, in this case, by the Logos coming into contact with it. Thus may we represent to ourselves the Logos becoming flesh.

Now this embryo, thus formed, gradually developed in the womb of the Virgin, through all the stages of foetal growth; and, when the period of foetal development was completed, the child Jesus was born. A careful study of

to show the least trace of a duality of consciousness. The boy of twelve in the Temple is just awakening to a great fact of his life; but there is no trace that he is conscious of another *ego* within himself: . "I must be about *my* Father's business" (Luke ii. 49). The man Jesus Christ, also, is ever conscious of both his divinity and his humanity, in one and the same act. Thus he says: "I am the living bread that came down from Heaven" (John vi. 51); "Before Abraham was, I am" (John viii. 58); and, to give but one other passage: "Glorify me with the glory which I had with thee, before the world was" (John xvii. 5). In these and many similar passages, Jesus Christ distinctly indicates the unity of his theanthropic consciousness and the continuity of his theanthropic personality, upon which the former depends. He does not seem to feel separately conscious of his divinity and of his humanity, nor does his claim of preëxistence before Abraham, and even before the world was, appear at all strained; but his consciousness of that preëxistence, and of the continuity of his identity and of his personality since before the foundation of the world, is perfectly natural to him. Jesus Christ knows himself, throughout his entire earthly career, from the time he could think for himself and claimed God for his Father to the end of that career, as one with the Father ("I and the Father are one," *ἐν ἑσμεν*, John x. 30). And yet, on the other hand, He always claims equality with men, calling himself "the Son of man." Yet there is never any duality of consciousness. It is the *man* Jesus Christ who is one with the Father, who expects to receive again the glory which he had with the Father, before the world was. Herein is given the fact of his theanthropic personality and consciousness. Both natures, intimately united, yet without intermixture of confusion, bound together in a single theanthropic personality, with a single theanthropic self-

consciousness, make up the historic Jesus Christ of the New Testament records.

Another speculative question that has been raised in connection with the incarnation concerns the integrity of the humanity of Jesus Christ. This is the oldest of these speculative questions, dating from the times of Bishop Apollinaris of Laodicea (latter half of the fourth century), who, in attempting to secure an organic union between the man Jesus and the Logos, denied that Jesus possessed a true human spirit, its place being supplied by the Logos. Thus while according to the anthropology of his time, man was made up of body, soul, and spirit, the man Jesus was made up of body, animal soul, and Logos. The orthodox church failed to follow the bishop of Laodicea in his views, but modern scholars hold views that infringe just as much upon the integrity of the humanity of Jesus Christ. Thus Gess, as we have seen, makes the Logos take the place of the human soul, in order to secure continuity of consciousness. The question is not without its deep interest for the Christologist, though it has little bearing on our doctrine. I want just to correct a common misapprehension that seems to run through most of our systems of theology. Modern anthropology, based upon the Greek and the New Testament anthropology, has generally adopted the trichotomy of *σῶμα*, *ψίχη*, and *πνεῦμα*. This trichotomy is based upon a misinterpretation and misconception of Paul's anthropology. From Rom. viii. and Gal. v. 16 ff., we learn what Paul means when he uses the terms *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* in the strict sense. Though there is, it is true, more or less laxity in the use of these terms in the New Testament, yet it is very obvious that both refer, here, to ruling principles of life. A sharp distinction is made between them, in these two passages; sin is referred to the *σάρξ*, and righteousness to the *πνεῦμα*. Only those are righteous who walk *μὴ κατὰ σάρκα ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and Rom. viii. 6, we read: "For the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the spirit is life and peace." Again (verse 7), we read that the *σάρξ* is hostile to God, and (verse 8) that those who walk *ἐν σάρκι* cannot please God. While it is very evident that an essential distinction is here made between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*, it is equally evident that *σάρξ*, used in this sense, is identified with *σῶμα* as little as *πνεῦμα*, used in this special sense, is identified with *ψίχη*. When we refer to Gal. v. 19, 20, and read the list of the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός*, we find that, in such connections, *σάρξ* is anything but material, and anything but identical with *σῶμα*. Fornication and uncleanness may be more or less material conceptions; but certainly idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, zeal, wrath, jealousy, and envy are not at all material. As used in the passages under discussion, these terms are used of the opposite life principles that overrule the entire human life, both body and soul. The *πνεῦμα* is the principle of life, the ambassador of God, in our being; and the *σάρξ* is the principle of death, the ambassador of Satan, in our being. Either principle may,

and does, use all the powers, both of body and of soul, for its purposes. The domination of one or the other principle in the life of a man determines his standing with regard to God and with regard to Satan. The man in whose being the *πνεῦμα* dominates is well pleasing to God; the man in whose being the *σάρξ* dominates is at enmity with God. Between these two principles there is constant warfare (Gal. v. 17), each striving ever to gain and to retain the mastery. The victory of the *πνεῦμα* means regeneration. In other words the distinction between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is a distinction made in the sphere of religious experience, while that between *σῶμα* and *ψύχη* is a purely psychological distinction. Instead of a trichotomy, *σῶμα, ψύχη, πνεῦμα*, we have, then, a double dichotomy: one psychological (*σῶμα, ψύχη*); and the other religious (*σάρξ, πνεῦμα*). In other words, man is composed, as to his nature, of *σῶμα* and *ψύχη*; and, as to his life principle, he may be ruled, either by the *σάρξ*, being in the unregenerate state, and doing the works of the *σάρξ* (Rom. vii. 8; Gal. v. 19, 20), or he may be ruled by the *πνεῦμα*, being in the regenerate state, and bringing forth the fruits of the *πνεῦμα* (Rom. viii. 4; Gal. v. 22, 23). I forbear entering further upon this fascinating theme, having touched upon the main points.

Now, Jesus Christ, the God-man, on assuming human flesh, took to himself a true human body and a true human soul. As regards his possession of one or the other of these life principles, the *σάρξ* in the sense of "principle of sin and death" can certainly not be ascribed to him. The only one of these two principles that can be brought into any connection with the sinless One is the *πνεῦμα*. But what use had he, who had within him the life of the Father, of this human life principle? The good, life, was his eternal choice; and, in his life, the eternal God-life, abiding in him, which he came to manifest, took the place of this human life principle. The integrity of Jesus Christ's humanity, according to my view, consists, then, in this: In the incarnation he took upon himself a human body and a human soul, while, as far as his religious experience is concerned, that was dominated by the fact of his sinlessness and the other fact of his oneness of essence with the Father, which placed him outside of the ordinary sphere of human religious experience. But we cannot, of course, enter into the innermost religious experience of the Son of God, and say just how the human and divine natures are combined in him, or what relations they bear, the one to the other. We can only accept the fact that he is the God-man, that he is both human and divine, and leave one side all speculations and all attempts to understand a mystery that is far beyond our ken.

Let me digress for a moment or so, and consider very briefly some passages in which the *σάρξ* and the *πνεῦμα* are attributed to Jesus Christ. The word *σάρξ* is used by Paul in four special senses, besides the religious signification which we have vindicated for it in our discussion: 1. The literal "flesh," as when Paul speaks of "flesh and blood" (*σάρξ καὶ αἷμα*), re-

ferring to the material portion of our being, which shall not inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. xv. 50). 2. The totality of attributes that make up our true humanity. Thus Christ is spoken of as "manifested in the flesh," *ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί* (1 Tim. iii. 16), signifying that he was manifested as a complete man. When Christ is spoken of as come of the seed of David, "according to the flesh," *κατὰ σάρκα* (Rom. i. 3), this same thing is implied. 3. It is also used as a synonym of *σῶμα*, by synchdoche,—using the part for the whole. In 2 Cor. iv. 11, Paul speaks of our "mortal flesh," *ἡ θνητὴ σὰρξ*, where it is evidently synonymous with *σῶμα*; and 2 Cor. vii. 5, "Our flesh (*ἡ σὰρξ ἡμῶν*) had no rest," where the identity of *σὰρξ* with *σῶμα* is quite evident. 4. It is used finally, in the sense of all material, physical being, both animal and human, generally in quotations from the LXX., as *πάσα σὰρξ*—Hebrew *בָּשָׂר בָּשָׂר*, in Rom. iii. 20; Gal. ii. 16, etc.

It is in the second of these senses, employed by Paul, that the term *σὰρξ* is used in John i. 15: "The Logos became flesh," i.e., became man, in all the totality of human attributes, to which statement the quotation from the old hymn (1 Tim. iii. 16), *Ὁς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί*, is parallel. Whenever, then, the expression *σὰρξ* is applied to Jesus Christ, even in so strong a passage as Rom. viii. 3, in which it is said that "he came in the likeness of sinful flesh," *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, it always refers to the integrity of his human nature, and has no reference to the usage of *σὰρξ* as the principle of sin and death. In the same manner we must interpret the word *σὰρξ* in passages like Heb. v. 17, "in the days of his flesh"; 1 Peter iv. 1, "Jesus Christ having suffered in the flesh" (cf. 1 Peter iii. 18); and "Jesus Christ come in the flesh" (1 John iv. 2; 2 John vii. 1).¹

The term *πνεῦμα*, also, is used more or less laxly and is often confounded with the term *ψύχη*, the soul, or immaterial part of our being. Whenever the *πνεῦμα* of Jesus is spoken of, it seems to have this significance. Thus Mark ii. 8: "Jesus perceiving in his spirit: *ἐπεγινώκει δὲ Ἰησοῦς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ*," where *πνεῦμα* is used of the noetic function of the soul, and is synonymous with *νοῦς*, which might stand in its place without changing the sense in the least. Matt. viii. 12: "sighing deeply in his spirit"; John xi. 33: "He groaned in the spirit"; and John xiii. 21: "He was troubled in the spirit," all refer to the immaterial side of human nature, to the *ψύχη*, which word might here well be used in place of *πνεῦμα*. I have appended these few references to my discussion of the *σὰρξ* and the *πνεῦμα*, in order to avoid any possibility of misconception.

We have, then, as a result of these discussions, arrived at the conclusion that the man Jesus Christ shared with us, in the fullest manner, our human constitution, both in the

¹ I have to some extent, and with modifications, used the discussion of Vincent, W. S. iii. pp. 74-76, which is very good and clear.

physical and in the psychical life. The Gospels everywhere bear witness to his physical likeness to ourselves, and to the reality of his body, which was not exempt from the weaknesses of the flesh. He was subject to bodily weariness, and to thirst (John iv. 6, 7); he slept in the boat, in the midst of the storm, an indication of great weariness (Matt. viii. 24); he was hungry (Matt. iv. 2; xxi. 19). He was like us also in his soul life: he loved the young ruler who came to him to inquire the way of life (Luke x. 21); he is again and again represented as "sighing," "groaning," or "troubled" in the spirit (Mark viii. 12; John xi. 32; viii. 21); he has mercy on the crowds that throng him (Matt. xiv. 14); he weeps at the grave of Lazarus (John xi. 35); he fiercely denounces the Scribes and Pharisees (Matt. xxiii.). The outcome of the incarnation, then, is a Being who, while he is true God, is at the same time true man; and herein lies the great import of the incarnation for our doctrine. It is the great turning-point in his eternal life of love, the point at which the Son of God, casting aside his pristine glory, and taking unto himself our human nature with all its weaknesses, becomes Son of man, the point at which the *Λόγος ἄσαρκος* becomes *Λόγος ἐνσαρκος*, the point at which the eternally preëxistent Christ enters into the world history as the man Jesus Christ. And this incarnation is in order to the salvation of the world (John iii. 16, *et al.*). Herein lies the eternal significance of the incarnation, that makes it the central doctrine of the Christian faith, and the central point of the history of our race.

ARTICLE IX.

THE TAXATION PROBLEM IN CHICAGO.

BY EDWARD W. BEMIS.

THE writer once heard President Andrews, of Brown University, remark, that of all the reforms tending to increase the beneficial influence of government, the most important would be that of taxation. Whatever may be thought of our methods of raising national revenues, all are agreed that local taxation, by which is meant taxation by states, counties, cities, townships, etc., is in a perfect chaos. Light seems to be breaking, to some extent, in Pennsylvania, and among those who have made a study of the writings of Professors Ely and Seligman on the subject. Nearly all of our States, however, still adhere to the system which worked very well in the early part of the century, but under the changed conditions of the present is rapidly breaking down. In accordance with this system, which once, also, largely prevailed in Europe, nearly all local taxation is raised by a supposedly equal rate of tax on all property, whether land, buildings, horses, cattle, etc., which can be seen by every one, or on stocks, bonds, notes, money, furniture and goods, which can easily be concealed, or whose value it is difficult to estimate. With the growth of wealth, the importance of these latter forms of personal property increases. The opportunity for evasion of taxes, and consequently for an enormous inequality of public burdens between individuals and various social classes, rapidly increases. Cities, possessing a larger proportion of intangible property than the country districts,

escape their proportion of state taxation. Likewise the wealthy conceal a larger proportion of their possessions than do the middle classes. The poor may pay no taxes directly; but, through increased rents and other expenses of living, they too are unequally burdened.

If to this common evil of American local taxation there is added almost equal inequality in the assessment of real estate, as is conspicuously true in Illinois, universal demoralization prevails. Ideas of justice and fair play are obscured, and business men of ordinary and even extraordinary character vie with one another in so corrupting the assessor as to secure ridiculously low and unequal valuations.

When the various townships now forming Chicago were united to it, they retained their local assessors; so that there are now over half a dozen different taxation districts which assess property independently of each other. The assessment must be made in May and June, which is too short a time for any careful study of valuations. To be an assessor for two years establishes one's financial credit ever afterward. The assessor's subordinates in the different sections of the city are appointed under the spoils system. There is no permanent board of review, and very little time is given to the county commissioners to readjust values. Under this system it is quite common for an assessor to be bribed directly to make an unjustly low assessment, or for him to make an unduly high assessment, in order to reduce it for a consideration. Even more common is it for a cheap grade of lawyers and hangers-on of the assessors' offices to approach a heavy taxpayer, and offer to get the assessment reduced, in return for a certain percentage of the taxes thereby saved to the individual.

During the present summer, Mr. Z. Swift Holbrook, of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, has organized the Taxpayers' Defense League, in order to bring an organized and legitimate

pressure upon assessing bodies, so as to reduce those assessments that were higher than the average. That the public, however, might not be deprived of any revenue, the League attempts to ascertain many properties that are assessed too low, and get their assessment raised, either through appealing to their fear of public condemnation, if too low assessments are published, or through giving information privately to the county commissioners, which would induce them to investigate the justice of a higher assessment upon practically exempt property. It should be here explained that the competition of each district of the State and city to keep down its proportion of State taxes has led to a continued reduction in the ratio of assessment to true value, until to-day real estate is assessed in the heart of Chicago for only about one-tenth of its market value.

In order to secure the necessary public revenue, the rate of taxation has been raised, from time to time, until the aggregate of the taxes for all local purposes amounts to about ten per cent of the assessed value in the business districts of Chicago, and about one per cent of the true value.

Although the law requires the assessment to be at the "fair cash value," there are no penalties for violation, and every one is under enormous temptation to avoid a truthful return of his property, lest the taxes be more than the income which could be obtained from it.

A man, to be sure, may make a truthful return of his property, and still insist upon its assessment at even one-tenth of its value, if he can show that surrounding properties are assessed on about the same basis, but it takes so much money to fight such a contention through the courts, that unless aided by a strong organization such as Mr. Holbrook has created, few have hitherto cared to undertake it.

A few instances given freely at random from the material in Mr. Holbrook's office, on condition that no names would be used, will furnish some remarkable evidences of the iniquitous and demoralizing results of an unreformed tax system.

The following shows the assessments upon the Chicago banks as compiled by the League from data in its possession :—

NAME.	CAPITAL.	SURPLUS & PROFITS.	TAXED.	PER CT.
First.....	\$3,000,000	\$2,152,274	\$770,400	14.9
Fort Dearborn.....	500,000	106,528	87,900	14.5
America.....	1,000,000	231,359	175,000	14.2
Northwestern.....	1,000,000	518,073	215,000	14.1
Republic.....	1,000,000	128,254	160,000	14.1
Commercial.....	1,000,000	1,155,957	300,000	13.9
Hide and Leather...	300,000	74,701	50,000	13.3
Union.....	2,000,000	235,204	270,000	12.0
Corn Exchange.....	1,000,000	1,144,095	145,000	12.7
Continental.....	2,000,000	485,047	300,000	12.0
Globe.....	1,000,000	78,528	130,000	12.0
Chicago.....	500,000	600,688	130,000	11.8
Merchants'.....	1,000,000	1,604,882	300,000	11.5
Bankers'.....	1,000,000	124,407	120,000	10.6
Home.....	250,000	185,273	40,500	10.7
Metropolitan.....	2,000,000	1,106,450	325,000	10.4
Royal.....	500,000	176,870	67,700	10.0
Illinois Trust & Savings.....	2,000,000	2,581,353	458,000	10.0
State Bank of Chicago.....	500,000	246,495	60,000	9.5
American Exchange	1,000,000	236,760	115,000	9.3
Drovers'.....	250,000	137,661	31,248	8.3
Western State Bank.	300,000	5,037	10,000	8.3
Chicago City.....	200,000	43,341	6,000	8.1
Live Stock.....	750,000	1,083,602	150,000	8.0
Bank of Commerce..	500,000	38,828	40,000	7.4
Northern Trust Co..	1,000,000	682,257	120,000	7.1
American Trust....	1,000,000	102,660	75,000	6.8
Garden City.....	500,000	94,957	40,000	6.7
Commercial Loan & Trust.....	500,000	101,314	40,000	6.6
Merchants Loan & Trust.....	2,000,000	1,439,667	200,000	5.8
Hibernian.....	222,000	346,944	30,000	5.3
First (Englewood)..	100,000	14,630	5,000	4.3
International.....	500,000	254,928	30,000	4.0
Lincoln.....	200,000	13,825	8,000	3.7
Foreman Bros.' Bank- ing Co.....	500,000	522,012	35,000	3.4
Union Trust Co....	500,000	982,431	50,000	3.4

NAME.	CAPITAL.	SURPLUS & PROFITS.	TAXED.	PER CT.
Milwaukee Avenue State.....	250,000	103,781	10,000	2.8
Homestead Loan & Trust.....	447,000	48,647	Not assessed	
Prairie State Bank..	200,000	63,771	25,000	9.5
Bank of Nova Scotia			40,000	
West Side Bank....	50,000	2,763	Not assessed	
Bank of Montreal..			200,000	

A jewelry firm rated by Bradstreets at over half a million dollars, is assessed for \$12,500. A famous trust rated at over a million dollars is not assessed at all on its personal property, while one of the greatest corporations in the world is assessed at only \$60,000. A gentleman rated by Bradstreets at over half a million dollars, and who has a library worth \$40,000, and horses, carriages, and furniture worth over \$20,000, besides a private yacht and other evidences of wealth, is assessed at \$200, while a poor woman comes with tears in her eyes to the Taxpayers' Defense League, and says that, though hardly able to have any carpets upon her floors, her assessment had been raised from \$200 to \$1000. Would it be much wonder if she became an anarchist?

One of the largest makers of sweat-shop clothing in the country, though rated at over a million dollars, is not assessed on a single cent of personal property. One of the largest manufacturers of billiard goods and office furniture, with a capital stock of \$1,500,000 besides a surplus, is assessed only \$3000 on personal property at the store, and \$2500 on property at the factory. A famous dock company is not reached at all by the assessor. In all this, be it remembered that reference is made only to personal property; but this, in the case of most large corporations, or wealthy men, must include fully half of the property. Government bonds, to be sure, are exempt, except in the case of national banks, where the bonds secure the circulation, and a man may deduct from his accounts and bills receivable any accounts and bills payable, but there remains the

large excess of credits over debts, together with many bank deposits, goods in stock, bonds other than Government, furniture, jewelry, horses, carriages, etc. Yet we have a great Chicago corporation which early in August went into a great trust on a capitalization of \$6,500,000, but which has been assessed this year on personal property at only \$80,000. In view of the high rate of tax and the average assessment on other business property, it may be assumed that the property should now be assessed at much over one-tenth of its value, but here we have properties assessed at less than one-thirtieth of their value, and some, indeed, not assessed at all. Mr. Holbrook has discovered, for example, that one of the largest wheat-brokers of the country, rated by Bradstreets as worth millions of dollars, is assessed at his office for \$2500, and nothing on personal property at his home. The assessor, for some reason best known to himself, likewise failed to find a dollar of personal property in the possession of one of the largest packing-houses in the world, while one of the mammoth harvesting companies, known to every one, escapes with \$47,100. One of the largest grocery firms on the continent was assessed this year for \$50,000, while another no larger was assessed for \$750,000. Agents from the assessor's office agreed to reduce it to about \$50,000 if they could have a \$5000 commission. The firm refused to bribe, and all their efforts in a legitimate way could bring the assessment down only to \$95,000, or twice the assessment of the rival firm. Another dealer in the same line, rated at over \$1,000,000, was assessed at \$10,000; a very wealthy banker and coal merchant, who is able to spend \$13,000 for a rare Bible, and thousands of dollars for art, is assessed at his office at \$400 of personal property, while the assessor finds nothing whatever at his home.

Mr. Holbrook is filing a petition to the county commissioners as this is written, stating that when the president

of one of the largest gas companies died recently, over 1,000,000 of personal property passed through the Probate Court, but the assessor was able to find the magnitude of \$750; while the son who inherits the bulk of the property is thought by the present assessor to be worth less than \$500, and so appears on the list, although the stable and horses alone are worth over \$25,000.

One of the largest and most profitable of the department stores, making fully \$1,000,000 a year of profit, and having probably \$2,000,000 of stock, is assessed at \$100,000. Another equally large department store is assessed for \$250,000, and a third for \$25,000, although this third store is rated at over \$500,000.

It has already been noticed how considerate the assessor has been persuaded to be towards our great trusts. In the evidence may be mentioned, that of one of the world's oil trusts—apart from the Standard. The correct question does not appear in the books of the assessors—whether it was because the latter himself struggled, or not, is not in evidence.

A certain banker, rated by Bradstreets among the millionaires, is assessed at \$1200, or less than one per cent of his personal property; while a poor woman, Mrs. [Name], is assessed on her real estate at twenty-three per cent of value. The question naturally arises, How long can there be any respect for government or law if these things are allowed to continue?

A fruit house, worth over a million dollars, the largest of its kind in the city, is assessed on its personal property at only \$500, while a man too busy and poor to have time to work in order to make complaint, was assessed for his property at \$700, as his wife, in deepest distress, has already described. One of the most famous of bicycles in the country is assessed at \$3000, a not so famous, is assessed at five times as much.

brewing company, rated at over a half million dollars, is assessed at only \$1500, while a candy manufacturer, well known throughout the land, is assessed for \$400. A millionaire corporation of brokers, known wherever bonds are bought and sold, was not discovered by the assessor at all, although the year before, this public official had found no difficulty in finding them in their elegant offices. When this firm was informed by the League that its personal property was not assessed, they first denied and then defended this oversight; but, rather than allow an investigation, authorized Mr. Holbrook to convey to the proper authorities their willingness to be assessed for \$25,000.

As one runs over the list of this assessed and personal property, attention is drawn to fully a dozen other cases of complete oversight, by the assessor, in the case of persons and corporations rated at from \$400,000 upward. Here is, for example, a large firm handling leaf tobacco, another dealing in stocks, grains, and provisions, another a large manufacturer of sausages, a famous banking firm, a well-known manufacturer of flour, another large banking firm, an important maker of clothing, a large maker of electric supplies, and a large private banker,—all of whom are found by the assessor to be so very poor that he is unable to discover a cent of personal property in their possession.

Here, too, is a great coal dealer, rated at over \$400,000, in whose possession the assessor finds only \$250. A prominent hotel, whose bar fixtures alone cost over \$35,000, is assessed at only \$1200. The largest iron jobbers in the city, rated at over \$1,000,000, have had such a hypnotic influence on the assessor (their iron, perhaps, having entered his soul) that he can discover only \$200 of their personal property. A large dealer in furniture and other household supplies, rated at over \$500,000, is assessed at \$8000, while a manufacturer and dealer in school supplies, whose manager lately told of \$40,000 of bills receivable, to say noth-

ing of other personal property, and who is rated at over \$500,000, gets off with an assessment of \$1600. An enormous publishing company, rated at over \$1,000,000, has been still more persuasive with the assessor, so that only \$150 of personal property was discovered, and a dealer in drugs, rated at between \$500,000 and \$1,000,000, is assessed at ten times as much, or \$1500, although that is not one-half of one per cent of the true value of his property, and not one-twentieth of what his assessment should be, to conform to the usual rate. It is very noticeable that the names of prominent church-members and "pillars" are found in this infamous list the same as are others. Creed, evidently, does not here coin itself into conduct.

Four prominent banks, including the First National, have retained the Taxpayers' Defense League, on finding that their assessment was over fourteen per cent of their combined capital, surplus, and undivided profits, while many prominent banks were assessed below seven per cent, four being assessed under four per cent, and two others not at all. A year ago, one of the largest banks in the city mysteriously failed to appear in the assessments of personal property.

The advocates of the single tax will assert that in all this there is reason for the entire abolition of personal property taxes, which are so slightly reached in the case of the wealthy, and will point to the fact that from 1873 to 1893 the assessment of personal property in the State, as a whole, declined from \$287,292,809 to \$140,318,403, or 49.42 per cent, while the assessment on real estate declined from \$899,615,952 to \$614,239,040, or 31.72 per cent. In Cook County, which includes Chicago, the decline in assessments of real estate was from \$228,399,663 to \$210,048,322, or 8.91 per cent, while the decline in personal property was from \$55,076,340 to \$39,879,887, or 27.59 per cent, so that personal property in Cook County reached by the assessor

declined from 19.43 per cent of the total assessment in 1873, to 15.96 per cent in 1893, although it is commonly believed by good judges that personal property is fully equal in value to real estate in our large cities.

Without here attempting to review the pros and cons of the abolition of all the direct taxes upon personal property, which of course may be done without substituting therefor a single tax on land values, since buildings, income, inheritance, and licenses furnish great possibilities of revenue, it may be here noticed that even in the assessment of real estate in Illinois, as well as of personal property, there are enormous inequalities and wholesale charges of corruption.

A commission of prominent real estate experts, appointed by Mayor Swift, made a report published in the *Chicago Economist*, April 25, 1896, relative to all the real estate in the business district, bounded on the east by the Lake, on the north and west by the Chicago River, and on the south by Twelfth Street. Exclusive of railroad property and land exempt from taxation, the value of the land was found to be \$337,342,880, and the assessment 7.33 per cent of this. The value of the improvements was returned at \$101,104,300, and the assessment at 15.77 per cent of this. The average assessment on both land and buildings was 9.28 per cent of the true value, although this assessment was afterward raised by the State Board of Equalization for 1895 to 11.1 per cent of this true value.

A careful study of this report of Mayor Swift's Commission has been made in the report of the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics, which the new administration of Governor Tanner is very singularly holding back from publication. This analysis shows that the ratio of assessment to estimated true value, even of real estate in the business district, ranges all the way from 2.37 per cent to 20.1 per cent. The reported rate of assessment in the case of the fifty highest assessed properties of an average value of \$185,969,

was, on the average, 14.39 per cent of this, while the fifty other properties, averaging \$219,438 in estimated value, were assessed 3.68 per cent of that amount. A piece of real estate belonging to the Secretary of the Treasury, Lyman J. Gage, is assessed this year twenty-seven per cent of its real value, while the assessment of both the real estate and personal property of the gas plants and street-car companies of Chicago is less than four per cent of the market value of their securities. A man of very moderate means has to pay \$183 on four vacant lots, while on twenty-one equally valuable adjoining lots on the same street a wealthy citizen pays \$181.

The rate of assessment of 839 pieces of residence and business property, in the residence sections of Chicago, of an average value of \$10,310, was 13.09 per cent of the true value, in 1891-92-93-94, according to the report for 1894 of the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics, as revised by the writer subsequently, at the request of the Bureau, for its next report. This figure of 13.09 per cent, as compared with the average of the business districts of 9.34 per cent, indicates that even were individuals in the business section assessed with perfect fairness as compared with their neighbors, the assessment would still be about one-fourth less than it should be, in comparison with other parts of the city, while there is much evidence tending to prove that assessment in the rest of the State averages fully one-third of the true value of real estate.

Some efforts are being made in Chicago to secure enough of reform to have greater equality of assessment between adjoining pieces of property, but even this very moderate reform could not secure the approval of the last legislature, and the Governor has been quoted, in an interview, as opposed to any special session, so that there is no remedy in sight in that direction for nearly two years.


The State Constitution limits the debts and taxes of

state and local bodies to a certain percentage of the assessed valuation. If the law should provide effective penalties for any assessment under the cash valuation, it is feared that incompetent and corrupt legislative bodies and city councils would greatly increase both taxes and debt, and the people are too much absorbed in money-making to take the pains to secure better government. If the limitation of taxation and indebtedness were lowered to correspond with a full cash assessment of property, the country districts would be unable to carry on their departments of government, because there is so much greater difference between actual and assessed values in the country and in the city. The city thus escapes its share of state and county taxes, an evil which is hard to remedy without entirely separating the sources of state and local revenue. If the State should get all its revenue from income and inheritance and corporation taxes, leaving to local bodies real estate and licenses, there would be no object in one town assessing at a lower rate than its neighbor, unless to keep down its own indebtedness and local taxes in accordance with constitutional limitation, and in proportion to its own inability to govern itself.

Aside from the general desire of all property interests in Chicago to have low assessments, it is generally believed in the city that the majority of influential, wealthy property owners are indifferent or opposed to any reform that will eliminate their opportunity, through intimidation or corrupt control of the assessor, to secure lower rates of assessment than their poorer rivals, and thus save to themselves thousands and hundreds of thousands of dollars yearly that should go to the public. It is very common for these men to claim that intimidation and bribery of the assessor are very distasteful, but necessary in order to avoid unequal burdens as compared with their neighbors. Even the assessor himself tempts to crime, making the State thus

a partner in the vilest iniquity. For example, the head of the Chicago branch of the Bank of Montreal is quoted in the daily press as saying that a lawyer claiming to come from the assessor offered to get its assessments largely reduced in return for a \$4000 fee, and when the bank refused the offer, this go-between offered \$500 to the bank's lawyers to secure their indorsement of the proposition. When, however, the influential people of Chicago, who thus complain, and who are accustomed to secure by purchase or otherwise from legislatures and city councils nearly everything they desire, are appealed to, for the gift of money or influence to help along even the most moderate reforms in either taxation or the granting of franchises, scarcely any response is made. There is more immediate hope from such movements as the 'Taxpayers' League above referred to, which is coming in touch with a large number of unjustly treated taxpayers. This may lead to an organization and agitation sufficient to change matters somewhat, and so relieve the state, county, and city from that direct incitement to bribery and that unjust evasion of public burdens which the present system of taxation induces.

No attempt has been made here to discuss the lines of further reform that must follow. Something will be accomplished if the reader can see how outrageously bad, how naturally destructive to all respect for existing property rights and of law and order, must be the present tax system of Chicago, and in a large degree, it may be added, of almost all our large cities.



RECTO

ARTICLE X.

THE NEW "SAYINGS OF JESUS."¹

BY PROFESSOR G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

HIGH expectations were raised a few months ago by the announcement that Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt, laboring under the patronage of the Egypt Exploration Fund, had discovered at Oxyrhynchus, on the edge of the Libyan desert, one hundred and twenty miles south of Cairo, among other Greek papyri some fragments from a "collection of Logia or Sayings of our Lord." The publication and discussion of the document forms one of the most important literary events of the year.

The fragment consists of a single leaf of papyrus $5\frac{3}{4} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$ inches in present dimension, which has been somewhat abbreviated by the breaking-off of fragments from the bottom and from one side. Opposite is a facsimile of one of the pages; while below is a reproduction of the text as it stands in the original. Restorations are inclosed in square brackets, and dots inside the latter indicate the approximate number of letters lost. Dots outside brackets represent letters of which only illegible traces remain.

¹ ΛΟΓΙΑ ΙΗΣΟΥ, Sayings of our Lord, Discovered and Edited by Bernard P. Grenfell, M.A., and Arthur S. Hunt, M.A. With collotypes. Pp. 20. New York: Henry Frowde. 1897. 50 cents.

Verso.

1A

ΚΑΙ ΤΟΤΕ ΔΙΑΒΛΕΥΕΙΣ
 ΕΚΒΑΛΕΙΝ ΤΟ ΚΑΡΦΟΣ
 ΤΟ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΟΦΘΑΛΜΩ 7
 ΤΟΥ ΑΔΕΛΦΟΥ ΣΟΥ ΛΕΓΕΙ
 5 ἸC ΕΑΝ ΜΗ ΝΗCΤΕΥCΗ
 ΤΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΚΟCΜΟΝ ΟΥ ΜΗ
 ΕΥΡΗΤΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΒΑCΙΛΕΙ
 ΑΝ ΤΟΥ ΘΥ ΚΑΙ ΕΑΝ ΜΗ
 CΑΒΒΑΤΙCΗΤΕ ΤΟ CΑΒ 7
 10 ΒΑΤΟΝ ΟΥΚ ΟΥΕCΘΕ ΤΟ
 ΠΡΑ ΛΕΓΕΙ ἸC Ε[C]ΤΗΝ
 ΕΝ ΜΕCΩ ΤΟΥ ΚΟCΜΟΥ
 ΚΑΙ ΕΝ CΑΡΚΕΙ ΩΦΘΗΝ
 ΑΥΤΟΙC ΚΑΙ ΕΥΡΟΝ ΠΑΝ
 15 ΤΑC ΜΕΘΥΟΝΤΑC ΚΑΙ
 ΟΥΔΕΝΑ ΕΥΡΟΝ ΔΕΙΨΩ
 ΤΑ ΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΙC ΚΑΙ ΠΟ 7
 4 ΝΕΙ Η ΨΥΧΗ ΜΟΥ ΕΠΙ 7
 ΤΟΙC ΥΙΟΙC ΤΩΝ ΑΝΩΝ
 20 ΟΤΙ ΤΥΦΛΟΙ ΕΙCΙΝ ΤΗ ΚΑΡ
 ΔΙΑ ΑΥΤΩ[N] ΚΑΙ . . ΒΛΕΙC

Recto.

- 22 [...]...[. Τ]ΗΝ ΠΤΩΧΙΑ
[ΛΕΓ]ΕΙ [Γ̄ ΟΠ]ΟΥ ΕΑΝ ΩΣΙΝ
[...]Ε[...]... ΘΕΟΙ ΚΑΙ
25 [...]ÇΦ . Ε[...] ΕΣΤΙΝ ΜΟΝΟΣ
[...]ΤΩ ΕΓΩ ΕΙΜΙ ΜΕΤ ΑΥ
Τ[ΟΥ] ΕΓΕΙ[Ρ]ΟΝ ΤΟΝ ΑΙΘ̄
ΚΑΚΕΙ ΕΥΡΗΣΕΙΣ ΜΕ
ΣΧΙΣΟΝ ΤΟ ΞΥΛΟΝ ΚΑΓΩ
30 ΕΚΕΙ ΕΙΜΙ ΛΕΓΕΙ Γ̄ ΟΥ
Κ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΔΕΚΤΟΣ ΠΡΟ
ΦΗΤΗΣ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΠΡΙΔΙ ΑΥ
Τ[ΟΥ] ΟΥΔΕ ΙΑΤΡΟΣ ΠΟΙΕΙ
ΘΕΡΑΠΕΙΑΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΥÇ
35 ΓΕΙΝΩΣΚΟΝΤΑΣ ΑΥΤ̄
ΛΕΓΕΙ Γ̄ ΠΟΛΙΣ ΟΙΚΟΔΟ
ΜΗΜΕΝΗ ΕΠ ΑΚΡΟΝ
[Ο]ΡΟΥÇ ΥΨΗΛΟΥÇ ΚΑΙ ΕΣ
ΤΗΡΙΓΜΕΝΗ ΟΥΤΕ ΠΕ
40 [C]ΕΙΝ ΔΥΝΑΤΑΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΚΡΥ
[Β]ΗΝΑΙ ΛΕΓΕΙ Γ̄ ΑΚΟΥΕΙΣ
[.]ΙCΤΟΞ... ΤΙΟΝ CΟΥ Τ̄
- •

1.] καὶ τότε διαβλεψαίς ἐκβαλεῖν τὸ κάρφος τὸ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ σου.

“ . . . and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote that is in thy brother's eye.”

2 Λέγει Ἰησοῦς, ἐὰν μὴ νηστεύσητε τὸν κόσμον οὐ μὴ εὕρητε τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ σαββατίσητε τὸ σάββατον οὐκ ὄψεσθε τὸν πατέρα.

“ Jesus saith, Except ye fast to the world, ye shall in no wise find the kingdom of God; and except ye keep the Sabbath, ye shall not see the Father.”

3. Λέγει Ἰησοῦς, ἔ[σ]την ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ ὤφθην αὐτοῖς, καὶ εὗρον πάντας μεθύοντας, καὶ οὐδένα εὗρον διψῶντα ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ πονεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἐπὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τυφλοὶ εἰσιν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῷ[ν]. . .

“ Jesus saith, I stood in the midst of the world, and in the flesh was I seen of them, and I found all men drunken, and none found I athirst among them, and my soul grieveth over the sons of men, because they are blind in their heart. . . .”

4. [. . . .] . . [. τ] ἦν πτωχεῖαν.

“ poverty”

5. [λέγ]ει [Ἰησοῦς, ὅπ]ου ἐὰν ὦσιν [. . . .] ἐ [. . . .] . . θεοὶ καὶ [. .] σο . ἐ [. .] ἐστὶν μόνος [. .] τῷ ἐγὼ εἰμι μετ' αὐτ[οῦ]· ἔγει[ρ]ον τὸν ἑλῖθον κακεὶ εὐρήσεις με, σχίσον τὸ ξύλον καγὼ ἐκεῖ εἰμί.

“ Jesus saith, Wherever there are . . . and there is one . . . alone, I am with him. Raise the stone and there thou shalt find me, cleave the wood and there am I.”

6. Λέγει Ἰησοῦς, οὐκ ἔστιν δεκτὸς προφήτης ἐν τῇ πατρίδι αὐτ[οῦ], οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς ποιεῖ θεραπείας εἰς τοὺς γινώσκοντας αὐτόν.

“ Jesus saith, A prophet is not acceptable in his own country, neither doth a physician work cures upon them that know him.”

7. Λέγει Ἰησοῦς, πόλις ὠκοδομημένη ἐπ' ἄκρον [ῥ]ους ὑψηλοῦ καὶ ἐστηριμένη οὔτε πε[σ]εῖν δύναται οὔτε κρυ[β]ῆναι.

“ Jesus saith, A city built upon the top of a high hill, and stablished, can neither fall nor be hid.”

The papyrus was in book form, and was found in "a mound which produced a great number of papyri belonging to the first three centuries of our era, those in the immediate vicinity of the fragment belonging to the second and third centuries. This fact, together with the evidence of the handwriting, which has a characteristically Roman aspect, fixes with certainty 300 A.D. as the lowest limit for the date at which the papyrus was written. The general probabilities of the case, the presence of the usual contractions found in biblical MSS., and the fact that the papyrus was in book, not roll, form, put the first century out of the question, and make the first half of the second unlikely. The date therefore probably falls within the period 150-300 A.D. More than that cannot be said with any approach to certainty. Any attempt to distinguish between second and third century uncials is, in the present paucity of dated material, extremely precarious."¹

In reference to the title given to the fragment by the discoverers, it should be noted that this is not a part of the document itself, but is an interpretation which they impose upon it. Each section does indeed begin with "Jesus says" (λέγει Ἰησοῦς); but it is by no means certain that the word λόγιον, either in the New Testament or in the early church fathers, was limited to mere sayings of Christ. For them λόγοι would have been more appropriate. The classical meaning of *Logion* is "oracle," having a much broader reference than to the simple words proceeding from a teacher's mouth; and such seems to be its meaning in the four passages in the New Testament where it occurs, namely, Acts vii. 38; Rom. iii. 2; Heb. v. 12; 1 Pet. iv. 11. Romans iii. 2 is especially significant, where the apostle speaks of it as one of the special privileges of the Jews that to them "were committed the oracles [λόγια] of God." It cannot well be maintained that the word oracle here refers

¹ Sayings of our Lord, p. 5.

simply to the direct sayings of God. It must include the whole Old Testament literature, including the history. Among other things which make this evident is, as pointed out by Salmond, the abundant use of the history by Paul.

It is probable, therefore, that Papias used the word in its comprehensive, classical, and New Testament significance; as did the apostolic fathers in general and other Jewish writers like Philo. Hence it seems most likely that when Papias says, that "Matthew wrote the oracles [*τὰ λόγια*] in Hebrew, and each one interpreted them as he could,"¹ he was referring to the entire Gospel of Matthew, which he recognized as on an equality with the sacred books of the Old Testament. Our authors, however, are careful to say that they do not suppose this fragment to have "any actual connection either with the Hebrew Logia of St. Matthew or the *λόγια κυριακά* of Papias,"² upon which he is said to have commented. All that they feel free to suppose is that the fragment belongs to one of the many independent collections of our Lord's sayings which they believe to have been current from the beginning.

That there were numerous attempts to write partial or complete biographies of Jesus while his contemporaries were still living, is altogether probable. Indeed, the fact is clearly stated in the introduction to the third Gospel, which informs us that "many have taken in hand to draw up a narrative concerning those matters which have been fulfilled among us." The same writer in his introduction to the Acts refers to the former treatise as relating to "all that Jesus began both to do and to teach," which might seem to imply that there had been a distinction between the narratives relating to his acts and those recounting the words of our Lord.

The most important question respecting the present fragment concerns its relation to the canonical Gospels. Does

¹ Eusebius, H. E. iii. 39.

² Sayings of our Lord, p. 18.

it bear marks of an independent origin, or is it an expansion and modification of material already incorporated in the Gospels? Upon this question there is much to be said upon both sides. The fact that these Sayings are introduced by the recurring phrase "Jesus says" certainly is in favor of their having been collected at a very early date; for it seems to have been very rarely the case that in later times our Lord was designated by the simple word "Jesus," while the present tense is more natural in a contemporary document. A fruitful suggestion is made by Rev. Henry A. Redpath, in the *Expositor* for September, to the effect, that this fragment may be from "some apocryphal Gospel claiming to give a sort of *procès verbal* of the indictment or evidence used at the trial of Christ before the Jewish authorities, in much the same way as the trials of the early Christians before the heathen tribunal were officially recorded. . . . We know that the last witnesses called at the trial misrepresented what our Lord had said, but did not actually invent charges against him. This fragment might then be taken to represent some of the previous evidence" (pp. 228-229). Color is given to this view from the facts pointed out by Professor Redpath, that the Sayings of the fragment are all in some way connected with utterances in the four canonical Gospels, and that the Sayings in general are such as would irritate the Jewish authorities. The Second Saying contains the offensive phrase "the Father." The Third Saying would make an impression clearly in the line of John vii. 37 and ix. 41. The Fifth Saying, on Harnack's interpretation and reference given below, would have seemed to the Jews a misquotation from their canonical Scriptures; while the Sixth Saying would irritate their pride in the highest degree by its exaltation of the disciples of Jesus. But the general question can be best discussed as we consider the sections in detail.

The First Saying agrees exactly with Luke vi. 42, and so has no bearing upon the question.

The Second Saying is new and peculiar, and, unless a bold, figurative sense can be given to it, is decidedly out of analogy with the general teaching of our Lord and of his apostles. The reasoning of Professor Thayer upon this point must commend itself to the final judgment of all. After remarking that in its mystical cast the Saying bears clear marks of its derivative and secondary character, he goes on to say:—

“The unexplained use of bold phraseology, such as appears in this Second Saying, implies an anterior educative process in the readers. The accredited teaching of Jesus respecting fasting and the Sabbath, corroborated as that teaching is by the very genius of primitive Christianity as set forth in the apostolical writings, excludes the supposition that the fasting and Sabbath-keeping here enjoined are to be understood literally. The Saying, therefore, in both its parts is doubtless to be taken spiritually. The term ‘world’ in its ethical sense of ‘that which is antagonistic to God’ became current early, as the writings of John, Paul, James, Peter show. But the novel phrases ‘Fast [i. e., abstain from] the world,’ ‘sabbatize the Sabbath’ [i. e., make it a veritable spiritual rest-day] imply a somewhat general antecedent training to warrant their employment as a summary of the teaching of Christ, or even to render them quite intelligible. Furthermore, according to usage in Jewish circles, the second phrase would primarily suggest the outward observance of the Sabbath, and even the circle of Christians for whom Ignatius speaks, early in the second century, could say, ‘We do not sabbatize.’”¹

The Third Saying has the appearance, also, of a late adaptation, rather than of an original saying, especially in

¹ See the Independent for August 12, 1897, p. 16.

the use of the past tenses in the first half. In the last half, however, the present tenses appear, as would be more appropriate in a contemporary document. But some of the phrases appear, as Professor Thayer points out, to be again, mere "verbal echoes" from various portions of the New Testament. "Was seen in the flesh" is identical with 1 Tim. iii. 10; "drunken," with Matt. xxiv. 49; "thirst," with Rev. xxi. 6; xxii. 17, etc. The general tenor of the Saying is like that of John i. 10. The authors, however, suggest that the beginning of the first clause of the Saying was "probably suggested by Baruch iii. 38—a passage which was applied by several of the early fathers to Christ's supposed sojourn upon the earth. Cf. Irenæus, *adv. Haer.* iv. 20; Cyprian, *Testim.* ii. 6" (p. 12).

Saying 4 is too defective to be of any value.

Saying 5 in its first and defective part seems clearly to have been parallel with Matt. xviii. 20. Whether the last clause gives expression to the pantheistic Gnosticism which connected itself with some sections of Christianity at an early date, or whether it is a genuine saying involving a bold figurative use of sacrificial ceremonies, admits of question. If the latter view be correct, it would point rather to modification by Jewish Christians. Perhaps, however, it is simply an echo of some of the fantastic applications of prophecy which abounded in the second century. In Hab. ii. 11, 19, we are told that the stones shall cry out of the wall, and the beam out of the timber shall answer it," and "Woe unto him who sayeth unto wood, Awake, and to the dumb stone, Arise, it shall teach." A natural enough meaning, however, is found when we take it as glorifying the homely duties of life. As Christ ennobles the gift of a cup of cold water only, so here it may be said he ennobles the work of those who hew wood and draw water. Thus viewed, there is nothing in it out of harmony with the general teachings of Jesus, nor is there any substantial ad-

dition in it to what we already have. This accords with the suggestion of Harnack,¹ that the source of the latter part of this Saying is Eccl. x. 9, "Whoso heweth out (or moveth) stones shall be hurt therewith; and he that cleaveth wood is endangered thereby." In this case the work of Christ in hallowing everyday employments would constitute a part of the striking contrast between the law and the gospel.

Some light is perhaps shed on the origin of this Saying by a fact pointed out by Mr. H. C. Leonard in the *London Guardian* that Ephraem Syrus, in his Commentary upon Tatian's Diatessaron,² expands Matt. xviii. 20 into a form something like that which appears in this Saying. Ephraem says that he (Jesus) comforted them in his saying, "Where one is, there I also am; and where two are, there will I also be." In the Diatessaron, however, the passage corresponds with that in Matthew. Still, the correspondence in Ephraem's commentaries lends some countenance to Mr. Leonard's suggestion that this fragment may be from some of Tatian's lost works whose views are known to be strikingly like some of the most peculiar of those found in this fragment. Tatian, for example, was ascetic, abstaining from meat and wine, and denouncing marriage, of which we are reminded in the exhortation of the Second Saying to fast to the world. For in the eleventh chapter of Tatian's address to the Greeks he exclaims, "Why are you fated to grasp at things often and often to die? *Die to the world*, repudiating the madness that is in it. Live to God, and by apprehending him lay aside your old nature." In all this, however, we have but another form of expressing the idea put forth by Paul when he tells us to crucify the flesh, to put off the old man, and represents

¹Über die jüngst entdeckten Sprüche Jesu.

²See Moesinger, 165.

ing themselves to be dead unto sin.

In the Sixth Saying we have, in addition to the familiar passage in Luke, "No prophet is acceptable in his own country" (with Luke's peculiar *δεσπότης* instead of Matthew's *ἄτιμος*), the parallel clause "Neither doth a physician work cures upon them that know him." While there certainly is nothing intrinsically improbable in this having been uttered by Christ, neither is there anything particularly valuable in the addition. The compilers of the Gospels did not show bad sense in omitting it if they had it before them.

The Seventh Saying certainly obscures the figure in Matt. v. 14 by mixing two diverse conceptions. That a city set on a hill cannot be hid is forcible enough, but that a city established on the top of a high hill cannot fall does not so forcibly express the idea as does the conception of a house builded on a rock. The passage is certainly out of analogy with the corresponding passages in the canonical Gospels. It has the weakness of a secondary modification.

Upon the all-important question, whether from such discoveries as this of Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt, light is likely to break forth in sufficient abundance materially to modify the conception of Christ and his teachings which we already have, we can do no better than commend the careful words of Professor J. H. Ropes, of Harvard Divinity School, whose recent studies concerning the so-called *agrapha*, or Sayings of Christ found outside of the canonical Gospels, give special weight to his conclusions:—

"The question that springs to the mind of every one, especially when such a discovery as these 'Logia Jesu' is put into one's hands, is whether new light is about to break on the gospel traditions, whether the little region of our knowledge is to be enlarged by new traditions carried by missionaries to Egypt and there loyally repeated and at last written down, or from books brought perhaps from remote spots in Palestine or Asia Minor by Egyptian travelers and kept as doubtful treasures in some dusty

library in a city up the Nile. If Papias should be found, the direct tradition that he preserved would probably be found to have been excerpted by Eusebius, who was in the habit of substantially exhausting the information of his authorities. His value would come from the more searching methods of our historical science, which draws inferences where the ancients only extracted positive statements. But such a discovery as this leaf of words which 'Jesus saith' opens larger possibilities. Perhaps these are genuine, perhaps some of the ten preceding leaves of the mutilated book may contain more and may yet be found. May it be that the Gospels are in danger of being superseded by these newcomers, or, to put it more reasonably, that our idea of our Lord could be considerably modified by some new knowledge?

"It may be confidently replied that this is wholly unlikely. It is probable that the canonical Gospels have preserved practically all the tradition of the evangelical history which came beyond the borders of Palestine at all. The writers of the second, third, and fourth centuries were profoundly interested in all that could be learned of the life of Christ. They occasionally mention extra-canonical sayings that they have picked up here and there, and reverence for the Gospels does not prevent them from transmitting such. But of these all that can possibly be thought genuine do not amount to twenty, and no one of them is sure enough or important enough to change our conception of Jesus and his teaching. One gets strongly the impression from studying these remains that the work of the writers of our Gospels, the laboriousness of which we seldom realize, was done with a thoroughness which practically exhausted the sources of knowledge at their disposal. We have, doubtless, not indeed a complete account of Jesus' teaching, but yet a complete account of the topics on which he taught and of the ideas which he most emphasized.

"And it is further to be noted that outside tradition can seldom or never have such certainty as that contained in the Gospels of the New Testament. Our reliance on them depends partly on their early date, now well ascertained, but also on the guarantee of the Catholic Church. They contain the history as those churches which had heard the apostles preach received it. They were accepted because they offered not new tradition but old, and the writers were in a sense the agents of the churches. The perpetual tradition of the church accredits them as it does not any other documents whatever. But the final test must be the consistency and intelligibility of the account of Jesus and his teaching which the Gospels furnish. The real difficulty with all such tradition as these Logia, or the other extra-canonical sayings of Jesus that have been collected, is that they lack the support which in a large mass of material the several parts give to one another, and that they have no context to make them intelligible. No one can tell what surprises may be in store, but of rivals to the Gospels there can be no question, and of valuable direct light on the life of our Lord there can be comparatively little hope. Indirect light, ancient documents which will make clearer to us the conditions in which our Gospels were written and how they were collected, and information about the complex life of the early church, we may hope for in considerable abundance."¹

¹ See *The Congregationalist* for August 19, 1897, pp. 253-254.

ARTICLE XI.

CRITICAL NOTE.

LEIBNITZ'S PLACE IN PHILOSOPHY.

FOR depth and originality of thought united with clearness of expression, no thinker, except Plato and Shakespeare, can rank with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz. He was more learned than either, even making allowance for the eras in which these lived. Indeed, for breadth and exactitude of his derived knowledge, Aristotle is his only superior; while Gladstone, Whewell, and Pascal may alone be considered his peers. In the influence which he has had on thought no philosopher since the Revival of Learning has been so suggestive in so many directions. There was no matter relating to physics, philosophy, or religion, which did not at some time occupy his absorbed attention, and be enriched by his grasp of thought which to ordinary minds seemed intuitive and akin to omniscience. He passed rapidly from subject to subject, but for a brief period gave his powers with concentrated force to the matter in hand. He had the faculty, rare among *polymaths*, of absorbed attention, amid the most varied and distracting cares, while engaged on any subject, and then of turning at once to another wholly different with like concentrated intensity. Hence he could not be justly called desultory, though he did not give enough time to any one line of investigation to do his powers full justice. It was a misfortune for the world of philosophy that he did not dwell longer on a select few of those metaphysical problems which always confront us, and embody his speculations in a system. For had he given his life to such a work, we can easily believe that it would have surpassed any other that has ever been elaborated. But he spent his long literary activity in sowing seed-thoughts which have found their way—generally without acknowledgment—into the works of every great writer who has lived since his day. Possibly he did not wish to construct a system or found a school; preferring, like Schleiermacher, who resembled him in so many characteristics, to throw out suggestions which should be seed-corn adapted to take root and bear fruit in every age and soil.

There is nothing stranger in the history of great authors than the fate of Leibnitz's writings. Much of his work has been before the world more than two centuries, and all of it nearly that long, and yet no adequate edition of the whole has been published. The cause for this is not apparent, but probably arises from the fact that no one is able to edit

properly the work of an extraordinary genius. For the ability to do this would make the editor on a par with the author himself; and if so he would prefer to do original and independent work. True it is in Leibnitz's case there has been no complete edition of his writings, despite the fact that they are acknowledged to be of transcendent importance, and are referred to constantly by all who touch upon any of the multifarious subjects which he treated. The editions of Raspe and Dutens are confessedly incomplete, and have little value for settling the text. Nor are they furnished with adequate critical helps for understanding the allusions of the author to other writers. The edition of Erdmann was by a competent editor; but he contented himself with the bare text, without illustration. The new work of Gerhardt is a great advance over all that had been previously done. We here have a correct text, valuable prolegomena, and many critical notes on the portions embraced in this edition. But this, though extended to seven volumes, embraces only the philosophical works, and is not intended to be complete—containing not half of Leibnitz's writings. An edition of the complete works is likely to remain a desideratum for a long time to come.

The great awakening in philosophical studies connected with the centennial of Kant is shown in a profuse crop of literature which bears marks of originality, but still more in critical editions of authors who have exerted wide influence on human thought. Much has been done in England of great value in editorial work. The translation of Kant's "Kritik" by Müller; the editions of Hume, Locke, and Berkeley, may be mentioned. In our own country, while the undertaking has not been so pretentious, yet it has been as well done in its reach, which has been confined to separate treatises. The first notable work in this line was by Krauth on Berkeley's "Principles of Knowledge." In the same connection we should speak of the admirable translation of Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy" by the lamented Morris; Schwegler's "History by Seelye"—both achievements of the highest order of ability. These have been followed in these last five years by so much that is good that we can only specify Windelband's History of Philosophy, by Tufts, Weber's, by Thilly; the translations of several philosophical treatises by Harris, and Duncan; followed lastly by the book which we are now considering. The recent edition of the New Essays by Langley¹ meets a want that has been keenly felt by all English philosophers who are interested in the great work of Locke. For this gave an impetus to speculative thought which has scarcely been equaled by any single treatise in the language. In fact, Locke's Essay was a quickening power not confined to England, but was quickly felt throughout the world of speculative thought. Its influence for good, as an awakening note, was felt by many who did not accept the author's views. Its tendency was too materialistic for the genius of the English people; and the inferences drawn from its doctrines,

¹ See *supra*, p. 593.

ments which were employed by materialists; and bore their true fruit in Hume's agnosticism and the French infidelity of D'Holbach and La Mettrie. While this tendency was perceived and partly corrected by Berkeley, it was reserved for Leibnitz to grapple with its materialism directly, and avowedly with the purpose for its overthrow. As Locke's cardinal doctrine was that there are no Innate Ideas, but all come through sensation, which gives the data on which Reflection works, it was an easy, and in deed an inevitable step, that the senses furnish all our knowledge by mechanical causation. For they are material instruments and work on material objects in order to produce knowledge, and therefore the mind is only an assumed instrument for their expression. It develops as they increase in power; it decays with their decay; and therefore has no independent personality or existence. Leibnitz saw this to be the legitimate result of Locke's theory even before Hume or other materialists developed its consequences, and determined to meet and check this formidable error. In his "Nouveaux Essais" he controverts successfully every point in Locke's system, which, either by fair interpretation or by wresting its meaning, as was done by Hume and the French agnostics, could lead to materialism. He shows his marvelous power in this masterpiece of his speculation on almost every page, and especially his genius to seize, as by intuition, that which is the essential idea in a disputed matter. It is doubtful if ever there was more argument contained in a whole chapter of any book of controversial writing than Leibnitz wielded by the use of three words. In the celebrated utterance, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*, which summed up the arguments of materialism, he saw instinctively the error, and as deftly brushed it away as my Uncle Toby did the bluebottle-fly which disturbed his afternoon siesta. By the addition of the words *nisi intellectus ipse*, which appeals to the common-sense of mankind, the brocard is torn from the gown of materialism, and with it all the specious ignorance which covered its naked deformity. By this significant addition he showed that there could not be anything in the intellect if it did not itself exist; and having no prior existence it could not be the instrument to receive and elaborate the testimony of the senses. The whole mass of sophistry which materialists had gathered to prove that they had no minds is rendered harmless in this retort of genius; and the intellect, the spiritual nature, is shown to be the independent factor to which the senses must report, and to which they must yield obedience. Without this the information furnished by the senses could neither be interpreted nor find expression. As we see this addition of three words cut the Gordian knot of Sensational Philosophy, we wonder how any one could have failed to perceive that which is so obvious as soon as genius strikes the electric spark.

While the overthrow of the materialistic tendencies of Locke's Essay is the service for which Leibnitz gets the most credit, there are many

other doctrines of the New Essays which are of first-rate importance in Philosophy. He contends as strenuously as Aristotle did,¹ that there are first truths which cannot be the result of experience, but are native to mathematical axioms which have their counterparts in the first truths or assumptions which are employed in every domain of knowledge, are the product of the mind acting through its own native powers. It must of the mind; that these truths, such as the principle of contradiction and the necessity be true that all universal principles arise in this way, since no amount of experience could lead to what is more than probable; and so, if there are no innate ideas as regulative principles for the intellect to guide its own action, there could be no science whatever.

Hence it is clear why Leibnitz thought that all subjects of human inquiry, resting as they do on the ultimate data of *a priori* truths, could be demonstrated; and therefore mathematics really has in this respect no exclusive prerogative. This view has been held by some of the greatest thinkers in all ages; and, while often derided as visionary, has the power of an endless life; and it appears to us that by his clear treatment of this doctrine Leibnitz rendered his most valuable service to philosophy. No man ever lived who had a better right to be heard when he enunciated his views on any subject which required depth and clearness of intellect wielding universal knowledge. The application of the mathematical method to moral reasoning could not be an idle dream when advocated by the inventor of fluxions; whose acquaintance with the truths of religion and philosophy embraced all the knowledge of the world up to his era—including more additions made by himself than by any other uninspired thinker since Plato.

His power of grasping the essential idea of a subject, and of expressing it in such a way as to compel assent because there is no room left for any other conception, was a characteristic of his genius. For instance, when he says, "If geometry were as much opposed to our passion and present interests as ethics, we should contest it, and violate it but little less," etc. (p. 93). For each branch of human knowledge must rest on data furnished by the mind as an integral part of its constitution. Hence all that is necessary to demonstrate in any department of inquiry is to gain clear² conceptions, construct accurate definitions, and exact nomenclature, and³ then apply the syllogistic process. If we do this we can have the same assurance in other sciences as in mathematics. The reason is obvious. For the process of reasoning must in the last analysis rest on first principles, which cannot be demonstrated any more than the axioms of geometry. They must be assumed without proof because they are furnished by the mind itself, and approve themselves because they are conformable to its structure.

JACOB COOPER.

¹ Metaph., iii. 4 *initio*.

ARTICLE XII.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES AND REVIEWS.

THE PULLMAN COMPANY AN OBJECT LESSON RESPECTING
UNEQUAL TAXATION.

[In the vigorous and wisely planned efforts of the Taxpayer's Defense League of Chicago, innumerable illustrations of the defects in our present tax laws, and of the opportunity and temptation which they afford, both for unjust evasion on the part of the unscrupulous and for unjust imposition upon the more docile and conscientious members of community, are brought to light. A general summary of these is given in Professor Bemis's article in our present issue. But it will be profitable to put on permanent record the more minute analysis of a single case given by Mr. Z. Swift Holbrook, the President of the League, in an open letter to one of the most flagrant offenders. Mr. Holbrook's service upon the Grand Jury which indicted Debs for his insurrection in behalf of the Pullman employees three years ago gave Mr. Holbrook special opportunities to appreciate the sociological bearings of the present tax investigations and of this case in particular.

G. F. W.]

TEXT OF THE LETTER.

The letter is as follows:—

“An Open Letter to George M. Pullman, President Pullman's Palace Car Company—Dear Sir: The assets of your company on July 31, 1896, as given by you to your stockholders at their last annual meeting, were as follows:—

1,732 cars and equipments, including franchises.....	\$23,779,143.30
*Amount invested in other car associations controlled and operated by this company.....	3,672,835.58
Real estate and plant, 476 acres of land, car works, homes for workmen, and other improvements at Pullman, Ill.	8,103,079.60
Real estate and Pullman building, Chicago.....	993,023.74
Real estate and plant, Detroit shops.....	401,184.95
Real estate and plant, St. Louis shops.....	217,617.32
Real estate and plant, Wilmington shops.....	167,889.08
Other real estate.....	17,812.33
Lumber and other construction material and operating supplies, including cars in process of construction, etc....	3,884,463.74
Patents.....	112,327.86
Furniture and fixtures in the several offices of the company.	114,370.98
Securities.....	8,727,871.20
Loans.....	5,930,440.24
Cash.....	3,149,657.75
Balance of accounts receivable and payable, including car-lease warrants.....	3,648,118.90
Total assets.....	\$62,919,838.77
The profits of your company were.....	\$ 4,527,408.18
Of this amount was paid as dividends.....	2,880,000.00

Carried to income account.....\$ 1,647,408.18

*Total number of cars owned and controlled, 2,490.

"That \$63,000,000 is a conservative estimate of the value of assets is apparent from the market price of your stock (175), which, multiplied by your capital stock (\$36,000,000), gives \$63,000,000 as the real value, or only \$80,161.23 more than your own estimate.

"The wide discrepancy between your own estimate of the value of your assets and the assessor's estimates upon which you pay taxes to this city, county, and state, is most significant, and worthy of careful consideration by the overburdened taxpayers of Chicago.

"The interesting question is, Upon what portion of \$63,000,000 ought you to pay taxes in Illinois, and what are you actually paying?

STATEMENT OF ASSESSMENT.

"The state auditor reports that you were assessed as follows:—

"Equalized value of tangible property assessed by local assessors—1893, \$1,023,154; 1894, \$1,149,771; 1895, \$989,351; 1896, \$1,130,367.

"Net assessment of capital stock, being excess of equalized value of capital stock and debts over tangible property assessed by local assessors—1893, \$672,346; 1894, \$593,824; 1895, \$697,439; 1896, \$431,588.

"Total amount assessed, being net assessment of capital stock by the board and equalized value of tangible property assessed by local assessors—1893: \$1,695,500; 1894, \$1,743,595; 1895, \$1,686,790; 1896, \$1,561,955."

"The assessments on your real estate for 1897, as made by the local assessors, are the same as for 1896, while the state board has not yet added its percentage.

"Your assets of \$63,000,000, then, are valued in this state for purposes of taxation at about 2½ per cent of their real value or about 4.3 per cent of your capital stock. This is less than one-half of the percentage that other property is taxed on.

"A certain portion of those assets, however, are not in the state and should not be taxed here. The following is clearly taxable elsewhere:—

Detroit real estate and shops.....	\$401,184.95
St. Louis real estate and shops.....	217,617.32
Wilmington real estate and shops.....	167,889.08
Other real estate.....	17,812.33
*Lumber and other construction material at above places..	388,446.37
*Furniture and fixtures.....	11,437.09

Total.....\$1,204,387.14

*Estimated in proportion to value of real estate.

"To this must be added the rolling stock that is actually taxed in other states. It is well known, however, that your contention in other states is that you pay taxes in Illinois and therefore should not be taxed elsewhere.

"But admitting that your rolling stock is properly taxed in other states in proportion to the mileage run by your cars in those states, the mileage in Illinois is about as follows:—

"In your testimony before the strike commission and in your last annual report, the total mileage of railways covered by contracts for the operation of your cars is about 125,000 miles.

"The Vanderbilt and Wabash systems are excluded, which you testified were the bulk of what you did not operate. We have in Illinois 10,600 miles of railroad, of which about 1,600 is under the Wagner system and 260 miles is not Pullman, thus leaving us about 8,700 miles operated by you, or about 7 per cent of the total mileage. As your rolling stock is valued by you at \$23,779,145.50, invested in 1,732 cars, the 7 per cent of same, as taxable in Illinois, would give us a value of \$1,664,340.21.

Your taxable assets in Illinois, therefore, should be (your estimate).....	\$62,919,838.77
Less cars taxed in other states.....	\$22,114,805.58
Real estate, etc., ditto.....	1,204,387.14 23,319,193.02

Total.....\$39,600,635.75

SHOULD INCREASE TAXES \$200,000.

"As other property in Illinois is assessed (supposedly one-tenth) this would leave your property assessable at \$3,960,063, instead of \$1,561,955, as it was in 1896. The difference in taxes last year to this city, county, and state would have amounted to more than \$200,000. In other words, a generous no less than a fair rate of taxation for your company, after deducting 93 per cent of your rolling stock for taxation elsewhere, and after deducting real estate and a fair proportion of personal property

elsewhere, would be, at the very least, 1 per cent on the capital stock of your company, or \$360,000. This would not be taxing your surplus of \$28,000,000, but would allow that much for property subject to taxation elsewhere. The method of assessing your property will here bear investigation. The real estate in Pullman is valued as acre property and the assessments, as reported from the county clerk's office, are as follows:—

On the Pullman building (Michigan avenue).....	\$125,000
On the personal property (south town).....	30,000
On the personal property (west town).....	6,500
On the personal property (Hyde Park).....	35,000
On 65.80 acres in Hyde Park (A).....	\$56,300
On 120.09 acres in Hyde Park (B).....	121,700
On 12.35 acres in Hyde Park (C).....	8,000
On 53 acres in Hyde Park (D).....	21,000
On 30 acres in Hyde Park (E).....	6,000
On 3.78 acres in Hyde Park (F).....	3,500
On 1.36 acres in Hyde Park (G).....	500
On 7.15 acres in Hyde Park (H).....	700

Total in real estate\$217,700

Total assessments.....\$414,200

Average per acre.....741

Total acres.....293.53

"The Pullman Land Association is assessed on 64.46 acres in Hyde Park, \$9,670; on 23.66 acres in Hyde Park, \$5,200, or an average of \$1,700 per acre.

"As your company owns 476 acres in the town of Pullman it leaves 182.47 acres not reported from the county clerk's office. But sufficient is here given to establish the rate of taxation which your company, compared with other taxpayers, is assessed at. This 293.53 acres which is assessed at \$741 an acre is in the heart of Pullman, and is covered with fine buildings, residences, factories, library, bank building, hotel, etc.

"(A) is located between 107th and 111th streets and east of the railroad tracks.

"(B) is located between 111th and 115th streets and east of the railroad tracks.

"(C) is bounded north by 10th street, south by 106th street, east by Pullman railroad right of way and west by ninth or Bessemer avenue.

"(D) is divided between 103d and 107th streets and is bounded west by Cottage Grove avenue and east by railroad tracks.

"(E) is all the land between 107th street and 111th street and Cottage Grove avenue on the west, except a track owned by Pullman iron and steel works.

"Contrast with this assessed valuation of \$741 an acre your own estimate of its value in your annual statement. You there estimate 476 acres at \$8,103,079.60, or about \$17,000 an acre. One hundred and eighty-two and forty-seven one-hundredths acres (not reported) is probably not as

valuable as the 293.53 acres in the heart of the town; hence your valuation would be nearer \$20,000 an acre.

"But even this is not much more than one-half the real value of the 293.53 acres. If we estimate land at \$50 a front foot and the improvements at 10 cents a cubic foot, these improved acres are worth nearer \$40,000 an acre (or one-tenth for assessment) at a fair cash value, instead of \$741 an acre, as the assessor has it.

"The poor taxpayer is assessed all the way from one-tenth to one-fourth of the real value of his property, and the average is nearer one-seventh than one-tenth. We estimated yours at one-tenth.

THE STRIKE OF 1894.

"Three years ago, when you reduced the wages of your workmen, on the ground that you were taking contracts for new cars at less than cost in order to keep your men employed, and then refused to arbitrate the question of fact, it precipitated the great strike of 1894. The result is a matter of history. The strike and the consequent riots, with a loss of life and property; the presence of state and federal troops; the impaneling of a special grand jury; the appointing of a strike commission by President Cleveland; the tying up of the railroads; the indictment of Mr. Debs for interfering with United States commerce; all these events recall the unsympathetic attitude which you assumed toward your working people in their distress at that time, many of whom had been in your employ for years. You reduced their wages, but refused to reduce their rents; you permitted many to work just long enough to earn for you their undiminished rent, and then left them to provide their food and clothing as best they could until another month should come around and possibly bring them relief.

"These facts came before the grand jury, of which the writer was a member, and there was not a dry eye in that juryroom when they were recited. In the midst of this trouble you left for your summer residence, and let the state and federal troops and grand jury fight your battles. Property rights are not more sacred than the natural rights of man, but because law and order seemed to be endangered the rights of property were triumphant. A good citizen never sympathizes with lawlessness in any form, and at that time many people, by their attitude toward Debs, took upon themselves the ill-will of those who nobly sympathized with your workmen in their struggle for their rights. Hence the two issues were confused. Your \$63,000,000 of property was protected by the courts and military at the expense of the state and the nation. You knew very well that the responsibility for the destruction of your property from riots and lawlessness rested on the city. Both the state and the federal courts have recently held that the city of Chicago is liable for damages arising from the riots of 1894, for which you were responsible by your refusal to arbitrate with your employees a simple question of alleged fact. Most

business men would have insisted upon an examination into the facts, had their word been doubted, but for some reason you were unwilling even to arbitrate the matter. The damages resulting from that strike in the Manhattan and attached cases alone aggregate \$1,500,000 which this city undoubtedly must pay, while the aggregate of other claims for damages growing out of the strike and now filed with the city is \$14,500,000 more. Property that is taxed for protection, if destroyed for the want of it, is chargeable to the municipality thus criminally negligent.

"Statutes similar to those in Illinois exist in New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania, and have been upheld by the courts. The city of Pittsburg paid heavy damages for losses incurred by the riots of 1877, because the legislature imposes upon municipalities the burden of protecting citizens from loss by riots within the limits of the municipality.

"The fact seems to be clear, then, that the strike and riots of 1894 were directly occasioned, if not caused by your unwillingness to arbitrate your differences with your own people.

"Whether or not you did take contracts at figures below cost, the strike commission appointed by President Cleveland signally failed to discover, because it was composed of theorists. It did not listen with sufficient precision, not to say suspicion, to your testimony as to what is included in 'cost,' but did permit you to estimate the 'fixed charges' of running your plant as part cost of new cars, when the truth was that fixed charges belonged to repairs on old cars, without which you could not keep them running and thus earn your 'usual dividend of 8 per cent.' This was involved in the very point you were unwilling to arbitrate, and it has never yet been cleared up. Your employees have no doubt whatever upon it. In precise language, your company will probably cost the city and state more money than you have ever paid in taxes, or will pay in the next ten years.

CONCLUSION.

"And what is your return for all this protection of your \$40,000,000 of assets?

"Some one has generously loaned to the assessor a smoked glass, through which to strain his virtuous eyes when he was estimating the value of your property. The poorest kind of a substitute for private justice is a cheap reputation for public philanthropy, but this seems to be the modern philosophy. It needs only to be stated to be believed by every sane citizen, that no intelligent and upright assessor could value the real estate in Pullman, with its fine buildings and residences, as acre property at less than your own estimate.

"The rights of property are now warring on the rights of man. Monopolies and trusts on the necessities of life threaten the destruction of the state. Capital and labor may each organize for all lawful purposes, but when capital corners the market on coal, iron, sugar, oil, coffee, salt, oatmeal, and is thus able to raise the price artificially to the consumer, it

are now doing this very thing. They keep the letter of the law; they violate its spirit. They take from the poor man a tithe of his daily food and in return make gifts to the public to satisfy the conscience or to throw dust in the eyes of the people. Society is between two malefactors—the criminals above and the criminals below; the trust magnate in the palace and the anarchist in the slums; the plutocrat and the mobocrat; the vulgar beggar who must ask at the back door for the necessities of life and the respectable beggar who is willing to beg at our front doors for the luxuries of life. A new study in crimes, criminals, and criminology must now be written. Convict No. 326 is a wealthy broker in New York who was in plain contempt of the highest court in the land and was punished twenty-eight days for his action in withholding the names of the United States senators who had patronized him, while his principals went unpunished. Debs would have no followers if men of wealth were righteous. The modern criminal class is a sociological study. It includes many a leading citizen, the philanthropist, the uncrowned king who sways his scepter over the markets and compels us to pay for the necessities of life a few extra pennies on each meal as the price of his power.

"The common people are straining their eyes toward socialism as a possible solution of unjust social conditions, and many of the middle class, the mainstay of our nation, are in doubt as to the outcome.

"It is not necessary to adopt the philosophy of either socialism or anarchy if the power to punish criminals and the power to tax property at its 'fair cash value' in a government like our own is not taken from the people by corrupt politicians. The prejudice and ill-will that is now so strong against our best and most successful business men is greatly to be deplored and is unjust in the majority of cases.

"It can all be allayed by an era of simple justice and good-will toward that other class of splendid citizens—our worthy poor who are struggling to stay on earth. It rests upon our honorable business men, and their name is legion, to start such a revival of righteousness that it will stop the unholy scramble for the almighty dollar by crushing out trusts and monopolies that have the people by the throat, and to insist that all property shall be equitably and justly taxed.

"Most revolutions begin with unjust taxation, and judging from the evidence in my possession, it is high time that the present corrupt system of raising revenue that is such a travesty upon justice should be replaced by the abolition of the township and by the introduction of a system that will work no injustice to any.

"A generous public may be depended upon for tips to poor colored porters to make up for such unjust wages as the sleeping-car companies pay, but the public will no longer tip the county treasurer to make up for the missing taxes that are justly due the county from men who are

abundantly able to pay, and, but for our rotten system of raising revenue, would have to pay their just share of public expenses. It is cruel, it is dishonest, it is criminal, to let the humble taxpayers, who seldom ask for protection, bear the heavy burdens that they are now carrying, while some rich corporations, many of our largest business houses, some of the wealthiest property-owners shirk their duty and escape by methods that demand the attention of the grand jury. Respectfully,

"Z. S. HOLBROOK,
"President Taxpayers' Defense League."

WAFFLE'S CHRISTIANITY AND PROPERTY.¹

AN interpretation of Christianity in its attitude toward acquisition and ownership is what Mr. Waffle essays. His plea is for a reasonable interpretation, and yet a strict obedience to Christ. He cannot make Christ out an impracticable enthusiast, as Rev. Brooke Herford does, nor does he follow the Tolstoi school of literal interpreters. Mr. Waffle presents a rational and earnest plea for practical worship through strict obedience to a modern conception of self-sacrifice in matters of property.

CHRISTISON'S CRIME AND CRIMINALS.²

DR. CHRISTISON has not in these few pages attempted a systematic treatise on the subject of Criminology. This book is rather a reprint of some valuable articles contributed by him to the *Chicago Tribune*, under the caption of "Jail Types," and presents a study of some noted Chicago criminals. Three classes of delinquents are noted: the insane (defective in reason); the moral paretic (defective in self-control); and the criminal proper (defective in conscience). The physiological aspects of these classes are noted. But the latest and best book on criminology is yet to be written, for it will contain faces of some noted criminals whose physiognomy is no indication of their character. The leaders and formers of trusts and monopolies are the latest addition to the rogues' gallery.

¹ Christianity and Property. By Albert E. Waffle. Pp. 106. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publishing Society.

² Crime and Criminals. By J. Sanderson Christison, M.D. Pp. 118. Chicago: The W. T. Keener Company. \$1.00 net.

SINCE Mill gave up the indorsement of the wages fund theory in 1869, and Walker published a book on the wages question in 1876, followed by the clever assault of Henry George in 1879, it has been popularly supposed that the last had been heard of this famous doctrine. Now Professor Taussig, in a very able and scientific work, attempts to show that there is an element of truth remaining in the old doctrine.

He entirely abandons, however, the old claim of the first half of the century, that there is any such fixity in this fund as to prevent the wage-earner from getting a larger reward with increase of efficiency either on his part or that of machinery or with his increase of bargaining power, through organization or otherwise.

In fact, Professor Taussig says of this theory—

"The wages fund doctrine, or what there is of truth in it, has to do rather with production than with distribution. It serves to describe the process by which the real income of the community emerges from a prolonged process of production; and it serves to describe in what manner the hired laborers of advanced industrial communities get their share of this accruing real income. It thus describes important parts of the machinery of production and distribution. But it can tell us little as to the forces which move that machinery,—as to the fundamental causes which make the real income of the community large or small, or which determine the share of that real income which, in the long run, shall go to wages or interest or rent. Its truth has been misconceived, its importance exaggerated."

The doctrine, as conceived by Professor Taussig, means simply this: The product of all the labor and capital of society to-day consists: (1) of the completion of machinery and tools, or some step in advance toward its completion, or in the transformation of raw material into articles to be directly used, such as food and clothing; and (2) the final stage, or finishing touch of this transformation by which all the things we use for direct enjoyment appear in that finished form. It takes a long time, under modern machinery, for all the steps in the first process to end in the second. Industry has been arranged with reference to the special amount of finished work that the wage-worker will desire to consume, the amount the well-to-do will similarly consume, and the amount that will be invested in new capital. The wage-earner cannot suddenly attain any large increase in such consumable goods as he might like to buy if able to secure a rapid rise in money wages, but there is nothing in this theory to prevent a very great expansion of wages, real as well as nominal, if it is not too suddenly done, or if the wage-earner invests part of the increase through saving; while, as to the efforts of single trades or

¹Wages and Capital: An Examination of the Wages Fund Doctrine. By F. W. Taussig, Professor of Political Economy, Harvard. Pp. 329. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1896. \$1.50.

occupations to increase their remunerations, Professor Taussig remarks, that the science of political economy can give too little sure guidance. He says: "It is safe to say that in concrete life it happens very rarely, probably never, that a specific rise of wages, secured by strike or trade-unions pressure or single agreement, can be shown to bring any off-setting loss in the wages of those not directly concerned."

Although in the comparatively new sense intended by the author there is a sort of wages fund, the conception is of so little value in solving current problems of distribution, that more of interest attaches to this work because of its extremely valuable criticism of the attacks and defenses of the wages fund theory, from the time of Adam Smith to that of Böhm Bawerk, than to any other part of the work.

It is, however, interesting to note how the virtual head of the department of economics at Harvard can write with such fairness and moderation respecting the wage-worker. Professor Taussig, who began with admirable studies of the tariff and the silver question, has been yearly growing in strength and in liberality of view, or at least in the expression of it with reference to various great questions of the day, and no one interested in the wages problem can afford to ignore the work under review, although it is to be regretted that the author did not devote a chapter to that form of the productivity theory of wages held by Professor John B. Clark, and other eminent economists of the present day.

EDWARD W. BEMIS.

WARD'S DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY.¹

MR. LESTER F. WARD, of the Smithsonian Institution at Washington, was the earliest important sociologist in America, and still ranks, among most good judges, as one of our most original thinkers, his reputation being largely established by the issue of the first edition of the above work, in 1883. It is now published with the correction of typographical errors, and with the addition of a preface which gives an interesting account of possible reasons for the cremation of the Russian edition, by the Russian Censor, in 1891. The Government has never vouchsafed an explanation, while a University of Warsaw professor thinks it due to the attitude of the book toward religion, but the same Warsaw professor, in a previous review of the book, had made no mention of the "atheistic" tendencies which he refers to in his later letters to Mr. Ward, and the author himself believes that the title "Dynamic Sociology" was supposed to have something to do with dynamite and socialism, or that the insistence in the work upon universal education was thought to undermine the government of the Czar.

The author's truly great contributions to sociology have never received

¹ Dynamic Sociology, or Applied Social Science. Two Vols. Pp. 706, 690. Second Edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1897. \$5.00.

the popular indorsement they deserved: first, because of the essential imperfections of a pioneer in a new science, for sociology was hardly recognized, or its name even known by most Americans, when Mr. Ward wrote; and, secondly, because of his rejection of all religious conceptions. Social scientists to-day, even when they reject the religious ideas of the age, are more reverential toward them than was common fifteen years ago. But the cosmogony of this work may be entirely omitted by those who prefer to do so, without trenching upon the really great contribution of our author. These contributions, as brought out in the introductory and concluding chapters, of over eighty pages each, and in his recent "Psychic Factors of Civilization," and his articles during the last two years in the *American Journal of Sociology*, may be here briefly referred to.

Five great truths have been discovered, or so ably treated by him as to couple his name closely with them. First and foremost may be mentioned his addition to the law of natural selection, or the "survival of the fittest" (strongest) fighters, namely, the law of artificial selection, or the survival through the deliberate action of society, of those types of development considered the best for society. The latter can largely control its own evolution, and determine thus what it shall be fifty years hence. While human purposeful selection, which we are only just beginning to realize and practice, is called artificial, it is held by Ward to be just as natural in the true sense as is the mother instinct of self-forgetfulness in her life for others, so beautifully described by Drummond. This possibility of a conscious shaping by society of its destiny is the most fruitful and encouraging supplement we have to the harshness of the law of evolution as stated by Spencer and others. A second important contribution of our author is his emphasis upon the possibilities of an improved public education to effect this conscious development. Mr. Ward holds that, through the control of the public school system and other educational institutions, society can ultimately control, in large measure, its further evolution. He thus lays the foundation for a most extensive improvement and development of this system. The progress of society is conceived as having hitherto occurred through the blind operation of such natural forces as the survival of the fittest. A new force—the action of human intelligence—is now beginning to act, and may in time be the controlling factor, so that human progress will occur with less waste and suffering, and with greater rapidity than hitherto. This conception is now found in most sociological works, but had received little emphasis before 1883, and indeed gets less now than its vital importance merits.

Mr. Ward has been practically alone among sociologists in the recognition of the fundamental importance of a great extension and improvement of a public education as a necessary prerequisite for any lasting industrial or political reforms.

In this connection the importance of absolute freedom of opinion and of expression in our institutions of learning, which has been so startlingly brought to the attention of the country by the recent action of the Brown trustees, is finely illustrated in the words of Mr. Ward: "The forcible suppression of the utterance or publication, in any form, of unwelcome opinions, is equivalent to withholding from all undetermined minds the evidence upon which these views rest; and, since opinions are rigidly the products of the data previously furnished the mind, such opinions cannot exist because no data for them have ever been received." The self-evident truth of this remark shows the alarming possibility, in the form of an effective shaping of public opinion in the wrong direction, which may be accomplished through the control of our colleges and universities by Philistine boards of trustees.

Mr. Ward has performed a third task, by insisting that the diffusion of knowledge among the people is as important as its discovery. Inequalities of knowledge are far greater than they should be, and render more difficult the problem of inequality of wealth. The head of the department of biology in a great university told a strong advanced student not to publish a remarkably good popularization of the most recent biological researches, for it might not be considered a scientific thing to do, and would destroy all chance of a professorship in that institution. Such aristocracy of learning received a well-merited attack from Ward.

Space forbids more than a mere reference to two more important contributions of the author. He has recently shown how, in both animal and plant life, competition does not tend to permanency, as held by the orthodox English economists of the last generation. Rather, competition tends to end in monopoly, and, if let alone, a monopoly of such species as weeds and thistles.

Again, Ward has shown that even where competition, or the struggle for survival, continues, the development is more backward and stunted than where human foresight develops, under monopoly, such species as are good for man, such as fruits and flowers and beasts of burden.

Rejecting Giddings' claim, that society arises from a consciousness of kind, and Aristotle's dictum, that man is naturally a social political being, Ward holds that man was originally an unsocial animal, and was led by his interests to unite with his fellows. Out of the benefits observed from such conduct, social habits gradually arose and became instincts.

At a recent gathering of his friends Mr. Ward was induced to describe his early life. He proceeded to sketch his youth of outdoor farm work in Illinois and Iowa until his eighteenth year, which contributed greatly to his physical vitality, and enabled him in his later years to do all his sociological work by devoting to it seven hours daily, after his seven hours of work for a livelihood. He also referred to his three years in the army, where he was severely wounded, and his clerkship in one of the

Government departments for many years at Washington, until he received his present position as geologist in the Smithsonian Institution. He studied in a Pennsylvania preparatory school before the war, and in a Washington college after it, until he received his degree. He spent five years writing "Dynamic Sociology," then read five years and spent five years more, until 1883, in rewriting it. In the meantime, in order to command a respectful hearing in other lines, he acquired a good reputation as a botanist. In that, and in biology and geology, he spent all his leisure time from 1883 until 1892, when the sudden awakening of sociological interest in this country turned him again to his first love, which he plans shall be the subject of his remaining years of work.

While other writers may produce better text-books of sociology and attract a wider reading, Mr. Ward will ever receive the respect that should be paid to a great pioneer, and one whose recent work gives promise of continued contributions to the new science.

EDWARD W. BEMIS.

ARTICLE XIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE VERACITY OF THE HEXATEUCH. A Defense of the Historic Character of the First Six Books of the Bible. By SAMUEL COLCORD BARTLETT, D.D., LL. D., ex-President of Dartmouth College. Pp. xiv, 404. Chicago, New York, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1897. \$1.50.

It is a far more difficult task for a scholar to write a book for the general public on a subject contested among the learned, than it is to write for scholars. To be accurate, with all the knowledge of the scholar, to unravel the tangle of technical terms, to show the fundamental facts in language that is common to all and in a way easily apprehended by all; that is the last and highest plane on which a scholar can move. Intelligence, diligence, and time will enable any man to write in the language of text-books; but to throw open the doors of the best learning in its results, one must know all sides of his subject so thoroughly that he can accurately express himself in simple terms.

All that the world in general can know, or cares to know, of any specialist's work, is its final results stated in plain language. These it has the inalienable right to judge and will judge. Nothing can prevent the final translation of the work of specialists into the language of every day when people will accept or reject it.

The Bible, treating of the highest themes that can engage the mind of man, was written in the language of the people to be understood by them, that they might accept or reject it, and be responsible for their judgment. But there have been learned men of all the ages who have sought to claim it as the exclusive privilege of scholarship to pronounce the final judgment on the Bible, which the people were bound to accept as coming from their high authority. What people want to know is, whether the Bible is true or false? That large question can be settled, has been settled by myriads of intelligent men in all the ages, and now, against the testimony of professed experts who have pronounced the Bible false. That is the fundamental, final, simple question to-day about the Bible. A few professed scholars and their followers decide against the Bible. A still smaller number of weaker ones decide both ways at once—it is both true and false. But the vast majority of Christians decide that the Bible is true in all that it states.

Dr. Bartlett in the work cited has written with remarkable clearness and point, in excellent temper and courtesy, a statement of the present

controversy over the Bible aroused by the higher critics of Germany, and continued by their followers in England and America. Those who have for many years sailed these seas of multitudinous waves of dispute will appreciate the large analysis that leads to his clear, straightforward statements. He begins his investigations with the evidence as to the presence of the Hexateuch in Israel and then passes on to consider the narrative of the book of Joshua; of the exodus to the conquest; of the residence in Egypt; of the patriarchal history; of the table of the nations; of the Deluge; of antediluvian life; of antediluvian occupations; of the primitive condition; of the temptation and the fall; of the creation; of the Sabbath; and then he treats of the historic basis of the Hexateuch; the literary problem; the analysis; the unfounded assumptions; the unsustained denials; the codes. All the main points of the controversy between the professed higher critics and believers in the truth of the Bible are brought out with singular patience and perspicuity and compared with the statements of the text and the collateral evidences of the authenticity and credibility of the Hexateuch. The discussion is always on the lines of exemplary fairness. There are no evasions of difficult points; no unwillingness to confess ignorance where all investigation has failed to find proof. But at the same time the arguments for the truth of the Bible are put forward with the ease, the confidence, and the firm grip of one long trained in this discussion, and acquainted with the strongest writers of the opposition in Europe, Britain, and America.

The various themes are treated in separate chapters of no great length, which make reading a pleasure and not a burden, and an index facilitates the finding again of any point in which one is interested.

Two extracts will give a taste of the quality of the work. In the Preface, Dr. Bartlett says:—

“We are now in the midst and at the height of a great movement against the trustworthiness of the ancient Scriptures. But already there are signs of weakening in some portions of the hostile camp, and in others the very excess and extravagance is a sign of growing weakness. Many of us have read of, and some of us have seen, collapses of popular and even universally accepted movements and theories, both in literature and science. All students of history know how manifold and unceasing have been the efforts to arrest the power and progress of God's Word; and it is easy to see that they will not end so long as men assume as a postulate the denial of the supernatural, or stumble at the ‘offense of the cross.’ It is unnecessary to arrange terms of surrender.”

The discussion is well summarized on the last page as follows:—

“Four things may be said in conclusion:—

“1. No book in the world's annals was ever so embedded in the literature, institutions, history, character and life of a nation as the Hexateuch.

“2. The assaults upon its truthfulness contain a vast amount of arbi-

and alterations of its text, scholastic criticisms of popular speech, and closet speculations ignoring the course of human life and action.

" Its literary peculiarities are no more, its obscurities and difficulties no greater, than were to be expected in narratives originating at the time and under the circumstances historically ascribed to them, are mostly susceptible of consistent explanation, and wholly fail to invalidate the historic view of their origin and character.

" 4. In view of the manifold, cumulative, and convergent evidence, and with due allowance for variations inevitable during the transmission from so remote an antiquity, the fundamental historic veracity of the Hexateuch remains unshaken, and may be as frankly and implicitly accepted by the modern Christian as by Christ and his apostles and the saints of all past ages."

The end and aim of Christian scholarship is to serve Christ, by bringing out all parts of the truth that those who have not the opportunity of these investigations may be benefited. A scholarship that results in opposing the plain and reiterated teachings of Christ is certainly not Christian. It may be excessively learned, brilliant in suggestion, alluring in style, but when it, by direct statement or necessary inference, contradicts Christ, it is not Christian. In all common sense, no one can be a true Christian who sees the plain teaching of Christ and refuses to follow it. The criticism of the Old Testament, which Dr. Bartlett answers, has assumed all the phases of philological, literary, historical, higher criticism; it has denied all the proofs which Christ gave that the Old Testament was the word of God and foretold him, his work and suffering; and it has denied Christ's competence to teach us concerning the Old Testament. There is not a single quotation of the Old Testament made by Christ which "higher criticism" does not pronounce to be an utter historical mistake, to be charitably judged as an adaptation to better use. In other words higher criticism has at last come, where all criticism of the Bible must come, to be judged by the teachings of Christ. From Kuenen and Wellhausen down to Marti and Meinhold, Christ is judged to be an erroneous teacher of the Old Testament. Only in Britain and America do we find the strange self-contradiction of followers of the higher criticism professing to hold the deity of Christ. The two beliefs are absolutely exclusive of each other, as every real higher critic will confess.

It is well that the issue is brought to this point, for here every one, who has been taught his sin, and his salvation by Christ, can grasp the plain teaching on both sides and make his decision on grounds that are clear to him. Throughout the nineteen centuries, the best answers to attacks on the Bible have always been made by the mass of real Christians cleaving closer to Christ, manifesting more earnestly the life derived from Christ, and commending the Bible by life and by word to men who knew their sin and longed for salvation.

In the work before us a Christian scholar crowns a long and active life for Christ by this learned, clear, and comprehensive work, showing the reasonableness of belief in the truth of the Old Testament. Christians may differ as to the manner and mode of the facts recorded in the Bible, while believing the facts. Dr. Bartlett offers his explanations on some of these disputed modes, not as the only explanation, but as satisfying himself, and leaving to others as wide a field as he claims for himself. We believe that Christ healed the sick and raised the dead, but no explanation of the mode will be satisfactory to many minds. He did heal and raise the dead, because he is God, who alone can do these things. Explaining miracles is not to be forbidden; it was not forbidden to the "fifty strong men," sons of the prophets, who insisted on finding the body of Elijah on the earth.

It is earnestly hoped that many a follower of Christ who has been disturbed by the loud tumultuous claims of the attacking parties, may in this work find a sufficient and satisfying answer on the large and true grounds on which the Bible is to be believed.

HOWARD OSGOOD.

NEUE BIBELSTUDIEN: Sprachgeschichtliche Beiträge, zumeist aus den Papyri und Inschriften, zur Erklärung des Neuen Testaments. Von Lic. theol. G. ADOLF DEISSMANN, Pfarrer und Lehrer am Kgl. Theologischen Seminar zu Herborn. Marburg, 1897. Pp. 109.

In the year 1895 Dr. Deissmann published, under the title "*Bibelstudien*," a volume of about three hundred pages, in which he emphasized the importance of studying the language and thought of the Hellenistic Jews and primitive Christians in the light of their times, and illustrated his theme by abundant and valuable gleanings from the recently published papyri and inscriptions. In that volume special attention was given to the Greek of the Septuagint. In the present, the New Testament language takes the first place. A leading aim with the author is to show that the biblical Greek is not an isolated and peculiar language, but that—apart from the unique quality of the scriptural thought—its linguistic characteristics are those common to the speech of the people in the Græco-Roman period.

The material he has collected is necessarily somewhat miscellaneous, but it is classified in three chapters treating respectively of orthography, the forms of words, and points of lexicography and syntax. The disconnected character of their contents makes a summary description of them impossible, but the biblical student will find much to interest and instruct him as he runs his eye over the pages. The author has hit on a plausible clue to the explanation of the "mark" in Rev. xiii. 16 in the stamp, giving the date and name of the ruling emperor, with which it was the usage to authenticate documents in the imperial period. The terms *ἐπισκοπος* and *πρεσβύτερος* occur as titles of sacred officials in pre-Christian heathen usage; and *προφήτης* even in the Ptolemaic period is the designa-

Received Greek text attaches to the name of the author of the Apocalypse, is found as an official eponym in Ephesus, Pergamon, Smyrna, and other cities of Asia Minor. The American reader will notice with interest the abundant corroboration furnished for the form *ἑλαιώρ*, and the rendering Olivet (instead of *of olives*, preferred by the English Revisers), in Luke xix. 29; xxi. 37 (compare Acts i. 12). An attractive analogue for the use of *ἡκυριαχὴ* to designate the first day of the week, Dr. Deissmann discovers in the now widely attested use of *σάββατον* as the name of the first day of the month.

But we will not cull further specimens of the contents of this valuable pamphlet. Every student will be gratified to learn that the author hopes eventually to incorporate the results of his researches in a new *Lexicon of New Testament Greek*.

J. H. THAYER.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

THE ETHICS OF JOHN STUART MILL. Edited, with Introductory Essays, by CHARLES DOUGLAS, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer and Assistant in Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Pp. cxxvi, 234. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1897.

This volume contains a republication of Mr. Mill's views on Morals as presented in his "Logic of the Moral Sciences" and his treatise on Utilitarianism, illuminated abundantly by footnotes giving selections from many other of Mill's Essays, Dissertations, and Discussions. In his interesting essays, the editor speaks favorably of Mill's views of Morals, but not with entire approval of the psychology of his system. The overwhelming difficulty is his view of human nature—the self. His conception of the mind or soul is the series of thoughts and sensations and feelings which succeed each other in our consciousness. He candidly admits that we are obliged to complete the conception of mind as a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future. His philosophy gives no place for freedom of will, or for the existence of a being to whom this series of consciousnesses belongs. He does not venture to deny the existence of a being—the self, manifested in the succession of facts in consciousness, but he does not intend to admit it; and he constructs his theory of ethics as if there were nothing beyond or back of the series. He uses the word character as belonging to man, without distinct definition, but to express the nature and order of succession of the facts in the consciousness of any person, and this order he conceives as determined by laws of heredity and association and by other conditions external and internal to which the man is exposed. The mind is a subject of scientific inquiry and treatment because the order of consciousness is under law, like the events of the material world. "It would be more correct to say that matter is not bound by necessity than that mind is so." He seems ready to admit the freedom of the will provided this succession of

¹ Compare Teaching, xiii. 3.

events in experience is not thereby interfered with. To ordinary apprehension his idea of freedom in human action is the same as of necessity. The idea of a freedom which allows a man to change his character would, as he thinks, render a science of mind unmeaning and impossible. His theory of ethics is therefore adjusted to the demands of this succession of experiences in human consciousness—of a personal being who thinks and feels and wills, who affirms, I ought or ought not, who finds in himself a law of obligation to which he ought to conform his conduct, and who approves and blames himself according to his conformity or nonconformity to this law of which he recognizes the authority. For an ethics conceived and presented with no reference to a being who is responsible for his character we can have little interest. Mr. Mill seems to find, on his own account, no reason for using the words obligation, good-will, desert, praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness. If they creep into his essays at all it is in deference to the writings of others. He has no such ideas, and needs no such words. The only thing in Moral Science for which he finds room is to suggest what order of thoughts and feelings is desirable in the human consciousness. Mill's nearest approach to a recognition of the force which words like obligation, duty, right and wrong have to the average human soul will be found in his pages on Conscience (pp. 131-133). The ultimate sanction of all morality—all that gives it authority or force—is the subjective feeling in our own minds. This is the final reason for one form of action rather than another. What is our feeling in the case, and how shall we feel after it is done? How much more satisfactory, even according to the utilitarianism of Mill, to embrace in our thought the well-being of the world as an objective reality—a good beyond all human comprehension, in view of which we are to regulate our conduct. The greater or less intensity of our feeling in view of it is of comparatively little consequence. We are rational beings, made to govern our conduct by what we see, and not by how we feel. Our feeling is too uncertain to be our guide. When we do what we see ought to be done, our feelings will take care of themselves. But Mr. Mill does stand alone among philosophers in finding all the force and authority of obligation in feeling. Nor do we need to cross the ocean to encounter such a blunder. Mr. Mill adds a remark which sounds like an apology for his view, as follows: "There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who sees in moral obligation a transcendental fact, an objective reality belonging to the province of 'things in themselves,' is likely to be more obedient to it than one who believes it to be entirely subjective, having its seat in human consciousness only. But, whatever a person's opinion may be on this point of Ontology, the force he is really urged by is his own subjective feeling, and is exactly measured by its strength." Here Mill sustains himself by a weakness or blunder in our popular philosophy—that all motive reduces finally to feeling. "I think, I feel, I will," is the practical maxim. A truer maxim would be,

"I perceive, I will." No man in his sober senses stops to see how he feels. There is something before us to be done; do it.

The prominent feature of Mr. Mill's ethical system, which to many constitutes its great vice, is its Utilitarianism. This disreputable word leads many to drop the treatise at once. Mill recognizes this liability. "Now such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit—they designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early day, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparison, by its German, French, and English assailants." It is to be apprehended that Mill has done little, when he might have done much, to redeem the doctrine of well-being as the foundation of obligation from the undeserved obloquy that has been heaped upon it. Contempt for the doctrine is ancient and classic, but utterly unjustifiable. The term, utilitarianism, which Mill adopts is a most unfortunate one, and suggests superficiality of thought and expression. The thought at bottom is that happiness or well-being—the satisfaction of sentient being—embraces all things that are ultimately desirable, all natural good. Every moral being comes face to face with this good, and sees his obligation to order his life with reference to this good—not his, but of all. Of course everything that will conduce to this good becomes useful, thus becomes interesting—has a derived value, but in itself it is nothing. It is a pity that a word like *utilitarianism* should have been adopted to express the great objective fact of universal well-being—of immeasurable value in itself. With a somewhat clearer apprehension, and a more fortunate selection of the name for his banner, Mill might have done better service for Moral Science.

Professor Douglas, the editor of the volume, in his preface says: "This edition of Mill's chief ethical writings is designed for the use of those who are beginning the study of moral science and has been prepared in the belief that there is no better introduction to this subject than an accurate knowledge of Mill's ethical theory." If the professor himself had introduced the work by a clear presentation of human personality in which Mill is confessedly so deficient, the introduction to the study of ethics would have been greatly improved.

JAMES H. FAIRCHILD.

WAS THERE A SECOND ISAIAH? By Rev. THOMAS E. BARTLETT. Pp. 42. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 10 cents.

A most serviceable and sensible criticism of the destructive critics and a convincing defense of the genuineness of Isaiah.

LECTURES ON CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By Rev. CORNELIUS WALKER, D.D.,
Dean of Episcopal Theological Seminary of Virginia. Pp. 158. New
York: Thomas Whittaker. 1895.

A treatise on Christian Ethics always suggests embarrassment on the part of the author to lay out his ground and draw a distinct line between his own territory and that of moral philosophers in general. The principles of ethics pertain to man as a moral being, or a being with faculties which bring him under obligation; and these principles must be essentially the same to all men in all the varying degrees of knowledge and ignorance—to Paul in the full light which fell upon him from the third heaven and to the heathen who, loving darkness rather than light, “changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and worshiped and served the creature more than the creator.” There can be no Christian ethics or any ethics at all without a recognition of the moral faculties of man, which belong to him by his creation in the image of God, and are found in him in every degree of sinful degradation. It is to such beings that the revelation of God in every form is addressed, not because they do not know duty, but because they do, and need to be induced and aided to do what they know. The duties which come upon one under the Christian revelation are essentially the same as those which belong to him as a moral being. The principles to be enforced in Christian ethics are precisely those derived from man’s moral nature. The missionary carrying the gospel to the heathen finds him a lost sinner because he is sinning against his own soul. The gospel is the power of God unto salvation, because it presents the mighty truths which bring to him help and hope in the conflict with temptation.

Dr. Walker does not fall into the error of making Christian ethics a new or independent science. He recognizes the original moral faculties as bringing with them the apprehension and fact of duty, and the powers of sin and of righteousness. A clearer apprehension of the fundamental principles of natural ethics on the part of the author would greatly simplify and clarify his presentation of Christian Ethics. Like the majority of writers he makes right and wrong essential and ultimate qualities of different actions, seen directly by the faculty of conscience without regard to any other fact or idea. We see by our conscience that an act is right and therefore ought to be done, or wrong and therefore should not be done. This original quality of rightness, however, belongs only to voluntary regard for well-being, and wrongness is predicated only of disregard of well-being. Conscience does not perceive right or wrong in any other action. On this point the universal conscience is infallible. Moral beings, good or bad, never differ here. When we come to the question, What action will promote well-being? then we differ endlessly, and it may be honestly, and here is the place for inquiry and instruction in Christian Ethics.

J. H. F.

In publishing these "Thursday Lectures," Professor Monroe has made one of the most important, instructive, and interesting original contributions to American history which have appeared for many a day. The author's life covers the most stirring period of the nineteenth century, and he has been intimately connected with the great moral and political movements in America which have made the century sublime. Professor Monroe's rare oratorical powers developed in early youth, and his strong humanitarian impulses, inherited from a Quaker ancestry, made it inevitable that he should throw himself into the thickest of the great anti-slavery struggle as soon as he was old enough to come upon the stage of action. As early as the year 1840, he began addressing temperance and anti-slavery meetings, and was continually engaged in this work for the next five years. He was thus brought into contact with all the original abolitionists throughout New England, and in his more extensive lecturing tours with those of the Middle States and the West. He is thus able to throw innumerable new sidelights upon the work of these earnest and noble men. His personal reminiscences of Garrison, Wendell Phillips, C. C. Burleigh, Alvan Stewart, Theodore Weld, William Goodell, Frederick Douglass, Salmon P. Chase, and many others make in themselves a history of very high value. The general effect of these reminiscences of his early days is both to increase one's respect and admiration for the early anti-slavery agitators, and to excuse many of their extravagances, especially in view of the reactionary attitude of the organized Christianity of the period.

One cold night in December, 1843, Mr. Frederick Douglass and young Monroe took passage together from New York on one of the Sound steamers. The clerk refused to give Mr. Douglass a ticket to the gentlemen's cabin or to the supper table, or to provide him with a bed even in the most retired part of the boat. As he was protesting with the clerk, a brutal-looking officer, using opprobrious epithets, was about to lay violent hands upon him. Mr. Douglass's reply was, "I will go where you order me; but don't you touch me," which, in view of his physical superiority, effectually cowed the impertinent official. Upon this, young Monroe declined to purchase a ticket to the gentlemen's cabin, but cast in his lot with his colored friend. After walking the deck for some time, they found a warm vacant place, upon some cotton bales near some machinery, into which they crept and slept the sleep of the just. On the morrow not a trace of irritation was to be seen on Mr. Douglass's face. This same spirit of proscription to a large extent characterized even the churches of the North at that time. Still, Mr. Monroe, like his warm patron Wendell Phillips and Frederick Douglass, was not drawn off into the bootless task of trying to destroy the churches, but, with broad charity for all, devoted his life to the positive work of directly promoting an-

ti-slavery and other humanitarian ideas. With this end in view he found himself in most congenial conditions upon coming to Oberlin for his education in 1844.

From 1855 to 1862 Professor Monroe was a member of the Ohio Legislature, where, in company with James A. Garfield and J. Dolson, he was influential in shaping the anti-slavery policy of the State, backed by the active coöperation of Governor Chase. The chapters dealing this experience are of unusual interest and importance, and will give the general reader a clearer idea of the progress of events in that period than any formal history can do.

One of the most interesting chapters of the book details the incidents of a journey made by Mr. Monroe from Oberlin to Virginia in November, 1859, for the purpose of securing the body of one of his neighbors who was executed for complicity in the John Brown raid. On this mission he was unsuccessful, but the sidelights which his narrative throws upon the condition of things are of the greatest historical value.

During the Civil War, Mr. Monroe was consul at Rio Janeiro, and participated in the settlement of the serious complications which arose at that port over the seizure of the rebel cruiser Florida by the United States war steamer Wachusett. This and many other complications kept the author in long and close correspondence with Secretary Seward, to whom he came to entertain the highest respect and warmest friendship. Indeed most of the partisan criticism which has been expended upon both William H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase receives an effectual answer in the revelations which this volume, from most intimate association with the author with those men, makes.

From 1870 to 1881 Mr. Monroe was a member of Congress. The chapters upon "The Hayes-Tilden Electoral Commission of 1877" and "Election of Speakers in Congress from 1871 to 1881" are of special interest.

Amid this long and varied career of public life, Professor Monroe's interest in the college with which he was connected never waned. After retiring from public life he has spent the subsequent period lecturing in large classes upon international law, political economy, and modern history. The present volume consists of lectures, of a more popular character, which were given before the whole body of students. The results of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA have already been made familiar with the high Christian purposes, his comprehensive thought, his pure rhetoric, and his charming literary style, in the essay on "Joseph as a Statesman,"¹ which closes the present volume, and in earlier essays on "The Divine Origin of the Bible; or, How a Layman Thought out his Conclusions."² All students of American history will find the book indispensable, and readers of every sort will be charmed and instructed by it.

¹ See the July no., pp. 484-500.

² See the numbers for April and July, 1896.

It is not often that Christian philanthropy finds at its service for dispensing its benefactions such peculiarly well-fitted agents as were Professor and Mrs. Harris. Belonging to the Society of Friends, their humanitarian interest is of the highest order, while the extensive experience of Professor Harris in discovering, deciphering, and interpreting early Christian MSS., lent a peculiar zest to his observations in a region full of reminiscences of the earliest development of the Christian church. The Letters must be read to be appreciated, no summary being able to do them any adequate justice. Incidentally they reveal, as scarcely anything else has ever done to us, the horrors of the late Armenian massacres. It would be comforting to agree with Professor Harris in believing that these experiences, so parallel with those of the primitive church in the time of persecution by the Roman power, were destined to work out as effectually the peaceable fruits of righteousness. But we should feel called upon to lay more responsibility, than his principles allow him to do, upon the strong arm of the military power of Christian nations.

In administering their trust, Professor and Mrs. Harris were constantly brought in contact with the missionaries of the American Board, and are unstinted in their praise both of them and of their work, agreeing with Mr. Bryce that they constitute almost the only redeeming feature in the present condition of the Turkish Empire. Amid the horrors of the past few months, the American missions have shone like beacon lights to inspire the hearts of the whole Christian population; so that Professor and Mrs. Harris found already prepared for them the fittest possible agency for the distribution of their charities. The testimony of such well-informed witnesses as Professor and Mrs. Harris and Mr. Bryce sets in very unfavorable light the random remarks upon our missions in Turkey so often made by ordinary travelers and political scribblers in absolute ignorance of the facts. Only the true statesman and the accomplished church historian can view the events in their true light, and fully appreciate the significance of the spiritual forces set to work by such agencies to leaven anew the mass of humanity that now covers that region.

TWO LECTURES ON THEISM. By ANDREW SETH, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Pp. 64. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1897. \$1.00 net.

These two lectures present in attractive form the very marrow and pith of their distinguished author's philosophy, and are among the many valuable results of the sesquicentennial celebration of Princeton University. The author is a true theist, keeping clear both from the materialistic tendencies of modern science and from the pantheistic implications of the increasingly prevalent monistic philosophy. His clear statements concerning the nature and limits of true agnosticism afford a fair speci-

men of the style of this small volume: "The agnosticism which rests on the idea of an unknowable thing-in-itself—the agnosticism which many of Kant's and Spencer's arguments would establish—is certainly baseless. But there are regions of speculation where agnosticism is the only healthy attitude. Such a region I hold to be that of the Absolute as such. But because the Absolute in this sense cannot be compassed by the finite mind, it by no means follows that such an all-embracing experience is not a reality; on the contrary, the denial of such a possibility would seem to be more than presumptuous. And, again, the ineffable transcendence of the Absolute must not be construed to mean that our experience is a vain show, which throws no light on the real nature of things. Rightly agnostic though we are regarding the nature of the Absolute as such, no shadow of doubt need fall on the truth of our experience as a true revelation of the Absolute for us" (pp. 60-61).

THE CLAIMS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Lectures delivered in Connection with the Sesquicentennial Celebration of Princeton University. By STANLEY LEATHES, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis in King's College, London. Pp. 74. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.00 net.

This little volume is a most wholesome and effective defense of the historical character of the Old Testament condensed into a small compass. Starting with the acknowledgment of Kuenen that "the critic has no other Bible than the public; he does not profess to have any additional documents inaccessible to the laity, nor does he profess to find anything in his Bible that the ordinary reader cannot see," the author proceeds to show the unreasonableness of the main assumptions of the higher critics respecting both the late date of the literary documents of the Pentateuch and the historical character of the events to which they relate. Not only is the historical character of the Pentateuch supported by a vast amount of positive evidence, but the internal evidence both of its early composition and of its historical trustworthiness is most convincing.

For example, the promise that all nations should be blessed in Abraham could not have suggested itself to writers of late date who were fabricating or expanding the account; for the whole course of history up to the time of Christ created the impression that the followers of Abraham were narrow in their mission and antagonistic to the nations of the world. The key to that promise only appears in the light of the Christian dispensation. It is in the highest degree improbable that such a promise should have been inserted into a narrative composed at the late date to which the destructive critics assign it.

Again, the original charter for the Jewish rite of circumcision was found in Gen. xvii., a passage which is ascribed by the higher critics to the Priest Code prepared in the fifth century B.C., and yet there is no doubt that circumcision was universally practiced during all the history of Israel, though there is but one solitary allusion to it (Jer. ix. 25) after

Abraham is evident from the fact that the Arabs still perform the rite in the thirteenth year, the age of their progenitor Ishmael when it was first established in the household of Abraham. To suppose that there was no written precept relating to the establishment of this rite until the fifth century B.C. is to disregard all the probabilities in the case which present themselves to, and are recognized by, students of history whose minds are not distorted by some narrow *a priori* theory.

THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST: A Devotional History of our Lord's Passion. By JAMES STALKER, D.D., author of "Life of Jesus Christ," "Life of St. Paul," "Imago Christi," etc. Pp. 321. New York: American Tract Society. 1897. \$2.00.

This elegantly printed volume, with its numerous illustrations, will be specially prized by the large constituency interested in the writings of Dr. Stalker. It has the charm of high scholarship, combined with true reverence for sacred things, and the simplicity of statement characteristic of the author's other works, all of which are preëminently serviceable to the great mass of readers. The limitation of the present volume to an exposition of the last few chapters of the Gospels gives opportunity for a more elaborate development of the devotional uses of this marvelous story than was possible in the previous volumes. For its purposes this compares favorably with Krummacher's well-known volume "The Suffering Saviour."

GLIMPSES OF GOD, and Other Sermons. By B. GWERNYDD NEWTON, Pastor Franklin Avenue Congregational Church, Cleveland, Ohio. Pp. 259. Cleveland: Franklin Avenue Congregational Church. 1897. \$1.00.

The secondary purpose for publishing this volume was to raise money to pay off the debt of a church building. We hope this purpose may be realized; for the sermons, while of special interest to the author's congregation, will be found by his brother-clergymen models in many respects, and edifying to a wide circle of general readers.

THE PILGRIM PRESS OF BOSTON AND CHICAGO, with which name the publications of the Congregational Sunday-school and Publishing Society will henceforth be christened, is undertaking new forms of activity, and adding to its already long and excellent list of publications some that it could hardly have issued with its former imprint. A new **CHAUTAUQUA YEAR-BOOK**, with daily selections compiled by Miss Grace L. Duncan, compiler of "The Chautauqua Calendar," is one of the latest of these. One of the most important of recent publications is Dr. Dunning's **CONGREGATIONALISTS IN AMERICA**, which was reviewed at length in the **BIBLIOTHECA SACRA** when it first appeared. The Society has secured the plates and is issuing the book in more attractive form, and at greatly reduced price (pp. 552, \$1.50). It is an admirable book, and the price is very low.

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